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ABSTRACT 
Aleks Sierz coined the phrase "In-Yer-Face Theatre" to categorize a new 
generation of plays written by a group of upstart playwrights in Britain and America. In 
addressing these plays, I draw upon recent contributions within the social sciences in 
order to understand better the interstices of language and violence in this drama. This 
interdisciplinary approach underscores the social considerations at the heart of these 
plays. Although frequently criticized for a perceived lack of social consciousness and a 
seemingly gratuitous use of profanity, prurient sexuality, and graphic violence, these 
writers in fact continue, and contribute to, a tradition of theater that is serious, ethically 
based, and socially aware. Specifically, the language represented in these plays is 
symptomatic of, and complicit in, the violence depicted on stage. 
I first argue that coercive institutional language subjects the characters in David 
Mamet's 0/eanna to systematic violence long before the infamous moment of violence 
that concludes the play. The reifying language of consumer capitalism in the plays of 
Patrick Marber and Mark Ravenhill precipitates violence by rewriting the cultural codes 
that inform subjectivity and the way that interpersonal relationships are conceived and 
experienced. Examining the work of David Harrower, Bryony Lavery, David Eldridge, 
and Tracy Letts, I identify examples of "public language" and show how they hamper 
intellectual development and maturity and disengage the cognitive mechanisms that allow 
individuals to regulate their behavior. I explore the allegiance on the part of those in 
"subcultures of violence" to the heavily gendered constructions of identity facilitated by 
their subcultural languages, and I address the linguistic mechanisms by which the 
characters in Rebecca Prichard's Fair Game create the sense that violence is necessary. 
In addition, I interrogate the formal nature of hyper-masculine violence. Finally, in the 
plays of Martin McDonagh, Judy Upton, and Rebecca Prichard, I discuss the adoption of 
traditionally male forms of violence by women, focusing on language's role in 
determining the likelihood and the nature of the violence committed both by and against 
women. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Having read widely among the plays written and produced during the nineteen­
nineties and the start of the new millennium, I quickly appreciated how many of the 
playwrights writing during this period were fundamentally concerned with violence. This 
prevalence of violence needed to be addressed in depth and detail. At the time I began 
researching and writing, I discovered a tendency for much of the violence to be 
characterized in wholly aesthetic terms-that is, the violence was most frequently 
discussed in terms of its function in the play as a dramatic device. Although I would not 
say that the presence of violence was neglected, nor that it was not taken seriously, in 
many instances, it did not seem to be considered beyond its function as a matter of craft. 
Too often, I encountered accounts of plays that I felt were making significant statements 
about violence and its social roots and repercussions which took such violence into 
account only in terms of its staging, its visceral impact on an audience. Too infrequently, 
was effort made to understand the sources of the violence written into these texts; as a 
result, any consideration of social commentary was precluded. 
In developing a methodology, I sensed the possibilities of applying the work of 
those individuals that most intimately and best understand the dynamics of interpersonal 
and social acts of violence. With vast resources in the fields of sociology (including 
criminology), psychology, and anthropology, I was certain of the value that these 
resources might offer when applied to the literature. Although plays, as human creations, 
cannot be treated as concrete support for the claims made in any of the given social 
sciences, as they are human creations, they are imbued with much that is human. As 
works of dramatic art, each of the creations included in this volume contain perceptive 
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and, oftentimes, accurate depictions of all-too-real situations culminating in violence. 
They ask the same fundamental questions as their counterparts in other disciplines about 
the nature of violence. They wonder about its origins, its outcomes, and the possibility 
that, with greater comprehension, might come reduction or prevention. The more I 
investigated the contributions of those in the social sciences, the more I began to 
recognize many of these playwrights as their kindred spirits. Whether consciously or 
intuitively-in most cases, I suspect the latter-these artists were often finding their ways 
to the same conclusions, and many of them showed themselves to be as incisive 
regarding human behavior as those formally trained to observe, document, and decipher 
it. Ironically, playwrights far more articulate than those writing in these other fields were 
frequently compelled to convey what they understood of violence by means of the least 
articulate of characters. As workers in words, they were alert and supremely sensitive to 
the languages of violence, paying it particular attention and, ultimately, drawing me in. 
The pursuit of the above methodology has brought together what began as an 
array of seemingly disparate bits of information and incongruous ways of engaging a 
subject. Nevertheless, these differences more often than not represented surmountable­
frequently superficial-matters of different terminology, a different vantage, or a 
different set of assumptions or hypotheses upon which investigations initially rested. In 
fact, the allegiance the social sciences owe to the scientific method holds a singular 
advantage in that assumptions are recognized as hypotheses and, therefore, not viewed so 
religiously as many that I have encountered in the humanities. In fields where the basic 
method privileges equally the proving or disproving of one's initial assumptions, the 
atmosphere of free inquiry was frequently more pervasive. Add to this the corollary 
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allegiance on the part of the social sciences to experimentation, with its insistence upon 
empiricism and corroboration. This laying bare all aspects of one's research promotes a 
greater measure of transparency than that often available, or possible, in the humanities. 
The work here has been inspired by the pioneering efforts of Jeanette R. Malkin. 
In her doctoral dissertation, and the book that grew out of it, Malkin also explores 
relationships between language and violence in dramatic literature. In some ways, my 
work extends hers. I, for example, discuss similar issues of inarticulateness in a selection 
of plays newer than those she addresses. However, my work is also quite different. 
Malkin draws primarily upon literary criticism-for instance, employing Martin Esslin's 
observations regarding the "devalued" language characteristic of the "theater of the 
absurd"-and deals with the text largely divorced from discussions of its social 
underpinnings and connotations. Keeping to the tack of aesthetics and literary theory, 
whatever social connections she makes tend toward abstract claims about the alienation 
of the modern subject in an increasingly impersonal, incommunicative, and mechanical 
world. I find Malkin's discussions of ritualized and mechanical language extremely 
useful; however, she is primarily concerned with the effects of institutionalized and 
mainstream language on individual speakers. She is less interested in uncovering how 
such institutionalized forms come into existence or what cultural consequences they hold. 
Perhaps most importantly, Malkin discusses, very effectively I should add, those 
occasions wherein the exercise of language itself may be said to constitute violence. 
While I, too, explore this feature of language, I focus much greater attention on 
language's other contributions to violence. Therefore, although I touch on moments 
when language is (intentionally or unintentionally) itself the source of violence, I also 
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interrogate language's contributions to physical acts of violence-for example, 
language's role in creating a general propensity on the part of some individuals towards 
violence, language's role in fostering a cultural ethic and/or logic of violence, as well as 
language's capacity to disinhibit and justify acts of violence. 
The following investigations concentrate on plays written and originally staged 
during the nineteen-nineties and the early part of the twenty-first century. This period in 
drama witnessed an explosion of new writing, oftentimes by new playwrights, as well as 
a distinct change in the climate of the theater in Britain and the United States. Therefore, 
the plays represent a range in terms of the time of their debut (from 1992 through 2004), 
the location of their authorship and initial performance (England, Ireland, Scotland, and 
the United States), as well as the established reputation and relative popularity of the 
playwright and the work (from David Mamet and his 0/eanna to Enda Walsh and his 
Disco Pigs). 
The first chapter provides an overview of contributions made by the 
contemporary social science toward a fuller understanding of the intimate relationships 
between language use and violence. Here I introduce many of the concepts and much of 
the terminology to be used throughout the remainder of the dissertation. Hopefully, this 
chapter also indicates the significance of work that offers to illuminate the individual 
human and collective social implications of certain forms and uses of language. Reading 
the dramatic literature through lenses made available by the social sciences demonstrates, 
I contend, the social consciousness of authors whose critiques of violence and its sources 
have often been neglected or taken as gratuitous attempts to shock or prurient forms of 
self-indulgence. 
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The second chapter, devoted to the play Oleanna by American playwright David 
Mamet, represents a close reading of the text informed by the theoretical work of Jean 
Piaget, L. S. Vygostsky, and Alexander Luria regarding the role of language in cognitive 
development, including the ability to reason effectively and to recognize alternatives to 
violence. The chapter also draws upon the work of Albert Bandura, Hans Toch, and Dolf 
Zillmann, applying their ideas about language's influence on the development of moral 
consciousness, empathy, and restraint. These scientists show how the incomplete 
development of language skills can affect the degree to which the above human 
characteristics become part of one's repertoire of cognitive options and, therefore one's 
recourse to their associated behavioral options. Overall, in this chapter, I argue that a 
coercive institutional language actually subjects Mamet's characters John and Carol to a 
form of systematic violence long before the infamous moment of violence that concludes 
the play. 
The reifying language of consumer capitalism is the focus of the third chapter. 
Here I contend that the aggression and violence in two plays by British writers-Patrick 
Marber's Closer and Mark Ravenhill's Shopping and Fucking-is precipitated by the 
socio-linguistic rewriting of the cultural codes that inform individual subjectivity and 
determine how interpersonal relationships are conceived and experienced. Towards this 
end, I employ neo-Lacanian psychology, and the work of a range of cultural theorists­
including Jean Baudrillard, Pierre Bourdieu, and members of the Frankfurt School-to 
interrogate the effects of the language of global consumer capitalism. I contend that the 
language of consumer capitalism, and the competitiveness and reification inherent to it, 
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are responsible for radically changing the ways in which human beings view themselves, 
others, and their relationships with self and Other. 
Basil Bernstein's depictions of "restricted" and "elaborated" linguistic codes and 
his theories regarding the import of the "public" and "formal" categories of language are 
at the core of the next two chapters. In the fourth chapter, I examine Knives in Hens by 
Scottish playwright David Harrower; the plays Frozen and Serving It Up by English 
playwrights Bryony Lavery and David Eldridge, respectively; and Killer Joe by 
American playwright Tracy Letts. In these plays, I identify examples of "public 
language" and show how they hamper intellectual development and behavioral maturity 
and can disengage the cognitive mechanisms that allow individuals to regulate their 
behavior. In the fifth chapter, I explore the allegiances that those living in what 
Wolfgang E. Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti call "subcultures of violence" have towards 
heavily gendered and highly performative constructions of identity. Again using 
Bernstein's notions of "public" language, this time in conjunction with sociological and 
criminological studies into the nature of violent masculine subcultures, I contend that the 
hyper-masculine, often paranoid and frequently violent, behavior of those in "subcultures 
of violence" are facilitated by their subcultural languages. The fifth chapter focuses on 
the plays discussed in the fourth chapter, with the addition of English playwright Rebecca 
Prichard's Fair Game. 
The sixth chapter also deals with hyper-masculine violence. Here, however, 
attention is concentrated on the highly formal or ritualized nature of much masculine­
especially hyper-masculine-violence. Irish playwright Martin McDonagh' s The Beauty 
Queen of Leenane, American playwright Neil LaBute's dramatic trilogy Bash, and a 
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return to English playwright David Eldridge's Serving It Up provide the platform for the 
chapter's discussions, and the work of Anne Campbell provides much of the sociological 
theory. Much like the fourth and fifth chapters, the sixth and seventh operate in tandem, 
for the final chapter takes on a recent phenomenon-the rise during the nineteen-nineties 
and first part of the new millennium of all-girl gangs. Using Ashes and Sand and the as­
yet unpublished The Girlz by British playwright Judy Upton and Essex Girls by British 
playwright Rebecca Prichard, I discuss how the adolescent girls in these gangs adopt 
forms of violence traditionally and exclusively associated with men. In doing so, I 
emphasize the role played by the male forms of language adopted by these girls in 
determining the likelihood and the nature of the violence committed by and against the 
young women in these plays. 
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CHAPTER I 
Understanding the Links between Language and Violence: The Contributions of the 
Social Sciences 
Recent social science investigations point us toward an examination of language 
as a means of identifying the potential for violence within specific situations. Many of 
these investigations have demonstrated that certain types of language use can reliably 
predict violence, and that, in some cases, violence has its genesis in the verbal exchanges 
preceding it. In seeking to forecast and explain occasions of violence that might 
otherwise have appeared random, such work emphasizes three significant areas of 
exploration. 
The first of these is what may be considered linguistic immaturity-that is, 
language use largely characterized by an absence or retardation of one's situational 
awareness. Such limitations can be recognized by a number of linguistic features, such as 
a display of poor cognitive skills, a high level of egocentrism in one's speech, a small 
linguistic range and repertoire, poor argumentative skills, as well as poor interpretive 
skills, especially difficulty with nuance and subtext in language. 
The second and third areas have as their point of convergence language use that is 
mechanical or formulaic in nature. As such, the second area of focus concerns those 
linguistic labels applied by individuals to others or to the events and environmental 
conditions they encounter. These labels are used to categorize experience, and they form 
the basis of information recall. In other words, they go to the most basic operations of 
perception and memory. These labels can even influence or determine an individual's 
linguistic repertoire and one's range of imaginative possibilities. 
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The third such area concerns the wholesale adoption of phrases and ideas based 
on an individual's participation within a certain cultural group--that group's cultural 
coding. When individuals accept and unquestioningly employ prefabricated units of 
language-as in cases of jargon, cliche, and proverbial constructions-or choose to 
abdicate any responsibility for deliberate thought by automatically adhering to the 
culture's predominant codes of behavior, the danger of violence increases dramatically. 
An awareness of these language features and linguistic techniques is eminently 
useful to the student of dramatic literature, for dialogue is typically at the heart of this art 
form. Such an awareness can lead one to identify the potential for violence where it is 
often overlooked-in the words human beings use every day. And since language affects 
perception and cognition, the violent potential inherent in certain forms of language also 
carries with it the potential for rendering such violence individually and culturally 
acceptable. By foregrounding the inherent potential for violence associated with these 
linguistic constructions as we encounter them in contemporary drama, we can begin to 
ask questions about these texts that may lead to an awareness of our own, often passive 
and unwitting, complicity in societal systems of violence. Interrogation of these speech 
patterns may then allow us to rethink the role language plays in the degradation and 
subjection of individuals within our own communities as well as the hand it may have in 
introducing conflicts into our interpersonal relationships. 
Because speech itself is not visible or tangible, it is all too easy to attribute to it a 
completely benign and transparent role; however, speech is action, and as such, it can be 
harmful, whether as the result of volition or negligence. It is speech's role as violent 
action that I wish to examine, and contemporary drama provides a unique opportunity to 
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peer beyond simple notions of language as an intangible and inconsequential medium to 
conceptions which recognize it as a powerful force, capable of establishing, shaping, or 
negating certain ways of seeing, thinking, and, therefore, behaving and being. 
As mentioned above, language maturity plays a considerable part in the 
possibility of violence. Research in the social sciences has indicated that, at its heart, 
much language-based violence betokens a lack of communicative efficacy. This lack of 
efficacy, essentially, indicates a gap between one's need for expression and the means of 
expression at one's disposal, or it indicates one's inability to correctly interpret the 
communications of others. In the first instance, one's set of communicative skills is 
comparatively ill-suited to the situation at hand, while in the second instance, 
misinterpretation is fundamental to the escalation from verbal exchange to violent 
episode. 
As an introduction to any discussion of language maturity, it is necessary to 
define "maturity" and explain how maturity is measured. In the social sciences, 
definitions of language maturity are all based on the belief that language is one of the key 
means of cognitive development in human beings. Although there are certainly points of 
disagreement within the social sciences, most view linguistic and cognitive development 
as indivisible. Therefore, whether the investigator employs strictly quantitative means to 
account for language maturity (e.g., the number and range of words in an individual's 
vocabulary) or attempts to gain a more qualitative and holistic understanding of an 
individual's cognitive ability (e.g., one's ability to generalize, abstract, and synthesize the 
information accumulated from one's experiences), both methodologies underscore that 
evidence of poor cognitive ability 1:Ilanifests itself in an individual's speech. 
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The significance of certain speech markers becomes more apparent when one 
considers that they are strongly associated with greater propensities toward and 
occurrences of violence. For example, Dominic Infante has designed and implemented a 
number of studies of language, aggression, and violence. He and his colleagues have 
discovered that "individuals resort to verbal aggression because they lack the verbal skills 
for dealing with social conflict constructively"; "that violent persons often do not have 
the verbal skills for dealing with normal frustrations and feel that violence is their only 
alternative" ("Verbal Aggressiveness" 62); that "verbal aggression can lead to physical 
violence" ("Verbal Aggression" 362); and that "verbal aggression functions as a catalyst 
to physical aggression when the target of verbal aggression has a latent hostile disposition 
because of undissipated anger due to personal (e.g., low self-esteem), societal (e.g., 
poverty), and situational (e.g., alcohol abuse) factors" (363). 
Likewise, John A. Piel discovered that "when attempting to explain physical 
aggression, language maturity had more explanatory power than sex or social class had. 
Specifically, an inverse relationship was found to exist between language maturity and 
physical aggression" (104). Essentially, Piel managed to demonstrate that a lack of 
language maturity is the best means at our disposal for predicting physical aggression. 
Piel also discovered that the key difference between individuals with language maturity 
versus those without language maturity is not, as has been the conventional wisdom, that 
linguistically mature individuals choose to use verbal as opposed to physical forms of 
aggression; rather, they generally choose not to aggress. 
Marvenia E. Bosley made similar discoveries while conducting research for her 
doctoral dissertation "An Analysis of Language Maturity, Verbal Aggression, 
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Argumentativeness, and Propensity Toward Violence in Middle School Adolescents." 
Her study "revealed that . .. language maturity and verbal aggression were inversely 
related, ... violent students had a statistically higher level of verbal aggression .. . than 
nonviolent students," and " violent students had statistically lower language skills than 
their nonviolent counterparts" (iii). The single greatest difference between the violent 
and nonviolent students she studied "was found in the language maturity scores" ( 1 34), 
and most alarming was the fact, highlighted by Bosley, that the gap in language maturity 
widened at every grade level. On the Comprehensive Receptive and Expressive 
Vocabulary Test (CREVT), "sixth grade nonviolent students scored eleven points higher 
than their 6th [sic] grade counterparts. Seventh grade nonviolent students scored 14  
points higher on language maturity scores than their 7th grade counterparts" and "eighth 
grade nonviolent students scored 20 [sic] points higher than the 8th grade violent 
students" ( 1 36). 
However, Bosley also provides information about the huge impact social factors 
have on both language maturity and violence. For example, while she admits that, in the 
United States, Blacks are more likely to be associated with aggressive and violent 
behavior, she also notes that there are often underlying social conditions which are not 
always registered in accounts citing such statistics. One must, for instance, consider the 
large-scale discrepancies in the treatment of individuals of different social backgrounds. 1 
Furthermore, Bosley stresses that social status is the single greatest contributor to, and 
predictor of, one's verbal communication ability. In her study, the violent group had an 
1 Bosley states that "Black students [are] more often victims of physical aggression by school officials. 
Meier, Steward, and England's study ... found that Black and lower economic class students were 74 to 
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almost opposite pattern of socioeconomic status when compared to that of the nonviolent 
group. 
K. E. Nelson, G. Carskaddon, and J. Bonvillian identified other factors that 
interfere with the development of mature language skills. For example, some parenting 
habits tend to delay language acquisition and maturity. These researchers found that 
"assum[ing] a too active role in directing [a] child's behavior" or "provid[ing] less verbal 
encouragement and restrict[ing] the child's linguistic environments" could have adverse 
affects on a child's ability to learn and employ language. They also note that, in general, 
parents of "language disordered children were more controlling and direct" (33). All of 
the above suggests that the availability of opportunities to learn and use language in a 
free and deliberate manner plays a fundamental role in both one's ability to achieve 
verbal competence and in one's ability to use that competence to find alternatives to 
violence. 
One of the most reliable indicators of cognitive immaturity is a high level of 
egocentrism in an individual's speech, which suggests one who has not sufficiently 
developed the ability to take stock of her/his immediate surroundings and interlocutors. 
Instead, such individuals tend to resort to more basic stages of thought, those that "serve 
immediate satisfaction . . .  or wishful imaginings that make the desired seem obtainable" 
(Vygotsky 14), childlike forms of cognition without the demands of verification, the 
rigors of proof, or an interest in uncovering truth. Well-known developmental 
psychologist Jean Piaget was the first to recognize egocentrism as the "genetic link" 
84% more likely to receive corporal punishment; 54 to 88% more likely to be suspended; and three to eight 
times as likely to be expelled" (8-9). 
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between autism (i.e., the earliest and least developed forms of mentation) and logical 
reasoning, and it was he who first noted that it takes "sustained social pressure" to move 
from speech centered around "immediate satisfaction" to speech that reflects "realistic 
thought" ( 13). 
One source of social pressure that can contribute to the level of egocentrism 
assimilated and exhibited by an individual may come in the form of parental 
punishments. By way of example, Albert Bandura argues that moral development 
follows a fairly standard progression. During the process of maturation from childhood 
and adolescence into adulthood, individuals pass through a series of stages. These stages 
are not bound to any particular chronological age, and they may or may not be achieved 
by individual persons, but they always occur in a relatively strict sequence. These stages 
also demonstrate an ever-increasing level of maturity and a corresponding reduction of 
egocentrism in thought and speech. In the first stage, individuals begin to expand their 
moral choices. In the second stage, they begin to move from concrete to more abstract 
reasoning. By stage three, their previous recognition of immediate comparisons starts to 
extend, and they begin to recognize larger social systems. The fourth stage is marked by 
an individual's move from individual prescripts to institutional prescripts, such as the 
consideration of social rather than simply physical consequences. Finally, the fifth stage 
is marked by an individual's move from external regulation to a high level of autonomy 
and self-regulation. 
What Bandura's research suggests is that certain socialization practices tend to 
precipitate an individual's progression along the above trajectory. Specifically, when 
parents combine social sanctions with reasoning, it tends to foster self-restraint better 
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than when sanctions alone are applied. This is especially true of reasoning which 
"appeals to empathetic concern for the adverse effects that detrimental conduct inflicts on 
others" (53). In fact, Bandura documents that "qualitative differences in the use of 
reasoning are evident when comparing families of aggressively antisocial and prosocial 
adolescents. The former families emphasize the punishments misconduct can bring one, 
the latter families stress the injury and suffering misconduct inflicts on others" (53). In 
this respect, a concern for others is associated with greater levels of self-restraint, 
whereas egocentrism is associated with low levels of self-restraint. 
Marvenia E. Bosley corroborates Bandura's findings. However, Bosley more 
clearly indicates the connections between egocentrism and language, stating that children 
raised in families which "tend to state their verbal appeals to regulate their child's 
behavior in accordance to what was appropriate socially" (35) are typically less effective 
communicators than children who come from families where such appeals are "based on 
allowing the child to know the behavior was, or should be contingent on the needs and 
wants of others" (35). As such, examples of egocentric speech can represent important 
markers, alerting readers of dramatic literature to the potential of impending violence as 
well as helping them account for it when it actually occurs on stage. 
Egocentric speech's greatest significance for students of dramatic literature, 
however, is that it may be used by a playwright to highlight how social and cultural 
influences can impact the development of characters' linguistic skills, cognitive abilities, 
and ultimately the choices they make and actions they take. Vygotsky and other social 
scientists have demonstrated that environmental factors exert a strong and consistent 
impact on intellectual development and linguistic maturity. For example, William Stem 
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found that kindergarten children who are exposed to greater amounts of group activity 
and socialization show lower levels of egocentric speech and that kindergarten-aged 
children typically show less egocentric speech at home, where they interact consistently 
with their adult parents, than they do in other settings (24). Vygotsky stresses that 
intellectual development is determined by a combination of "language, i.e., by the 
linguistic tools of thought, and by the sociocultural experience" and that "intellectual 
growth is contingent on . . .  mastering the social means of thought, that is language" (5 1). 
The work conducted by Vygotsky and his disciples reveals that the absence of 
opportunities to use the higher forms of cognition and advanced language skills can leave 
individuals relatively unprepared, or entirely unable, to deal with future social encounters 
and challenges. This is true because, beyond the earliest stages of childhood, intellectual 
development is socio-historical in nature. "Verbal thought," as Vygotsky says, "is not an 
innate, natural form of behavior but is determined by a historical-cultural process" (5 1). 
One must first understand that individualized experience is, essentially, incommunicable. 
Communication between individuals is only possible insofar as one's individualized 
experience may be generalized and converted into symbols. In order to communicate at 
all, individuals must rely on categories which, "by tacit convention, human society 
regards as a unit" (7). This means that "true human communication presupposes a 
generalizing attitude" and that "the higher forms of human intercourse are possible only 
because man's thought reflects conceptualized actuality" (7). In addition, the ability to 
abstract information, in conjunction with the ability to generalize it, is the only means by 
which human beings may "progress to the formation of genuine concepts," for "a concept 
emerges only when the abstracted traits are synthesized anew and the resulting abstract 
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synthesis becomes the main instrument of thought" (78). Human beings, of course, learn 
these categories and conventions and, therefore, concepts by means of their societal 
interaction. 
So, when a student of dramatic literature encounters egocentric speech in 
theatrical dialogue-that is, when a character' s speech evokes cognitive and linguistic 
issues that have well-established environmental roots and associations with aggression 
and violence-it becomes appropriate to ask pointed questions pertaining to the social 
dimensions made apparent in the text. Do these speech acts lead to incidents of violence 
within the play? Are the speech acts themselves violent in nature? Are there any 
indications of the environmental factors leading up to these speech acts? Is there any 
information regarding the immediate or long-term effects that such speech acts may 
have? Such questions may, in tum, help scholars better understand the relationship 
between the creative work of the playwright and the social and cultural significance such 
work may hold. 
Cognitive scientists seem to agree that the most reliable ways of fostering 
generalizing, abstracting, and synthesizing skills and countering egocentrism and the 
egocentric speech that is its symptom are those forms of learning which emphasize 
formal reasoning, scientific terminology, and deliberation-that is, the deliberate 
acquisition of categories and concepts as opposed to the passive adoption of conventions. 
On this front, Vygotsky cites Claparede's law. This law states: "to become conscious of 
a mental operation means to transfer it from the plane of action to that of language, i.e. , to 
re-create it in the imagination so that it can be expressed in words" (88). The ability to 
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break away from the contingent, concrete moment is a linguistic function, and one's 
ability to do so becomes apparent in one's speech. 
Mastery of linguistic structures and knowledge of semantics are necessary for 
such cognitive leaps. Those, on the other hand, who do not possess strong language skills 
or who do not have recourse to adequate vocabularies find the ability to generalize and 
discern, and the ability to imagine possibilities other than what is immediately familiar 
and concrete, difficult if not impossible. As such, it is significant that during moments of 
high uncertainty or stress, people are most likely to resort to concrete examples of the 
past and sacrifice their present situational awareness for the relative certainty of ready­
made, and often borrowed, units of thought and language. 
A full range of linguistic options is necessary for one to learn to deal successfully 
(and nonviolently) with the variety of challenges one will meet during a lifetime. 
Whether in the earliest stages of childhood or the transition from adolescence to 
adulthood, the truth of this statement is reiterated among those in the social sciences. In 
Adolescent Aggression, Arnold H. Buss discusses the rather predictable behavior of 
young children. Unless adults teach children alternative ways of acquiring desired 
objects, they soon learn that "aggression is the only response that leads to the reward" 
(56). Buss's observations of adolescents also demonstrate that, in order to control 
aggressive behavior, individual repertoires must be equipped with alternative responses, 
for if one can conceive of only one possible (i.e. , successful) response, then one will 
perceive that response as necessary. 
Jonella Harbin and Donald Miller also discuss the implicit connections between 
one's linguistic and imaginative repertoire and violence in their 1 991 examination of the 
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language children use when they play with neutral versus inherently violent toys. When 
young boys were asked to talk about various toys and the play accompanying them, 
Harbin and Miller found that the combination of neutral toys and nonviolent boys elicited 
the longest stories. These stories tended to be more imaginative and complex, with the 
introduction of characters, subplots, and comparisons, all of which showed the promise of 
the graduation to conceptual thought. By contrast, the boys who were prone to violent 
play tended to resort to the "repetition of sentences and phrases," to the use of gesture in 
lieu of words, and to "questioning of the interviewer" (82). These boys also displayed 
"decreased language and they tended to hurry through their story telling" (82). Harbin 
and Miller suggest one set of possibilities, stating that: 
Imitative gun and warlike play behavior does not foster language usage or 
complex dialogue. Once a child shoots someone or something, there is 
nothing else left to say or do! This type of play has nothing to do with a 
child's anger or aggression but with their lack of language and creative 
abilities. What appears to be missing from the violent play behaving child 
is the metacommunication Garvey and Berndt ( 1977) contend is required 
to maintain and elaborate the flow of play (Chafel, 1987). These children 
simply cannot assume roles and verbally interact with another child to 
define the make-believe roles and props. (84) 
These researchers argue that it is incumbent upon parents and teachers to help 
children develop linguistic complexity, more expressive language, and greater 
imaginative freedom by "providing models of language" for them (84). Marvenia E. 
Bosley echoes the conclusions of Harbin and Miller, adding that relative advantage and 
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social status are perhaps the greatest predictors of one's linguistic possibilities and 
available repertoire. She also echoes their suggestions by arguing that "aggression may 
be improved by addressing the language proficiency of violent students" and that "verbal 
aggression may be the symptom of a deficiency in language communication skills" (iii­
iv). 
The fundamental role played by language competence is the main reason that 
cognitive experts often underscore the importance of formal education. School instruction 
is particularly effective in presenting students with the cultural standards of language use 
and in helping students develop the generalizing, abstracting, and synthesizing traits that 
are the hallmark of the higher linguistic and cognitive functions. This is in part because 
of formal education's reliance upon "scientific concepts, with their hierarchical system of 
interrelationships," as opposed to spontaneously generated concepts, insofar as 
"spontaneous" is a synonym for "unconscious" (Vygotsky 92). The advantage of 
scholastic and other formal types of learning is in the fact that the acquisition of scientific 
concepts requires an entirely conscious process of acquiring a largely relational 
terminology.2 
2 Vygotsky writes: 
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The following example may illustrate the function of varying degrees of generality in the 
emergence of a system: A child learns the word flower, and shortly afterwards the word 
rose; for a long time the concept "flower," though more widely applicable than "rose," 
cannot be said to be more general for the child. It does not include and subordinate 
"rose"-the two are interchangeable and juxtaposed. When "flower" becomes 
generalized, the relationship of "flower" and "rose," as well as of"flower" and other 
subordinate concepts, also changes in the child's mind. A system is taking shape. 
In the scientific concepts that the child acquires in school, the relationship to an 
object is mediated from the start by some other concept. Thus the very notion of 
scientific concept implies a certain position in relation to other concepts, i.e., a place 
within a system of concepts. (93) 
It is important to recognize that such learning is necessarily social in nature, for 
the individual's understanding of terminology and of relationship are generated from the 
outside inward and are also filtered through the individual's personal experience. In both 
of these ways, the cognitive processes are socially mandated; that is, they are generated 
by contact with social influences, both lexical and lived. It is, therefore, easy to 
comprehend the difficulties one might have generalizing, abstracting, and synthesizing if 
most, or all, of one's learning is made up of the unconscious adoption of cultural codes 
and inherited bits of wisdom without opportunities to practice cognition as an active 
endeavor and view words as representing relationships rather than merely objects. 
Another advantage of formal education is the emphasis on written forms of 
communication. Vygotsky describes written speech as "speech deployed to its fullest 
extent, more complete than oral speech" ( 100). This is because oral speech is "almost 
entirely predicative because the situation, the subject of thought, is always known to the 
thinker. Written speech, on the contrary, must explain the situation fully in order to be 
intelligible" ( 100). I would qualify this assessment by stating that written speech requires 
deliberate attention to situational factors at a fundamental level. Without this attention, 
written speech fails. Oral speech, by contrast, can gloss over much of what must be 
explicit in writing. In this way, written speech has the same relationship to oral speech 
that scientific concepts have to spontaneous concepts-a highly determined awareness of 
the processes at hand. This is why, Vygotsky notes, writing is always harder for children 
than speaking. "The discrepancy," he explains, "is caused by the child's proficiency in 
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spontaneous, unconscious activity and his lack of skill in abstract, deliberate activity" 
(100).3 
So, once again, one's environment can greatly influence linguistic and cognitive 
development. In spite of their differences, three of the foundational thinkers in the field 
of cognitive development-Piaget, Vygotsky, and Maria Montessori-all share a few 
ideas. First, all three agree that in order for individuals to increase their intellectual 
abilities, instruction (in whatever form) must be challenging. Second, all three recognize 
that there are what Montessori calls "sensitive periods"-that is, moments appropriate for 
the introduction of certain intellectual demands. Individuals who have not yet reached 
such a moment simply will not develop the skill at hand; those who have passed such a 
moment will have to overcome existing knowledge and forms of thought which they have 
learned to employ in lieu of these other skills. In such cases, the already familiar forms 
of thought are often so entrenched that relinquishing them is more difficult than the 
acquisition of new forms. Third, all three acknowledge that the lack of challenging 
instruction and a lack of social interaction that requires deliberate, abstract, and 
generalizing processes will tend to debilitate an individual' s achievement of linguistic 
and intellectual maturity. 
3 Vygotsky writes: 
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Written speech is a separate linguistic function, differing from oral speech in both 
structure and mode of functioning. Even its minimal development requires a high level 
of abstraction. It is speech in thought and image only . . . .  In learning to write, the child 
must disengage himself from the sensory aspect of speech and replace words by images 
of words. Speech that is merely imagined and that requires symbolization of the sound 
image in written signs (i.e., a second degree of symbolization) naturally must be as much 
harder than oral speech for the child as algebra is harder than arithmetic. Our studies 
show that it is the abstract quality of written language that is the main stumbling block. 
(98-99) 
In other words, if one's environment is characterized by a lack of opportunities 
for a challenging education, if such opportunities come too early or lag behind, or if one 
is subject to anti-intellectualism, rote learning principles, or pressure to adopt without 
question a collection of cultural codes and inherited bits of received wisdom, one may 
never have the chance to acquire any of the higher linguistic and cognitive skills. And, as 
we shall see, without such skills in one's repertoire, one's likelihood of participating in 
violence or initiating it in others increases dramatically. 
Vygotsky's student and protege Alexander Luria corroborates these conclusions. 
Luria studied the stages in the development and implementation of speech as a regulatory 
device. He discovered that the excitatory role of language-what he calls the "impellant 
or initiating function of speech" (Luria 52�precedes the development of the inhibitory 
roles of language. Furthermore, individuals must learn to subordinate their actions to the 
verbal instructions of others. Finally and gradually, an individual "acquires the faculty of 
subordinating his actions to the connections formed in his own speech" (52). This shift 
from being subject to the speech acts of others to taking ownership of language and using 
it independently, only occurs when one learns to "actively . . .  organize his acts of 
perception and his deliberate attention" ( 17). In essence, Luria documents that aggressive 
responses to the speech of others is an earlier stage of development than are responses of 
restraint; furthermore, people learn to borrow the language of the predominant culture, to 
follow its dictates, and to organize their loyalties and attitudes according to this borrowed 
cultural language before they learn to employ language as a tool in active, deliberate, and 
individual reflections upon experience. 
23 
What each of these cognitive experts conveys is that the higher levels of cognitive 
development are comprised of a series of skills "transmitted with varying efficiency and 
success by the culture-language being a prime example" (Bruner 1 ). These cognitive 
and linguistic skills are "external implementation systems" ( 1 ). When it comes to the 
development of thought and action, the fact "that humans have the capacity for using 
speech" for hierarchical classification is not the main point. The point is that this human 
capacity for hierarchical classification "is not used until it is coupled with the technology 
of language" ( 1 3). One's cognitive growth and one's ability to exert control over one's 
own behavior are socially determined and linguistically facilitated processes. 
For students of drama, it may prove useful to keep the above information in mind 
when analyzing the textual worlds created by contemporary playwrights, especially those 
playwrights concerned with social opportunity and the social construction of identity, for 
it is primarily one's level of deliberate participation in thought and language-one's level 
of awareness regarding situation, subject, relationship, process, cause and effect, and 
consequence-that marks both intellectual and linguistic maturity. Shelagh Delaney's 
play A Taste of Honey provides a perfect case in point. Delaney's play is ultimately 
concerned with the impact of environment on the formation of both identity and social 
milieu. Some of the information regarding initial environmental conditions are, and 
perhaps must be, conveyed primarily by means of speech. How, for instance, can one 
convey the notion that Helen is "a semi-whore" by means of visual cues alone? Her 
costume may be revealing, for example; however, sexy clothing does not necessarily 
denote one's promiscuity. Furthermore, the sort of subtlety implied by the qualifying 
pre-fix "semi" simply cannot be communicated without recourse to Helen's actions, 
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including her speech. Primarily in her verbal interactions with Peter and in her advice to 
Jo do we come to understand what the designation "semi-whore" actually signifies. 
The information we are given about the characters' linguistic and intellectual 
maturity by means of the dialogue----their available vocabularies, their level of 
egocentrism, their relative capacity to recognize, interpret, and employ subtlety and 
nuance-are all as helpful in establishing a textual reality as are the stage directions. Just 
as costuming, set design, sound, and lighting effects can flesh out the instructions that 
"the stage represents a comfortless flat in Manchester and the street outside" (Delaney 7), 
speech can help establish the social conditions in play. In addition, key to any 
interpretation of Delaney's play is the recognition of Helen's immaturity and its effects 
on Jo. Such information speaks volumes about the possibilities available to Jo, and this 
information is, literally, spoken. These qualities of speech are social products, and their 
appearance in the drama is an invitation to apply our knowledge regarding their social 
origins, to make them explicit, and thereby to explore the social conditions implicit in this 
speech. Ultimately, such exercises can facilitate our comprehension of character 
dynamics, and in the case of much contemporary drama, this includes recognizing the 
possibility of violence latent in a scene or accounting for an individual character's 
general propensity towards violence. Any methodology that might provide some 
explanation for such violent potentialities should be of value to students of socially 
conscious drama. 
Some of the language skills that should be paid the utmost attention are those 
classified as argumentative skills. These skills have some of the strongest implications 
for the study of violent behavior. In 1989, Dominic Infante, Teresa Chandler, and Jill E. 
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Rudd conducted a study confirming that both males and females in abusive relationships 
show high rates of verbal aggression and low rates of trait argumentativeness; 
furthermore, "the converse was true for nonabusive partners" (362). In another study, 
Infante and his collaborators concluded "that individuals in abusive relationships . . .  lack 
communication skills in argumentativeness" and that "the lack of this skill . . .  contributes 
toward the tendency to use verbal aggression" (64). 
One particularly relevant study, undertaken by Kent R. Colbert, the Director of 
Debate at Georgia State University, was published as "The Effects of Debate 
Participation on Argumentativeness and Verbal Aggression." The primary phase of the 
study was designed to assess the level of argumentativeness and verbal aggression of 
students in relation to their level of experience participating in competitive debate. The 
results were clear. Colbert found that the levels of verbal aggression among experienced 
debaters were significantly less than among those without debate experience. 
A second phase of the study was designed to assess any differences in 
argumentativeness and verbal aggression between students who participate in different 
forms of debate. 4 What Colbert found is that students who received formal instruction in 
policy debate scored significantly higher on the argumentativeness scale, and students 
who received formal instruction in value debate scored significantly lower on the verbal 
aggression scale. The two forms of debate tend to foster different, yet equally important, 
4 Policy debate is designed to address problem-solving models, "largely adapted from Dewey's ( 19 10) 
problem solving principles" (Colbert 207). This form tends to be more formal as well as more traditional. 
The newer forms of non-policy debate, particularly value debate formats, tend to employ "more abstract 
models focusing on value conflicts" (207). Colbert states that "a major shift from traditional policy style 
debating to non-policy (value) debating occurred in the 1970's" so that now "non-policy debate has 
overtaken policy debate as the predominant intercollegiate activity" and that "many universities no longer 
offer policy debating" (207). 
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skills in the control of aggression and violent behavior. The formal nature of policy 
debate training helps students to think more deliberately and critically (i.e., to enhance 
their intellectual and linguistic competence). The empathic nature of value debate 
training encourages students to inhabit value conflicts from multiple positions and to 
think in terms of the needs and desires of those with differing viewpoints (i.e., to counter 
their egocentrism). 
An interesting exception to the above patterns, also documented by Colbert, is 
accounted for in the work of A. J. Roberto and M. E. Finucane. Their study shows "that 
argumentativeness and verbal aggression [are] significantly correlated with adolescent 
populations" (58). They conclude that, "unlike the adult populations previously studied, 
adolescents do not appear to discern the difference between argumentativeness and verbal 
aggression" (58). It is surely not surprising that one must achieve some measure of 
linguistic maturity in order to acquire and utilize argumentative skills; however, it may 
surprise some people to know that a person must possess some measure of linguistic 
maturity to even recognize argumentation as a set of potential skills. It will also likely 
surprise many people to discover that the average adolescent has not yet developed the 
cognitive subtlety and linguistic maturity necessary to distinguish between argument and 
aggression. Without an advanced level of language maturity, an individual may have no 
hope of understanding that there is any difference between their ad hominem attack and 
their interlocutor's reasoned and thoughtful engagement of the issues at hand, let alone 
how to participate, or participate effectively, in the latter. 
This linguistic maturity and cognitive subtlety are not only ingredients needed to 
recognize and participate in argument, they are also prerequisites in the development of 
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interpretive skills. Hans Toch's book Violent Men represents a landmark in the 
progression towards our present understanding of aggression and violent behavior. Toch 
concentrated his work on those who are, perhaps, most associated with violent acts­
prison inmates convicted of violent crimes. By means of extensive interviews with (and 
often by) these prisoners, he came to the realization that "the majority of violence-prone 
persons may be classed as deficient in verbal and other social skills" ( 1 53). Even more 
significant, however, is the degree to which the violent actions of these individuals can be 
at least partially attributed to deficiencies in language skills, including those instances 
when "violence is clearly related to clumsiness, as in cases of armed robbery where the 
bluff is unconvincing, or in situations where forcible rape substitutes for courtship and 
seduction" ( 1 53). 
Toch divides such individuals into two main groups: those he calls "pressure 
removers" and those calls "exploiters."5 The "pressure removers" are individuals who 
"use violence as an expression of helplessness, or as a last-minute effort to obliterate 
situations to which they are unable to respond" ( 1 53). Individuals belonging to this 
group are characterized by their limited array of interpersonal skills and strategies, which 
tends to add to their feelings of helplessness and victimization. They tend to feel unable 
to use verbal means to solve problems or resolve conflicts, and so they resort to physical 
means as a way of removing the social pressures they perceive. 
In addition, their poor communicative skills also manifest themselves in the form 
of poor interpretive skills, so that these individuals will perceive conflicts where none 
5 Both categories of individuals exhibit traits associated with high levels of egocentrism. 
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exist. These individuals often have paranoid tendencies and readily consider themselves 
the victims in any situation where conflicts arise. In fact, Toch estimates that one out of 
every four violence-prone persons sees his acts of violence as "self-preserving strategies" 
into which he was unwillingly forced ( 1 53). To make matters worse, this twenty-five 
percent also tends to think that a failure to follow a violent course of action will be 
mistaken for weakness or cowardice, a subject that will be addressed later in relation to 
cultural coding. 
The other group, the "exploiters," is "comprised of persons who see themselves 
( and their needs) as being the only fact of social relevance. Other people are viewed as 
objects rather than as persons whose needs must be taken into account ( or must be 
countered or anticipated)" ( 157). Toch notes that, with "exploiters," violence typically 
erupts when others prove unwilling to be exploited. He adds that "the less socially adept 
and perceptive the exploiter, the greater the likelihood that he will have to invoke 
violence, or that he will meet unexpected violence which he must counter" ( 1 57). In 
other words, those "exploiters" who are least able to manipulate others-those who are 
ineffective in their cajoles or threats-are the most likely to use violence. 
K. A. Dodge also indicates that in addition to the trouble adolescents may have 
distinguishing between argument and aggression, many of them also have difficulty 
interpreting the subtleties and nuances in language. This lack of interpretive skill is key 
in determining the nature of adolescents' responses to interlocutors whose intentions are 
not absolutely obvious. Dodge found, for example, that: 
When the peer's purpose and aim were clearly stated, aggressive boys 
changed their response according to that intention as appropriately as do 
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nonaggressive boys. It was only in the ambiguous condition that 
aggressive boys responded as if the peer had behaved with hostile intent 
(i.e., aggressively), while nonaggressive boys responded as if the peer had 
acted with benign intent (i.e. , nonaggressively). (77) 
A. J. Roberto and S. Wilson confirmed the above findings. They discovered that "the 
perception of intent mediates the relationship between verbal aggression and propensity 
toward violence" (78). When there is doubt about intent, individuals project their own 
behavioral tendencies onto others. In the case of aggression, an initial misinterpretation 
may become self-fulfilling and invite a violent counter-response. 
In addition, while the ability to interpret the messages and intents of others-in 
other words, a matter of perception applied to one's interlocutors-is often crucial in 
leading to episodes of violence, so is one's sense of "self-regulatory efficacy"--one's 
perception of her/his ability to withstand peer pressure. Albert Bandura, Cian-Vittorio 
Caprara, and Camillo Regalia launched a study in the late 1990's designed to assess how 
an individual' s  sense of "self-regulatory efficacy" impacts that individual' s  likelihood of 
participating in anti-social and violent forms of behavior. Their research specifically 
implicates language, for language appears to provide the primary force in the 
development of a strong perception of "self-regulatory efficacy," which is, in turn, 
inversely related to participation in anti-social and violent behavior as well as substance 
abuse. 
The researchers concluded that open communication between adolescents and 
their adult role models is necessary for the development of a "secure sense of self­
regulatory efficacy" ("Impact of . . .  " 130). It must be stressed that "with regard to the 
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familial environment, how children perceive . . .  expectations and socialization practices 
are usually most predictive . . .  because it is the constrned environment that constitutes 
their social reality" ( 131 ). Furthermore, the researchers state that strong language skills 
represent the sort of "domain-linked structures that operate as part of the self system that 
gives unity, continuity, and coherence of personality," and "people build their sense of 
efficacy through mastery experiences, social modeling and the evaluative feedback of 
others" ("Longitudinal . . .  " 63). So, in all of these respects, efficacy beliefs are 
fundamentally impacted by language competence and maturity. 
Robert Baron summarizes the prevailing lessons of recent social science 
investigations, stating, "Aggression is largely acquired" (324), "it is certainly modifiable" 
(324), and it is "under the influence of a wide range of situational, social, and 
environmental conditions" (313). He continues by saying that some of the conditions 
associated with "repeated aggressive encounters" are "disturbingly simple" to identify 
(322). Foremost among these is language competence and maturity. As Baron explains, 
individuals associated with violence are often: 
Severely lacking in basic social skills. For example, they do not know 
how to communicate effectively; moreover, to make matters worse, they 
often possess an unfortunate, abrasive style of self-expression. Similarly, 
they lack sensitivity to the emotional states of others, and so are unable to 
tell when they are annoying the persons around them. Finally, they do not 
know how to perform basic social acts in a manner viewed as 
"appropriate" by their culture. Making requests, engaging in negotiations, 
lodging complaints-all these tasks are beyond their limited repertoire of 
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social skills . . . . The severe social deficits shown by such persons seem to 
assure ( 1 )  that they will experience repeated, intense frustration, and (2) 
that they will frequently anger individuals with whom they have social 
contact. . . .  When individuals with a long history of interpersonal violence 
are closely and systematically studied, many demonstrate the pattern of 
arrested social development. . . .  And while such persons are not very 
great in number, they contribute far more than their fair share to the 
overall level of violence occurring in a given society. (322) 
Such individuals frequently inhabit the dramatic worlds of socially minded playwrights. 
It is, therefore, important to pay particular attention to the dialogue, looking for the signs 
of impending violence. When such signs exist, the dialogue may, additionally, provide 
key information regarding the social conditions that may have had a hand in the creation 
of these characters' language deficiencies, paranoid and anti-social states of mind, and 
violent behavior. Yet, however much attention to language maturity may help one 
understand the social contexts presented by a playwright, there are other elements of 
language and its use that may prove equally helpful in evaluating those episodes of 
violence we witness on stage. 
As we have seen, a lack of language maturity on the part of an individual can 
contribute substantially to the likelihood of that individual participating in violent 
behavior. And, as we have seen, one of the ways that language maturity may increase 
the likelihood of violence is by means of its effects upon one's capacity to use language 
deliberately. However, some factors may increase the likelihood of violence even when 
persons are perfectly capable of using language at an advanced level, and in some 
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circumstances persons find it difficult to use language deliberately, even when they have 
the linguistic and cognitive development needed to do so. And, just as language maturity 
is largely socially mandated, so too is another form of language-based violence-a form 
which arises as the result of "linguistic labeling." 
To properly understand the concept of linguistic labeling and how it operates, it is 
helpful to revisit the work of Alexander Luria for an account of "the rule of force." This 
rule is a Pavlovian truth that has been applied effectively time and again to the behavior 
of human beings, and it states that "in a complex stimulus the strongest component is 
decisive" (20). The difference in this rule's application to human behavior is that, with 
human subjects, the relative strength of individual components can be modified by means 
of language. Experiments have shown that "speaking to a child can in fact re-shape its 
significant perception of a compound stimulus and thus modify the 'rule of force' and 
make the physically weaker component predominate" (23 ). "Detailed experimental 
studies have [even] shown that this modifying of the 'rule of force' by speech 
associations may in certain conditions become not ot?-lY extremely stable but also very 
deep-rooted, and may extend its influence to the subject's non-voluntary reactions" (23). 
This means that language can override one's natural responses to the physical stimuli one 
_encounters within her/his environment. This shift is essentially one of cognitive 
categorization, and it is accomplished by means of the application of linguistic labels. 6 
6The process and its implications may be better understood by considering an example of such language­
modified perception. Luria relates the following: 
While young children react correctly and consistently to the physically strongest stimulus 
of a compound stimuli, these same children often find it difficult or impossible to 
correctly follow direct commands which ask them to react to one of the weaker stimuli of 
a compound stimuli. For example, in Luria's experiments, children were able to correctly 
respond to airplane silhouettes only when the silhouette was red in color, regardless of 
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Linguistic labels enable individuals to alter their perception of experience by 
shifting their primary focus. This is accomplished by using language to alter the ways in 
which stimulus information is received, stored (i.e., categorized), and recalled for later 
use. Those very adept with language can initiate this process deliberately; however, even 
among those who are very adept with language, some linguistic labeling, and much of the 
labeling associated with violence, reflects the passive or unconscious application of labels 
generated outside the individual. As Luria intimates above, the cognition accompanying 
these labels can become entrenched and prevent thought from flowing into alternative 
channels. Several other cognitive specialists attest to this phenomenon, agreeing that 
"this verbal-generalization system determines both the formation and the non-fonnation 
of new links" ( 45). These researchers indicate that, while it may be difficult for 
individuals to form a cognitive bond in the first place, it is even harder for them to 
establish a new and different bond once a strong associative bond has been engaged.7 
background color; however, the children routinely failed to correctly respond to the color 
of the background when told to shift their focus to this secondary feature. It was only 
when researchers provided a solid linguistic association for the children that they were 
able to successfully shift their focus away from the predominant feature ( e.g., a red 
airplane) to some weaker component (e.g., background color). For example, a researcher 
might tell the children, "The plane can fly when the sun is shining and the sky is yellow" 
to have them look for a yellow background or "When it's rainy the plane can't fly and 
has to be stopped" to look for a grey background. (23) 
70ne example is how traditional conceptions regarding catharsis-e.g., that one can watch violent films or 
television shows, exercise, engage in sexual activity, or aggress against an inanimate object as a means of 
preventing accumulated frustration and anger from manifesting themselves in physical form-still 
represent conventional wisdom, in spite of overwhelming evidence that catharsis does not operate in such 
ways. In fact, the above activities are associated with increases in the likelihood of physicality, aggression, 
and violence. However, the metaphors typically used to articulate these traditional notions of catharsis 
(i.e., "hydraulic" models of"blowing off steam," "reaching one's boiling point," and "bottling up one's 
anger and frustration") have proven so powerful that older, exploded accounts are considered a matter of 
common sense, and it takes great effort to convince people that such older depictions are in error. 
Notions of catharsis based on hydraulic models are still, perhaps, the most commonly and widely 
proliferated within the popular consciousness. Within a two-week span, I noted examples on syndicated 
episodes of TV's Seinfeld, The Simpsons, Everybody Loves Raymond, Frontline, and Law and 
Order:Special Victims Unit. 
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Jerome S. Bruner asks us to think of this process in a slightly different sense. He 
invites us to view the majority of intellectual growth as an outward-in process, wherein 
"innovations are transmitted to the child in some prototypic form by agents of the culture: 
ways of responding, ways of looking and imaging, and most important, ways of 
translating what one has encountered into language" ( 1 3). Bruner's point is that language 
is the medium human beings use to reflect upon and analyze experience as well as to 
enact the processes of memory and remembering. He cautions: 
If we are to benefit from contact with recurrent regularities in the 
environment, we must represent them in some manner. To dismiss this 
problem as "mere memory" is to misunderstand it. For the most important 
thing about memory is not storage of past experience, but rather the 
retrieval of what is relevant in some usable form. This depends upon how 
past experience is coded and processed so that it may indeed be relevant 
and usable in the present when needed. (2) 
Bruner is correct in implying that it is all-too-easy and all-to-common to forget that the 
linguistic associative bonds used to categorize and store past experience are also the keys 
with which these past memories are unlocked for use in the present. And how such 
experience is categorized and stored will determine which past experiences and 
accumulated information is available for retrieval at any given point in the present. 
Linguistic labels literally determine the portion of the things one has seen, heard, felt, and 
learned that s/he will be able to access at key moments; and, because of this, it is 
oftentimes the culture, not the individual, that determines access to previous information 
and experience. In short, outside forces exert tremendous control over inner processes. 
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Recognition of egocentric speech patterns or a strangled vocabulary can signal 
students of dramatic literature to begin looking for signs of violence and to investigate the 
social milieux created and presented by playwrights. Likewise, the labels that characters 
apply to other characters and to the events that take place on stage can provide key 
evidence regarding a playwright's treatment of violence and the social circumstances 
which may have contributed to the appearance of violence. These labels, however, do 
not always point directly to their sources, and an understanding of some of the basic 
dynamics of displacement is necessary to take these episodes of staged violence into 
account. 
Displacement is a well-known psychological process that occurs when responses 
initiated in reaction to a primary stimulus are transferred to the source of a secondary 
stimulus, even though the secondary source may be entirely independent of the original 
source and the stimulus that fostered the original response. This is the case when, for 
example, a person is angered by one individual but takes her/his anger out on another 
individual who is not primarily responsible for those feelings of anger. Psychological 
tradition and conventional wisdom claim that displacement can be a healthy process 
whereby anger and aggression may be transferred to an inanimate object, such as when 
one hits a punching bag; however, the most common form of displacement shifts the 
aggressive response from the original source of annoyance to another person, one against 
whom it is safer to aggress, as when a spouse receives abuse for provocation her/his 
partner experienced at the hand of a superior at work. 
Linguistic labels play a substantial role in the predominant form of displacement, 
for while there is a form of displacement-"primary stimulus generalization"-in which 
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aggression is displaced from one individual to another based upon physical similarities 
between the provocateur and the victim, such identification of physical similarities is not 
necessary and, in fact, makes up only a small portion of instances of displacement. By 
far the most common form of displacement is "mediated stimulus generalization." 
Arnold H. Buss describes the process, saying, "Mediated stimulus generalization does not 
involve physical similarity of stimuli. Rather, stimuli are linked by a common response. 
The mediating response is usually a verbal labef' ( 63 ). One example is "the child who 
learns to avoid dogs [ and is then] confronted with a new animal that is different than any 
dog he has previously encountered. Ifhe labels this new animal with the word 'dog,' he 
would probably avoid this stimulus" (63).8 Some forms of stereotyping fall into this 
category. For example, much of the violence directed toward homosexuals is based 
entirely upon the application of labels that have little or nothing to do with the physical 
characteristics exhibited by the victims of such violence. It is no wonder that many gays 
and lesbians are reluctant to publicly acknowledge their homosexuality. 
Hans Toch even concludes his landmark book Violent Men by touching on 
linguistic labeling. In a final section entitled "The Anatomy of Violence," Toch 
incorporates literary examples in order to illustrate "violence-prone premises"-those 
occasions where heightened probabilities of violence are made evident in the language 
8 As the owner of a large dog, I have witnessed time and again that individuals who exhibit the markers of 
lower socioeconomic standing are much more likely to be frightened by my dog. I attribute this to 
linguistic labeling. It is unlikely that the majority of these individuals has been harassed or attacked by 
dogs. It is, however, very likely that they are the recipients of labeling-inherited associative bonds-that 
tell them that dogs are aggressive, dangerous creatures. By comparison, those with the hallmarks of upper 
middle class and higher socioeconomic standing rarely hesitate to walk right up and begin to pet my dog, 
whether or not they have had previous contact with my dog or me. Even those in this group who indicate 
that they have had very little or no exposure to dogs are typically unafraid. Perhaps, for the first group, 
dogs are labeled "guards" or "attackers," whereas, for the second group, dogs are labeled "pets" or 
"companions." 
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and are generally "tied to the extent to which the aggressor indulges in pre-classification 
or selective perception" ( 1 85). For instance, Toch refers to a passage from Hemingway's 
Men without Women to characterize the aggressor who pre-classifies his victims, and he 
references a passage from Richard Wright's Native Son to characterize the aggressor who 
has re-classified himself as one capable of taking a life. Both are characterizations of 
features recognized by social scientists as tied to the prediction or facilitation of future 
violence. 
For our purposes, perhaps the most important aspects of linguistic labeling are 
those linked with acts of dehumanization. Both of these are explored in experiments 
conducted by Albert Bandura, Bill Underwood, and Michael E. Fromson, the results from 
which were published in "Disinhibition of Aggression through Diffusion of 
Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims." The study was designed to test the 
hypothesis that the verbal labeling of victims alters the willingness of individuals to act 
punitively toward them. 
The experiments documented that people were more likely to act punitively when 
responsibility was diffused among a group, and they were much more likely to act 
punitively when victims had been dehumanized by means of the linguistic labels applied 
to them. In the experiments, subjects were asked to apply electrical shocks to unseen 
(and non-existent) persons whenever they were informed that these "persons" failed to 
successfully complete a task, ostensibly to study the effects of punishment on trial 
performance. In one portion of their study, an experiment was designed that would force 
participants to recognize that their punitive actions were not helping trial performance in 
the least. The experimenters believed that presenting test subjects with the obvious 
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failure of their punishments to improve performance on the trials would lower the 
aggressiveness with regard to humanized and neutral victims. Appropriately, none of the 
subjects attempted to justify shocking the humanized victims, and three quarters of them 
condemned doing so; likewise, none of the subjects attempted to justify shocking the 
neutral victims, and sixty-seven percent condemned this behavior. 
However, surprisingly, the researchers predicted that "under dehumanizing 
conditions escalation of aggression would be even more precipitous when punitiveness is 
dysfunctional in improving performance" (Bandura, Underwood, and Fromson 263). The 
researchers reasoned that the "apparent lack of progress by degraded victims is apt to be 
interpreted as further evidence of their culpability and thereby justifies intensified 
punitiveness toward them" (263). As it turned out, the experimenters were absolutely 
correct. In the case of the dehumanized victims, seventy-three percent of the subjects 
tried to justify administering high levels of electrical shock in spite of overwhelming 
evidence that their actions were having a negative effect. What makes the above even 
more distressing is that, as the experimenters make a point of reminding us, "in studies of 
obedient aggression people are commanded to behave punitively. Here, participants 
escalated their punitiveness on their own" (268). Participants were even given the chance 
to opt.out of the experiment anonymously and without loss of pay. 
Yet, as striking as these results are,. it was the language used by the test subjects in 
the post-experimental interviews that most disturbed me. This language, however, did 
provide greater clarification of the mental processes at work to assuage any feelings of 
responsibility or guilt the subjects might have experienced in the face of their openly 
aggressive choices. As noted above, with the neutral and humanized victims, the subjects 
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strongly disapproved of physical punishments and made no attempts to excuse its use. 
However, with the dehumanized victims, the subjects "seldom condemned punitive 
techniques but often voiced self-absolving justifications" (262). Most notable about these 
justifications is the degree to which they exhibit the features of linguistic immaturity that 
have already been discussed. They indicate immature cognition, low levels of language 
skill, and little or no deliberateness of thought and speech. This is in spite of the fact that, 
otherwise, these individuals show themselves to be perfectly adept with language and 
capable of high levels of cognition and language use. 
Interestingly, the only statement from the post-experimental interviews that 
adequately demonstrates the skill and maturity possessed by these subjects ( all college­
aged and educated men) is one disapproving of the use of the shocks. This individual 
states: "I felt uncomfortable because I was administering punishment without knowing 
whom I was punishing and also not knowing enough about their mistakes" (26 1 ). Here 
we see an attempt to take the present situation into account instead of resorting to a strict 
and arbitrary set of rules. Unfortunately, all of the other comments regarding the use of 
physical punishment-both in support and in disapproval-illustrate the sorts of speech 
patterns we have come to associate with violence, or they represent the adoption of 
cultural codes, a feature that will be discussed in greater detail shortly. 
A brief account of the justifications shows that some of these statements are 
essentialistic ( e.g., "People are basically evil and have to be put in their place"), some are 
callous ( e.g., "Everyone is punished for something everyday"), and some seem fairly 
automatonic ( e.g., "As an acting supervisor it was my job to punish poor performance"). 
None of them register more than a selective engagement with the situation at hand, and 
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all attempt to justify measures which were clearly counterproductive.9 In fact, some of 
the participants chose to stubbornly ignore the immediate situation and place their trust in 
some aphoristic nugget of wisdom (e.g., "It gets more efficiency out of the group"); some 
of them misrepresented the truth to themselves and others ( e.g., "I administered shocks 
because I was told to"); some made uncorroborated claims based on arbitrary 
assumptions ( e.g., "It would not hurt them too bad"); some seemed predisposed to 
hostility ( e.g., "If doing my job as a supervisor means I must be a son of a bitch, so be 
it"); and some seemed impervious to the existence and concerns of others (e.g., "I was 
reacting mechanically to the lights"). 
As these comments tend to suggest, so much speech-related violence boils down 
to an abdication of situational awareness and a corresponding abdication of one's 
responsibility for doing one's own thinking and speaking. Language is necessary for 
reflection and analysis; however, as Albert Bandura elsewhere notes, "Self-evaluative 
influences do not operate unless activated, and many situational dynamics influence their 
selective activation" (Bandura, "Social" 24). He elaborates, saying: 
9 Here is a complete list of the categories of responses as documented by the researchers followed by 
examples of each type of justification: 
(a) ascribing culpability to the performers (e.g. ,  "In many cases poor performance is 
indicative of laziness and a willingness to test the supervisor" and "People are basically 
evil and have to be put in their place"); (b) extolling the benefits or necessity of 
punishment (e.g., "It gets more efficiency out of the group" and "Although punishment is 
looked down upon, that's not going to influence me because I've seen it work"); (c) 
attributing their punitive behavior to situational or role requirements ( e.g., "As an acting 
supervisor it was my job to punish poor performance" and "If doing my job as a 
supervisor means I must be a son of a bitch, so be it"); ( d) displacing responsibility ( e.g., 
"I administered shocks because I was told to"); (e) minimizing the painful consequences 
of their actions (e.g., "It would not hurt them too bad"); (t) disavowing conscious · 
involvement in the activities ( e.g., "I was reacting mechanically to the lights"); (g) 
emphasizing the prevalence of punishment ( e.g., "Everyone is punished for something 
everyday"). (261)  
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People do not ordinarily engage in reprehensible conduct until they have 
justified to themselves the morality of their actions. What is culpable can 
be made honorable through cognitive restructuring. In this process, 
reprehensible conduct is made personally and socially acceptable by 
portraying it in the service of moral ends. Over the years, much 
destructive conduct has been perpetrated by decent, moral people in the 
name of religious principles and righteous ideologies. Acting on moral or 
ideological imperative reflects not an unconscious defense mechanism, but 
a conscious offense mechanism. (24) 
This is true, and it is false. Bandura is correct in claiming that individuals like 
those cited in the above passage have chosen to avoid engagement in evaluative activity, 
but that means they have consciously chosen to remain unconscious. What Bandura 
describes is a way for people to participate verbally and socially without accepting the 
responsibility of doing so intellectually. It is a way of removing the requisite elements of 
knowledge, skill, and deliberateness from one's social involvement and one's 
participation in discussion and debate. This type of engagement is what Karl Popper 
refers to in his discussion of "The Machine Argument"-those cases where a person 
interacts without intention, much like a human Magic Eight-ball. And therein lies the 
problem, for as Popper sees things: "How can a decision be reached? There are, in the 
main, only two possible ways: argument (including arguments submitted to arbitration, 
for example to some international court of justice) and violence" (356). The first of 
these, of course, requires conscious and deliberate consideration. 
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Once one has elected to remain disengaged, it is important to remember, that 
individual is no longer fully conscious, situationally aware, or deliberate in thought and 
speech. Abdication becomes the key method of self-exoneration, and the process most 
closely associated with this abdication is what P. G. Zimbardo calls "deindividuation," 
whereby "intense aggression . . .  result[ s] mainly from a loss of cognitive control" (26). 
The lack of situational awareness and deliberateness characteristic of such disengagement 
is frequently apparent in one's language use, most notably in one's reliance upon various 
culturally coded and formulaic bits of language, such as aphorisms and cliches, 
quotations ( or misquotations) of sentiments borrowed from religious texts, elders, 
leaders, or experts, or sound-bites and slogans. In such cases, there is a willingness to 
view the world according to a set of established cultural codes, and in such cases, one can 
see a return to the immature, egocentric thought processes we have been exploring and 
the abandonment of the abstract, conceptual, and self-evaluative modes of thinking we 
have established as key to mature, non-violent interpersonal exchange. 
These adopted or inherited cultural codes comprise the third and final form of 
violence-prone language I hope to explore. In their now-famous book Adolescent 
Aggression, Albert Bandura and Richard H. Walters recognize that physical maturation is 
essential to the changes in behavior that mark the transitions from childhood to 
adolescence and adolescence to adulthood; however, they also emphasize the significant 
role played by social influences. Most adults, for example, learn to substitute socially 
accepted forms of behavior to replace the openly_hostile forms they practiced as children 
and adolescents. In most cases "even direct verbal expressions of anger meet 
disapproval, and the child eventually learns more or less subtle forms of expressing 
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aggression that do not involve a direct attack on the instigator" (91 ). This is borne out by 
the fact that "most adults rarely engage in direct acts of physical violence, and even their 
verbal attacks tend to be softened or camouflaged to some extent" (91 ). Overt aggression 
is something that most individuals outgrow. This is not because feelings of anger and 
responses to anger are outgrown; instead, most individuals simply acquire the skills 
necessary to refract or disguise them in a majority of the situations they encounter. 
Cultural codes can, therefore, assist in the development of techniques for the 
management of aggression and violence. However, socialization is a long, arduous, and 
irregular process. And, in spite of the many advantages that may accompany the learning 
of cultural codes, when it comes to the control of aggression and violence, not all codes 
are created equal. Some cultural codes are part of larger systems that social scientists 
term "subcultures of violence." These subcultures tend to concentrate the social 
conditions-including linguistic codes-that are recognized as being closely connected 
with violent conduct. The most obvious of these-subcultures are probably those existing 
within prison communities. Dorothy Lewis indicts our penal system, calling it a 
"laboratory which predictably produces and reinforces aggressive behavior" (4). This is 
because, she says, "Our correctional system produces all of the ingredients known to 
promote violence: isolation, discomfort, exposure to other aggressive individuals, 
insecurity, and lack of intellectual stimulation" ( 4). 
Prisons, however, are not the only sites concentrating these negative ingredients, 
and as we shall see, they are not the only places where violence is the predictable 
outcome. There are, for instance, both male and female .subcultures that tend to accept 
and promote comparatively high levels of violence, and some contemporary playwrights 
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have attended to the conditions contributing to, and wrought by, these gendered 
subcultures. We shall also see that "subcultures of violence" tend to have their own 
linguistic codes and that these codes contribute to the ongoing acceptance and 
maintenance of violence within these subcultures. 
Violent male subcultures have been studied for some time now, and researchers 
have documented a series of linguistic features that can be identified among their 
members. One such feature is a pattern that Bandura and Walters discerned in the speech 
of the violent adolescent boys they studied for Adolescent Aggression. As opposed to 
non-violent boys, when speaking of their interpersonal relationships-that is, their peer 
relationships, parent-child relationships, and sexual relationships-these boys tended to 
characterize them in predominantly physical terms. Peers were viewed as physical rivals 
rather than as confidants or sources of support; fathers were viewed as physical 
disciplinarians rather than as role models; and those with whom they had sex were seen 
as mere physical conquests rather than as romantic partners-sex was something you did 
to, not with, a girl. 
Such boys are steeped in the physicality of the gender roles they have inherited, 
and this physicality is manifested in their speech as well as in the ways they choose to 
convey strong emotions, such as anger. It is, perhaps, easy to understand how these boys 
come to learn and hold such powerful notions that masculinity equates, at a basic level, to 
physical strength, action, competition, and aggressiveness, for gender conditioning is 
particularly stringent when it comes to boys. Anne Campbell cites research that shows, 
for instance, that "fathers [are] nearly five times as disapproving of cross-sex play by 
boys than by girls" (Campbell 20), and Beverly Fagot documents that along with male 
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children's ''understanding that they are boys" comes a corresponding increase in 
aggression (26). Fagot' s research specifically showed that "the amount of aggression 
depended not on chronological age but on whether the children understood that they were 
a girl or boy" (26). Debby A. Phillips adds that, among peers, males are subject to 
"constant surveillance of each other, which seem[ s] to promote hyperperformativity of 
the norm" (58) in terms of socially sanctioned male behaviors. 
Another key aspect of many male subcultures is the way in which male 
aggression, as opposed to its female counterpart, is regularly justified, not by its moral 
rightness, but by its form-with "form" indicating both "formality" as well as "formula." 
For instance, violent encounters between men are frequently judged simply by the odds 
of the struggle. As Campbell states : "The rules of propriety are not explicit . . .  and 
[males] will have to deduce from hints and clues that aggression wins respect only when 
the odds of winning are equal or unfavorable. When the odds are too favorable, it is 
bullying" (36). This is why, Campbell writes, "In the gulf war [sic] in 1991, the 
American media made much of the fact that Iraq had the fourth largest army in the world 
and that the Iraqi Republican Guard was a crack team of dedicated soldiers. This was in 
the service of presenting the encounter as a fair fight rather than a case of bullying by a 
major superpower" (36). Perhaps, in the more recent conflict with Iraq, the current 
administration's ad absurdum repetition of the phrase "weapons of mass destruction" was 
designed to achieve a similar effect with an American public reluctant to go to war. 
Campbell also found that men are more likely to approve of ritualized or institutionalized 
forms of violence, which include acts of aggression as diverse as boxing, the use of war 
to settle international di_sputes, and the death penalty. 
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Perhaps the most significant feature shared by many violent male subcultures is 
the terrific emphasis placed by men on efforts to "save face." As aggression is often 
utilized as a tool to establish hierarchy within these subcultures, a refusal to employ 
aggression may be viewed as one's acceptance of an inferior position. Where this is the 
case, violence may be viewed as less risky than simply walking away. Campbell 
paraphrases from her numerous interviews with men, saying, "The very act of entering 
the fray, regardless of whether the conflict is won or lost, is sufficient to avoid any 
imputation of cowardice . . . .  For most men the risk of a black eye or a cut lip is more 
acceptable than the risk of being labeled a wimp by the community of male observers" 
(59). The male proclivity for ritualized forms of violence combined with male concerns 
with saving face help explain why many more women view a violent response to a 
challenge to fight unacceptable; whereas, men more frequently view such a response as 
acceptable, appropriate, or even necessary. 
Other challenges may be more indirect, and several studies indicate that verbal 
attacks on one's competence are among the most likely to initiate a violent retaliation. 
Furthermore, for men, the questioning of one's manhood--one' s competence at 
achieving a masculine ideal-seems to be the most fundamental of all verbal attacks 
against men and the most likely to lead to violence. Richard B. Felson is among those 
who acknowledge this, adding that "men are more likely than women to respond to 
attacks on their competence" and that "implications of homosexuality" are among the 
most likely means of initiating a violent response" (25). For men, this linguistic label is, 
literally, a fighting word. 
47 
In order to combat such attacks and implications, Debby A. Phillips observed, 
male individuals "strategically [take] up normative practices of masculinity ( e.g., 
violence, heterosexual display) in order to achieve more normative positions" (60). This 
was true even to the extent that violent behavior and heterosexual display (often in the 
form of misogynistic speech and behavior) were used as ways of"proving" one's 
masculinity. In other words, some male subcultures teach that "men" (i.e., those worthy 
of the highest social strata) are violent and that they view and talk about women as if they 
were mere costumes, meant primarily to outfit them as "masculine." Those who are 
either unwilling or unable to reproduce the cultural codes of masculinity as part of their 
subjectivity are "repeatedly humiliated through practices of verbal ridicule and physical 
assault" ( 62). 
On the other hand, some cultural codes work against the likelihood of violence. 
Felson found that while "the tendency of parents to protect and side with younger siblings 
and on behalf of girls typically leads to more fighting among siblings," when older or 
male children are given responsibility to look after their younger or female siblings-i.e., 
when families adhere to traditional hierarchies based on age and gender-fighting tended 
to occur much less frequently (55). Felson also suggests that notions of chivalry still 
retain formidable power in modem western societies and that men with traditional 
attitudes toward women are generally less likely to commit violence against women (7 1 ). 
Referring to the scientific data, he says, "'Wife beaters' are breakers, not bearers, of 
society's norms" (70). People tend to act less violently when they know that such 
behavior is not sanctioned or approved by the culture. However, in these cases, there is 
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also the added pressure of avoiding accusations of bullying or the implications of male 
weakness that accompany "hitting a girl." 
The works of several contemporary playwrights, such as Martin McDonagh and 
Anthony Neilson, explore the above codes of masculine behavior, and ignoring such 
evidence would seem necessarily to lead to incomplete or erroneous interpretations of 
these works. The language that signals the presence and operation of these cultural codes 
of masculinity directs audiences and critics to look to the environment depicted in the text 
and on the stage for help understanding the nature of the dramatic relationships and the 
violent interactions to which they are subject. 
Language also plays a key role in violence enacted by women. Richard B. Felson 
states that it is common for a woman, too, to "engage in a physical attack . . .  under the 
impression that . . .  she is losing the verbal battle" (26). In fact, in spite of conventional 
wisdom and cultural stereotypes, escalation from verbal to physical violence is just as 
typical of female as of male behavior. For instance, "Women are slightly more likely 
than men to engage in physical violence against their spouses and lovers and . . .  engage 
in violence with greater frequency" ( 41  ). Felson also discovered that the perceived odds 
of success of a violent encounter figure as predominantly for women as for men. Women 
are, for example, equally likely to hit those smaller and weaker than themselves (57), and 
they are less likely to be hampered by the dictates of any chivalric code. 
Some cultural codes likewise contribute to a woman's propensity toward 
violence. Prime examples occur in love triangles and occasions of relationship jealousy. 
When a man's partner is unfaithful, there is a tendency for the man to try to save face, 
and any violence is likely to be focused on the man's rival; however, when a woman is 
49 
confronted by infidelity, she is much more likely to attack her partner. Some suggest that 
this is because men perceive the infidelity as a form of property theft, while women view 
it as a form of betrayal. However, it is also plausible that predominant cultural codes 
help one determine where to place the blame-such codes tend to perpetuate the notion 
that men are always the sexual aggressors, while women are always passive and sexually 
narve. According to such codes, it would make little sense for a woman to attack her 
rival or for a man to attack his partner. Add to this the above-mentioned reluctance on 
the part of men to commit violence that may be viewed as bullying and the power of 
notions of chivalry, and such patterns begin to make more sense. 
It is also important to consider that much violent behavior is undertaken by those 
who feel that it is a reasonably safe response. And, for women, the traditional stereotypes 
can make violence seem like a path that may be pursued with relative impunity. Women, 
according to these codes, are gentle and passive, not aggressive and violent. As a result, 
female violence is rarely treated the same as male violence. It is simply not taken as 
seriously. It is often seen as an ineffectual or even slightly humorous imitation of male 
behavior. In support of this claim is the fact that conviction rates and sentences for men 
and women committing similar crimes have little similarity. 10  
Recently, a handful of cases have defied conventional beliefs about gender and 
violence. The recent rise in all-girl gangs and events like the recent violent episode of 
high school hazing committed by young women against other young women are cases in 
10 There are, of course, instances where female violence is viewed as wholly ''unnatural" behavior and 
therefore as a much more serious offense than when committed by men. Both extremes, however, are 
arbitrary and based on codified essentialistic notions of gender. 
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point, and they seem to be occurring with greater frequency. They may, in fact, be 
happening more often, due to contemporary changes in cultural coding. Some of these 
changes have been occuring at the subcultural level for a time, and those occurrences 
may shed light on the shifts we see taking place more and more in the mainstream and at 
the cultural level. One example is how the social realities of girls in lower 
socioeconomic strata have, for a long time, tended to resemble the social realities 
traditionally associated with boys. Rachel Simmons has conducted extensive interviews 
with girls of all backgrounds, and she offers the following assessment: 
For some girls, silence and indirection are neither attractive nor an option. 
They are instead signs of weakness. I found this to be true especially 
among the girls I met whose lives were marked by oppression. For them, 
assertiveness and anger were tools of spiritual strength. These young 
women might encounter the misogyny of families and neighbors, the 
racism of teachers, and threats of violence in their neighborhoods. Where 
economic struggle and disenfranchisement prevail, self-assertion and 
aggression become as much a part of the social landscape as playgrounds 
and ice-cream trucks. In this world, silence can mean invisibility and 
danger. (177) 
Social scientists confirm that, oftentimes, female violence, like its male 
counterpart, is tied to a particular environment-one characterized by threat, hostility, 
and violence. Whether male or female, individuals often create a hostile environment by 
virtue of cultural attitudes regarding how to interpret the actions of others. Marvenia 
Bosley indicates that when individuals rely on cultural assumptions about others' 
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intentions, they tend to create "through their own actions a hostile environment" and 
"play an active role in constructing their own reactions" (48). L. D. Eron and R. 
Huesmann demonstrate this particular manifestation of power of cultural coding to 
influence behavior. They concluded, for instance, that violent television viewing is "in 
fact a longitudinal antecedent of [highly aggressive] behavior" by individuals ( cited in 
Bosley 54 ). The best explanation is that "through television viewing, they [perceive] that 
they [live] in a violent society and chances of being victimized by crime [are] great" (54). 
Furthermore, many of these individuals consider "their acts of aggression as shields to 
victimization," believing that "to perpetuate violence upon others somehow prevent[s] 
others from perpetuating violence on them" (54-5). The communication researchers 
Gerbner and Gross add that "people who [prefer] to view violence on television [seem] to 
be less trustful of others and [overestimate] their chances of being victims of crime" (55). 
Many contemporary playwrights make it a point to develop and present fully 
realized environments on stage, and many of these playwrights consciously or intuitively 
do so by recreating the behavioral patterns and cultural markers associated with specific 
environments. They convey information about the social conditions by means of set 
design and costuming, but also by means of character dialogue as well as in the language 
of the cultural influences surrounding their characters. When a playwright takes pains to 
introduce a character's television viewing habits or carefully replicates language marked 
by linguistic immaturity, egocentrism, and violent cultural coding, these efforts should 
not be viewed as mere window-dressing. When such information is painstakingly 
provided, it makes sense to view it as an important aspect of the mise-en-scene of the 
play-the linguistic mise-en-scene-and an element purposefully added for the benefit of 
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those who hope to better understand the playwright's art. 1 1  I hope to do exactly this in 
the following chapters. 
1 1  Dr. Stanton B. Gamer, Jr. suggested, in conversation, this useful way of conceiving of language in 
drama. 
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CHAPTER II 
Language and its Lessons: Institutional Language and Institutional Violence in 
David Mamet's Oleanna 
Issues of language and education have long been centerpieces of David Mamet's 
drama. Roger Bechtel says, "Critics and scholars have long held differing interpretations 
of [Mamet's] plays, and wildly differing opinions of their merit. What they all recognize 
in common, however, is that Mamet' s theatre is one of language" (29). In addition, 
Mamet's exploration of language is often formulated within "some kind of quasi-teacher­
student relationship," because, for Mamet, this kind of relationship "is also a power 
relationship" (Foster 40), and power relationships figure prominently in Mamet's canon. 
This is true of earlier plays such as American Buffalo and Glengarry Glen Ross, but it 
also true of his more recent work, including his 1992 drama Oleanna. 12 As critic Steven 
Ryan says, "Oleanna is developed around one of Mamet' s most basic themes: human 
beings' never-ending battle to dominate one another" (393). 
However, with Oleanna, most of the critical attention in the form of performance 
reviews and scholarship has focused on issues of sexual harassment and political 
correctness. While both play a significant role in the meaning of Mamet's play, they do 
not represent the primary issue; instead, they represent the way in which Mamet's 
persistent interest in struggles over power comes to be manifested in this particular play. 
12  It has become commonplace for critics to speak of Mamet's "Teach-like characters," a phrase coined in 
reference to the name of a character from American Buffalo but also suggestive of Mamet's continued 
interest in the nature and practice of teaching. 
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One can see the merit of this statement when one recognizes that sexual harassment is a 
key element of the play only insofar as it provides Mamet the opportunity to explore the 
often linguistic and contextual nature of truth and insofar as the language associated with 
sexual harassment is used by Carol to wrest institutional power away from her teacher, 
John. Likewise, political correctness is essentially a manipulation or policing of language 
that was originally conceived as a way to address and combat certain forms of 
institutional power, specifically forms that are derived from a privileged institutional 
language. As Christine MacLeod perceptively notes, "Gender becomes a crucial factor as 
and when Carol discovers that she can use the rhetorical strategies of sexual politics to 
change her position in the hierarchy" (207). In thinking about the play, it is also 
important to consider Richard Badenhausen's reminder that Carol "appears zealous and 
deceitful only in Act Three, when she turns the discourse of the academy against John" 
(Badenhausen 1 3). As these quotations indicate, blame should be shared, not only by 
Carol and John but also by academe-the institution-as it is portrayed in Mamet's play. 
If Carol becomes adept at using language unethically, she has learned this from John. 
However, John, in tum, learned and honed these skills during his time at the university, 
first as a student, then as a teacher. 
In direct response to those critics who read the play as solely or primarily about 
sexual harassment and who, therefore, view the issues central to 0/eanna as new territory 
for the playwright, MacLeod argues that John's and Carol's "contestation of hierarchy 
and linguistic control in [ 0/eanna] is not necessarily dependent on gender difference," 
citing the fact that "men do to men in Glengarry Glen Ross much as woman does to man 
and man to woman in 0/eanna" (MacLeod 208). Thomas H. Goggans agrees, stating 
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"gender becomes a factor merely as a tactic Carol can employ to change her position[-] 
the sort of pragmatic strategy employed within . . .  Mamet's other plays" (344). Finally, 
Mamet himself has said in an interview that "the play' s central interaction is not about 
sexual harassment. It' s  about power" (Lopate). The best way to understand the power 
dynamics inherent to Mamet' s play is to take stock of the play' s explorations of linguistic 
power-that is, the ways that institutional forms of language constitute institutional forms 
of control and violence. To assist in this process, recent work undertaken in the social 
sciences can illuminate the connections between language and violence and contribute to 
our understanding of how institutional language may function as verbal violence. 
During the opening moments of 0/eanna, Carol has come to John's  office seeking 
guidance and hoping that John can help her understand the material presented in his class 
and in his book that is a text for the course. Carol catches her instructor in the middle of 
a telephone conversation, during which he twice uses the phrase "term of art." Curious 
about the phrase, Carol asks him what the phrase means. Although part of a private 
conversation, John makes no attempt to keep his words private by having Carol wait 
outside or by lowering his voice, and he eventually volunteers to answer her question. 
However, his answer to Carol' s  question-his definition of the phrase "term of art"-is a 
fumbling account peppered with: "it seems to mean," "I believe," and "would mean" 
(Oleanna 3), as opposed to "does mean." When John applies such vagueness to a phrase 
he has just employed with confidence, it is no wonder Carol seems taken aback and asks, 
"You don't know what it means . . .  ?" (3). At this point, John must admit: "I'm not sure 
I know what it means" (3). That John cannot adequately define the term is beside the 
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point. At issue is John's impulse to fake his way through until this tactic fails him. 
Richard Badenhausen states: 
Contrary to Showalter's contention, John is the dishonest character from 
the start, failing to respond to Carol's requests for a definition of the 
phrase ' term of art,' which she has overheard during his telephone 
conversation. John first fudges a definition in appropriately obscure 
academic-speak and then confesses he might not be absolutely clear on the 
term since ' [i]t's one of those things, perhaps you've had them, that, you 
look them up, or have someone explain them to you, and you say 'aha,' 
and, you immediately forget what . . .  "' ( 13-4). 
In addition, the opening sequence about the phrase "term of art" allows Mamet, right 
from the beginning, to introduce jargon as a topic and as a particularly loaded form of 
speech. That this is one of the purposes of including this phrase and this scene is 
corroborated by the fact that the phrase "term of art" represents jargon in two ways. 
First, it is an example o/jargon; second, it essentially means "jargon." So, from the 
outset, institutional language is placed in the forefront. 
Also in Act I, language's potential to facilitate the use or abuse of power is first 
introduced. For example, in spite of John's professed desire to put Carol at ease in the 
present meeting and to aid in demystifying the content of his course, in Act I he manages 
to dismiss her, to refer to Carol's visit to his office as an "obeisance" and as "potentially 
humiliating," and to command her impatiently to "get on with it" (5). John then informs 
Carol, in reference to the work she has submitted, that "it will not do" and imperiously 
waives away the possibility that Carol's difficulties lie in her inability to understand 
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John's abstruse and jargon-laden use of language. When she tries to object, John 
interrupts, saying, "You' re an incredibly bright girl. . . .  You're an incredibly . . .  you 
have no problem with the . . .  Who's kidding who?" (7). 1 3  By saying this, John refuses to 
accept the responsibility that comes with the possibility that Carol is, in fact, baffled by 
what he has written in his book and says in class. The compliment that John pays Carol 
regarding her intelligence is nothing more than a "line," an attempt by John to use flattery 
to avoid acknowledging her incomprehension of his language. According to John's 
ultimate refashioning-that Carol is "angry"-he is able to delude himself into thinking that 
the problem lies completely outside his control in the very "educational system" that has 
disenfranchised Carol. This frees John to play the role of the sympathetic mentor and 
iconoclast without ever addressing the main source of Carol's confusion. John casually 
implicates and critiques an entire system without acknowledging that he and his academic 
speech are both very much a part of that system. Audience members must, however, see 
this as a form of verbal misdirection on the part of John, and they must be aware enough 
of John's tactics to ask, "Upon what evidence does John base the above judgment of 
Carol? Is it her poor writing and her poor performance in his class or her inarticulate and 
broken speech that gives him the impression that she is ' incredibly bright?"' 14  
13 This passage also shows how one-sided the communicative effort really is. While John can demand that 
Carol be absolutely explicit in her use of language, in his own elliptical speech-e.g., "I know how . . .  
potentially humiliating these . . .  " (6); "I see what you . . . .  Yes. I understand" (6); "you have no problem 
with the . . .  Who's kidding who?" (7)-John is not required to meet a similar standard. Because John's 
academic speech is automatically privileged above Carol's vernacular, Carol is expected to parrot back 
John's ideas nearly verbatim and without the benefit of notes. John need not even pay attention to Carol as 
an interlocutor. "I think you're angry" (7) John asserts, even though, as Badenhausen says, "Carol . . .  has 
shown no signs whatsoever of being angry" and "is given little opportunity to ask her professor why he 
imagines that" she is (9). 
14 Regarding Carol's understanding of John's academic language and, therefore, her ability to convey any 
of its content in her own writing, Kellie Bean argues that John "cruelly . . .  reads [Carol's] work as ifhe 
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Mere moments into their meeting ( and Act I), John surrenders, throws up his 
hands, and asks, "You tell me what you want me to do . . . .  You tell me what you want 
me to do . . . .  What can I do . . .  ?" ( 1 0- 1 1 ), to which Carol pleads, "Teach me. Teach 
me" ( 1 1 ). 1 5 At first John attempts another evasion, saying of his book, "Well, perhaps 
it's not well written . . .  " ( 1 1 ), even blurting out "Look. It's just a course, it's just a book, 
it's just a . . .  " ( 1 2). In his frustration, John reveals his unwillingness to take Carol's 
desire to learn, or Carol, seriously. In addition, he inadvertently shows the audience that 
beneath his progressive educational philosophies he is an out-of-touch teacher speaking 
from a position of privilege. Perhaps, now on the verge of securing tenure, he believes 
that an individual student and the outcome of an individual course cannot possibly matter 
that much, at least to him. And perhaps, contrary to the inflated rhetoric he later utters 
regarding the importance of his book and his ideas, he is all-too-ready to disown them if 
doing so will get Carol out of his office. 
does not understand it. John's performance demonstrates Carol's failure of language and underlines his 
own success, for he knows that she has read-and not understood-his book" ( 1 1 0- 1 ). In other words, John 
denies Carol's admission of ignorance and immediately follows it with his own feigned admission of 
ignorance-an admission that ultimately holds more weight that Carol's real one. Also, Alain Piette notes 
that, during the first part of their meeting, Carol seems "able to utter only a few monosyllables or broken 
sentences, which invariably begin-and immediately end-with the personal pronoun 'I. ' Ironically, as C. 
W. E. Bigsby has pointed out," he continues, "'the reiterated personal pronoun ["I"] is a marker indicating 
the collapse of the very self that it seems to proclaim' (Bigsby 107)" ( 178). 
1 5  Both John Lahr and Jill B. Gidmark criticize Carol, saying, "Since Carol won't work to master a world 
she can't comprehend in Act 1, she changes the frame of reference to a world that she can manipulate in 
Act 2" ( 1 85). However, this statement ignores not only John's failure, but also his disinterest, in teaching 
Carol. Kellie Bean accurately characterizes the lack of effort, commitment, and seriousness John displays 
with the following example and assessment of his pedagogy: 
The lesson: if she wants to stop failing, she should try succeeding instead. Teaching 
seems to annoy John, even as being a teacher empowers and defines him. He has 
accepted the inconvenient responsibility of instruction long enough to practice rhetorical 
aggression against his students and to receive the material reward and social validation 
represented by tenure, promotion, and the house in which he intends to raise his family. 
But having come this far, John cannot conceive of any further obligation to his student: " . 
. . what can I do . . .  ?" he asks Carol; "Teach me. Teach me," she begs him ( 1 1 ). He 
never does. ( 120) 
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While the above is one possibility, developmental psychologist Jean Piaget's "law 
of shift" offers another possibility. Lev Semenovich Vygotsky explains this law, saying, 
"To become conscious of a mental operation means to transfer it from the plane of action 
to that of language, i.e., to recreate it in the imagination so that it can be expressed in 
words. This change is neither quick nor smooth" (88). According to Piaget's law, it is 
conceivable that John's linguistic mastery is simply inadequate. John, of course, knows 
how to speak in the vernacular, he knows how to theorize in the specialized language of 
his field, and he can move from one to the other with relative ease; however, there is no 
evidence to suggest that John is able to express the ideas he has formulated in his 
academic speech into everyday speech. 
This fact jibes perfectly with Vygotsky's observations regarding the natural 
progression of speech proficiency among adolescents. Vygotsky characterizes adolescent 
thinking as a transitional phase during which individuals are just learning to master 
certain cognitive and speech skills, but it is important to remember that such transitions 
occur throughout one's life whenever one is introduced to new concepts or new forms of 
expression. For example, Vygotsky's findings document a trend typical of both 
adolescent and adult cognition: 
60 
The adolescent will form and use a concept quite correctly in a concrete 
situation but will find it strangely difficult to express that concept in 
words, and the verbal definition will, in most cases be much narrower than 
might have been expected from the way he used the concept. The same 
discrepancy occurs also in adult thinking, even at very advanced levels . . .  
. Analysis of reality with the help of concepts precedes analysis of the 
concepts themselves. (79). 
So, one likely alternative is that John's linguistic competence simply has not advanced to 
the point wherein he can translate concepts from one form of speech-from one language­
into the other. John's academic speech is one he acquired late in life and, by his own 
account, with some difficulty. In addition, its application has surely been limited to a 
proscribed array of settings and topics. What we generally see in the play is John 
switching from one mode of speech to the other, occupying each totally. He is capable 
of leveling a barrage of jargon, and he is adept with the colloquial voice he uses when he 
provides Carol with ( often unfortunate) examples of his tenets; he seems unable, 
however, to choose at will the form of speech he will employ at a given moment or use 
for a given topic or area of discussion. He sometimes slips from one mode of speech into 
the other in a single passage, much the way a person who is fluent in both Spanish and 
English might do so in the form of "Spanglish" sentences-adept in both, yet subject to 
the language itself and unable to adequately control the form in which each thought will 
be expressed. But using terminology with facility is not the same thing as understanding 
the concepts expressed in a language to the degree necessary to articulate them in that 
language, let alone in another. In fact, the unsuitability and poor communicative quality 
of the examples John employs in his attempt to explain ideas from his class demonstrates 
the difficulty John has converting these ideas into clear, meaningful, and appropriate 
verbalizations apart from their original academic formulations. In addition, he may feel · 
hampered in the sense that his vocabulary in one language is insufficient for the effective 
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translation of concepts formed and articulated in the other language. This is an 
inadequacy that John is loath to admit-even to himself. 
Despite John's desire to be rid of Carol, instead of leaving she bursts into a fit of 
self-recrimination, calling herself "stupid" ( 12). 16 Hastily responding to Carol's 
emotional outburst, John acquiesces immediately, telling Carol that her inability to 
understand is "[his] fault" and saying ingeniously, but perhaps accurately : "That's not 
you're fault. And that is not verbiage. That's what I firmly hold to be the truth. And I 
am sorry, and I owe you an apology" ( 1 7). John now tries to establish some form of 
rapport or camaraderie with his student. Unfortunately, this attempt is handled poorly. 
As Steven Ryan notes, rather than merely "simplifying his ideas into more easily 
digestible data, John . . .  chooses instead to reminisce with his student" (397). It is in 
John's sudden departure from the relative safety of institutional forms of language and 
decorum that events begin to take a turn for the tragic. 17 In a series of confessional 
stories, John begins to adopt a dangerously intimate tone, a tone especially inappropriate 
for addressing a female student, even more so because he does not know her very well. 
16 In this passage, Mamet includes a cleverly constructed, but very subtle, scripting of John and Carol' s  
ongoing communicative failures. When Carol calls herself "stupid," John counters, saying, "No one thinks 
you're stupid." Carol then asks, "No? What am I . . .  then?" Here John assumes that Carol is asking what 
she is if not stupid; however, Carol's next line ("You think I'm nothing") carries with it another possibility. 
As Richard Badenhausen clarifies, Carol's response of"What am I . . .  then" may also be read as: "Ifl have 
called myself 'stupid,' and you are telling me that 'no one' holds that opinion, am I, then, 'no one' (i.e., 
'nothing')?" 
. 17 One should consider the possibility that Mamet's claim of 0/eanna-that "it's tragedy" ("Tender 
Thoughts" C 10)-is legitimate, not hyperbolic. Mamet says: 
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As Aristotle told us as to strategy, . . .  at the climax of the play the hero is going to 
undergo a reversal of situation. So that when he hits her at the end of the play, everything 
she's been saying about him becomes true. And he's transformed in his own eyes, and in 
the eyes of the world, from someone who had power, who had prestige, who had a great 
opinion of himself, into a person whose life is ruined, who has no power, no prestige and 
has a dreadful opinion ofhimself. And it 's his ownfault. (C l 0, emphasis added) 
While relating his own past failures, he tells Carol, "I'm talking to you the way I wish 
that someone had talked to me. I don't know how to do it, other than to be personaf' 
( 19), and he speaks of removing "the Artificial Stricture, of 'Teacher' and 'Student"' 
(21 ). Then, within this newly personalized context, he arbitrary offers to give Carol an 
"A" for the course, if she agrees to "come back and meet with me. A few more times" 
(25); after all, "What's important is that I awake your interest" (26), and "What is The 
Class but you and me?" (26). When Carol objects, reminding John that "there are rules" 
(26), he responds by saying, "Well. We'll break them" (26) and "We won't tell 
anybody" (26). Mamet has very carefully cast all of John's sudden interest and 
accommodation in terms of an uncomfortable closeness and unwanted complicity 
between John and Carol, and it is within such a context that Carol first questions John's 
motives: 
Carol: Why would you do this for me? 
John: I like you. Is that so difficult for you to . . .  
Carol : Um . . .  
John: There's no one here but you and me. (Pause). (27) 
Mamet has rendered the audience helpless witnesses to John's unfortunate strategy and 
his ill-chosen words, making it possible for them to recognize just how uncomfortable the 
situation has become. 1 8  John has essentially invoked his institutional privilege while 
1 8  Even Kellie Bean, a critic who attacks Mamet and his play, must agree that John's "dimwitted, although 
ostensibly radical reorganization of his course," "rather than throwing off the hierarchical confines of the 
teacher-student relationship, or liberating himself and Carol from the power dynamic inherent in any 
relationship like it," manages to "reinscribe" John and Carol "within a new configuration of precisely the 
same power hierarchy" ( 1 1 8). She continues, "John's plan reveals that his true desires are in fact 
pedestrian and self-serving: to keep the student in her place and to escape an unpleasant meeting quickly. 
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abandoning the language that makes this privilege possible and frees it from 
interrogation. In addition, John seems to confuse or conflate lay-speech with personal­
even intimate-speech. And characteristically, John does not pick up on Carol's 
discomfort, nor does he recognize how his words seem to invite Carol to take chances 
that, ultimately, endanger only her. 
Admittedly, John's speech in this section of the play has the potential of 
presenting some valid and interesting ideas regarding flaws in the American system of 
higher education. At first, however, John appears unable or unwilling to render his ideas 
more accessible by abandoning the rhetoric of academe that has only, thus far, managed 
to distance him from Carol. Then, once again, John seems capable of two completely 
different forms of speech-academese or its absence-but incapable of translating between 
the two. As a result, the portions of his speech that might have proven instructive, that 
might have explained his thoughts on higher education, and that might have exonerated 
him from Carol's future charges of elitism are all absent from his speech. 1 9  Carol and the 
audience are left to fill in John's blanks, a task that the audience members, but not Carol, 
are prepared to do. For example, next to John's assertions that the curricula and 
John's glib and ill-conceived offer to throw of the 'Artificial Stricture' of student and teacher, then, belies 
his own confidence in those very labels to protect his position" ( 1 1 8). 
19 In the article "Miscommunication and Its Implication in David Mamet's 0/eanna,"to be discussed later 
in this chapter, Lenke Nemeth analyzes the play using linguistic techniques. Nemeth sees 0/eanna as 
primarily about "the struggle for dominance of one individual over another and how it shapes and distorts 
human relationships" ( 167), and he sets out to show "that sexual harassment is displaced to linguistic 
harassment" ( 167) by scrutinizing "the two characters ' communicative strategies" ( 1 67) and their 
"miscommunication, that is [the times they ignore] both the thematic and behavioural restrictions imposed 
on a professor and a student by the institutional setting" ( 1 68). In John's speech, Nemeth detects several 
instances of "diversion," "metasequences," and a "lack of adjacency pairs"-i.e., an absence of "the 
fundamental units of conversation . . .  which constitute tied relation between two utterances such as 
question and answer, offer-acceptance, greeting-greeting" ( 1 68)-which are replaced by "contradicting," as 
well as numerous examples of "delays" and "interruptions" (passim). 
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processes associated with a college education are "garbage" ( 1 6, 23), "artificial" (22), a 
''joke" (23), and "nonsense" (23), and beside his assertions that he has been deemed 
"incompetent" ( 1 7), ''unworthy" ( 1 7), ''unprepared" ( 1 7), "a fuckup," (22), and "no 
goddamned good" (22) by both himself and others in the academy, it is extremely 
important for him to make himself understood, for him to make his characterizations of 
the university system and his role in it absolutely clear. However, while it is possible for 
audience members to speculate (as I do) about what John means to say-that all students 
feel, or are made to feel, inadequate at some point during their college careers and that for 
the purposes of the consistent evaluation of student progress, many academic tasks 
become standardized and are rendered more arbitrary and formulaic than clear and 
helpful, student-friendly, and educational-this seasoned lecturer appears as unaware of 
the void he leaves in the logical support of his claims as he is of the effect his delivery 
and the content of his speech produces in his audience. Above all, the fact that these 
speeches represent a litany of the failures associated with the American system of higher 
education, its methods, and its language surely represents a strategy on the part of Mamet 
to render John's participation in such failures (as in the present moment) that much 
clearer for his audience. 
In this series of "explanations" of his views regarding higher education, John 
speaks of disgrace, of ruination, and of sick games and rituals. This is hardly the list one 
might expect from one who owes his living to an institution of higher learning. John then 
speaks of "prejudice," claiming that "we, in effect, create a prejudice toward" education 
(30). Carol attempts to clarify. Perhaps she does not understand; however, it is also 
likely that she is having difficulty accepting what she hears coming out of her own 
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teacher's mouth. Just as Alexander R. Luria noted in his studies, one's "verbal­
generalization system determines both the formation and the non-formation of new links" 
( 45). In other words, Carol has come to recognize certain acceptable ways of viewing 
higher education, and these conceptions have been formed linguistically. One might 
think of the way in which speakers often neglect the difference between the words "may" 
and "can" and ask, for example, "Can I use your restroom?" The distinction between the 
idea of "appropriateness" or "permissibility" and that of "capacity" or "possibility" is 
elided. When "may not" is made equal to "can not," then that which is atypical or 
unlikely becomes that which is unthinkable or impossible, and this is what happens in 
Carol's mind. Because none of the ways John speaks of higher education in his highly 
critical accounts-in class, in his book, and in this meeting-jibe with those recognized by 
Carol, they become cognitive challenges to her linguistically-formed and culturally 
reinforced opinions of higher education. And insofar as they refuse to conform to the 
conceptions already in place, she is initially ( and literally) unable to process these radical 
new (and radically new) conceptions. So, she echoes John's statement, but as a question: 
Carol: It is prejudice that we should go to school? 
John: Exactly. (Pause) 
Carol: How can you say that? How . . .  (30) 
John recognizes Carol's application of critical thinking skills on this subject and 
exclaims, "Good. Good. Good. That's right! Speak up!" (30), but then he sours this 
praise by promptly accusing Carol of exhibiting prejudice in their current conversation, 
saying, "What is a prejudice? An unreasoned belief . . .  When it is threatened, or 
opposed, we feel anger, and feel, do we not? As you do now. Do you not?" (30). He 
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concludes this unflattering accusation of prejudice with "Good" (30), as well. John then 
proceeds to cut Carol off in mid-sentence twice, and when she says, "I'M SPEAKING" 
(30), he cuts her off an incredible five more times with his apologies before she is able to 
continue. 
When Carol is finally allowed to speak, she asks a question central to Mamet's 
depiction of John and his relationship to institutional language and the academy. When 
she asks, "How can you say in a class. Say in a college class, that college education is 
prejudice?" John, at first, attempts to clarify his point, and corrects her, saying, "I said 
that our predilection for it . . .  " ( 0/eanna 3 1  ). In doing so, he begins to introduce a 
nuance that matters a great deal; however, instead of clarifying-instead of teaching-John 
again wholly abandons the language of the academy, and the lesson, altogether. As a 
result, John never translates what he has said in his book and in class into a language 
accessible to his student, and here John never completes the explanation, presumably, 
that the prejudice of which he speaks is the automatic and arbitrary privileging of higher 
education regardless of whether that education is actually helpful or advantageous for 
one's career or life goals. Instead, John does exactly what he claims it is his job to do: 
Carol: But how can you say that? That College . . .  
John: . . .  that's my job, don't you know. 
Carol: What is? 
John: To provoke you. 
Carol: No. 
John: Oh. Yes, though. 
Carol: To provoke me? 
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John: That's right. 
Carol: To make me mad? 
John: That's right. To force you . . .  
Carol: . . .  to make me mad is your job? (31-2) 
Here, too, John' s meaning is never adequately articulated. John does not, or cannot, 
translate the language he has employed in the classroom into everyday, one-on-one 
speech. He does not give a straightforward answer to what Carol probably views as a 
straightforward question; instead, he introduces what, to her, must seem utterly 
tangential. He does not explain that he believes the introduction of controversial material 
in the classroom invites students to question conventional wisdom and to reexamine their 
own beliefs and value systems. He does not explain that he sees his statements about 
higher education as the introduction of such controversial material. Finally, John's  
failure to translate between these languages is made eminently clear when Carol defines 
John's word "provoke" as "to make me mad." Although this is certainly one way to 
define the word, it is not the most apt one. By simply failing to complicate Carol' s  
understanding of the word "provoke," John misses an opportunity to add to Carol' s  
linguistic skills by providing her a fuller understanding of a word that she already 
considers familiar; he fails to clarify the pedagogical philosophy that underlies his desire 
to "provoke" his students; and he fails to connect any of this back to Carol' s  original 
question about what she sees as a profound contradiction between John's  attitudes 
towards higher education and his eagerness to participate in it. So, again, John misses the 
opportunity to make himself understood, and he leaves Carol mystified, misinformed, and 
understandably upset. 
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John adds to Carol's misapprehension and provides more fodder for her eventual 
charges against him when, in an attempt to explain his use of the word "prejudice," he 
fishes for an example of a time when he had accepted something as a matter of faith. 
This happens because his choice is about as unfortunate as one could imagine for two 
reasons. First, his example is comprised of ridiculous and spurious information he once 
received from a schoolmate. Second, it is sexual in nature and "ostends his own 
sexuality" (Foster 4 1 ). For these reasons, it is simply a poor example, pedagogically 
speaking. However, just as John doesn't seem to recognize how his position within the 
university changes his responsibilities regarding the manner and content of his speech 
with his students, his example shows that he doesn't seem to understand that for Carol­
and for most people-it is not the same thing to question ribald hearsay from an adolescent 
peer and to question the conventional wisdom of one's culture or of those who, like John, 
hold positions of trust and authority within that culture. John's position within the 
academy has made such questioning his standard modus operandi; whereas, it is a 
difficult thing for many people to do. Similarly, John's reliance on the language of the 
academy when speaking of the academy has the effect of excluding many people-those 
who are uninitiated-from the conversation. A reliance on academic speech-rendering it 
second nature-makes it easy for an instructor to assume universal access to his language. 
Lecturing in the classroom, a large and public forum, John may be seldom called upon 
and, therefore, may be poorly equipped, to assist his students in the transition between 
their language and that of the academy. That may explain why John chooses to introduce 
abstruse material as his means of explaining his use of a term to a student already 
69 
registering difficulties with basic concepts and terminology-because he has no other 
choice, or at least no other option readily at hand. 
This section of the play also demonstrates the legitimacy of Richard 
Badenhausen's account of John's pedagogy, for as he says, John's explanations tend to 
"reveal more about [John] than his subject matter" and show that "he finally sees the 
class as more teacher-centered than subject-centered" (5). However, this egocentrism is 
not limited to the classroom or to a desire to be the center of attention. In the lines 
immediately following this passage, John shows just how far his egocentrism extends and 
how intimately it is intertwined with a love of power and a stake in institutional 
hierarchies. In John's self-indulgent harangue of higher education, in which John refers 
to it as "a fashionable necessity, for those either of or aspiring to the new vast middle 
class" (33), he takes time out to make a note, presumably for a future lecture or 
publication: 
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John: What might be some reason for pursuit of higher education? One: A 
love of learning. Two: The wish for mastery of a skill. Three: For 
economic betterment. (Stops. Makes a note.) 
Carol: I'm keeping you. 
John: One moment. I have to make a note . . .  
Carol: It's something that I said? 
John: No, we're buying a house. 
Carol: You're buying the new house. 
John: To go with the tenure. That's right. Nice house, close to the private 
school . . .  (He continues making his note). (33) 
John clearly exhibits an uncanny ability to partition off portions of his own experience, 
for he is capable of mocking the desire to achieve "economic betterment" in others while 
at the same time desiring it for himself. He sees no contradiction in encouraging his 
students to question the value of higher education while, at the same moment, he exploits 
the university system and pursues its trappings without question. When he refers to the 
trinity of "tenure," "nice house," and "private school," he speaks as if he were 
accessorizing an outfit (Carol: "You're buying the new house. I John: To go with the 
tenure. That's right. Nice house, close to the private school.")-merely coordinating 
objects to be owned and put on display. Although John speaks of tenure throughout the 
play, there is never any indication that tenure might have a broader purpose-that it is a 
means of protecting students from teaching that is too tightly controlled by the institution. 
It is always spoken ofby John as that which indicates membership within the academy. 
Badenhausen also sees "John's ultimate failure-to gain tenure, to help Carol, and 
to understand himself' as the product of John's "confused understanding of what it 
means to teach" (5). This is because, as Thomas E. Porter says, John's notions of what it 
means to teach are "not founded on philosophical principles or logical analysis" (16). 
Instead, they are the direct result of John's relationship to the institution. From the time 
he himself was a student to the present moment, John's experience of the institution has 
taught him to view academia as a series of competitions and hierarchies. The cooperative 
possibilities of the university have rarely been part of his education or his teaching. 
Lecturing as the favored mode of instruction, the acquisition and employment of an elite 
and specialized language, the academic titles designed to represent the varying degrees of 
respect, privilege, and autonomy one may claim-all of these linguistic models and verbal 
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cues reinforce John's conception of the academy as a grand contest with winners, losers, 
and a finite array of goods to be gotten. Within such an environment, and in light of 
John's relationships with his own professors, that such attitudes were formed and, once 
formed, have never been displaced, should not be terribly surprising. 
Albert Bandura's observations regarding the development of moral thought and 
action in human beings have continually supported the idea that the modeling of behavior 
by individuals within a given environment-especially the behavior of those viewed as 
peers-will generally outweigh the power of any precepts ( cf. "Social Cognitive Theory" 
55-56). So, regardless of what principles and methods John may have heard espoused on 
college campuses during the last twenty or more years, the speech acts of his former 
professors and current colleagues will determine how John views his own role in the 
academy. John indicates that his teachers felt the need to constantly demonstrate the gulf 
between their knowledge, power, and importance and his own. This helps explain why 
John is perfectly willing to question whether all of his students should go to college and 
whether or not college instruction is truly worthwhile for them, but he never once 
questions whether his son should participate in the institutions he criticizes.20 The above 
also offers to explain how it is possible for John to have, once again, momentarily 
20 It deserves mention that John automatically assumes that Carol is not in college for any of the ostensibly 
"legitimate" reasons for pursuing higher education that he lists: "One: A love of learning. Two: The wish 
for mastery of a skill. Three: Economic betterment" (Oleanna 33). John has the nerve to tell Carol why 
she is in school, saying, "Somebody told you, and you hold it as an article of faith, that higher education is 
an unassailable good. This notion is so dear to you that when I question it you become angry" (32-3). It 
never occurs to him that whatever anger she feels and exhibits may be the result of this sort of arrogant 
assumption or is, perhaps, a displacement or projection of his own anger onto her. 
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forgotten Carol and, perhaps, why he might follow up his own sudden bit of note-taking 
by voicing his disapproval of Carol's desire to take notes.2 1  
When Carol asks him point-blank, "If education is so bad, why do you do it?" 
( Oleanna 35), John answers, without the slightest self-awareness, sense of irony, 
comprehension of the present situation, or consideration for the effect that his words 
might have upon one of students. Indeed, without the slightest hesitation, he exclaims, "I 
do it because I love it" (35). John follows this declaration with the suggestion that Carol 
pursue an in-depth examination of the statistics he has provided his class regarding 
demographics and wage-earning, utterly ignoring the fact that Carol came to him with 
questions of a much more fundamental nature. It is no wonder that Carol finally cries 
out, in abject frustration, that she does not understand, saying: 
What are you talking about? What is everyone talking about? I don't 
understand. I don't know what it means. I don't know what it means to 
be here . . .  you tell me I'm intelligent, and then you tell me I should not 
be here, what do you want with me? What does it mean? Who should I 
listen to . . .  I . . .  (36) 
21 Badenhausen shows how unreasonable John's reaction is. In spite of John's professed departure from 
traditional forms of instruction: 
The actual teaching going on in the office . . .  consists of little more than John asking 
Carol to parrot back his own ideas and perform for him in the process, as when he prods 
her with comments like "I spoke of it in class. Do you remember my example?" and 
"Can you repeat it to me . . . .  Without your notes?" (29) . . . .  Upset by her note taking, 
John asks Carol to stop, for "I'm not lecturing you, I'm just trying to tell you some things 
I think" (34), as if there were a difference. (6) 
Thomas E. Porter adds that although John "is intellectually committed to his egalitarian, student­
centered theory, it is painfully obvious that he violates it regularly in practice. He does not listen 
sensitively to Carol's  hesitant efforts at self-expression. He regularly interrupts her and is impatient with 
her lack of spontaneity . . . .  Most significantly, he fails to acknowledge her traditional perspective on the 
educational process and ignores his own dominant position in their relationship. He monopolizes the 
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This moment is clearly pivotal, and John's next move will figure significantly. 
John has already attempted an informal-even personal-tone, he has offered to break the 
rules and give Carol an "A" because he likes her and with the understanding that she 
must return to meet him one-on-one in his office. Now, immediately after Carol asks 
"What do you want with me?" he approaches Carol and chooses to initiate physical 
contact, wrapping his arm around her shoulder. Carol's response-"NO!" (Oleanna 36)­
is unambiguous. 22 She quickly frees herself from his embrace and escapes him by 
crossing the room. The conflict that eventually becomes Acts II and III is really the 
product of two elements. The first is the interaction of three distinct, and in this case, 
conflicting languages. The first of these is the academic speech to which John 
continually resorts. Formulaic institutional language, such as that used by John, 
discourages original, spontaneous, and situational thought and speech, but this very 
specialized language also circumscribes Carol's understanding of the present context. 
Jeanette Malkin's account of Basil Bernstein's Restricted Codes can help explain this 
phenomenon. She says: 
Bernstein argues that an underdeveloped code may be so redundant and 
predictable, [sic] that the speaker's intention can only be fathomed 
through "extra-verbal channels" of gesture or intonation. Furthermore, he 
claims, those who are limited to a Restricted Code often become very 
discussion while at the same time deprecating professional authority; he attacks middle-class prejudices 
about the value of education while pursuing its rewards. ( 17). 
22 I agree with Thomas E. Porter, who says, "The vehemence of this outburst would warn someone more 
perceptive than John that his sympathy and his 'friendly' expression of concern do not respond to her 
needs, that they are unwelcome and disturbing" ( 18). John, however, shows little, if any, cognizance of 
this. 
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sensitive to such cues and highly dependent on them. (Verbal Violence in 
Modern Drama 252) 
Such is the case with John and Carol. As Bernstein clarifies in his discussions of 
restricted and elaborated codes, the distinction is not one of lexical deficit versus lexical 
breadth and richness. What Bernstein is documenting are merely two classes of 
language, each of which is more effective and more appropriate within certain contexts; 
what separates these two classes is the amount of "shared and taken-for-granted 
knowledge" (Atherton 2) one may assume when speaking.23 So, although 'jargon," 
defined as a lexes, "does not constitute a restricted code" (Bernstein, "A Socio-linguistic 
Approach" 1 45), its high level of predictability among those in a field can make it 
function as one. In other words, as with a restricted code, John's reliance on his 
academic speech can become so automatic as to be largely removed from any conscious 
deliberation of the code itself. Furthermore, his habitual use of it renders the need to be 
highly explicit-the definition of an "elaborated code"-frequently, even generally, 
unnecessary in a university setting. He may be completely unconscious that his 
institutional speech has become unelaborated or that he has failed to negotiate between it 
23 The following comparative example may be helpful: 
Restricted code: "If you're going to town, get Rupert a new April from you know where." 
Elaborated code: "If you are going into Bedford, please get a new toy for Rupert the dog from the 
pet-shop (which we can't name because if the dog hears it he will go mad), to replace the one 
which we have come to call "April", which he has almost chewed to bits." (Atherton 2) 
Note that the "elaborated code spells everything out: not because it is better, but because it is necessary" (2-
3). Elaborated codes are needed when listeners are unacquainted with, or do not have access to, the 
original context, past conversations, inside jokes, colloquial phrases, and the like. In addition, as J. S. 
Atherton points out, "misunderstandings may come not [only] from your use of elaborated code, but from 
your use of your restricted code, adapted to your own speech community Gargon, abbreviations, etc.), 
rather than a properly and appropriately elaborated code" and that "a class's own language grows up 
through its interaction and history: using it can be socially important (the shared laugh whenever a 
particular group member is mentioned is both a means of bringing most of the group together, and of 
course of excluding her), and powerful" (4). 
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and Carol's everyday speech.24 As Vygotsky says of Claparede's Law, "The more 
smoothly we use a relation in action, the less conscious we are of it" (88). This is 
because "analysis of reality with the help of concepts precedes analysis of the concepts 
themselves" (79). In fact, a restricted code can be formulaic enough and its use can 
become automatic enough to suggest a speaking role as well as to constitute a mode of 
speech. 25 Because a restricted code is so intimately tied to a setting, a subject, and a 
certain kind of speaker, it may become easy, even attractive, to slip into some ready­
made subject position, thereby adopting certain attitudes and assuming the existence of 
certain interpersonal relationships typically associated with this form of speech. 
Elizabeth Minnich says that "'to inform our thinking at all levels, we need to remain in 
conversation with multiple others, not just those with whom we find discourse easy. We 
need to listen to informed and thoughtful critics and stay in touch with lives outside of the 
academy in this culture and in others"' (quoted in Parks 20). As Linda Jean Parks 
elaborates, "solutions usually follow consciousness, which is raised by critical thinking, 
upon our accustomed modes of thought and action" (22). And while John is very adept at 
questioning Carol's modes of thought and action, one can see the effects of John's 
automatic use of a restricted code, in combination with his misapprehension of Carol's 
24 As speakers of restricted codes tend to translate utterances into their restricted code, much of John's 
meaning will be subject to translation into a code unequipped to express the information articulated in the 
original code. 
25 Bernstein writes: "Roles are learned in the family, in the age or peer group, in the school and at work. 
These are the four major sets of roles learned in the process of socialization. As a person learns to 
subordinate his behaviour to the linguistic code through which [a] role is realized, then orders of meaning, 
of relation, of relevance are made available to him. The complex of meanings, for example, generated 
within the role system of a family reverberates developmentally in the child to inform his general conduct" 
(Bernstein, "A Socio-linguistic Approach" 145). 
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speech in the way John reads Carol, her relationship to the academy, and her relationship 
to him. 
In addition, because Carol finds much of John's academic speech confusing or 
altogether inaccessible, she will form the greater part of her opinions about John's 
character and credentials, as well as his intentions, based on those bits of speech with 
which she considers herself already familiar. This is where the second language, 
manifested as John's attempts at casual speech, locates its significance. According to the 
above model, this "familiar" mode of speech, along with John's intonation, his gestures, 
his facial expressions, and body language, must, for Carol, appear comparatively 
transparent and carry an undue weight in her assessments of her interlocutor and her 
environment. This is especially true due to what Malkin identifies as Mamet's tendency 
to have his characters speak "dialogue [that] is eliptic [sic] in the extreme, expressing 
emotional nuance rather than logical connections" so that "interpretation depends on the 
characters' ability to 'read' extra-verbal cues-at which they usually fail" (252). John's 
overly personal and provocative attempts at casual speech would appear to confirm what 
Carol has read as unprofessional, inappropriate, and unwanted-as sexual-in John's 
extra-verbal cues. 
Finally, a language Carol has learned by first- and/or second-hand experiente 
additionally burdens the two languages used by John, and it shapes Carol's reading of 
John's ill-conceived informal speech and the extra-verbal cues that accompany it. 
Thomas H. Goggans argues that Carol's speech echoes the verbal patterns of someone 
who has suffered abuse as a child or as an adolescent. He speaks of "the code words of 
incest" (435) that comprise much of Carol's dialogue. These are the ways of"speaking 
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and responding . . .  recognizable to anyone familiar with the representation of sexual 
abuse in today's culture" (435). As evidence of earlier abuse, Goggans also cites Carol's 
low self-esteem, her depression, and her feelings of guilt and shame; the frequent 
references to an ominously sexual past; and the way in which 'the student-teacher 
relationship depicted in Act One is a pastiche of phrases and cliches associated with the 
secrecy and psychological manipulation of incestuous abuse" ( 436). If such were Carol's 
history, it would necessarily color Carol's interpretation of John's words and actions. 
While Goggans' s case is fairly convincing, the fact remains that even if Carol is not 
meant to be read as a victim of prior sexual abuse, the play references some very 
disturbing and barely suppressed experience or set of experiences that have clearly had a 
profound effect on the range of interpretations available to her. 
In addition to Carol's suspect reception of John's speech, one of the most 
frequently voiced complaints about Mamet's play is that the language skills exhibited by 
Carol in Act I are so poor that they do not jibe with the linguistic competence she 
demonstrates in Acts II and III. Some of those voicing this complaint see Carol's 
ultimate facility as too greatly improved and regard this as a glaring failure in 
verisimilitude in Mamet's depiction of Carol. Others believe Carol's initial 
incompetence to be feigned, casting her as duplicitous and coldly calculating from the 
start. Verna Foster, however, offers an alternative interpretation that, like Goggans's 
reading above, takes into account how one's personal history and one's use of language 
to classify past experience commingle to determine the scope of cognitive categories 
available for one's future interpretation of experience. What Foster asserts is that 
"Carol's inability to understand John's lectures and his book seems to stem at least in part 
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from her unwillingness to accept his radical questioning of why she should be in college 
in the first place" ( 45). This is a fair point, for as Thomas E. Porter notes: 
Carol . . .  has different expectations about the professor's role and a 
different view of the educational process. She is a consumer who comes 
from a different social and economic background; she is here "[ t ]o be 
helped. [ . . .  ] 'To get on in the world'" ( 12). She has done her part as she 
understood it-attended class, bought his book and read the material 
assigned, took notes, followed instructions-and is nonetheless failing. 
Apparently she is not interested in being friends; she wants instruction: 
"Teach me," she pleads, "[t]each me" ( 1 1 ). In her view, it is John's 
responsibility to get her through the course, to provide clear explanations 
of his ideas that can be translated into equally clear exam questions with 
corresponding clear answers. ( 16) 
Albert Bandura' s investigations support the logic of this interpretation. In "Social 
Cognitive Theory of Moral Thought and Action," Bandura discusses the unlikelihood of 
one adopting views different from one's own. He observes that the degree of cognitive 
change an individual is likely to undergo depends largely upon how discrepant any new 
idea is in relation to the individual's originally held beliefs, as well as how credible that 
individual considers the source of this new information. 26 In short, Carol's difficulties 
26 Albert Bandura says, "Sources of high credibility produce increasing cognitive change the more their 
views differ from those held by the person being influenced whereas, for sources of low credibility, the 
more discrepant their view, the more they are rejected" ("Social Cognitive Theory" 62). On the one hand, 
John's ideas regarding higher education never become more welcome or more clearly articulated as the 
play progresses. On the other hand, however, John steadily loses credibility with Carol, making it 
increasingly unlikely as the play progresses that she will ever entertain his ideas seriously or with an open 
mind. 
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with the content of John's class and book may have as much to do with an unwillingness 
to entertain notions she considers unwelcome as they do with an inability to understand. 
In addition, whatever credibility John originally had in Carol's eyes quickly deteriorates 
during the course of Act I, in large part, ironically, due to his attempts to "explain" these 
same ideas. Bandura also observes that "families who are estranged from the mainstream 
social systems"-which is a distinct possibility given the information we have about 
Carol's background-"pay little heed to institutional values" (62). Carol, then, may not 
value John's iconoclasm, or his pursuit of tenure, but she is certainly unlikely to value his 
privileging of an institutional language she considers intentionally abstruse. 27 
Linguist Lenke Nemeth has similar doubts about John's communicative efficacy. 
Even though John is typically viewed as the character most in command of language in 
the opening act, when Nemeth conducts a linguistic analysis comparing Carol's use of 
language in the first act to John's, his conclusions may surprise. First, remarking that the 
action in 0/eanna consists of a fairly obvious struggle for control over the use of 
language, Nemeth then identifies "certain patterns" in the verbal exchanges between John 
and Carol so that he might evaluate "the techniques they use to control language to fight 
for and maintain their linguistic power" ( 1 67). While neither John nor Carol exhibits 
much in the way of "collaborative effort" ( 1 70), Nemeth contends that "Carol has a more 
active and dominant role . . .  than John," even in the opening scene ( 1 7 1 ). Nemeth 
acknowledges that John attempts to control the conversation from the beginning by 
ignoring Carol's initial question; however, he considers Carol "somewhat more 
27 Cases in point are Carol's impatience with John's use of the word "predilection" in Act I, of"paradigm" 
in Act II, and of "indictment" in Act III, all occasions when another more familiar word would have 
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successful in her communicative strategies" because she introduces "a full, qualifying, 
complete question" and, in doing so, determines the topic and direction of their 
conversation. Also, opposed to several critical accounts to the contrary, Carol manages 
to give "the impression of a decisive inquisitive student" by being confident enough in 
her linguistic and intellectual prowess to "[ disregard] the expected social conventions of 
being polite and deferential to her professor'' (171 ), although she could simply not know 
any better. More convincing evidence comes in the fact that, in the early portions of Act 
I, it is John, not Carol, who "hedges his language ( e.g. , "I think," "I'm sure"), who uses 
shorter utterances, and who has a number of incomplete noun phrases, "while Carol 
manages to finish most of her utterances" (172). Nemeth essentially introduces the 
possibility that John's perceived linguistic competence is merely a privileging of his 
institutional speech by critics and audiences similar to that of both John and the academy. 
Nemeth also draws attention to the moment when John makes his unwise offer to 
change Carol' s grade. As mentioned above, when a language becomes so familiar as to 
be automatic, the speakers often condense the language down to a highly restricted code, 
and along with a less deliberate application of the language often comes an unexamined 
adoption of those speaking roles most closely associated with the language. Nemeth 
accounts for John's offer in a similar manner. Drawing upon the work of Roland 
Barthes, he says, "[Barthes] claims that what a teacher demands of a student is ' to 
acknowledge him in whatever "role" it may be-authority, benevolence, militancy, 
knowledge, etc.'" (384). This is an apt description of John, who frequently inhabits one 
sufficed and, moreover, aided in their mutual communication and understanding. 
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or another pre-established role in his efforts to exert control over Carol and gain control 
over the situation. From the beginning, John has failed as the authoritarian, for Carol 
does not show the proper deference upon entering his office. John's use of the word 
"obeisance" to describe Carol's visit clearly indicates his desire to cast himself in a role 
of authority and to cast Carol in a role of submission. However, despite the implications 
of John's diction, Carol does not come to his office at his request. In fact, Carol seems to 
have wrested time away from John that he was initially unwilling to devote to her. 
John's capitulation to Carol's desire for a meeting contradicts John's assertion of an 
authoritarian role, just as his initial behavior towards Carol belies his later claims to the 
role of benefactor. Nemeth sees a further failure of authority in the fact that John's 
"student does not understand what he is teaching" ( 1 73). John "cannot adequately 
explain a term," he "apologizes . . .  for being distracted," and he eventually loses "his 
linguistic power over [his] student" because she "constantly contradicts him" ( 1 73), at 
one point limiting his speech "to answering and agreeing" ( 1 74). Ultimately, Nemeth 
sees John's offer of an "A," and his abandonment of the "authority" role in favor of the 
"benevolence" role, as an act of desperation-the most expedient way to rid himself of 
Carol and "the only way to restore and build a positive self-image" ( 1 73). 
Nemeth's conclusion, then, is that "Carol is considerably more effective than John 
because she operates her communicative strategies more convincingly than John does 
from the beginning of Act I," which "is of pivotal importance since the origins and the 
potentials of the change in dominance are convertly [sic] present in Carol's speech from 
the outset" ( 1 75). Whether or not this is true, the evidence presented by Nemeth shows 
that Carol is not a weak, feeble-minded individual who suddenly grows a backbone and 
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inexplicably learns John's language, a characterization common to many early critical 
accounts. Nemeth's evidence does suggest, however, that Carol's greatest disadvantage 
in Act I is that she, unlike John, attempts to communicate and that she does not 
concentrate her linguistic efforts chiefly in the establishment, maintenance, and 
consolidation of power. It is not until Act II that we see Carol begin to employ language 
primarily for purposes other than pure communication. Therefore, the development we 
witness in Carol during the course of the play is not an expression of some change in 
knowledge, talent, or skill, but in recognizing as mistaken her assumption that John wants 
to communicate-that he wants her to understand-and the abandonment of speech 
strategies that are based on this assumption. However, whether Carol truly cannot 
understand John's speech or is merely feigning (as some critics claim) her actions have 
not forced John into the choices he has made. John's feelings of self-importance have led 
him to take risks, and his egocentrism, starkly apparent in his language, reflects a lack of 
self-awareness that has led to, and compounds, his lack of situational awareness. Carol's 
charges are not the conflict, they are merely one of its outcomes. 
The second of the elements leading to the conflict between John and Carol is the 
willingness of each of these characters to misuse whatever power is at their disposal, a 
willingness that is the direct result of each character's extreme egocentrism, a quality 
social scientists have identified as being intrinsic to many forms of violence. Take, for 
example, the conclusion of Act I, a scene where John begins "acting more like a therapist 
than a professor" (Ryan 398). He attempts to draw Carol out, trying to elicit some sort of 
personal confession rather than keeping the conversation within the parameters of their 
professional, teacher-student relationship, where it belongs. When Carol starts to reveal 
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something of her private self, John does more than simply allow her to vent or encourage 
her to feel comfortable sharing a personal concern. John actively pursues knowledge of a 
personal nature: 
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John: What? 
Carol: I . . .  
John: What? Tell me. 
Carol: I don't understand you. 
John: I know. It's all right. 
Carol: I . . .  
John: What? (Paus e) What? Tell me. 
Carol: I can't tell you. 
John: No, you must. 
Carol: I can't. 
John: No. Tell me. 
Carol: I'm bad. (Paus e) Oh, God. (Paus e) 
John: It's all right. 
Carol: I'm . . .  
John: It's all right. 
Carol: I can't talk about this. 
John: It's all right. Tell me. 
Carol: Why do you want to know this? 
John: I don't want to know. I want to know whatever you . . .  
Carol: I always . . .  
John: . . .  good . .  . 
Carol: I always . . . in my life . . .  I have never told anyone this . . .  
John: Yes. Go on. (Pause) Go on. 
Carol: All of my life . . .  (3 7-8) 
I have included this lengthy passage to show just how relentless John becomes in his 
pursuit of this private knowledge. He hounds and cajoles her by turns. However, as soon 
as the phone rings, John answers it, quickly forgetting Carol and leaving her on the brink 
of expressing what is clearly a difficult and painful confession. In his recollection of a 
production at the Kennedy Center, David Kennedy Sauer isolates this moment as one 
"central to the meaning and experience of the play" ( 429). He speaks of the way that 
"John had led Carol on shamelessly to reveal her innermost secret and then, as she started 
to confess, he just abandoned her and left for his party" ( 429). Although there may never 
have been sexual abuse, John's actions are, for Sauer, "certainly some form of student 
abuse" ( 429). What Sauer terms "student abuse" may more accurately be called an abuse 
of power, for as Sauer points out, the key to this passage is "not what her secret was but 
John's total lack ofrecognition of her vulnerability in being about to reveal it" (329). 
The equality of teacher and student that John espouses in class ignores the fact that he 
still retains and routinely wields power in the classroom, and here he ignores a power 
differential augmented by Carol's own willingness to lower her defenses, a move that 
Carol makes only because she does not yet realize that John views their relationship as 
competitive, as was the case with his instructors, and that she is in the midst of a struggle. 
Shortly after, when "Carol reaches the conclusion that the party is being held because 
[Your friends and family are] proud of you,"' Steven Ryan adds, "as usual, unfortunately, 
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John denies her the satisfaction of an acceptable conclusion; 'there are,' he smugly 
announces, 'those who would say' that 'a surprise' is 'a form of aggression' (4 1 )" (399). 
His hasty departure at the moment of her revelation denies her human value, and his final 
comment denies her even the slightest claim to verbal and intellectual command. "We 
find in John's actions," says Richard Badenhausen, "a professor who very much enjoys 
his power" (5), and in these speech acts, we witness "a form of aggression" on stage. 
At the start of Act II, John again attempts to control the situation ( and Carol) by 
controlling the conversation. He does all of the speaking. Furthermore, his speech is 
elevated and formal, perhaps an attempt to intimidate Carol, or perhaps to demonstrate to 
her the skills and erudition he believes justify the position he holds and the power he 
exerts over his students.28 That John, like Levene in Mamet's Gle�garry Glen Ross, 
"does most of the talking is no accident; his refusal to let [his interlocutor] speak is 
further evidence of his terror," for he "prefers his audience's silence to the risk of 
allowing another-possibly condemning-voice to join in" (Dean 1 99). In any event, 
John here too displays the egocentrism that is at the source of his misuses of power and 
position. Seemingly out of the blue, and almost as if caught red-handed, John volunteers 
that he is "covetous" (Oleanna 43) of tenure, and he speaks of this desire at length. What 
John's monologue most clearly shows is that he views tenure as merely a material 
pursuit, as part of his "duties beyond the school" (44), and as representative of, or 
28 Steven Ryan writes: 
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[John] first attempts to intimidate his student with his vocabulary: "And, so, I asked and 
ask myself if I engaged in heterodoxy, I will not say 'gratuitously' for I do not care to 
posit orthodoxy as a given good-but, 'to the detriment of [sic] my students"' (43). He 
expects that Carol, confronted with such verbiage, will wither. Further, he claims that he 
is trying to protect Carol and not his own vested interests when he attempts to bully her 
into withdrawing her accusations against him. (399) 
necessary for, his "security," "comfort," and "enjoy[ment]" (44). Throughout, his 
primary concern is the deposit he has placed on a new house. He seems to view Carol, 
essentially, as little more than an obstacle that has come between him and his eventual 
rise in status and subsequent material gain. She is an inconvenience to John's habitual 
ways of doing things and an interference to his progress. When John finally realizes that 
his monopolization of the conversation and his frequent displays of erudition are only 
succeeding in upsetting Carol, John's egocentrism intensifies. John remains convinced 
that Carol must be viewing him the selfsame way that he once viewed his own teachers 
and, as such, he interprets Carol as wholly unable to articulate her real concerns. He 
says, "Can't you tell me in your own words?" (49), for she surely must be feeling what he 
felt when he was "in her position" as an undergraduate. "I understand your anger at 
teachers," he continues. "I was angry with mine" (45). It never occurs to him that he has 
never been in her position, or anything like it, nor that Carol might be stating her 
grievances very clearly. Piaget was the first to "scrutinize the problem of insufficient 
introspective abilities" of this nature, and he came "to [the] conclusion that the widely 
accepted belief according to which the egocentric people are more aware of themselves is 
not correct" (Vygotsky 24). Here, one can see that John's egocentrism is precisely that 
which stands between him and any real, profitable introspection. 
Ironically, John demonstrates his egocentrism most clearly at a moment when he 
is asserting his consistent concern for others. He says: 
John: To continue: I feel that one point . . .  
Carol: I . . .  
87 
John: One second . .. upon which I am unassailable is my unflinching 
concern for my students' dignity. I asked you here to ... in the spirit of 
investigation, to ask you ... to ask . . .  (Pause) What have I done to you? 
(Pause) And, and, I suppose, how I can make amends. Can we not settle 
this now? It's pointless really, and I want to know. (45-6) 
This passage provides a veritable goldmine of evidence of John's egocentrism and also 
suggests how this egocentrism is tied to John's ideas about the teacher-student 
relationship. First of all, in the habit of lecturing students-a pedagogical form that is 
counter to the teaching philosophies John espouses, and one that emphasizes the 
hierarchical relationship between teacher and student-he silences Carol so that he might 
inform her that he has an "unflinching concern" for her dignity as one of his students. He 
has tremendous difficulty formulating a sentence that might tend to alter this hierarchy 
and place Carol in a position of power. Specifically, John cannot bring himself to ask the 
one thing he needs, and probably planned, to ask: to drop the charges against him. He 
tries, unsuccessfully, to phrase the request and cannot; instead, he resorts to "asking" a 
rather accusatory question, one for which he should already know the answer since he has 
a copy of Carol's complaint in his hand. Finally, finding the entire process intolerable, he 
sheds the momentarily and unconvincingly adopted role of supplicant, showing his true 
feelings about Carol and her untoward presumption, saying, "It's pointless, really" (46). 
This summation ostensibly refers to Carol's complaint, but John clearly has in mind 
Carol's claims upon a linguistic power that he feels is rightfully and exclusively his own, 
for John concludes his "supplication" with the imperative: "And I want to know" ( 46). 
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John has shown us with both words and actions that he does not teach because he 
loves it (as he claims), or knowledge, or his students. What John loves is a particular 
aspect of a traditional conception of teaching-the hierarchy. In fact, he does not teach 
at all; he merely approximates the role of teacher. It is as Roger Bechtel says: 
The language that constructs John's identity is that of the academy . . . .  
His language has earned him the identity of teacher; a title which, 
ironically, lends his language a credibility it would not otherwise have. 
Thus language has bestowed upon him a certain privileged use of 
language. But scratch the surface of even his most practiced rhetoric and 
a hypocrisy which betrays an ultimate hollowness is quickly exposed. 
(36-7, emphasis added) 
John tells Carol, "I swore that I would not become that cold, rigid automaton of an 
instructor which I had encountered as a child" ( Oleanna 43), and he has not-not become 
"that" automaton, but a different kind of one. His delivery is substantially different than 
that of his instructors; however, although his style is not cold or rigid, his position within 
the classroom and the effects of his speech are very similar and not what he claims. 
Robert Skloot discusses the nature and effects of John's pedagogy: 
John does show an awareness of a kind of pedagogy consistent with the 
concern to "open up the classroom." This is the exact sense in which 
[bell] hooks defines teaching as "performative act," in that it "offers a 
space for change . . .  to engage 'audiences,' to consider issues of 
reciprocity" ( 15). Nonetheless, John's pedagogical method, at bottom, is a 
clear contradiction of the [Augusto Boal/Paulo] Friere/[bell] hooks 
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liberational model; in fact, his pedagogy is doubly flawed, for he is using 
performative acts not to enlarge space for reflection and engagement but 
rather to beguile and enthrall his tuition-paying audiences. (98) 
Perhaps, in John's case, there is more hollowness than hypocrisy. In the article 
just cited, Skloot addresses "how Oleanna can be linked to Mamet's preoccupation with 
the issue of teaching, of how facts, customs, and feelings are transmitted among 
inhabitants of the same social and cultural spaces" (96). Skloot says, "It is because 
Mamet is provoked by issues of authority that he has created a play that revolves around 
the authority of pedagogy" (97). We have already seen that John's investment in 
teaching is based mainly on a desire to secure for himself the sort of power and status that 
his teachers held when he was a student. And since John always viewed his relationships 
with his teachers as competitive and their instruction as a series of personal affronts, it 
becomes difficult for him to imagine a teacher-student relationship that does not involve 
a personal contest for power. John sees Carol's suit against him as corroboration of this 
assessment ( and perhaps he's right) and, in John's mind, this excuses him from 
consideration of her complaint or the hand he may have played in its inception (here, 
however, he is in the wrong). The inability to imagine an alternative view prompts John 
to assume Carol's case to be personal and to ask, "My God, are you so hurt?" (Oleanna 
49). 
Later, the egocentrism and the competitive conception of academe that drive 
John's speech and behavior lead John to whine: "You talk of rights. Don't you see? I 
have rights too. I have a house . . .  part of the real world; and the Tenure Committee, 
Good Men and True . . .  " (50). The audience should recognize this weak sort of scolding 
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as the fallacy it is. John's reference to home ownership as a "right" shows the same 
confused line of thinking with which John takes Carol to task when he says: "It has 
become a ritual, it has become an article of faith . . . .  We confound the usefulness . . .  
with our . . .  right . . .  to the same. We, in effect, create a prejudice toward it" (29-30). 
John's mental conflation of the "fashionable necessity" of home ownership "for those of, 
or aspiring to the new vast middle class" and home ownership as a right allows him to 
"espouse it, as a matter of right" (33). This only serves to highlight his position of 
privilege, the discrepancies between John's and Carol's respective "rights," and the gap 
in their respective expectations and concerns. John's latent feelings about teaching and 
about the academy are also made apparent when he chooses to distinguish them things 
from those things that qualify as substantial, as "part of the real world" (50). The depth 
of John's egocentrism and the shallowness of his convictions regarding the pedagogical 
methods he professes can be measured in the ease with which "John reverses positions he 
held firmly in their first discussion . . . .  He now stands by the committee members­
whom he wouldn't trust to wax his car-and his contempt for the tenure process has 
turned to admiration" (Porter 22). Even though he seems to view his colleagues as 
competitors, when confronted by danger, John's impulse is retreat to a position behind 
them and the institution he has, up until now, mocked and condemned. 
Carol feels compelled to remind John of the privilege that enables him to shift his 
opinions so deftly. Perhaps ''unwittingly," rather than "deftly" is a more accurate term, 
for John's speech and behavior are often so involuntary that he fails to see the 
inconsistency in his words and actions. John, for instance, fails to recognize the insult in 
calling "higher education a joke" while simultaneously "confess[ing] to a taste to play the 
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Patriarch" ( 0/eanna 5 1 ) in class. Nor does he seem to recognize the audacity of 
disrespecting the ambitions of students who are struggling to escape their lower 
socioeconomic standing while, as in the example above, asking them to "understand that 
[he has] aspirations too" (52). Carol notes John's readiness to fall in line with the 
institution he has so harshly criticized and from which he has tried to set himself apart, 
accusing him of following conventions only when they afford him power and privilege. 
John's academic training has taught him how to argue effectively, but he has never 
learned self-reflection or empathy, so rather than examining the behavior Carol has made 
the subject at hand, John instead considers how best to exercise his linguistic skills-to 
cajole, to coerce, or to convince.29 As a result, John's response takes the form of an 
apologia regarding the importance of conventions, and he finds himself asserting that 
"much of what we do, you 're right, in the name of 'principles' is self-serving . . .  much of 
what we do is conventionaf' (53) . 
John has, unknowingly, introduced one of the foremost dangers of institutional 
language-that is, its tendency towards the automatic and egocentric. John's long speech 
about linguistic conventions, for example, is essentially a confession that what he says 
and does is often said and done without thought and without concern for others. 
29 Dominic Infante and Kent Colbert have each studied the effects of debate training on the use of language 
(cf. Chapter I, 20-1). Both researchers forward evidence indicating that the greater one's argumentative 
skills, the more likely one is to engage in argument. More importantly, they indicate that the type of 
argumentative skills one learns influences how one will approach both issues and interlocutors. For 
example, traditional ''policy" debate, which focuses on Dewey's ( 19 10) problem-solving paradigms, has 
been shown to "enhance argumentativeness .. . without affecting verbal aggressiveness"; whereas, "value" 
debate, which focuses on abstract value conflicts, "may reduce verbal aggressiveness . . .  without affecting 
argumentative development" (Colbert 2 12). The gist of Colbert's findings is that the sort of traditional 
academic training John received as a student was likely to teach him argumentative strategy rather than 
reflective or empathetic skills. Colbert also notes that the increasingly competitive nature of debate 
training contributes to the acquisition of argumentative skills at the expense of the development of 
reflective and empathetic skills. So, John's competitive instincts are also likely to get in the way. 
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Vygotsky explains that such "egocentric thought is . . .  not fully conscious. It occupies 
an intermediate position between the conscious reasoning of adults and unconscious 
dream activity" (24); that is, it occupies the midpoint between the rational analysis of 
reality and pure wishful imagining. The nature of his speech, John admits, is generally 
dictated by such egocentric thought; or else, by ritual. Jeanette Malkin speaks to the 
ritual aspect of institutional speech, when she points to instances when ''uses of jargon 
signal the total self-containment of rhetoric which ?as even integrated the terms of its 
own criticism" (83), a feature that makes any institutional language a powerful 
ideological influence. For example, Anne Dean discusses how, in American Buffalo, 
Teach's worldview has become ritualized and encapsulated by his all-pervasive business 
lingo; similarly, in 0/eanna, whenever John chooses to criticize the academy, he may 
think of himself as iconoclastic, but he easily overlooks the fact that even in his 
criticisms, he is a spokesperson for the academy, within the academy's walls, and using 
the academy's own language. So, while/by attacking the academy, he is also 
participating in it, becoming more entrenched in it and more reliant on it, widening its 
sphere, strengthening it. Dean argues that Teach "is not a psychopath or a fundamentally 
evil man, but one who uses his manipulative powers to buy affection and respect" 
because he is entirely subject to the linguistic logic of the marketplace (95); likewise, 
John is not an essentially bad man, but his speech acts are often cruel and violent because 
they are expressions of the elitist and hierarchical logic of the academy. Speakers of any 
highly specialized language are encouraged to view this speech merely as a tool and not 
to consider the implications of its use, and this serves to shift attention away from the 
source of this language and the ideologies it expresses and of which it is an expression. 
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Because it is typically viewed as innocuous, speakers permit institutional speech to 
become highly automatic-highly conventional-yet by providing the means of its own 
criticism, it conceals its own conventionality. Because one can criticize the source of the 
speech, one is invited to separate the speech from the institution; however, such criticism 
will always be leveled only in those ways provided for and codified by the institution­
that is, only on (and in) its own terms. Speakers are also encouraged to separate their 
own use of institutional language from use of the language in general or in the abstract. 
This allows ( or leads) speakers to believe that their individual employments of the 
language's conventions are not subject to the influence of these very conventions-that 
their use of the language does not run the risk of, nor invite, being compromised by any 
of the institution's ideologies. Speakers are encouraged to believe that they are in 
complete control of their speech, a position refuted by the very existence of linguistic 
convention. 
What Anne Dean says of Glengarry Glen Ross-that "there is no moral law at 
work . . .  merely a system of reward and punishment" (202)-is equally true of the 
academy as it is portrayed in 0/eanna. Both the institution and its members, represented 
in the form of John and the members of the Tenure Committee, appear to operate 
according to the demands of the marketplace, and so John is faced by the extremes of 
either tenure or termination. Kellie Bean writes: 
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Always present but invisible to Carol, the Tenure Committee stands 
behind John as the mechanism that reifies his identity as the natural 
provider of grades and class credit and underwrites her role as the 
submissive facilitator of his identity. Like dominant ideology, the Tenure 
Committee, through its tacit power over the members of the faculty it 
polices, influences the behavior of the group's individual members, and 
inspires (if not determines) their ideological standards. In order to receive 
material and professional advancement John enacts the Committee's 
approved notions of academic identity. This ideological imposition 
masquerades in John's career as academic freedom and disguises a 
collusive relationship as the diverse reality of university life. He writes, 
for example, an apparently iconoclastic book, but even as he criticizes the 
institution, he subscribes to the established conventions for acquiring 
increased status within that institution: he publishes a scholarly book. 
( 12 1  )30 
As "Mamet has observed [,] . . .  when connected in some way to a large organization or 
state ideology, people can behave in ways quite unacceptable to them in any other 
context: 'The code of the institution ratifies us in acting amorally, as any guilt which 
might arise out of our acts would be borne not by ourselves"' because acts "'done in the 
name of some larger group, a state, a company, a team . . .  are somehow magically 
transformed and become praiseworthy"' (202). Even in his role as a limited partner in 
the institution, John hopes, even half expects, that his speech acts will be automatically 
privileged, but when he threatens to become a liability to the institution, John is easily 
30 I disagree, however, with Kellie Bean's assessment of the play's resolution. Bean argues that "John's 
vexed relations with the Tenure Committee are repaired through the oppression of a member of a 
marginalized group. In this case, his female student. This oppression reinforces John's cultural authority 
and, as it is implicitly sanctioned by the Committee, reinvigorates his relations to the powerful center" 
( 122). Instead, I see an institutional body that readily sacrifices John due to the evidence presented by 
Carol, but primarily to safeguard its own continued existence, security, and influence. 
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sacrificed and his privilege is readily revoked. "The catch and irony," in the words of 
Jeanette Malkin, "is that these figures derive their position and their authority from their 
own conformity to pre-existing verbal norms, and are thus appropriate vessels through 
which language can subjugate the rebellious and uninitiated" (99). Such is the case with 
John and with the members of the Tenure Committee, and it will eventually be true of 
Carol, as well. 
John's assertion that conventions are "the essence of all human communication" 
(53), and the intimation that all conventions are as benign as his example: "Nice day, 
isn't it?" (54), each represent an attempt simply to waive away the potential weight of his 
speech. Roger Bechtel perhaps says it best: 
If . . .  we can view John's language as having little if any inherent 
meaning or value, . . .  it nevertheless has tremendous consequence. It is 
action. John's academese, which ideally should elucidate, only obscures. 
Yet, as professor, his language is privileged, inherently credible." (38) 
Bechtel comments that "from the outset, John fails to see that his flood of language is 
anything more than just that" and that, as a result, John remains "utterly oblivious to the 
consequences of [his] language" ( 41 ). 
He considers his language as deserving of both power and privilege-for 
example, justifying and facilitating an increase in income and status-yet simultaneously 
as mere words, not to be taken too seriously.3 1  So, when "John declares that convention 
31 Elsewhere, John has advised Carol, saying, "Look. It's just a course, it's just a book . . .  " ( 0/eanna 12) 
or "Your grade's an 'A.' Forget about the paper. You didn't like it, you didn't like writing it. It's not 
important" (25). 
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is 'the essence of all human communication' (53)," as Kellie Bean is quick to point out, 
he "ignores the obvious political questions of how social conventions are established and 
who [sic.] they serve" ( 120). Marc Silverstein sees John's newly adopted ideology as 
that of "the New Right" ( 109). John now professes "that the 'agree[ment] that we are 
human' takes precedence over the fact 'that we have . . .  positions, and that we may have 
. . .  desires, which are in conflict' (53)" ( 109).32 Of course, in such a conservative appeal 
for universal amity, "it is precisely those students occupying sites of class, ethnic, and 
sexual difference who find themselves asked to (mis)recognize the irrelevance of such 
difference when compared with their membership in a 'common culture"' ( 109), a 
membership that is often unwanted, often forced, and often withheld even after such 
sacrifices. Furthermore, those occupying this position often argue that it is "a kind of 
distorted communication rather than culture difference [that is the] main obstacle to 
community" ( 109); still, these same individuals tend to view the "cultural difference" of 
marginalized individuals as the source of the "distorted communication" they register. 33 
The move by John to embrace what, previously, were foreign positions signals his 
attempt to "submerge[,] . . .  in the ideological rhetoric of the 'human,' a . . .  difference 
that threatens to reveal this rhetoric as ideological" ( 1 10). 34 Once again, language 
32 In Mamet's other plays, such appeals to the human-as in American Buffalo when Don declares "We're 
human beings. We can talk, we can negotiate" (62)-are often linked to examples of predatory behavior. 
So, when a character makes such an appeal, that character may be using this rhetoric to mask predatory 
behavior or may be using such rhetoric as a last-ditch effort to prevent being victimized by the predatory 
behavior of another. 
33 Not only are these claims contradictory, but the formulation as a whole suggests that communication 
distortions are unidirectional and exclusively the province and responsibility of marginalized individuals. 
34 Albert Bandura elaborates on this process, saying: 
Disputes over the labeling of aggressive acts assume special significance in the case of 
collective behavior involving dissident and institutionally sanctioned aggression. 
97 
conceals the presence of the institution and of the ideologies to which it is tied. The New 
Right's universalizing and conventional rhetoric hints that it is unnecessary for John to 
examine his behavior too deeply, and it provides a collection of ready-made roles for 
John conveniently to adopt and the linguistic smokescreen John needs to disavow his ties 
to a specific ideology or to the academy in general. Using the rhetoric of the New Right, 
John can simply recast himself as a spokesman for community and an advocate of 
academic tradition. 
The availability of a new set of prescribed roles is significant. In an article 
entitled "Post Violence Dialogue: Perception Change Through Language Restructuring," 
Barbara A Neizo and Marilyn Lewis Lanza discuss ways they have helped violent 
patients recognize the role they have played in initiating violent incidents so that they 
might avoid such behavior in the future. The techniques employed by N eizo and Lanza 
are "accomplished by altering language style" and are "designed to change the patient' s  
dysfunctional perceptions of self and others which may be associated with violence" 
(246). Neizo and Lanza acknowledge their indebtedness to the theories of linguist 
Benjamin L. Whorf and his hypothesis "that the forms of a person's thoughts are 
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Agencies . . .  are entrusted with considerable rewarding and coercive power. Either of 
these sources of power can be misused to produce detrimental social effects. Punitive 
and coercive means of control may be employed to maintain inequitable systems, to 
suppress legitimate dissent, and to victimize disadvantaged segments of society. People 
can similarly be harmed both physically and socially by arbitrary denial or discrimination 
in the administration of beneficial resources to which they are entitled. 
People vary markedly in their perceptions of aggression for social control and 
for social change. The more advantaged citizenry tend to view even exteme levels of 
violence for control as lawful discharges of duty, whereas disadvantaged members regard 
such practices as expressions of institutional aggression . . . .  Thus, in conflicts of power, 
one person's violence is another person's benevolence. Whether a particular form of 
aggression is regarded as adaptive or destructive depends on who bears the consequences. 
("Social Leaming Theory" 13) 
controlled by inexorable and unconscious laws of pattern. These patterns are the 
unperceived, intricate structures of language that influence how we see, think, and feel" 
(246). The task, then, is to make the unconscious linguistic patterns that shape one's 
behavior available for conscious examination ( cf. Piaget, Vygotsky, and Luria). By 
simply shifting from one set of "roles" to another, John forfeits the opportunity to 
examine his own behavior; he merely abandons the linguistic scripts he has employed up 
to this point in favor of others, and in this case for the older and more established scripts 
of an academy that he hopes will rally in his defense and against his accuser. Because 
John refuses to consider his own speech, he is unable to see how his words might 
legitimately be interpreted in unintended ways, and he remains unable to recognize just 
how accurately Carol's accusations can account for what took place in his office. In 
addition, John remains primarily interested in institutional membership, status, and 
security, and he still considers teacher-student relationships as competitive, not as the 
cooperative professional relationships they could ( and should) be. 
According to Neizo and Lanza, the violent patients with whom they work often 
use language as a way to avoid acknowledging the contributtons they make to the violent 
situations in which they find themselves. To combat this sort of linguistically structured 
blindness, Neizo and Lanza have successfully employed "language restructuring 
techniques" that are designed "to reconnect the patient with her or his experiences, then 
to establish new alternatives for action" (253). One method involves making patients 
aware of their tendencies to generalize even when the situational specifics necessary for 
proper analysis are readily available to them. These patients view their stock 
generalizations and pat responses simply as a form of shorthand. However, this 
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"shorthand" often lacks accuracy and often invites inappropriate, offensive, or 
provocative responses that, in turn, often attract violent reactions from their interlocutors. 
L. S. Vygotsky explains that the ability to generalize marks an important stage in 
intellectual development; however, he also cites the problems that may occur when an 
individual has learned to generalize but has not yet developed the ability to discern 
between entities within a generalized group, a cognitive development that typically 
comes later. Generalization, unlike discernment, is possible with a minimal level of 
attention and deliberateness, and the comparative ease of applying a generalization is 
often an attractive alternative to the more demanding combination of generalization and 
discernment. "When a person speaks in generalizations," explain Neizo and Lanza, 
"distinctions critical to a full understanding of one's experiences are blurred. Making 
distinctions is a necessary first step in identifying possible choices for coping with any 
particular situation" (252). 
John's use of language shows the sort of tendency towards generalization that is 
associated with violent behavior, and these features will persist, and even increase, as the 
play rushes to its dramatic conclusion. Later, when Carol says, "You think I am a 
frightened, repressed, confused, I don't know, abandoned young thing of some doubtful 
sexuality," John answers: "Yes. I do" (68), thereby confirming his generalized 
conception of Carol. In the written results to an experiment outlined in the last chapter, 
Albert Bandura, Bill Underwood, and Michael E. Fromson disclose: "When the 
performers were humanized, subjects strongly disapproved of physical punishment and 
rarely excused it use. By contrast, when performers were divested of humanness, 
subjects seldom condemned punitive techniques but often voiced self-absolving 
1 00 
justifications" ("Disinhibition of Aggression" 262). John's willingness to see Carol as a 
damaged version of a human being is the sort of initial step that leads to an acceptance of, 
or encourages, the use of aggression and violence. A� Bandura writes, "Maltreatment of 
individuals who are regarded as subhuman or debased is less apt to arouse self-reproof 
than if they are seen as human beings with dignifying qualities" ("Social Leaming 
Theory" 25). Overall, John's defense of himself never really takes the form of a rebuttal, 
and he never really attempts to counter Carol's accusations; instead, one sees a stream of 
unsupported and rote assertions regarding his concern for students, his interest in higher 
education, and his right to certain privileges-authority, security, and a higher income. 
Carol's eventual response to John's appeals regarding conventions, obligations, 
and rights is simple, direct, and masterful. She agrees with John. That is, she agrees to 
follow conventions. As Carol points out to John, by lodging a formal complaint and 
following the official channels, she is doing exactly what John, on the surface, asks of 
her. Carol's commitment to "stick to the process" (56) demonstrates the ineffectiveness 
of John's rhetoric to sway her, as well as the ambiguous relationship John has with the 
institution. John's command of the situation is steadily deteriorating and, at this stage, 
we see the first unmistakable indication of John's propensity for aggressive physical 
action. After proclaiming, "I am trying to save you" (57), a claim that Carol puts aside 
immediately, and failing in his attempt to intimidate and control Carol with the command 
to "sit down," John physically "restrains her from leaving" (57). 
Act Three is Mamet's tour de force depiction of two languages colliding, and it is 
in this act that we begin to understand how much Carol has adopted the same aggressive 
uses of institutional language. Again, many critics have complained that the 
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transformation in Carol from a position of ignorance in Act I to one of absolute fluency 
and control in Act III is a violation of realistic theater and verisimilitude. However, aside 
from the fact that Mamet has never been particularly interested in producing traditional 
realistic drama, this complaint is not accurate. As we have seen, Carol is never 
incompetent in her use of language and, even in Act Ill, Carol is occasionally at a loss, as 
when John calls Carol's  report to the Tenure Committee an "indictment" (0/eanna 63): 
John: I have spent some time studying the indictment. 
Carol: You will have to explain that word to me. 
John: An "indictment" . . .  
Carol: Yes. 
John: Is a "bill of particulars." A . . .  
Carol: All right. Yes. (63) 
John again tries to use his specialized vocabulary to his advantage, but Carol wrests 
control away from John, and he capitulates to Carol's demand for more simplified 
language. It is unfortunate that John has waited so long to allow Carol access to his 
ideas-that he has waited so long to teach. The real difference in Carol' s use of language 
between the first and last acts is not a sudden and miraculous mastery of the English 
language; rather, the change comes in Carol's recognition of language as action-she 
becomes much more versed in how language is used within the academy in general and 
by John in particular-and in her new willingness to employ language in a like manner. 
Sadly, Carol comes to use language in an equally irresponsible way and, sadly, 
Carol' s relationship with her "group" represents another source of linguistic misuse and 
violence. Although Carol has become much more savvy about John's use of language, 
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she continues to exhibit an uncomfortable level of naivete and faith where her "group" is 
concerned, and she seems all too ready to relinquish control of her thoughts and speech to 
this "group." Rather than focusing on the violence against John, Thomas H. Goggan sees 
Carol's relationship with her "group" as the third case of abuse suffered by Carol. If, as 
discussed earlier, Goggans is correct in suspecting an abusive childhood, then, he argues, 
"the harassment she perceives does not seem to be drawn from a 'willful 
misinterpretation,"' as has been suggested by several critics; "instead, it seems to be 
misinterpretation fated by her personal history and merely mis-channeled by the self­
interested Group which pursues, in John, a legitimate perpetrator of hierarchic abuse, but 
the wrong representative of Carol's literal ' patriarchal' abuse" ( 440). Therefore, Carol's 
linguistic violence against John arises from the same sources as John's violence against 
Carol, and both characters find themselves subject to the language they employ. Just as 
John's academic speech at first appears a source of individual power, Carol's relationship 
with the Group "seems to free her, [but] in fact it merely replicates the manipulation of 
her abusive past, allowing her to repress rather than excise her secret," for ultimately 
"power structures pursue their own preservation, often disregarding those whom they 
claim to serve. In this sense, Carol's relation to the Group mirrors her relation to John. 
In echoing the rhetoric of the Group, she is again merely reading back her notes as she 
did in John's class" (439) 
The adoption of ready-made cultural or subcultural interpretations and responses 
in lieu of exercising real situational awareness and deliberateness of thought have long 
been a subject of particular interest and an area of investigation for Albert Bandura. For 
over three decades, he has discovered evidence positively correlating such adoptions with 
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an individual's likelihood of engaging in violent actions against others, and this is exactly 
what Carol does under the "guidance" of her "group." John Lahr astutely writes that 
Carol "has acquired a new voice and a new vocabulary, whose authority precludes 
ambiguity. She adopts . . .  an intellectual carapace that substitutes dogma for thought, 
mission for mastery" ( 124) and, rather than "work to master a world she can't 
comprehend," Carol "changes the frame of reference to a world she can [ comprehend]" 
( 124). There is no doubt that Carol has introduced a new "frame of reference" by Act III, 
a move necessitated by the power inequity of the earlier frame of reference and John's 
role in Carol's relative lack of success at mastering John's language. The shift to the 
languages of sexual politics and political correctness inaugurates a corresponding shift in 
power, and Carol's use of language becomes as flawed and violent and as subject to the 
control of outside influences as John's was, when the previous frame of reference 
provided John with the greater measure of power. 
Although critical responses to Mamet's play tend to place the lion's share of 
blame at Carol's feet, both John and Carol exhibit communicative failures, the most 
fundamental of which have little to do with whether characters know the definitions of 
particular terms. These collapses are primarily examples of the inability of characters to 
avoid the pre-fabricated institutional and cultural roles replicated in their language. In 
terms of both intellectual demand and cultural convenience, it becomes easier mindlessly 
to adopt than to avoid such roles. For example, in spite of the disdain John expresses for 
his own instructors and the educational environment they fostered, they appear to be the 
primary models, if not of the philosophies he expresses, certainly of his teacherly 
behavior. In spite of his rhetoric, John appears unable to conceive of roles other than 
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those he learned while a student himself, and the recollections of these unequal 
relationships, and his continued performance of them, attest to the enormous effect they 
have had on his understanding of student-teacher relationships.35 John's memories, 
therefore, contribute to the development of his liberal rhetoric, but also to his 
uninterrogated adoption of largely identical roles. Although they spur in him the desire 
to separate himself in some way from those who taught him, they still represent his most 
significant models of teaching, teacherly behavior, the academy, and how to gauge one's 
success therein. Unfortunately, "each of the roles that John tries on with Carol-firm but 
understanding professor, wise father, benign mentor," says Verna Foster, "underscores 
his position of authority and bolsters his own ego" ( 42). The largely unconscious process 
of adoption makes it possible for John to continue to see himself as a "maverick," as a 
competent communicator, and as a defender of intellectual openness, even as he occupies 
a conventional hierarchical position, speaks an elitist and exclusionary language, and 
disregards intellectual freedom. Of this last point, Richard Badenhausen says: 
John first defends academic freedom in the play's last minutes and 
significantly only when his own book is threatened. He actually is willing 
to consider the list of banned books, instead of rejecting the notion 
outright on the basis of principle. What emerges most forcefully is not a 
lesson in the importance of free speech, but a rambling diatribe by an 
egocentric hypocrite squirming under the pressure of a formidable attack. 
(12) 
35 Mamet has indicated that "his experience as a student at the mercy of incompetent and intimidating 
pedagogues informs 'Oleanna"' ("Tender Thoughts" C lO). 
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When his academic and material advancement are at risk, he no longer says, "Look. It's 
just a course, it's just a boolc' ( 12). Now, he sputters, "I'm a teacher. I am a teacher. 
Eh? It's my name on the door, and / teach the class, and that's what I do. I've got a book 
with my name on it. And my son will see that book someday" (76). This passage, which 
Robert Skloot calls "John's final attempt to reassert his authoritarian prerogatives" (99), 
shows John's investment in the status quo of the academy, as well as .the egocentrism to 
which it is linked. 
Carol, however, turns "the oppressive 'banking' system of education back on 
John" when she "asserts her dominance in act 3: 'I came here to instruct you,' but she 
leaves the system intact" (Skloot 99). In addition, Carol is quick to adopt the roles of 
"oppressed minority" and "victim" and the equally violent use of language encouraged by 
her "group." She is, for instance, willing to have John face charges of physical '�assault" 
and sexual "rape" as punishment for John's misuses of the language of authority. John 
may retreat from the positions he originally expressed to the safety of the institutional 
conventions he had earlier discounted, and he may be hypocritical in his ideas regarding 
individual rights and intellectual freedom, but Carol is willing to use the language of 
sexual harassment in an attempt to blackmail John.36 John tries to dismiss any injury to 
Carol as a mere matter of semantics, but Carol asserts that any sort of injury.done to John 
will be justified. One should also consider Richard Badenhausen' s suggestion that Carol 
"has come to master many of her teacher's own tricks, including a penchant for 
36 Since Mamet believes that "the true nature of the world, as between men and women, is sex, and any 
other relationship between us is either an elaboration or an avoidance" (Some Freaks 90), it should hardly 
be surprising that his female protagonist suspects a sexual advance, claims sexual harassment, or chooses to 
employ the language of sexual politics in her bid for power. 
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intellectual bullying: an ability to use language ambiguously so as to get her way" ( 14 ). 
Clearly Carol and John misuse language and the power that comes with it, but their 
misuses of language also implicate academic culture and the institution. 
Although commentators often cite John's eventual inarticulateness and the 
impotence of his language as the catalysts that lead him to abandon speech and resort to 
physical violence, this is only partially accurate.37 To appreciate fully the extent of 
John's loss, one must acknowledge the degree to which John previously held and wielded 
power in the form of institutionally sanctioned speech. Failures of speech can, certainly, 
be sources of frustration or anger, but John's peripeteia can only be sufficiently gauged 
by taking stock of other contributing factors. Indeed, John has lost the control he 
previously held over language, but more importantly, he has lost the control he 
previously held by means a/language. The tragedy of John's case is not simply a matter 
of his vocabulary failing him when he encounters an unfamiliar and unforeseen situation. 
John's tragedy lies in the fact that, prior to his engagement with Carol, he owed his 
position, his anticipated advancement, his self-perception, and his very identity to his 
language.38 He has, suddenly, come face to face with the inadequacy of his institutional 
37 For example: Roger Bechtel argues that "what Mamet does here, in extremis, is show us the kind of 
dynamic that can lead to violence in people normally considered extremely civilized. When language is 
rendered impotent, when one's mode of expression is repressed, what expression remains but violence?" 
Unfortunately, he ends with an oversimplified account of aggressive responses by saying, "And who else 
but the repressor will be its victim?" ( 46). Paul McDonald explains that John is shown "to resort, 
ultimately, to the last recourse of the inarticulate precisely because [he has] been denied the use of 
language" (28). Indicating the adverse effects of "political correctness" on John, Alain Piette speaks of 
John's  inarticulateness and his loss of control over language, features he sees shared by most of Mamet's 
characters (passim). And Jill B. Gidmark refers to John's beating of Carol as "the savagery of a silence 
that's beyond words" (1 86), by which I assume she means an "inarticulateness" rather than a "silence," 
considering the flood of verbal abuse that accompanies John's  physical attack. 
38 With regard to John's anticipation of advancement, Dolf Zillmann theorizes that because of the human 
ability to categorize by means of language, and as a result the human ability to abstract and imagine 
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language. Robert Storey has said of Mamet's plays in general that "Mamet's characters . 
. . are their language; they exist insofar as-and to the extent that-their language allows 
them to exist. Their speech is not a smokescreen but a modus vivendi" (Storey 3). In 
other words, while it may be frustrating for John when his speech is rendered ineffective, 
this is only part of the story. John's institutional speech represents more than a weapon 
in his battle with Carol; it represents his ability to exercise authority, to maintain his 
position, and to gauge his success and self-worth. This loss of speech is not only a loss of 
power, but also a loss of identity. It calls into question many of his most cherished roles-
"teacher"· "scholar"· "academic"· "intellectual"· "authority" and "authority figure"· ' ' ' ' ' 
"breadwinner"; "husband"; and "father"; even "man" insofar as he subscribes to 
traditional conceptions of manhood built upon these other roles and his linguistic skill­
and these are the roles according to which he has defined himself. 39 In addition, John 
cannot claim to be a "liberal ideologue," an "iconoclast," or an "intellectual 'maverick"' 
when the sentiments he has so passionately professed have been shown to be empty 
rhetoric. 
In Mamet's plays, as Diane M. Bordon points out, "The meaning of 'meaning' . . .  
is always contextualized . . .  through Mamet's preoccupation with discursive 
communities-or communities bonded by what John.in 0/eanna calls. 'terms of art"' 
alternative and hypothetical states of existence ( e.g., what might have been in the past and what may 
happen in the future), human beings are subject to the "de facto deprivation of objects and services they 
deem desirable but have never experienced directly." Such deprivation seems to be associated with the 
anthropological development of increasing "aggregations of vital resources" (Zillmann 103); that is, the 
foundations of materialistic endeavor, that also "created [in human beings] a new dimension for violent 
conflict" ( 103). 
39 John feels his identity under attack and in danger of slipping away when he says, "I'm a teacher. I am a 
teacher. Eh? It's my name on the door, and J teach the class, and that's what I do. I've got a book with my 
name on it. And my son will see that book someday" (76). 
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(235). In 0/eanna, one such discursive community is Mamet' s main target. The 
institution, as it appears in 0/eanna, has long been complicit in John 's  ongoing ignorance 
and, as a result, in his communicative failures. This community has, after all, 
consistently rewarded John. They have routinely rewarded his ability to manipulate 
jargon, to criticize for the sake of criticism, to espouse theories he does not really believe 
or at least will never practice, and to imprison language in the abstract realm of generality 
and the hypothetical. Consider that John has secured a position in the academy, has been 
allowed to teach classes and enjoy relative autonomy, has managed to have a book 
published, and had almost achieved tenure. Social psychological accounts of verbal 
aggression suggest the potentially far-reaching repercussions of rewarding John's 
behavior, including his misuse of language. "Approval," they warn, "not only increases 
the specific aggressive responses that are socially reinforced but it tends to enhance other 
forms of aggression as well" ("Social Leaming Theory" 21 ). Unfortunately for Carol and 
John, those within the academy in Mamet's  play seem so accustomed to trafficking in a 
language void of communicative substance that they are no longer able to recognize its 
flaws. 
One particular exchange best illustrates the extent of John' s loss, and that is when 
Carol infiltrates the most intimate areas of John's existence and tells him, "Don' t call 
your wife baby" (79). Roger Bechtel indicates the significance of this statement when he 
says: 
If identity is constructed of one's own language, and 0/eanna shows that 
it is, not only has John lost his public language, he himself has become 
publicly impotent. His last vestige of identity resides in his private 
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language-the very language Carol's parting comment seeks to control. 
"Don't call your wife baby" goes to the core of John's private self, and 
threatens him with utter impotency. (46)40 
Seen in this light, what Carol's comment registers is the extent of John's loss of 
authority, an authority based on the language of the academy and John's claim to certain 
institutional roles. John's tremendous loss of power and prerogative and his desire-to 
exert any form of power left to him are the real factors eliciting his final spectacular and 
violent response. By this time, John even feels the loss of a form of power he never 
imagined it possible to lose-the power associated with being male in this society. Unlike 
many of the roles John has claimed for himself that are largely a masquerade, John's 
maleness is a trait to which he has a legitimate claim. Carol's last parry calls into 
question the traditional patriarchal powers John feels he has the right to exercise in the 
home. Considering all of the above, it is hardly surprising, then, that John's final 
response should be a violent and physical expression of masculine size and strength, and 
one accompanied by virulently misogynistic language.41 
40 Thomas E. Porter answers those critics who see this act of Carol's as signifying a distinct difference 
between Carol's behavior and John's. Carol is the one, these critics claim, who has taken the conflict out 
of the public, and moved it into the private, sphere. Such a reading ignores the fact that John was the first 
to "get personal." Porter points out the rough equivalence between what Carol does here and what John 
had already done in Act I. She says, "As John tried to probe Carol's personal life in the first interview, so 
Carol the teacher invades his private space by challenging his treatment of his wife" (26). Carol shows 
Jol;m how inappropriate and unwanted it is for an instructor to invade a student's private life. Another 
important consideration is the exact nature of the comment. Hans Toch identifies statements perceived as 
questioning one's manly status as among the most distressing for men and, by far, the most likely to initiate 
a violent response from a man (Toch 65; also cf. Campbell and Connell). Considering all of the above, the 
escalation from speech to violence is much less surprising. 
41 John screams, "I wouldn't touch you with a ten-foot pole. You little cunt . . .  " (79). 
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While sexual politics and political correctness are certainly a part of Mamet's 
play, it is important to remember that these issues appear in Oleanna insofar as they are 
implicated in a more general struggle for power. I know just how attractive it can be to 
think of Mamet's play in terms of naturalistic characterization, to pick sides, or to assign 
blame; however, it is important to remember how much Mamet, in his depiction of the 
academy, implicates the institution, its ideologies, and the medium and source of its 
greatest power-its specialized language.42 Oleanna is about "the subordination of 
individual freedom to an absent source of power characteristic of Mamet's plays" (28). 
One could certainly make the case that American capitalism, another typical target of 
Mamet's, drives the power struggle in Oleanna-and capitalism's role in shaping 
language, human relationships, and acts of violence will be taken up in the next chapter 
in a discussion of some other contemporary plays. Still, in Oleanna, this absent source of 
power is made manifest in the language of the institution that defines both John and Carol 
and circumscribes all of their actions. 
42 Mamet's hopes for the play's reception are best expressed in his insistence that he agrees "with what she 
says as much as what he says. She may do some things that are dishonorable, but then so does he. For me, 
it is a play about the uses and abuses of power, and the corruption is on both sides" (Nightingale 37). 
Furthermore, the difficulties associated with reading 0/eanna as a realistic or naturalistic work are well 
documented in the large and readily available body of critical commentary. 
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CHAPTER III 
You Bought It; You Break It: Commodification, Language, and Violence in Patrick 
Marber's Closer and Mark Ravenhill's Shopping and Fucking 
The discussion of 0/eanna in the previous chapter illustrates how language can be 
used to maintain institutional ideologies and institutions themselves. Institutions are 
always more (or other) than the individuals that comprise them. They. are themselves 
entities and often have agendas and interests other than, or counter to, those professed 
and pursued by their members. In fact, the language of an institution may be structured 
primarily to ensure its continued existence and its increase in power and influence. This 
is true of the academy as depicted in Mamet's play, but it is also true of other, broader 
social institutions. The discussion of 0/eanna also demonstrates how language may be 
used to establish and maintain hierarchy within groups. Baudrillard sees this function of 
language as a form of commodification, describing the process in the following way: 
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It is easy to see how one can . . .  "consume" language. As soon as it 
becomes loaded with in-group connotations, and, instead of being a 
vehicle for meaning, turns into a group lexicon, a class or caste heritage . . .  
. As soon as it ceases to be a means of exchange and becomes a material 
of exchange for the internal usage of a group or class-:its. real function, 
under cover of conveying a message, being one of collusion and 
recognition; and as soon as, rather than putting meaning into circulation, it 
begins itself to circulate as password, as shibboleth, in a process of group 
tautology (the group speaking itself), then language is an object of 
consumption, a fetish. (200) 
He summarizes: "It is no longer being used as a language [langue] ,  as a system of 
distinctive denotative signs, but consumed as a system of connotation, as a distinctive 
code" (200). 
The tautological process cited above involves the creation of a group identity; 
however, group identities are frequently at the core of individual subjectivities. This was 
the case with John, Carol, and the members of the Tenure Committee in 0/eanna. Cathy 
Urwin says, "For [Jacques] Lacan, language acquisition is the central process whereby 
conscious subjectivity is produced, to be continually reproduced every time we use 
language, whether as adults or children" (275). Theorists such as Jean Piaget, L. S. 
Vygotsky, and Alexander Luria share this position. That is why, as Urwin says, 
"Examining the processes involved in language development is vital to the theorization of 
subjectivities" (275). As social factors exert a considerable influence on subjectivity, the 
work of contemporary social scientists and theorists-the primary investigators of social 
identity-offers unique entree into the social worlds created by contemporary 
playwrights. The postmodern, consumer-capitalist identities and subjectivities that 
populate many contemporary plays, and the violent tendencies exhibited by the characters 
that possess them, are erected and cemented in part by language. Much is to be gained, 
therefore, by examining contemporary drama through the lenses provided by the social 
sciences. The social theory of Jean Baudrillard and the socially and linguistically 
informed psychological theories of Erich Fromm and Jacques Lacan will be particularly 
helpful in introducing the superstructures of capitalist ideology and language, for I 
contend that these factors under-gird the violent tendencies and the acceptance of 
violence central to many plays of the 1 990's and the start of the new millennium. 
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Contemporary cultures are not the first to have consumed objects, exchanged 
goods and services, or employed monetary systems. However, the essential relationships 
between individuals, society, and consumption are substantially different than those of 
earlier ages. Jean Baudrillard explains: 
What is sociologically significant for us, and which marks our age as an 
age of consumption, is precisely the generalized reorganization of this 
primary level into a system of signs which reveals itself to be one of the 
specific modes, and perhaps the specific mode, of transition from nature to 
culture in our era . . . .  The circulation, purchase, sale, appropriation of 
differentiated goods and signs/objects today constitutes our language, our 
code, the code by which the entire society communicates and converses. 
(79) 
A sea-change in the basic communicative structures and modes of current capitalist 
societies-and of global capitalism itself-is what defines our age as one of 
consumption. So, while consumption is nothing new, never have consumer goods been 
fetishized to such a degree, and never has consumerism so infiltrated the realm of 
interpersonal relationships. While the extent to which consumer capitalism has altered 
group and individual consciousness and the relationships between people is a matter for 
debate, even those unwilling to concede the possibility of radical change in the inter­
relational understanding of human beings are likely to admit, in the words of Jim 
Murphy, that contemporary narratives have, increasingly, become ones "in which persons 
and experiences are subordinated to consumer objects and electronically stored and 
circulated images" and that more and more often "people define themselves through the 
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TV shows they watch, the store toys they had, and the brand-name foods and beverages 
they consumed" (Murphy 1 0). 43 The plays of the 1990' s and the new millennium are full 
of characters that surrender inordinate amounts of thought and time and effort to their 
favorite products. For example, in Mark O'Rowe's Made in China, Kilby and Paddy are 
so enamored of the snack food Nik-naks that in their conversations they apply the 
trademark to other objects, to actions, and to part of the female anatomy. The characters 
in the play show more loyalty to the brands of clothing they wear than to people, they 
adopt nicknames based on the brands they love, and the label in a jacket introduces the 
anagnorisis and brings about the play's peripeteia. 
Similarly, one need only look to the national and international news to see the 
pervasiveness of a consumer mindset and to recognize, in Baudrillard's phrase, that 
"consumption is a system which secures the ordering of signs and the integration of the 
group; it is therefore both a morality ( a system of ideological values) and a 
communication system, a structure of exchange" (78). That capitalism continues to order 
and integrate western culture at the most basic levels may be seen in the fact that nobody 
43 Sociologist Richard Harvey Brown discusses how people have come to remember and speak of the past 
in terms of consumer objects and signs. Rather than speaking of a past decade, for instance, in terms of its 
natural disasters, major political events, scientific or medical advancements, broad artistic trends, or even 
by recalling the people and places significant to them at the time, individuals are more and more likely to 
list the products by which they remember a particular period. Brown's examples include the following: "I 
would sleep over at friends' houses on the weekends. We played army with G. I. Joe figures, and I set up 
galactic wars between Autobots and Decepticons"; "I drank Dr. Pepper . . .  Shasta was for losers. TAB 
was a laboratory accident. Capri Sun was a social statement"; "We are the ones who played with Lego 
Building Blocks when they were just building blocks and gave Malibu Barbie crewcuts with safety scissors 
that never really cut . . . We hold strong affection for the Muppets and The Gummy Bears"; "We forgot 
Vietnam and watched Tiananman's Square [sic] on CNN and bought pieces of the Berlin Wall at the store" 
( quoted in Brown 204-5). Brown's juxtaposition of nameless friends and brand-name products, his 
suggestion that the brand of a soft drink can have serious social implications, his observation that some 
people define their childhoods in terms of trademarks, his avowal that people can have "strong affection" 
for a cartoon that was created, primarily, to market an existing product (i.e. Gummy Bears), and his report 
that some people only comprehend historical significance by the exchange value of historical artifacts are 
all telling indicators of a strikingly contemporary consumer mentality. 
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blinks when popular Christian leaders and evangelists like Pat Robertson can image 
capitalism as not merely compatible with, but part of, a vision of contemporary Christian 
theology.44 However, the wholesale integration of western culture within a consumer 
capitalistic ethic across all levels-from the international to the individual-was perhaps 
expressed most clearly immediately after the 9- 1 1  attacks, when President Bush made 
consumption a national mandate and called upon American citizens to show their 
patriotism and help combat terrorism-by which he meant: "get on board," spend more 
money, and "go to Disney World." Consequently, the USA Today headline for October 
3, 2001 read: "Shoppers Splurge for Their Country" (Horovitz AOl )  and, around the 
same time, buttons began to appear with the slogan: "Fight Back NY! Spend Money!"  
The national imperative to consume is peddled as an imperative of personal 
enjoyment, yet as Baudrillard points out, this ostensible enjoyment is, in reality, a 
collective and displaced enjoyment. He explains: 
Enjoyment no longer appears . . .  as finality, as rational end, but as the 
individual rationalization of a process whose ends lie elsewhere. 
Enjoyment would define consumption/or oneself, as something 
autonomous and final. But consumption is never that. Enjoyment is 
enjoyment for one's own benefit, but consuming is something one never 
does alone (this is the illusion of the consumer, meticulously sustained by 
the whole of the ideological discourse on consumption). One enters, 
rather, into a generalized system of exchange and production of coded 
44 In his speech at the Republican Convention of 1992, Pat Robertson famously stated: "Feminism 
encourages women to leave their husbands, kill their children, practice witchcraft, destroy capitalism and 
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values where, in spite of themselves, all consumers are involved with all 
others. (78) 
Consumerism on this level has little to do with the needs of the consumer. However, new 
cultural narratives make it clear that participation in the group (i.e., in consumer society) 
requires constant consumption for consumption's sake. Furthermore, a language shaped 
by the values central to consumer capitalism invisibly promotes their incorporation into 
every aspect of life. When the language of the marketplace infiltrates to such a degree, 
then it is inexorably the case that even the most intimate form of enjoyment, "though 
seemingly a private matter, actually involves a reference to the other" so that "we 
structure our enjoyment by fantasizing about how the other enjoys" (McGowan, "From 
Enjoyment" 58). 
Baudrillard depicts the enjoyment associated with consumerism as decidedly 
active and purposeful. Modem man, he writes, "must constantly see to it that . . .  all his 
consumer capacities are mobilized. If he forgets to do so, he will be . . .  reminded that he 
has no right not to be happy . . . .  He is engaged in-has to engage in--continual activity. 
If not, he would run the risk of being content with what he has and becoming asocial" 
(80). However, while the mobilization of one's consumer capacities may be "active and 
purposeful," the process by which one adopts the principles of consumer culture, comes 
to view them as "natural," and extends them to areas of existence previously far removed 
from them, is typically undertaken passively and unconsciously and by means of 
language. Under such conditions, one becomes subject to desires in areas where none 
previously existed, and society comes to function to an ever greater extent according to 
become lesbians" (emphasis mine). 
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the principles of consumption, including the privileging of the acquisition of consumer 
goods, competition for objects and signs, novelty and variety, and disposability-all of 
which alter a society's conception of time, depth, and value-conditions that 
contemporary playwrights explore. 45 
There are, in addition, obstacles to actual enjoyment. One dilemma confronting 
the consumerist subject is the following: 
Insofar as it creates [a] sense of obligation, the imperative to enjoy 
makes enjoyment that much more difficult. . . .  The subject who attempts 
to obey the command to enjoy cannot help but notice all of the ways that 
she/he is not fully enjoying because contemporary society so highlights 
the endless possibilities for enjoyment. This sense of not fully enjoying . .  
. leads . . .  subjects to move . . .  from commodity to commodity, from 
internet site to internet site, from channel to channel. (McGowan, The 
End 31-8) 
Browsing, a word originally used to describe the selecting by animals of the few edible 
bits of fodder amongst the generally scanty vegetation, has long been applied figuratively 
to window-shopping, the idle thumbing of magazines in waiting rooms, or the gazing at 
the spines rather than the pages of books on a library or bookstore shelf. It is only natural 
that this usage of the term be extended to account for, perhaps, the most common method 
45 Baudrillard describes this as "the principle of maximizing existence by multiplying contacts and 
relationships, by intense use of signs and objects, by systematic exploitation of all the potentialities of 
enjoyment" (80). He writes: "'Try Jesus!'  runs an American slogan. You have to try everything, for 
consumerist man is haunted by the fear of missing something, some form of enjoyment or other. You 
never know whether a particular encounter, a particular experience (Christmas in the Canaries, eel in 
whiskey, the Prado, LSD, Japanese-style love-making) will not elicit some 'sensation'. It is no longer 
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of using the Internet. For many people, the idea of browsing is nothing less than a 
complete understanding of, and approach to, the Internet-a kind of Internet culture. 
This understanding of the Internet involves engagement in momentary and superficial 
contact with a variety of words and (primarily) images, until one stumbles upon 
something stimulating enough to encourage one to linger momentarily. It is very much a 
gestalt process. This-like surfing, the equivalent term taken from television parlance­
emphasizes consumption that is driven by restlessness, dissatisfaction, and the extremes 
of familiarity and novelty; implies consumption that is both purposeless and haphazard; 
and facilitates consumption that privileges speed and convenience as opposed to 
credibility, comprehensiveness, and accuracy. 
The Reification of Relationships in Patrick Marber's Closer 
This restlessness is most prominent in the way the characters in Closer and 
Shopping and Fucking enter and exit "intimate" relationships. Partners are largely 
interchangeable, and the extreme physicality of such relationships is routinely juxtaposed 
with the absence of emotional depth, understanding, and commitment one sees 
documented in the language. Of Closer, Robert Brustein says, "The four lovers . . .  are 
obsessed with erotic conquest and immediate gratification" (36). After similarly noting 
that "the four coalesce in every possible permutation (heterosexual), coming together 
with impassioned need, and then splitting up in violent spasms of rejection" (Kroll 70), 
Jack Kroll ends his review ofMarber's play by saying that "his actors . . .  become 
desire, or even 'taste', or a specific inclination that are at stake, but a generalized curiosity, driven by a 
vague sense of unease" (Baudrillard 80). 
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affecting embodiments of a failure to love that is in the end a mystery, an affliction of the 
modem soul that sets the body on fire and leaves the spirit cold" (70). Kroll' s phrasing is 
significant. With two men and two women who never engage in homosexual or 
polygamous relationships, there are only two possible options for each of the characters. 
That the play gives the impression of multiple pairings testifies to the sense of 
arbitrariness, flippancy, and disposability that permeates each coupling. Furthermore, I 
would like to suggest that the mystery of which Kroll speaks is, perhaps, not so 
mysterious. 
Kroll himself eloquently remarks, "The key element in pornography is the 
absence of love. What's new about Closer is that it's a play about love that's fighting 
fiercely not to become pornography" (70).46 This comparison is particularly appropriate 
. considering the graphically sexual language that imbues the entire production with, and 
inflicts upon the audience, a palpable sense of voyeurism. The play, I would argue, is 
much more able to make an audience feel uncomfortable than many plays wherein the 
sexuality is corporeally graphic. The voyeuristic nature of Marber's play lies solely in its 
language. It rests in his presentation of the ways in which people talk about relationships 
and one another-the unlimited ways language can be used to reduce others to mere 
commodities, and the correspondingly limited ways relationships may then be conceived 
46 Baudrillard would probably subscribe to a similar reading of the play, for he says, "Obscenity begins 
when there is no more spectacle, no more stage, no more theatre, no more illusion, when everything 
becomes immediately transparent, visible, exposed in the raw and inexorable light of information and 
communication" (Ecstasy o/Communication 21 -22). This may help account for the uneasy reception of 
these and other plays in this vein. 
120 
and fashioned. Jack Kroll' s statement is also appropriate because the most infamous 
interaction of the play takes place virtually-that is, via an Internet chat room.47 
Before taking up this scene, one must recognize the close ties between 
contemporary consumer culture and some of the most recent forms of mass media 
through which consumer ideology is disseminated and fortified, and which represent 
much of the product now being consumed. The Internet and the burgeoning array of 
portable, even hand-held, devices allow for a ready, continuous immersion in severely 
truncated forms of information and entertainment. These various media are themselves 
coveted, owned, exchanged, and fetishized much like the pop-cultural artifacts mentioned 
above ( cf. footnote 1 ). Sociology professor Val Burris believes that, "As technology 
acquires a particular social form, human behavior is made to 'personify' (i.e., 
accommodate itself to) patterns of social organization compatible with the accumulated 
mass of technology" ( 16). 
It is clear that the contemporary media have, in fact, initiated changes in national 
character, mental disposition, and language. Some of the most significant of these 
changes are in transformations taking place in the ways people interact using a language 
indebted to the electronic media and in how individuals, thereafter, communicate and 
construct their identities. The electronic media alter the form of human narratives, and 
these formal alterations have effects on the content of those narratives. Consider 
sociologist Lauren Langman's familiar critique of our cultural dependence upon the mass 
media, wherein he suggests that the form of an electronic medium informs its content and 
can, in tum, shape its audience: 
47 The Internet has been long and irrefutably linked with pornography in the popular consciousness. 
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Viewing television requires no extended training; most children can 
operate a television set before they can walk or talk. Changing the 
channels brings an immediacy of visual gratification as colors and images 
change. The rapidly changing images, not to speak of the resolution of 
plots or crises, foster a compression of lived time. Stories unfold in 
twenty-four- or forty-nine-minute shows or in thirty-second spots. In 
other words, the self-indulgence required by consumerism is first instilled 
by privileging the visual and affective and thereby relaxing former 
constraints of childhood that were part of print-based nationalism. ("From 
Subject" 1 84) 
Yet, television programs may be regarded as a comprehensive and fully developed 
packaging of information and entertainment when compared with many of the latest 
trends in electronic media.48 These new electronic media reinforce the mandate to enjoy 
and, consequently, countermand the dedication of the time, energy, and imagination 
necessary to contend with periods of boredom or sustained periods of difficulty within 
relationships. Effective communication and understanding between partners requires that 
these same qualities of patience, effort, and open-mindedness be represented in the 
language. 
48 Recently, the media giant Fox announced a new companion to its hit TV show 24. It would comprise 
twenty-four one-minute video episodes to be viewed via cell phones, further paring that which cannot be 
immediately absorbed and idly processed. Similarly, Dan Kranzler, CEO ofMFORMA cites his own 
daughter as the source and test case for many of the ideas considered by his media company. Regarding 
the above trends for cell phones, he says, "[My daughter] looks at media as a snack, as opposed to a full 
meal. She wants to get little tid-bits of what's happening . . .  and she likes those in very small bits and 
bites" (Kaufman). Dr. Charles Maland noted to me here a "kind of fragmentation in the one-minute 
narratives that make movies seem old-fashioned and sustained." 
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Returning to the infamous Internet meeting of Larry and Dan in Marber's Closer, 
the language--the "'dialogue' [that] appears on the large screen simultaneous to their 
typing it" (22}-is abbreviated and impatient. The fact that Marber places the word 
"dialogue" in quotation marks indicates how he views the interchange he crafted for this 
scene. Take, for instance, one of the scene's most comic moments, one that emphasizes 
the nature of language as it is increasingly influenced by the electronic media. In this 
passage, Internet ''virgin," Larry, asks Anna (a.k.a. Dan) for a physical description of 
herself: 
Larry: describe u. 
Dan: Dark hair. Dirty mouth. Epic Tits. 
Larry: define epic 
Dan: 36DD 
Larry: Nice arse? 
Dan: Y 
Larry: Becos I want 2 know (Dan smiles.) 
Dan: No, "Y" means "Yes." 
Larry: 0 (23) 
Larry is identified as an outsider precisely because his expectations and uses of language 
are alien to the current virtual context. When Dan's response to Larry's "Nice 2 meet U" 
is "I love COCK," Larry is taken aback and types, "Youre v.forward." At this point, the 
experienced Dan reminds him, "UR chatting on 'LONDON FUCK"' (23). And while 
hardly a revelatory statement on its surface, an important consideration is being raised. 
When one chooses to use language within a specific virtual environment, there is 
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frequently an absence of multiple "voices," in addition to the obvious physical absences, 
even though there are multiple "speakers." Contact is reduced to a single point of shared 
interest, an interest one can safely assume because it is advertised. 
At London Fuck, foreplay or anything preliminary to one's engagement in 
vicarious and linguistic sex is deemed unnecessary. In fact, language that attempts to 
move past the abbreviated and the superficial, or that attempts to move away from the 
immediate agenda, is unwanted. Nuance, subtlety, complexity, and individuality (as 
opposed to simple patterns and types), anything smacking of emotion ( as opposed to a 
strictly dispassionate sexual input), and even certain of the more conventional variations 
on human sexual desire and fantasy are likely to be viewed as unacceptable in this venue. 
For those "meeting" via London Fuck, transgressions of mainstream language and 
behavior are precisely the point, whereas deviations from the site's linguistic protocol are 
sure to attract resentment.49 So, while the chat room appears on its surface to invite all 
manner of license and experimentation, it is mere pretense. The outrageousness of the 
interactions disguises a forum that is, in its own way, utterly conservative in nature. At 
London Fuck, there can be no real communication because language is generally 
restricted to the point where single voices echo themselves in monotonous and endless 
repetition. Here, rather than making something common by sharing it, individuals merely 
circulate something already held in common. 50 This circulation of language is nothing 
49 Eva Illouz argues, "In a complex and pluralistic society, no one can issue any definitive statement. We 
can only use language, and rules about how to use language" (143). 
50 The act of"making common" is consistent with the Latin origin of the word "communicate" and, by 
extension, "communication"; whereas, the "communication" found on the Internet often divests the term of 
a measure of the activity meant to define it (i.e., "making common" becomes simply "is common"). 
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but a form of distributing, or trafficking in, commodities. And the society of enjoyment 
seems all too ready to accept artificiality, so long as it is easily accessed and appears 
novel and exciting-that is, so long as it is packaged to be marketable.5 1  
Because it does not convey constant and direct confirmation of the actuality and 
the alterity of one's interlocutors, the Internet is especially prone to purely egocentric 
"dialogue." Encroachments by differing languages or differing ideas of linguistic 
etiquette only serve as unwelcome reminders of the existence of the Other and of the 
Other's needs-exactly what many are hoping to escape by indulging in the Internet. 
While the Internet offers many opportunities for honest investigation and legitimate 
dialogue, "surfing" the Internet is far less likely to be motivated by a desire to hear new 
voices than as a way to avoid them and to encounter and reassert the self. Todd 
McGowan argues that the Internet often "merely increases the range of the subject's 
private world" because it "provides the subject with a community that reflects the self' 
(The End 1 57, emphasis added).52 The significance of McGowan's use of the word 
"community" becomes apparent in the following passage, wherein McGowan cites Cass 
Sunstein's book Republic. com: 
51 In his play The Treatment, Martin Crimp addresses this contemporary increasing willingness to buy into 
manufactured and commodified bits of experience. 
52 D. J. Boorstin observes of postmodern culture: "We are simply imitating ourselves . . . .  We . . .  become a 
tautology standing for what we stand for . . . .  We look for models, and we see our own image" (83). Even 
celebrities are now "known primarily for their well-knownness . . . .  The celebrity is usually nothing greater 
than a more publicized version ofus" (83)-that is, a publicly communicat�d version of ourselves. Here 
we see the ego hard at work and narcissism as the norm. Consider, for example, the general shift in 
television programming towards confessional talk shows and "reality" �ows, whereby the ordinary 
features of one's own life become an endless iteration of the self. Such phenomena provide Don Delillo the 
material for his play Valparaiso. 
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According to Sunstein, "New technologies, emphatically including the 
Internet, are dramatically increasing people's ability to hear echoes of 
their own voices and to wall themselves off from others." . . .  Because it is 
an imaginary space, whatever community one finds on the [I]nternet tends 
to lack the key characteristic of an actual community-its otherness. 
( 1 57) 
Because they lack reference to an Other, these so-called acts of communication are no 
such thing; they are, instead, exercises in pure egocentrism. So, contrary to the popular 
wisdom that the electronic media invariably shrink distance and enlarge experience, some 
contemporary forms of media regularly demonstrate their capacity for the exact opposite. 
The homogenization of voices characteristic of "surfing" or "browsing" has not had the 
singular effect of uniting people's attitudes and interests. Langman argues: 
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If the Nation brought diverse groups together under the fiction that they 
were a "people," consumer society fostered the splintering of society and 
pluralization of life-worlds . . . .  Expressions of self now sustain the social 
order not so much through "willing assent" in Gramsci' s sense, but as an 
indifference to the political born of the migration of subjectivity from the 
public worlds of work, politics, or religion, to various private and personal 
realms. This process began when consumption first shifted from buying 
products for use to marketing images that promised the fulfillment of 
repressed or stimulated desires. But in order for consumerism to become 
hegemonic, its dominant media would need to dispose the body to 
consumption as a major source of identity. ("From Subject" 1 83) 53 
Evidence cited earlier suggests that the dominant forms of contemporary media do, in 
fact, link inextricably an ideology of consumption with the formation and articulation of 
identity. Combine any form of communication with a system of consumer capitalism, 
and there is bound to be reification. However, many new forms of communication 
introduce a new precariousness. Val Burris explains that more of the "social relations 
that were once realized directly through communicative interaction are now mediated by 
technical apparatuses of various sorts . . . .  As a result, social arrangements that were once 
visibly the product of human agency now appear as technological imperatives ( 15).54 
The most crucial detriment introduced by contemporary forms of media, however, 
is how many so-called advances in communication actually rely on and cater to truncated 
forms of language and to absences of language. 55 Reason and reflection are both 
diminished when complex and deliberate language gives way to automatic language-in 
the form of cliches, idioms, and jargon-and when it gives way to abbreviated and 
53 Christopher Lasch sees one result of this in the following: 
Instead of supporting public services, the new elites put their money into the 
improvement of their own self-enclosed enclaves. They gladly pay for private and 
suburban schools, private police, and private systems of garbage collection; but they have 
managed to relieve themselves, to a remarkable extent, of the obligation to contribute to 
the national treasury. Their acknowledgement of civic obligations does not extend 
beyond their own immediate neighborhoods" ( 4 7). 
54 Burris says, "A good example of such technological determinism may be found in Jacques Ellul' s  best­
selling work The Technological Society, wherein he writes: 'It is useless to rail against capitalism. 
Capitalism did not create our world; the machine did' (Ellul, 1 964:5)" ( 15). 
55 Roland Barthes characterizes the new world order as one wherein "the image no longer illustrates the 
words; it is now the words which, structurally, are parasitic on the image" (204), and Neil Postman argues 
that in a culture wherein words have been supplanted by images, this "predominance of the image produces 
an epistemological revolution: we begin to believe on the basis of images we identify with rather than 
arguments we find convincing" (quoted in McGowan, The End 64). 
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incomplete forms of language. Keeping in mind Piaget, Vygotsky, and Luria and their 
work regarding the development of the higher intellectual functions, one can see that as 
soon as language is relegated to the role of sound-bite, or used merely for the captioning 
of images, no arena remains where the language skills needed for the development of the 
advanced cognitive skills associated with complex, abstract thinking may be exercised. 
Similarly, truncated uses of language encourage individuals to view objects and events in 
uncomplicated ways and to boil things down to the gut level. So, again contrary to 
popular wisdom, consumer culture and its media are not always the liberating forces they 
are commonly advertised to be. 
As a matter of fact, consumer capitalism itself is typically advertised as, and 
popularly held to be, the epitome of freedom-which is why Frederick Jameson calls the 
market "Leviathan in sheep's clothing." Here, too, language plays a fundamental role. 
Jameson sees the narratives of global capitalism as heavily pessimistic, as exemplifying a 
mistrust of human motives and intellect. Furthermore, he recognizes that movement 
towards universal acceptance is, likewise, facilitated by means of language-a "rhetoric 
of market abnegation" that advocates "the surrender of human freedom to a now lavish 
invisible hand" (274). Jameson cites the generally accepted position of consumer culture 
that "we only need to keep [the market] clean and well oiled, and it . . .  will see to us and 
keep us in line" (274).56 The language of market ideology, accurately characterized by 
56 In response to the current shortage of flu vaccine in the United States, Dr. Jerry Avom, Associate 
Professor at Harvard Medical School, suggests the following: 
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This i s  part of  the sense that it's perfectly okay to just put medications and related health 
affairs into the marketplace and that the marketplace will do its thing and everybody will 
get what they need. It turns out that making vaccines is not a very profitable thing for the 
drug companies to do, and over the years, more and more of them have dropped out of 
making vaccines . . . . The first step is to reassess whether or not we should use the 
Jameson, therefore "assures us that human beings make a mess of it when they try to 
control their destinies" (273). So, instead of placing one's trust in human beings, the 
language of capitalism persuades individuals to put their faith in an "interpersonal 
mechanism . . .  which can substitute for human hubris and planning and replace human 
decisions altogether" (273). 
The problem, never acknowledged within the language of consumer capitalism, is 
that this mechanism is both arbitrary and chaotic. So, to refer without irony to the "laws" 
of the marketplace-as if they, like the "laws" of physics, follow undeviating and 
naturally occurring patterns-abets widespread faith in a system devoid of overriding 
goals or principles, design, guidance, or accountability to any one or any thing simply by 
characterizing the abnegation and the faith as things both reasonable and natural. 
Language influences perception, which, in its tum, governs dogma. The anti-human 
dogmas of consumer capitalism, like the dogmas of religion, provide individuals 
something bigger than themselves-something similarly depicted as both omnipotent and 
beneficential-in which they may place their faith. At the same time, individuals are 
allowed and encouraged to satisfy the human desire to surrender freedom (i.e. , the 
secularized version of "free will") if it permits the abdication of the responsibilities that 
come with it.57 
marketplace to make everything work right in healthcare, and this is just one of the many 
examples where it doesn't work right." ("U.S. Faces") 
57 Jameson, Adorno, and Horkheimer are three theorists among several who see the desire to surrender 
freedom as widespread among, if not common to, those living under consumer capitalism. The idea that 
this desire is common to those subject to any authoritarian system is the basis of Erich Fromm's The Fear 
of Freedom (later published in America as Escape From Freedom) and important to his The Art of Loving: 
Modem capitalism needs men who co-operate smoothly and in large numbers; who want 
to consume more and more; and whose tastes are standardized and can be easily 
influenced and anticipated. It needs men who feel free and independent, not subject to 
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So, if ruled solely by market forces, there can be no expectation of authenticity on 
the Intemet.58 One can pretend to be anyone (as Dan in Closer makes clear), and one can 
submit anything as truth, when everything is designed for optimum consumability. If the 
Internet scene in Closer highlights anything, it is that "the World Wide Web .. . tends to 
depersonalize the life story because it is diffused to an unknown and potentially unlimited 
audience with whom the author has no direct contact or accountability" (Brown, 
"Narration" 204).59 Theater critic Don Shewey provides the following insight regarding 
the language of this scene: 
The two guys meet online in a chat room called London Fuck, only Dan is 
pretending to be Anna and describes himself as 'a cum-hungry bitch' 
whose ultimate fantasy is to have a line of strangers filling her every 
orifice. Only a man would try to pass that off as a woman's fantasy; only 
a man would believe it. ( 68) 
any authority or principle or conscience-yet willing to be commanded, to do what is 
expected of them, to fit into the social machine without friction; who can be guided 
without force, led without leaders, prompted without aim-except the one to make good, 
to be on the move, to function, to go ahead. (The Art of Loving 77) 
58 Regarding "authenticity" and subjectivity, Terry Eagleton says the following: 
The depthless, styleless, dehistoricized, decathecated surfaces of postmodern culture are 
not meant to signify an alienation, for the very concept of alienation must secretly posit a 
dream of authenticity which postmodemism finds quite unintelligible. Those flattened 
surfaces and hollowed interiors are not "alienated" because there is no longer any subject 
to be alienated and nothing to be alienated from, "authenticity" having been less rejected 
that merely forgotten. It is impossible to discern in such forms, as it is in the arte facts 
[sic] of modernism proper, a wry, anguished or derisive awareness of the normative 
traditional humanism they deface. (386) 
59 The sheer volume of information has its own effect, as sociologist Richard Harvey Brown conveys: 
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In the ascending scale of numbers, stories give way to statistics, personalized appeals to 
typifications" (Peters 199 1 ,  26) . . . .  Embodied selves and the politics of identity operate 
within "systems" . . .  of capital and mass communication [that] have deeply entered the 
life-worlds and the phenomenological experience of the body/self. ("Introduction" viii) 
Shewey's statement verifies the absence of the Other and the unobstructed exercise of 
egocentrism. Dan's version of Anna is a male construct (he can say, as Anna does earlier 
in the play, "I know what men want") and clearly pandering. Dan does not-probably 
cannot-present a believable female persona in his appropriation of the female. 
However, with a consumer audience all-too-ready to be catered to, to have his own image 
of woman realized, nothing could be more unacceptable and unbelievable than reality. 
Baudrillard is correct in stating that "consumption is governed by a form of magical 
thinldng; daily life is governed by a mentality based on miraculous thinking . . .  based on 
a belief in the omnipotence of thoughts" (31 ). This is the "primitive" understanding 
characterized by Freud in Totem and Taboo or the egocentric "autistic" thinking Jean 
Piaget describes as being characteristic of children's language. Dan's overblown and 
fantastic construction does not represent the desire of a particular female psyche; it is 
purely an expression of male desire, as is Larry's acceptance of this portrait. Whether 
such women exist is irrelevant-in a completely egocentric forum, Dan's ability to tap 
into Larry's  desire is the source of the representation's credibility. It becomes an 
interpretation and expression of Cartesian logic: "It is what I want it to be; therefore, it 
is." Consumerist orientation of this brand is totemic and fetishistic. Baudrillard calls it a 
"belief in the omnipotence of signs," among which language has primacy of signification. 
"'Affluence' is," for instance, "merely the accumulation of the signs of happiness" 
conceived of as a "means of calling down or summoning up total Well-being or Bliss" 
(31 ). However, there is no magic, and the accumulation of signs is destined to be 
perpetually unsatisfying and to lead to obsessive consumerism. 
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It is also useful to consider the language used to speak of the Internet itself 
because, in the words of Jeanette Malkin, "the habitual forms the significant" (Verbal 
Violence 35). When Shewey says the men "meet" online, he is simply subscribing to a 
commonplace usage of language. This is precisely the point. In any other strictly 
linguistic interaction, this terminology would never be employed. When people interact 
by letter or telephone, they say, "I can't wait to meet you." With the Internet, to engage 
in the electronic equivalent of letter writing or a telephone conversation is to meet one's 
interlocutor. The virtual world is, also, always designated as a place, a "site" that one 
"visits" or "goes to." Thus, "Where did you meet him?" "Online." Space, like identity, 
becomes fluid and subject to "reification." Consider Daniel du Prie's explanation of the 
term "reification": 
The term "reification" is hardly an everyday word, and its verb form "to 
reify" is defined . . .  as, "to think of or treat something abstract as if it 
existed as a real or tangible object." The original German term is 
"Verdinglichung" (Lukacs, 1923), which conveys the sense of the process 
of being changed into a thing. That which is changed is the "relation 
between people" (Lukacs, 197 1 : 83), which "takes on the character of a 
thing" (83). ("Lukacs' Reification") 
Reification, in this sense, is inextricably a part of a contemporary electronic media-based 
culture. The willingness to grant online activities a status of physicality similar to that of 
face-to-face interactions is in line with the culture's general shift toward a blurring of the 
lines between presence and absence, public and private, the real and the artificial, the 
universal and the particular, the reasoned and the arbitrary. The effacement of these 
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boundaries is nowhere more evident than in the language used by those living within a 
culture of consumer capitalism. 
Elements of reification and consumer culture permeate Marber's play. Robert 
Brustein notes how, in production, "the set . . .  gradually accumulates all the scenic 
pieces used in the play, as if these four lives were a detritus of props and furniture" 
(36). 60 Don Shewey describes the "frisson of excitement" he witnessed as audience 
members recognized "the up-to-date details scattered like brand names throughout the 
script," as well as the fact that the characters all have "trendy occupations" (68). One's 
career is no longer a vocation, a calling, but another identity marker, nothing more than a 
title or another sampling or exploration of the available lifestyles. Richard Zoglin 
laments how "Marber' s tactic of eliding large chunks of time-people meet; in the next 
scene they've been living together for months-stresses the impersonal power of sex but 
robs the characters of human dimension" ( 65), a criticism of what is likely both a 
conscious decision and a commentary on Marber's part. And Jack Kroll suggests that if 
"Aristophanes had a Macintosh, he might have written [the] classic [Internet] scene, the 
metaphor of emotional disconnection in a world of digital sex" (70). 
This last quotation in particular points to the location of the greatest reification in 
Marber's play-in the interpersonal relationships. Lacanian psychology holds that 
"enjoyment is .. . never immediate; it is always mediated by the presumed enjoyment 
imputed to the Other" (Zizek 28 1 ). While it may be argued that this has always been the 
case, the change from a society of production and denial to one of consumption and the 
60 The property list for Marber's play is fifty-three items long. 
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imperative to enjoy has introduced a sense of competition and a degree of reification into 
enjoyment that was previously absent. In a society of denial, individuals sacrifice their 
enjoyment for production and for the commonweal.61 Self-sacrifice for the good of 
society is fast eroding as a primary virtue. It becomes much more important to preserve 
one's opportunities for enjoyment. One key side-effect is that, whereas in a society of 
denial citizens share in their sacrifices, in contemporary consumer culture and under the 
mandate to enjoy, any loss of such opportunity is not viewed simply as a loss, but as a 
theft; therefore, "regret soon turns to aggressivity" (McGowan, "From Enjoyment" 56). 
McGowan argues that this is the case because, when individuals "connect their own loss 
of a thing with the other's enjoyment of it, which is precisely the connection that late 
capitalist subjects are quick to make[,] . . .  in every relationship with the other, fear of a 
potential theft of one's enjoyment, or the sense that the other has already stolen one's 
enjoyment, pervades" (56, 57). Appeals for a collective repudiation of enjoyment have 
been replaced by increasing concerns about private enjoyment and the encroachment of 
others upon that enjoyment. 
These conditions of late capitalist subjectivity are keenest in the reified 
relationships and language of Marber' s characters. In the second scene, when Dan, who 
is living with Alice, makes a pass at Anna without compunction, she asks him pointedly, 
"Why are you wasting [Alice's] time?" ( 19) (i.e., by letting her believe in a relationship 
61 Pierre Bourdieu writes the following: 
134 
Whereas the old morality of duty, based on the opposition between pleasure and good, 
induces a generalized suspicion of the "charming and attractive," a fear of pleasure and a 
relation to the body made up of"reserve," "modesty" and "restraint," and associates 
every satisfaction of the forbidden impulses with guilt, the new ethical avant-garde urges 
a morality of pleasure as a duty. This doctrine makes it a failure, a threat to self-esteem, 
not to "have fun." (367) 
you do not equally, nor sufficiently, value). Dan, focused on his own enjoyment, says, 
"I'm not. I'm grateful to her . . .  she's . . .  completely loveable and completely 
unleaveable" ( 19), suggesting that either his "gratitude" or Alice's charm are enough to 
warrant his enjoyment without obligating him to consider anything external to that 
enjoyment. This also shifts the onus for his behavior onto Alice, a variation on the theme 
of attributing blame to the victim. Anna emphasizes Dan's conception of Alice as largely 
based on commodification and competition, shooting back, "And you don't want 
someone else to get their dirty hands on her?" to which Dan provides the appropriately 
noncommittal response, "Maybe" ( 19). In relationships based on love, one expects 
infidelity to cause hurt feelings, a sense of having been betrayed, and a sense of loss. 
Only in a relationship of commodification and perceived ownership would there be a 
sense of loss attached, not to the absence of one's partner (a condition with little effect on 
Larry or Dan), but the presence of the former partner as the source of another's 
enjoyment. 
All four of Marber' s characters, at some time, cheat on their partners and lie about 
their infidelities before eventually admitting to them. However, the way such news is 
received by Larry and Dan demonstrates the degree to which these relationships are 
reified. All four characters are possessive of their partners, but the men in particular 
show that the imminent departure of a lover is not nearly as troubling as the thought that 
someone else may be enjoying at their expense. In this respect, none of the male-female 
relationships has the power of the relationship, through competition, of the two men. 
After Larry has confessed to having sex with a prostitute, Anna tells him that she is 
leaving him for Dan. Aside from the to-be-expected question, "Why?" Larry insists on 
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hearing details about Anna's relationship with Dan. In his interrogation, Larry reduces 
both men's relationships with Anna to the physical, and his language foregrounds his 
competition with Dan for enjoyment of Anna: "ls he a good fuck?"; "Better than me?"; 
"Did you do it here?"; "Where?"; "Think of me?"; "Did you come?"; "How many 
times?"; "How?"; "Who was where?"; "Did you touch yourself while he fucked you?"; 
"You wank for him?"; "You enjoy sucking him off?"; "You like his cock?"; "You like 
him coming in your face?"; "What does it taste like?" ( 44-7). Later, Dan puts Anna 
through an almost identical inquisition: "Did you come?"; "Did you fake it?"; "You fake 
it with me?" (59), et cetera. 
Both men claim that their need to hear the intimate details of Anna's relationships 
is part of a general concern with "truth." However, both men later confirm the essentially 
reified, competitive nature of their relationships with Anna and the competition for 
enjoyment that underlie their blunt and aggressive questioning. Larry accuses Dan of 
wanting Anna for purely selfish reasons, saying, "You don't love Anna, you love 
yourself." Dan denies this, but his retort is telling: "You're wrong, I don't love myself' 
( 69). 62 Dan wants Larry to know that he is self-loathing, not that he's wrong about not 
loving Anna. Likewise, in response to Dan's jab, "When she came here you think she 
enjoyed it?" Larry answers matter-of-factly, "I didn't fuck her to give her a 'nice time.' I 
fucked her to fuck you up. A good fight is never clean" (70). 
This contest-their competition to enjoy Anna-exhibits two key notions drawn 
from N eo-Lacanian theory regarding late capitalist consumer culture. The first is that "all 
62 The unusual combinations of italics and underlining here and later are Marber's. 
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enjoyment involves seeing the Other as nothing more than a tool and not showing 
'consideration' for the Other" (McGowan, The End 14). In a competition like that 
between Larry and Dan, a product of consumer culture's imperative to enjoy, the Other 
can be located in two distinct sites. Insofar as Anna is the female complement in each 
relationship, she is the Other, and she is not shown consideration but used as leverage as 
these men compete-not for her love, but for their own claims to enjoyment of her. Of 
this mindset, Linda Jean Parks is correct in noting, "We so thoroughly assimilate the 
social scaffolding that supports the 'naturalized' view our culture pedals that behavior 
which is not illegal, but still hurtful, does not register with us as violence" (8). This is 
true with the characters in Closer and their professed allegiance to truth, so that, in this 
case, what Anna feels and what is best for her is not of interest to these men, nor do they 
experience guilt or remorse. Much more important is their "{potentially aggressive) 
desire to see into the privacy of others" (Green 594). The men try to enjoy at the expense 
of others, which for them means to participate, uninvited and unwelcome, in others' 
enjoyment. In their struggle, to do so is a coup. Each man intuitively knows the other 
will view it as an encroachment or attempt to "steal" his cache of enjoyment. In addition, 
each man tries to bar the other from enjoyment, because the enjoyment of others reminds 
him of his own failure to enjoy fully. For these men, there is an implicit comparison. 
Another's enjoyment is, therefore, always an aggressive "statement" regarding one's own 
competence and one's own place in the social hierarchy. All enjoyment by others is, 
therefore, always felt to be at their expense. 63 Then, insofar as Dan and Larry are rivals, 
63 McGowan argues the following: 
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they are each the Other, the extra-subjective self that embodies difference, the "not-I." 
For Larry to enjoy is for other-than-Dan to enjoy, and vice versa. 
This leads us to the second Neo-Lacanian feature. This feature is quite 
contemporary, because it is based on the society of consumption's  mandate to enjoy and 
not on the society of production's  reciprocal denial or sacrifice of enjoyment. In a late 
capitalist environment like that depicted in Closer, "if one subject does not have a thing, 
at least another doesn't  have it either, which provides some degree of consolation for lost 
enjoyment," because "if l see that no one else is able to enjoy [an object] , I feel as if we 
are partners in loss rather than rivals in enjoyment" (McGowan, The End 17). As rivals, 
the men need not treat each other with consideration; instead, they each compete to enjoy 
at the other' s expense. And in "a world flooded with enjoyment [or the appearance of it] 
and bereft of symbolic mediation" (i.e., the presence of the Name of the Father, the 
symbolic "law" that requires the sacrifice or denial of enjoyment), contemporary 
consumer subjects "cannot envision a fair exchange: either he got the best of the buyer or 
the buyer got the best of him" (McGowan, "From Enjoyment" 56). This is precisely 
because consumerist subjects mistake the acquisition of goods for their enjoyment. Erich 
Fromm best articulates this unique late capitalist example of confusion and conflation: 
In the society of enjoyment, the ego, like one's house, is a fortress to be defended and 
enhanced, if possible. But the more desperately the ego tries to defend and promote 
itself, the more it feels itself under attack . . . .  This is the inescapable logic of the ego. It 
is always looking to defend or expand its territory and realizes that every other ego it 
encounters is trying to do the same. ( 1 73) 
Whether or not this is true of all egos, it is the above perception that matters. The ego is inherently 
suspicious and, by definition, the source of egocentrism (i.e., it never occurs to one to think of others) and 
egotism (i.e., one recognizes that there are others, but places one's needs and desires above theirs). The 
ego, then, is always potentially aggressive, and the imperial language used by McGowan is perfectly apt. 
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An affluent society is one in which all the people's wants are easily 
satisfied; and though we are pleased to consider this happy condition the 
unique achievement of industrial civilization, a better case can be made for 
hunters and gatherers . . . .  For wants are 'easily satisfied,' either by 
producing much or desiring little and there are, accordingly two possible 
roads to affluence. 
Scarcity is the peculiar obsession of a business economy, the 
calculable condition of all who participate in it. The market makes freely 
available a dazzling array of products. All these 'good things' are within a 
man's reach-but never his grasp, for one never has enough to buy 
everything . . . .  Scarcity is not an intrinsic property of technical means. It 
is a relation between means and ends. (The Anatomy of Human 
Destructiveness 145) 
A culture that keeps creating new perceived needs and desires in its citizens will never 
produce and market enough to "satisfy" them. And with this artificially created sense of 
scarcity, competition is bound to be continually reinforced within the culture. If all 
subjects really are in competition for enjoyment, there cannot be a fair exchange. So, 
wherever acquisition equals enjoyment, simply to concede enjoyment is felt as a 
comparative loss of one's own enjoyment. This "value-added" sense of deprivation tips 
the balance, for where subjects feel constant scarcity and feel themselves perpetually in 
competition for enjoyment, they truly cannot conceive of a fair exchange. So, wherever 
the language of late capitalism convinces individuals there is competition, there is. 
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An examination of Larry's language in scene ten displays an uneasy combination 
of the techniques of dehumanization and the transference of blame to the victim and their 
role in the competition for Anna. When Dan arrives at Larry's office to tell him he wants 
Anna back, he says, "If you love her, you'll let her go so she can be .. . happy" (69). 
Perhaps because he is a doctor, Larry's dehumanization of Anna, his ability to exploit 
their relationship for his own pleasure, and his efforts to spite Dan, take on a clinical air: 
Larry: She doesn't want to be "happy." 
Dan: Everyone wants to be happy. 
Larry: Depressives don't. They want to be unhappy to confirm they're 
depressed. 
If they were hfilmY they couldn't be depressed anymore, they'd 
have to go out into the world and live, which can be . .. depressing. 
Dan: Anna's not a depressive. 
Larry: Isn't she? (69) 64 
Larry's speech is flippant, but it is more than that. The application of a medical 
"diagnosis" allows him to view Anna as unwell or "diseased." As such, she is not 
deserving of the same seriousness or consideration one would extend to healthy or 
64 Erich Fromm refutes the common view of happiness as an absence of sadness: 
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The average person defines happiness as a state of mind which is free from sadness or 
sorrow . . . .  However, . . .  there is something profoundly wrong in this concept of 
happiness. A person who is alive and sensitive cannot fail to be sad, and to feel sorrow 
many times in his life[,] . . .  not only because of the amount of unnecessary suffering 
produced by the imperfection of our social arrangements, but because of the nature of 
human existence, which makes it impossible not to react to life with a good deal of pain 
and sorrow . . . .  To avoid it is only possible ifwe reduce our sensitivity, . . .  harden our 
hearts and withdraw our attention and our feeling from others, as well as from ourselves. 
If we want to define happiness by its opposite, we must define it . . .  in contrast 
to depression. (The Sane Society 201 )  
"normal" individuals. Also, despite Larry's readiness to "diagnose" Anna, there is more 
than a little hint of incredulity and condescension regarding Anna's "condition." He 
seems to forget that he, not she, ascribed to her an abnormality. The implication is that 
Anna is ''unhealthy" because she has chosen to be so--therefore, a delusion more than a 
condition. Later, Larry applies a similarly dubious interpretation to Alice: 
Larry: You don't even know . . .  Alice. (Dan looks at him.) Consider her 
scar, how did she get that? (Beat.) 
You remember. A scar in the shape of a question mark, solve the mystery. 
Dan: She got it when her parents' car crashed. (Pause.) 
Larry: There's a condition called "Dermatitis Artefacta." It's a mental 
disorder manifested in the skin. The patient manufactures his or her very 
own skin disease. They pour bleach on themselves, gouge their skin, 
inject themselves with their own piss, sometimes their own shit. They 
create their own disease with the same diabolical attention to detail as the 
artist or the lover. It looks "real" but its source is the deluded self . . . .  
I think Alice mutilated herself. 
It's fairly common in children who lose their parents young. 
They blame themselves, they 're disturbed. 
Dan: Alice is not "disturbed." 
Larry: But she is. 
"Depression," he continues, "is the inability to feel, it is the sense of being dead, while our body is alive" 
(201). This definition renders Larry and Dan, not Anna, the likely "depressives." 
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Dan: How do you know? (Beat.) 
Larry: Clinical observation. (70- 1 )  
Larry uses his medical training and professional jargon to condescend to Dan, discount 
his opinions, and preempt further discussion. He also uses jargon to.define each woman 
as weak, unbalanced, and dependent. By means of the clinical terminology at his 
disposal, Larry has effectively reduced each of the women to a specimen and, as such, 
has given himself leave to conduct any sort of experiment he wishes. 65 
However, what Larry casts as concerned paternalism is called into question and 
recast as pure objectification when one considers Larry's previous interactions with these 
women. In scene seven, for instance, Larry is shown in a rather pathetic light. He is 
begging Alice for her attention: "Hold me, let me hold you" (53). The Hallmark Card 
sentiments he then unreels are followed by the equally conventional platitudes long a part 
of male-female relationships. However, even in his borrowed language, he reveals what 
is at stake is his desire to play the traditional male role of protector and provider: "Come 
home with me, Alice. It's safe. Let me look after you" (53). Larry then pleads with 
Alice, the woman he is at that very moment paying to strip for him, "Could [you] 
perceive me as something other than a sad slot machine spewing out money?" With an 
awareness of one used to being on the receiving end of the commodification in male-
65 Eva Illouz argues, "Pain has become a dominant cultural and political category to discuss selfhood and 
intimate relations" ( 127), and linguist Norman Fairclough identifies, in contemporary language, an increase 
in "promotional" and "consumer" forms of dialogue; "conversationalization" (i.e., the appearance, in public 
and media settings, of topics, forms, and vocabulary traditionally reserved for private conversations); the 
sort of "synthetic personalization" documented by this chapter; and a reflexivity that relies on "expert 
systems" for the construction of self identity ( e.g., the use of specialized psychological and medical 
terminology to define or reference aspects of one's self). ( 1 37- 140) 
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female relationships, Alice replies, "That's the transaction; you're the customer, I'm the 
service" (54). At this point, Larry's wholly reified and competitive understanding of the 
interpersonal and intimate is forced to the surface in an expression of frustration, for he 
says, "You think because you don't love us or desire us or even like us you think you've 
won" (55). Here, he lumps Alice into a category, foregrounding the rather generalized 
conception he has of women-they are object, Other, enemy. 
To hammer the point home, the entire scene is replete with images of 
relationships as so many commercial exchanges or contests for power. Within such a 
context Larry insensately demands his rights as a customer be honored while, at the same 
time, he becomes angry at the notion that he must honor his end of the bargain-that is, 
to acknowledge that Alice, "the service," has rights, too. Finally, an intentional irony 
occurs when, "at the end, it is revealed that [ Alice, who arguably has the most stable 
("authentic") identity in the play] has been living the most spectacular lie of all, having 
taken her name and her biography off a memorial tablet belonging to someone else" 
(Brustein 36). This is entirely in keeping with the play's world, defined by its fluid forms 
of identity and dominated by a consumerist mentality. In this world, Alice's wholesale 
adoption of identity does not mark her as less "authentic" or "honest"; it simply testifies 
to her better apprehension of her surroundings and her ability to work within an existing 
system based on minor fictions and major myths. It attests to Alice's shrewdness-the 
capitalist's substitution for a full and deliberate use of the intellect and the justification 
for an egocentric set of ethics. Alice's life, then, is more "authentic" only because it is 
stable, because it is consistent. Other forms of authenticity are merely the quaint artifacts 
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of an antiquated social system that manage to mark one out as ill suited for the 
contemporary world, as slightly ridiculous, and as fair game and easy prey. 
The Exchange Value of People in Mark Ravenhill's Shopping and Fucking 
The previous chapter highlighted some of the dangers that come with an 
unthinking application of an overly familiar language. Similar dangers must be 
addressed here, as well. Minus the Marxian terminology, Jean Piaget depicts a child's 
comprehension of her/his social environment as highly reified. "Confronting a system of 
pre-existing, external, and frequently coercive social institutions," explains Val Burris, 
"the infant views the ontological status of these as equivalent to that of natural objects" 
so that "moral norms are projected onto the objective realm and understood as categorical 
imperatives" (14). Piaget attributed this to an underdeveloped awareness of autonomous 
subjectivity at the heart of the child's (reified) view of the world. In contemporary 
consumer culture, this lack of subjective awareness and a correspondingly reified 
perception linger on into adolescence and adulthood via language.66 While consumer 
culture is highly invested in the notion of individuality-that we are a society of diverse 
66 Consumer culture and the mass media have a hand in this extension of a childlike and reified vision of 
the world and a lack of subjective autonomy into the later stages of human development: 
As [D.] Riesman writes, "The product now in demand is neither a staple nor a machine; it 
is a personality." . . .  [The] "over-reflexive" expression (personalizing oneself . . .  in 
person, etc . ! )  tells the real story. What all this rhetoric says, while foundering about 
unable to say it, is precisely that there is no one there-no person. The "person" as 
absolute value, with its indestructible features and specific force, . . .  the person with its 
passions, its will, its character . . .  is absent, dead, swept out of our functional universe . . .  
. It is this lost being which is going to reconstitute itself in abstracto, by force of signs, in 
the expanded range of differences . . .  incorporated and arrayed to re-create a synthetic 
individuality and . . .  shine forth in the most total anonymity, since difference is by 
definition that which has no name. (Baudrillard 88) 
For a psychological account of the drives underlying the pursuit of "synthetic individuality," see the section 
titled "Anonymous Authority-Conformity" in Erich Fromm's The Sane Society. 
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individuals-the market and the media guarantee that the citizen-consumer will be 
individual just like everyone else. The imposed desire to be an "individual"-as if this 
required conscious effort--often forces one to select and articulate one's identity from a 
range of pre-existing options. In other words, some individuality is actually prescribed. 
Such is the case when people identify and/or define themselves and others by means of 
the objects and commodity signs they purchase and collect. Baudrillard specifically 
condemns the way that the language of advertising has infiltrated everyday speech and 
manifested itself as common sense. 67 As language has become more commercial in its 
vocabulary, metaphors, and examples, there has been a corresponding change in 
subjectivity, group identity, and individuals' perception of their interpersonal 
relationships. This is the world depicted in Mark Ravenhill' s Shopping and Fucking. 
Don Shewey characterizes Closer as "a mixture of cruelty, boredom, and 
cynicism" ( 68). If Marber depicts such a world, Mark Ravenhill portrays lives that are 
even more desultory, apathetic, and rife with violence. Ravenhill' s Shopping and 
Fucking (infamous as much for its title as its content) critiques the consumer culture it 
darkly documents. The culture of "shopping and fucking" is one where acquisition and 
competition are more than merely financial matters and have been extended to the 
relationships between people. Relationships are arenas wherein people are sought, fought 
over, used, then traded or discarded, and all with an eerie absence of the corresponding 
human affective responses. The characters even define themselves in primarily monetary 
67 Baudrillard cites the following examples: 
"There is no woman, however demanding, who cannot satisfy the tastes and desires of 
her personality with a Mercedes Benz!"  (87); "To have found your personality . . .  is to 
discover the pleasure of being truly yourself. It often takes very little to achieve this . . . .  
145 
ways, seeing their own self-worth in their ability to generate or spend capital. 
Ravenhill's world is one where people no longer privilege capitalist ideology, for to 
privilege something, there must be an alternative. The characters are without alternatives 
largely because the predominant ideology has become invisible to them. They are unable 
to express any part of their existence without recourse to the language of capitalism. 
Even so-called alternatives like religious fundamentalism are unable to escape its 
sovereignty. Such alternatives have the habit of incorporating the language (but with 
great inherent contradiction, as in the U.S.) or self-consciously denying it (as in the 
Middle East where it may be decried and targeted using the financial support of 
billionaires). The latter alternative may even end up defining itself entirely in opposition 
to western capitalism and, therefore, in terms of western capitalism. Without the ability 
to use language free of this influence, Ravenhill' s characters do not notice its 
( omni)presence and cannot conceive of an alternative to its pervasiveness. 
One key difference of Ravenhill's world is a degree of turning inward that is not 
exhibited in Marber's play. McGowan links the tum from the social to the individual to a 
particular symptom-apathy-and a particular source--the failure to enjoy. McGowan 
also speaks of the widespread guilt he feels accompanies this inward tum-that is, a 
general sense among individuals that they are the only ones unable to find satisfaction, 
and it must, therefore, be their own fault. This perception defines any lack of enjoyment 
as an individual weakness, as having nothing to do with social structures, the status quo, 
or one's relationship to these realities. Such apathy is characteristic of consumer 
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I realized that a little light tint in my hair was enough . . . .  I am more than ever myself." 
(87); "Use Ultra-Beauty cosmetics for . . . that natural bloom you dream of!" (89). 
capitalism and a society of enjoyment. Whereas the "prohibition of enjoyment has the 
effect of turning subjects toward the social order where they seek recognition as 
recompense for their 'lost' enjoyment[, w ]ithout an explicit prohibition . . .  subjects do 
not look to the social order for this recompense" (McGowan, The End 1 39). In addition, 
"to be apolitical (i.e. apathetic) is to be free of reminders that one is subjected to lack; 
that one is not fully enjoying" ( 1 39). So, instead, attention goes inward (i.e., subjects 
blame themselves for their lack of enjoyment), and this inward, self-accusatory tum is 
contrary to a social focus and militates against social action and social change. 
The words of cultural critic Stephen Carter are relevant to an examination of the 
"uncivil" society depicted in Ravenhill' s plays. He says, "Civility is possible only if 
members of a community bind themselves to obey a set of rules of behavior not because 
the law requires it but because they understand the virtue of sacrificing their own 
desires-their own freedom to choose-for the good of the larger community of which 
they are a part" (77). Jean-Frarn;ois Lyotard has written about his concern that the 
technocracy we live in is isolating us against all other forms of knowledge (e.g., religious, 
philosophical, literary) and that this opposing of difference (in knowledge forms) 
constitutes a revolt against the human. His concern, then, is that contemporary media 
forms have eroded the master narratives that had, previously, bound together members of 
society. Leslie Wade speaks on this subject in direct relationship to Ravenhill' s drama: 
[Shopping and Fucking] is quite compelling in its portrayal of the many 
breakdowns of contemporary capitalist culture . . . .  In this play, even 
Robbie, who cannot hold a job in a fast-food restaurant, can expound on 
the culture's loss of its master narratives: "I think a long time ago there 
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were big stories. Stories so big you could live your whole life in them. 
The Powerful Hands of the Gods and Fate. The Journey to Enlightenment. 
The March of Socialism. But they all died or the world grew senile or 
forgot them, so now we're making up our own stories. Little stories" 
(Ravenhill 63). ( 1 10- 1 )  
Wade's argument is that "Ravenhill ' s  work [is] ultimately ethical in its focus and 
philosophical in its resolution, with a conclusion that begs reflection regarding personal 
freedom, identity, interdependence, and the viability of human solidarity" ( 1 12). The 
ethical position Wade sees operating in the play, and "the one [Wade sees] advocated by 
the playwright himself," is "the commitment to a radical freedom and the imperative to 
self-create" ( 1 12). In reference to Lyotard's notion of the "inhuman," Wade goes on to 
argue, "Despite the obscenity, violence, and affrontive elements depicted in Shopping 
and Fucking, the play is, at its core, a play about ethics ( albeit posthuman ethics) that 
grapples with the issues of kinship and connection in the face of dehumanizing social and 
economic order" ( 1 1 1 ). 
William C. Boles also reads Ravenhill's play as all about language and the 
narrative construction of identity. Centering his discussion on the story Gary wants to 
see enacted in reality-one in which the longed-for father figure "fucks [him] with a 
knife" (Ravenhill 83)-Boles depicts Mark's improvised capitulation to Gary's demand 
as "generated out of a sense of love and obligation" and believes that, "through Gary's 
murder, love, albeit brief and unregenerative, is finally achieved" ( 1 33). For his part, 
Boles speaks of "the hypnotic and curative powers of storytelling" and argues that 
"Ravenhill uses [violence] as a way of 'making' a story come true" ( 127), reading the 
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play's conclusion as hopeful-as an act of cleansing and an act of love. Aside from the 
fact that one never learns whether or not Mark actually performs the requested act, the 
claims that either the story or the violence are curative acts or signs of love are flawed. I 
agree with Boles that the "violence is not gratuitous" ( 127), for I agree with Wade that 
Ravenhill "locates the source of violence" ( 1 14) in the play. I even agree with Wade that 
the "violence issues . . .  from the status quo hierarchy of capitalism and its supportive 
moral/aesthetic value system" and "the postmodern modalities of alienation and virtuality 
that engender a flat affect, which recognizes no connection with the other" ( 114). 
However, unlike Wade and Boles, I do not discern the absence of a master narrative, and 
unlike Boles, I do not discern any signs of optimism in Ravenhill's play. 
In "Myth Today," Roland Barthes talks about myth as "a type of speech," as a 
"metalanguage" ( 410-5). Myth is a culture's way of understanding its language. Wade 
says that the characters in Shopping and Fucking are "Indifferent to legal, moral, or 
religious codes . . . .  The communal order has no legitimate basis but coheres according to 
the logic of the marketplace"; therefore, "no master narrative serves to enliven or 
organize the world of these characters" and "it is incumbent on each to self-fashion, to 
reject dependencies of various forms, and to assume a validity that is self-proclaimed" 
( 112-3). Some questions seem warranted in response to Wade's claims. Foremost, in a 
society dominated by late-capitalist consumerism and contemporary media culture, does 
not "the logic of the marketplace" introduce a widely shared set of codes? And does not 
"the logic of the marketplace" serve to legitimate the (non-)communal order? And 
finally, does not "the logic of the marketplace," if not enliven, certainly organize the 
world-not only of these characters, but those around the globe? If "the logic of the 
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marketplace" does not constitute a global mythology, it serves several of the key and 
defining purposes of one. As one has already glimpsed, a variety of cultural theorists­
including Jean Baudrillard, Pierre Bourdieu, Erich Fromm, Frederick Jameson, Jean­
Franyois Lyotard, and Todd McGowan-all note the similarities in terms of form and 
function shared by religious dogma and the so-called laws of capitalism. Both narrative 
sources have managed, each in its way and in its time, to provide the basic principles that 
inform people's life-styles, priorities, goals, ethics, cognition, beliefs, and behaviors. I 
submit, therefore, it is not a loss of master narratives that Ravenhill documents in his 
play, but the loss of older conventional and communal ones. Rather, his play seems to 
suggest the adoption of novel, universal, and often unhealthy, narratives-anti-communal 
ones inextricably tied to "the laws of the marketplace"-on the part of his characters. 
Perhaps the major change in narratives is not, after all, one of presence or 
absence, but of emphasis. Many of the more traditional narratives teach one to look 
outside oneself (i.e., to others or the society at large) when constructing identity. The 
narratives of consumer capitalism teach one to look to oneself or to the possessions with 
which one surrounds oneself. So, one looks to oneself but not within oneself in the self­
reflective manner Vygotsky ties to cognitive advancement and linguistic maturity or that 
Bernstein, as we shall see, considers possible for those whose linguistic "formality" has 
allowed for the development of a meta-language. Even though ostensibly internal, 
radically free, and self-determined as Wade suggests, none of these qualities truly exist in 
the narratives that drive Ravenhill' s characters. Perhaps the feeling that there are no 
longer any shared narratives is not due to their actual absence-there appears, in reality, 
to be a collective adherence to capitalist narratives that is ever more widely shared and 
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ever more completely prescribed-but to their anti-communal nature. The narratives are, 
in fact, shared; however, they do not foster a recognition of the Other-that is, of 
communal or social bonds-and, therefore, do not create a sense of shared experience, 
but usher in a profound sense of isolation and alienation. 
The lack of narratively devised social bonds is one of the causes of violence in 
late capitalist society. As Todd McGowan suggests, "The public world is a manifestation 
of the symbolic bond, providing a ground through which intersubjective contact is 
possible. Without the mediation of the public world, every intersubjective encounter is 
necessarily violent-an experience of two private worlds . . .  colliding with each other" 
( 167). Again, it is not an absence at the level of myth that Ravenhill depicts; it is an 
absence at the level of language. When the overarching narratives-the new global 
cultural myths-teach one to place one's trust in the market, but not in human beings, it 
is the social bond, not the narrative, that has disappeared. We are then left with 
narratives that speak what Slavoj Zizek calls "pathological narcissism." These narratives 
market a narrow view of language so that, at the linguistic level, one learns that even 
interpersonal language is-and must be, if one wants to protect oneself-a tool designed 
for competition, not communication. In the words of Zizek, the global cultural narratives 
facilitate each individual's "shift towards a 'pathological Narcissus,'" to whom the Other 
( desiring subject) as such appears as a violent intruder," so that "whatever he or she does 
(if he or she smokes, laughs too loudly or not loudly enough, casts a covetous glance at 
me . . .  ), amounts to a disturbance of my precarious imaginary balance" ("The Indivisible 
Remainder" 19 1  ), a balance easily upset by language that focuses attention away from the 
self. 
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When Frederic Jameson defines the postmodern, in part, as a "waning of affect" 
Postmodernism 11 ), it is easy to view this statement as a mere description of aesthetic 
characteristics; however, there is more to it than that. A general waning of affect can 
easily translate into a basic distrust in the "human"-in human beings and in human 
communication-that may usher in a corresponding waning in the affective bonds 
between people and in the nature of human institutions built on notions of the "human." 
Jameson provides the following consideration or caution: 
No doubt the logic of the simulacrum, with its transformation of older 
realities into television images, does more than merely replicate the logic 
of late capitalism; it reinforces and intensifies it. . . .  There cannot but be 
much that is deplorable and reprehensible in a cultural form of image 
addiction which, by transforming the past into visual mirages, stereotypes, 
or texts, effectively abolishes any sense of the future and of the collective 
project, thereby abandoning the thinking of future change to fantasies of 
sheer catastrophe and inexplicable cataclysm, from visions of terrorism on 
the social level to those of cancer on the personal. ( 46) 
These grim portraits of the apathetic, the asocial, and the narcissistic have their correlates 
in the language in Shopping and Fucking. The most glaring ex�mple probably comes in 
Lulu's account of her visit to a Seven-Eleven: 
Lulu: An argument is forming at the counter. A bloke. Dirty, pissy sort 
of--
Robbie: Wino? 
Lulu: Probably. Wino sort of bloke is having a go at this girl, young-
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Robbie: Student? 
Lulu: Yes. Student girl behind the counter. Wino is raising his voice to 
student. 
There's a couple of us in there. Me-chocolate. Somebody else-TV 
guides. (Because now of course they've made the choice on TV guides so 
fucking difficult as well.) 
And wino's shouting: You've given me twenty. I asked for a packet of ten 
and you've given me twenty. 
And I didn't see anything. Like the blade or anything. But I suppose he 
must have hit her artery. Because there was blood everywhere. 
Robbie: Shit. 
Lulu: And he's stabbing away and me and TV guide we both just walked 
out of there and carried on walking. 
And I can't help thinking: why did we do that? (Shopping 28-9) 
A look at this passage provides clues to the master narratives at work, and it points to 
language's role in the way the characters think and act. 
When Lulu begins to tell the story, she starts to provide very specific details about 
the perpetrator-a "dirty, pissy sort of'-at which point Robbie helpfully offers an 
encapsulating stereotype: "Wino?" Lulu tentatively accepts this shorthand, even though 
there is an indication that it might be inaccurate and beyond her ability to say. 
"Probably," she says, continuing, "Wino sort of bloke . . .  " Robbie then offers a category 
to summarize the girl of the story, as well. "Student?" he submits. "Yes," she agrees. In 
the next few lines we see references to the two further and further depersonalized, not 
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simply shortened. "Student girl'' and "Wino" have come to function as proper nouns. It 
is "Wino," not "the wino." If a desire to abbreviate were the issue, existing pronouns 
would serve this purpose better and, presumably, be readier for use. Skillfully, Ravenhill 
allows the language to speak for itself and identify itself as the product of consumer 
culture that it is. Lulu fashions a similar designation for the other Seven-Eleven shopper, 
calling (him? her?) "TV guides." Much like the examples of personal narratives at the 
beginning of this chapter, Lulu is most attuned to this other human presence as consumer, 
noting above all else his or her product of choice. Although Lulu also refers to herself in 
reference to a fetishized consumer object, for a split second Ravenhill lets the audience 
think--due to the pause that necessarily accompanies the. structure of the sentence-that 
there is only one person in the store: "There's a couple ofus in there. Me--chocolate." 
Even after the appositive construction becomes apparent, one is left to deal with the fact 
that each person has been defined in terms of (as?) a product. 
Lulu's tangents evoke her consumerist preoccupations. In the midst of recounting 
what one would expect to have been a disturbing incident, Lulu introduces a topic that 
appears to upset her much more. Not only is her complaint-"Because now of course 
they've made the choice on TV guides so fucking difficult as well"-significant enough 
for her to warrant its inclusion, this also marks the second time in a dozen lines that she 
introduces such an issue. Immediately before this, Lulu rambles, "I go in but I can't 
decide which [bar of chocolate to buy]. There's so much choice. Too much. Which I 
think they do deliberately" (28). Moreover, her statement about the TV guides is the only 
portion of the entire scene that contains some vestige of emotion, especially when 
compared to the deadpan delivery of other information, such as: "I suppose he must have 
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hit an artery. Because there was blood everywhere" or "And he's stabbing away . . .  " 
The absurdities of the scene are further emphasized by the nature of the argument that 
initiates the violence. It appears to be a minor conflict regarding the amount of a sale­
however, not a matter of the cashier overcharging for an item, but of selling too much of 
one. Of course, the point is probably that any little thing was likely to set off this volatile 
person, but this choice by Ravenhill has the effect of foregrounding consumption and of 
linking it with negative effects, psychological and physical. 
Finally, the loss of human affect, the widespread permeation of consumerism, the 
likelihood of violence, and the language used by the characters are united in this scene's 
culminating moments. After admitting that she left the Seven-Eleven without attempting 
to intervene or even summon assistance, Lulu confesses to having stolen the chocolate 
bar that lured her into the store to begin with: 
Lulu: And I've still got. You see I took. 
She produces the chocolate bar from her pocket. 
I took the bar of chocolate. She's being attacked and I picked this up and 
just for a moment I thought: I can take this and there' s nobody to stop me. 
Why did I do that? What am I? (30) 
Albert Bandura observes that, from childhood, people "come to respond to their own 
behavior in self-approving and self-critical ways, depending on how it compares with the 
evaluative standards set by others" ("Social Cognitive Theory" 54). So when these 
evaluative standards come to be based more and more upon the "logic of the 
marketplace," upon a sense of competition for enjoyment and the implausibility of a fair 
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exchange, the subject's standards for self-approval and self-criticism are going to change 
dramatically. 
The evaluative standards of the world Ravenhill creates are registered and 
codified in the language. Robbie's response to Lulu' s confession is that "they must be 
used to it. Work nights in a shop like that, what do they expect?" (30). On the surface, 
Robbie is simply attempting to console Lulu, but when examined more closely, his words 
are shown to have a noxious taint to them. There is, first of all, the operation of a kind of 
common-law morality. So many people steal to secure what they desire that it can hardly 
be taken seriously as a crime, especially when the item has little exchange value. The 
next clause is more insidious and more haunting because of its latent ambiguity. When 
Robbie says, "What do they expect?" it isn't clear whether he intends the theft of the 
candy bar or the entire episode of violence. In fact, none of Lulu's story seems to strike 
Robbie as extraordinary. "Shit," he mutters, at one point. However, to unite this 
ambiguous phrase with the phrase, "Work nights in a shop like that," is to connect one of 
the mechanisms of moral disengagement (i.e. , attributing blame to the victim) to, 
potentially, theft, murder, or both. They (the owners and operators of the Seven-Eleven) 
were asking for it (the theft of easily stolen products in a store that stays open at night 
with only one or two employees to prevent it}-or-she (the female cashier) was asking 
for it (a violent, even fatal, attack, because she works the night shift at a Seven-Eleven). 
That this trivializing remark might actually refer to the murder rather than the theft is 
made clear when Lulu places the two crimes on an equal plane. She worries, "They'll 
have me on the video [security surveillance camera] . With the chocolate." Robbie 
assures her, "They' ll be after him. Not you." "I suppose" (31 ), says Lulu. 
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Brian is, of course, the most concentrated manifestation-the personification-of 
the "logic of the marketplace" in Shopping and Fucking. When William C. Boles says, 
"Not only have the characters . . .  become inured to the brutality of violence around them, 
but communal, self-affirming personal relationships have disappeared as well. Emotional 
relationships are devoid of commitment, love, trust, and respect, having been replaced by 
transactions" ( 132), he surely has Brian in mind. In fact, he continues, "Money drives 
these characters. As Brian 'lectures' Robbie: 'Money is civilization' (87)" ( 132). For 
Brian, money is the basis of civilization (i.e., society), and money is the supreme measure 
of societal value (i.e., it is money that makes one "civilized").68 As a characterization of 
capitalist mentality, Brian seems to spring fully-formed from the head of Marx. 69 As 
such, the neo-Marxian psychology of Erich Fromm provides a particularly useful and 
appropriate lens with which to view Brian and his interactions with the other characters in 
Ravenhill's play. 
Several of Fromm's theories are relevant to a discussion of Ravenhill' s characters. 
One such theory is elaborated by means of reference to the social orientations Fromm 
believes people hold and exhibit. He sketches five basic forms of social orientation that 
interplay to greater and lesser degrees, considering four of the five as at least partially 
68 McGowan says, "Whereas authority previously had to make at least the pretense of preventing corruption 
. . .  now it is openly corrupt and criminal. It is openly on the side of enjoyment, not prohibition" (52). 
69 Val Burris explains: 
In Marx's theory, the concept of reification specifies the dialectical relationship between 
social existence and social consciousness-that is, between objective social relations and 
the subjective apprehension of those relations-in a society dominated by commodity 
production. It describes a situation of isolated individual producers whose relation to one 
another is indirect and realized only through the mediation of things ( the circulation of 
commodities), such that . . .  human relationships are veiled behind the relations among 
things and apprehended as relations among things. (2) 
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unhealthy. He views them as unhealthy because they are constitutive of what he calls 
the "having mode" as opposed to the "being mode": 
By being or having I do not refer to certain separate qualities of a subject 
as illustrated in such statements as "I have a car" or "I am white" or "I am 
happy." I refer to two fundamental modes of existence, to two different 
kinds of orientations toward self and the world, to two different kinds of 
character structure the respective predominance of which determines the 
totality of a person's thinking, feeling, and acting. 
In the having mode of existence my relationship to the world is one 
of possessing and owning, one in which I want to make everybody and 
everything, including myself, my property. (Fromm, To Have or To Be 24) 
The "having mode" is manifested, specifically, in the language: 
To those who believe that to have is a most natural category of human 
existence it may come as a surprise to learn that many languages have no 
word for "to have." In Hebrew, for instance, "I have" must be expressed 
by the indirect forrnjesh Ii ("it is to me"). In fact, languages that express 
possession in this way, rather than by "I have," predominate . . . .  The word 
for to have develops in connection with the development of private 
property, while it is absent in societies with predominantly functional 
property, that is, possession for use. (23) 
It is also readily apparent that the "having mode," which undergirds the four unhealthy 
social orientations, reflects those conceptions of consumer culture that have been 
discussed in this chapter. A shorthand account of these orientations (the "receptive," 
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"exploitative," "hoarding," and "marketing" orientations) is that they all exhibit the 
tendency to define people's lives, their goals, and their social and interpersonal 
relationships in terms of their possessions. The difference between the four exists in their 
particular relationships vis-a-vis those possessions, with that relationship being, 
respectively, one of waiting for, taking, keeping, or selling cultural commodities. 
Influenced by Freudian ideas of the unconscious and biological drives of human 
beings, as well as the Marxian notions that people are largely shaped by the conditions of 
their social environment and, in particular, the economic systems and conditions under 
which they live, Fromm's theoretical amalgamation allows for a greater measure of 
individual freedom from deterministic systems than either Freud or Marx. In fact, for 
Fromm, "Freedom characterizes human existence as such" (Fromm, The Fear of 
Freedom, 19). The difficulty lies in the fact that it is also human nature to fear the 
responsibilities that come with freedom. Fromm outlines two fundamental ways in which 
human beings escape an exertion of individual free will.70 Each of these lends itself to 
the creation and maintenance of authoritarian systems: 
We seek to avoid freedom by fusing ourselves with others, by becoming 
part of an authoritarian system . . . .  There are two ways to approach this. 
One is to submit to the power of others, becoming passive and compliant. 
70 Boeree explains that one should not confuse "true" personal freedom and political freedom: 
Most ofus . . .  tend to like the idea of political freedom, because it means that we can do 
what we want. A good example is the sexual sadist ( or masochist) who has a 
psychological problem that drives his behavior. He is not free in the personal sense, but 
he will welcome the politically free society that says that what consenting adults do . . .  is 
not the state's business. ( 4) 
He also cites enfranchisement, saying that while we have secured the right to vote, rather than using it to 
our benefit or the benefit of society, we "tend to be conformist and often rather irresponsible" (4) with it. 
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The other is to become an authority figure yourself, a person who applies 
structure to others. Either way, you escape your separate identity. 
(Boeree 2-3) 
Fromm locates the extreme positions on this spectrum as those of sadism and masochism, 
extremes one can see in Brian and Gary, respectively. However, some degree of both 
positions exists in many of the relationships within an authoritarian system. 7 1 Boeree 
provides another useful example: 
In many classes . . .  there is an implicit contract between students and 
professors: Students demand structure, and the professor sticks to his 
notes. It seems innocuous and even natural, but this way the students 
avoid taking responsibility for their learning, and the professor can avoid 
taking on the real issues of his field. (3) 
In this respect, global capitalism introduces new narratives, new mythologies whose 
languages allow for new mindsets, new ethical systems, and a whole new set of ready­
made justifications for capitalism's newly privileged behaviors. 
Erich Fromm argues that along with new conceptions of ownership and new ways 
of determining worth within the economic sphere, the advent of capitalism introduced in 
the language new ways of understanding and expressing one's identity and one's 
relationship to the world. These new conceptions of what it means to be human and how 
human beings fit into their environment draw heavily upon stories designed to exemplify 
71 Todd McGowan speaks of the "often masochistic impulse at the core of desire," saying, "Joan Copjec 
calls it a 'principle beyond pleasure,"' wherein "we will sacrifice anything and everything ( even life itself) 
for our particular Thing-which is to say, for our enjoyment" (The End 5). 
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and privilege capitalistic values and goals, and these serve as harbingers of the behaviors 
that have come to be most associated with capitalistic means and ends. In the following 
passage, Fromm takes up the role of the cultural narrative in the shaping of human 
endeavor: 
Radical hedonism and unlimited egotism could not have emerged as 
guiding principles of economic behavior had not a drastic change occurred 
in the eighteenth cen� . . . .  The growth of ever larger corporations was 
an economic necessity that one might regret, but that one had to accept as 
if it were the outcome of a natural law. Development . . .  was no longer 
determined by the question: What is good for Man? but by the question: 
What is good/or the growth of the system? One tried to hide the 
sharpness of this conflict by making the assumption that what was good 
for the growth of the system . . .  was also good for the people. This 
construction was bolstered by an auxiliary construction: that the very 
qualities that the system required of human beings-egotism, selfishness, 
and greed-were innate in human nature; hence, not only the system but 
human nature itself fostered them. (Fromm, To Have or To Be 6-8) 72 
Greater concern shown for systems than people is nothing less than the tangible 
counterpart to linguistic reification. 
Indeed, radical hedonism and unlimited egotism echo hollowly in Gary's final 
words. And if Gary's request to be sexually mutilated is not sufficient to do the job, 
Gary's final words certainly refute Boles' reading of the play's final encounters as 
merciful, loving, and healing. First, Gary signals how consumer capitalism has fashioned 
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his notions of commitment and duty. He says, "Listen, right. When someone's paying, 
someone wants something and they're paying, then you do it. Nothing right. Nothing 
wrong. It's a deal. So then you do it. I thought you were for real. Pretending, isn't it? 
Just a story" (Ravenhill 85). Here, commitment is not conceived in relation to an 
individual or in pursuit of an ideal; instead, commitment is defined in terms of a business 
ethic and via a consumer relationship-specifically, Gary espouses the principle that one 
(i.e. , the "customer") should get what one pays for (i.e. , the "service"). Robbie refuses to 
continue to indulge Gary's fantasy when it threatens to become violent. This refusal is 
met with anger. Since, as the text makes clear, no money has changed hands, Gary's 
anger seems directed, not so much at Robbie's failure to render the service purchased, but 
at his reluctance to make the deal in the first place. To forfeit the chance to make an 
exchange, and to make money, counters Gary's view of the world. It strikes him with 
such vehemence that one might conclude that Robbie has committed some "crime against 
nature," or a betrayal of the first magnitude. Robbie' s qualms are, for Gary, an indication 
of Robbie's "nature"-too squeamish for business and, therefore, a sign of Robbie's 
weakness-and this opinion reflects the assessments of others, including Brian, Lulu, and 
Robbie himself. Nothing should ever stand in the way of commerce, of revenue, of the 
profit principle. At this point, as if illustrating a lesson regarding appropriate behavior, 
Gary shows the extent to which consumer capitalism has infiltrated to the level of 
emotion or, rather, the extent to which the so-called higher emotions are realized 
superficially, as just another set of sensations in a world full of sensations. Finally, Gary 
shows the extent to which the "need to exchange"-the transaction as archetype-has 
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informed his very understanding of love.72 For Gary, human affection represents nothing 
more than one more bargain to be struck between individuals. In what are arguably the 
most depressing lines in the play, Gary displays his conditional, tit-for-tat conception of 
love and attempts emotional bribery of Mark. Gary will give Mark something he has 
long desired, ifMark will do what Robbie will not: "Do it," Gary says. Do it and I'll say 
'I love you"' (85). 
As with Gary, the other characters in Shopping and Fucking can be understood as 
representations of the two ways of escaping individual freedom within a particular 
authoritarian system-that is, within consumer capitalism-outlined by Fromm. Consider 
Lulu's interview with Brian for a telemarketing job. The scene opens with Brian 
showing Lulu a collector's plate for the movie The Lion King and, with childlike 
enthusiasm, relating to Lulu an editorialized version of the story. The film is, of course, a 
simplified cartoon version of Hamlet and a mass-produced replication. Disney films 
represent the sort of phenomena that Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer probably 
have in mind when they speak of the apparatus of mass reproduction in action. More 
than the mere making and distribution of a film, consumption also affects production. In 
an attempt to make an optimally consumable product, the original text's identity had to 
be substantially altered. In addition to shaping a text, the apparatuses of consumer 
capitalism and mass communication profit by creating distracted viewers/consumers, 
those who will pay attention to only those aspects of the text the apparatuses have 
represented as valuable. Brian only understands the film as commodity: on the conscious 
level, as a product to be marketed in various forms for his own profit; but also on an 
72 See Erich Fromm's discussion of the "need to exchange" in The Sane Society ( 146 ff.). 
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unconscious level, as egocentric wish fulfillment. Brian places great value in a 
hierarchical system that places him near the top, and he understands and justifies this 
placement by means of a circular logic. According to this logic, his greater individual 
worth is what determines his place at the upper end of the hierarchy, and his place at the 
upper end of the hierarchy is what attests to his individual worth. The Lion King 
reconstructs this circular logic by introducing a world where Simba' s place in the animal 
hierarchy is what justifies his right to rule, and his position as ruler is what justifies 
Simba' s place at the top of the animal hierarchy and his "right" as heir of the King of the 
Beasts. So, it is fitting that Brian should establish this Disney film as the underlying 
narrative for his meeting with Lulu. 
For Brian, The Lion King must seem special, even magical, in how well it 
documents his life and speaks to his desires. Brian's connection to the film makes him 
genuinely surprised when Lulu easily "guesses" elements of the plot. This is true even 
though the original plot is well-known, especially to Lulu who is a "a trained actress." 
Moreover, the plot is oft-repeated, frequently referenced as a cultural artifact, and made 
fairly obvious by Brian's way of telegraphing what is coming next and, thereby, giving 
away the plot. However, for Brian to recognize the unoriginality of the plot would be to 
recognize the banality of his own life and desires, both of which the cartoon so 
successfully presents. Instead he preserves his ignorance by simply following the 
mandates of a hedonistic consumerist society rather than engaging in self-reflection or 
examining his social environment. 
He shows the same unawareness regarding consumption's infiltration into every 
aspect of society. He feels compelled to tell Lulu, "Our viewers, they have to believe that 
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what we hold up to them is special. For the right sum-life is easier, richer, more 
fulfilling. And you have to believe that too. Do you think you can do that?" ( 1 0). In 
both instances, it is as Todd McGowan says: "Insofar as symbolic authority operates 
today undetected, less obtrusively than when it manifested itself through prohibition, it 
increases its power over contemporary subjects. The less we feel symbolic authority as a 
repressive power, the more likely we are to submit to its dictates" (The End 40) or, I 
would add, to reflect upon one's self or examine one's social environment. Brian is 
among the least oppressed by consumer capitalism, and he is completely a product of the 
new symbolic authority of the society of enjoyment; therefore, he cannot detect its 
influence. Aside from an obvious love for pontification, this is the reason Brian feels the 
need to lecture Lulu about how to sell. Brian likes to think that his special talents and 
specialized skills for business have most contributed to his success. He remains ignorant 
of any circularity in his logic or any permeation of sales culture beyond the market he has 
cornered, so he sees even the most basic principles of consumer capitalism as ideas to 
which he must formally introduce Lulu and which she must make a conscious effort to 
obey. Intuitively, he even feels the need to assert the nature of the roles each play in their 
relationship, to identify their relationship as strictly business, and to spell out their 
respective positions in the hierarchy: "You're looking to me aren't you. Well, aren't 
you?" ( 10); "Come on. You're an actress. You must be able to do some acting. An 
actress-if she can't do acting when she's asked then what is she? She's nothing" ( 1 1 ). 
However, the clearest articulation of their relationship is Brian's shockingly transparent 
commodification of Lulu. He coerces her to remove her blouse, not for sexual 
gratification, but simply to exert power and make her "act" for him. 
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When we next see Brian, he once again selects the narrative that will provide the 
structure of a meeting to take place in his office. This time the narrative does not contain 
the overt commodification of a Disney movie. Brian instructs Lulu and Robbie to watch 
a videotape of his son's cello recital. Interwoven with Brian's frequent emoting about the 
beauty of the music, which he delivers in overtly religious terms, are repeated rebukes 
and even an assault on Robbie. By these means, Brian makes clear the nature of their 
relationship. For the audience, the exaggerated expressions of emotion regarding the 
boy's playing are juxtaposed with a complete lack of affect when it comes to his dealings 
with Robbie and Lulu, as when, toward the end of the scene, Brian quizzes Robbie in the 
same condescending tone he had employed in his earlier meeting with Lulu. Prior to this 
moment, Lulu had been humoring Brian by marveling at his son's talent and skill, saying 
it is amazing and "that it just looks so effortless" ( 47). Brian agrees that it appears so, but 
insists she recognize that a great deal of effort is involved. When Lulu responds by 
saying that the boy must practice hours a day, Brian says, "His efforts-of course-but 
also my efforts" ( 48). Then, he turns to Robbie: 
Because, at the end of the day, at the final reckoning, behind beauty, 
behind God, behind paradise, peel them away and what is there? (To 
Robbie.) Son, I'm asking you. 
Robbie proffers an answer, saying, "Well-a father" (48), reading correctly Brian's 
egocentric desire for recognition. However, Brian tells him to try again. On Robbie's 
next attempt, he gets it right: "Money" ( 48). Brian takes pride in the fact that he has had 
a hand in his son's development; however, it is not the hand of a father, but that of a 
patron. Brian defines himself primarily by the money he makes, and his notions of 
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fatherly support appear to be limited to the financial. Moreover, Brian is so immersed in 
an ethos of competition that he competes with his own son for the credit of the boy's skill 
at playing the cello. 
Like Larry and Dan, Brian also cannot imagine an interaction that is a fair 
exchange, and he's convinced that Robbie has, in McGowan's phrase, "enjoyed at his 
expense." He tells Robbie, "I don't like mistakes" ( 49), but perhaps contrary to the 
audience's expectations, he is not speaking of Robbie's mistake in losing the three 
hundred tablets of ecstasy. He feels that Robbie has gotten the best of him and interprets 
the whole episode as a failure in his business instincts and in appropriate delegation on 
his part when he entrusted the tablets of E to Lulu: "I don't like mistakes. I don't like 
my mistakes. And now you tell me I've made a mistake. And so I hate myself. Inside. 
My soul" ( 49). Brian did not predict this outcome, so this perceived lapse in business 
savvy serves as a reminder that he too is subject to greater forces. This affront serves to 
threaten his megalomaniacal conception of self. In speaking of the effect on his soul, 
Brian allows his business dealings to commingle with his understanding of metaphysical 
being and defines this, as well, in relation to business and the "laws of the marketplace." 
Brian's conflations of the commercial and the religious (and his fledgling God complex) 
are evident throughout the scene in his application of religious phrasing to all of his 
discussions of business. They are even more strongly foregrounded as the scene 
concludes. With the aura of the Old Testament reverberating through his words, Brian 
commands that penance be done and homage be paid: "Seven days. To make the money . 
. . . You understand, son?" ( 49). At this point, he acquaints Robbie and Lulu with his 
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"wrath" which, rather than that of an "angry god," is calculating and devoid of emotion. 73 
He shows them a videotape of a man being tortured with a power tool, casually and 
dispassionately providing commentary. 
Brian's approach to punishment invites a return to Fromm, for another key feature 
of his psychological theory is relevant to an understanding of the characters in 
Ravenhill' s play. Fromm uses the analogy of the nuclear family to speak more subtly 
about the previously mentioned social orientations and, in fact; sees the family structure 
as the key factor contributing to the social behavior learned and exhibited by children into 
adulthood. He describes contemporary culture as being exemplified by "withdrawing 
families," wherein punishment is not an angry, and not always an immediate, response. 
Fromm believes the prevalence of such families is a mark of the advent of capitalism and 
the rise of the bourgeoisie. 74 And these families, he says, are characterized by two 
particular kinds of father figure. The first, and older, form of father may be familiar to 
those who were raised in more traditional or conservative family settings: 
He is a "good father," but at the same time authoritarian. Whenever he is 
pleased with the son's conduct he praises him, gives him presents, is 
affectionate; whenever the son displeases him, he withdraws, or scolds . . .  
. When [the son] succeeds he feels happy, secure and satisfied. But when 
73 Of the interlacing of patriarchy, capitalism, and religion, see The Sane Society and The Art of Loving. 
74 Fromm sees the "immature" forms as characteristic of the advanced capitalist nations and points to 
contemporary attitudes of child rearing that view children as their parents' equals. Boeree says that such 
parents "are no longer parents, just cohabitants with their children" and, "the children, without any real 
adult guidance," must "turn to their peers and to the media for their values" (5). Similarly, Todd McGowan 
notes a switch from the "aloof executive who issues commands but always remains out-of-sight" to "the 
contemporary CEO with an open-door policy, always seeking input from his employees rather than simply 
giving orders" ( 46), a "democratizing of authority" ( 46) he sees as more perception than actuality. 
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he makes a mistake, fails, or does not succeed in pleasing father, he feels 
deflated, unloved, cast out. (Fromm, The Art of Loving 88) 
According to this model, the response is meant to be "just" and "rationally" applied; 
however, it is always punitive and retributive (in the sense of being conceived as 
recompense-Le., compensation of a sort), and it is often vengeful. The principles 
informing this conception of fatherhood are, in Fromm's words, "I love you because you 
fulfill my expectations, because you do your duty, because you are like me," and 
"obedience becomes the main virtue [ and] disobedience is the main sin-and its 
punishment the withdrawal of fatherly love" (39). Brian is ostensibly more 
representative of this older, more traditional conception of parenting. He prides himself 
in being a producer rather than a consumer, and he clearly strives for these more 
conventional expressions of fatherhood in his relationship to his own son-whom he 
expects to master the cello-as well as to Robbie. And, with Brian, it is important to 
keep in mind A. H. Buss' s observation that "when aggression occurs in the absence of 
anger, there is an increase in the tendency to aggress" (89).75 Violence in the heat of 
anger is often regretted later, while a cold, dispassionate implementation of violence has 
already been reconciled and justified in the aggressor's mind; as opposed to angry 
violence, the aggressor's justification typically has more to do with the aggressor's 
opinion of the victim than of the victim's actions. 
Fromm contrasts this model of fatherhood with a more contemporary and 
increasingly prevalent form, one where he says the application of "a term like filiarchy 
75 Buss also observes that punishment is not an effective curb to violence in the absence of some immediate 
source or representative of punishment ( cf. 56), and there is none for Brian. 
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would not be entirely facetious" ( 160). In this version, "the picture has changed 
drastically . . .  as far as parent-child relations are concerned" (Fromm, The Sane Society 
10 1 ) :  "Children are no longer afraid of their parents. They are companions, and if 
anybody feels slightly uneasy, it is not the child but the parents who fear not being up-to­
date" ( 10 1  ). The earlier form of withdrawing father "resembles in many ways the earlier 
phase of [production] Capitalism," with its obvious authoritarianism, hierarchy, and 
ruthlessness. Yet, authority is not absent in the newer form of withdrawing family. As is 
generally the case in contemporary consumer capitalism, authority is much less 
noticeable, but as alive as ever. The "abstractifying and quantifying ... beyond the realm 
of things" ( 1 16) apparent even within production capitalism-an approach "seen in 
expressions like 'Mr. Ford produced so many automobiles,' or this or that general 
'conquered a fortress'; or if a man has a house built for himself, he says, 'I built a house"' 
( 1 16}-is replaced by a system wherein one no longer recognizes who exactly has power 
and, therefore, who is responsible for the abstractifying and quantifying customary of the 
contemporary treatment of human beings. Fromm addresses this change in the following 
way: 
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Authority in the middle of the twentieth century has changed its character; 
it is not overt authority, but anonymous , invisible, alienated authority. 
Nobody makes a demand, neither a person, nor an idea, nor a moral law. 
Yet we all conform as much or more than people in an intensely 
authoritarian society would. Indeed, nobody is an authority except "It. " 
What is It? Profit, economic necessities, the market, common sense, 
public opinion, what "one " thinks, does, feels. The laws of anonymous 
authority are as invisible as the laws of the market-and just as 
unassailable. Who can attack the invisible? Who can rebel against 
Nobody? ( 1 52-3) 
Viewed from this vantage point, it is easy to see that both the new shape of authority and 
the new model of father are heavily indebted to consumer culture and a language that is 
more advertisement than articulation. 76 And both of the above paternal paradigms are 
symptomatic of Jameson's depiction of the postmodern condition, with its "lack of 
affect." 
Withdrawing families dominate Ravenhill's  play, and Gary's relationship with 
Mark seems to exhibit some of the clearest examples of this kind of withdrawal. Gary is 
a rent-boy and, thereby, already commodified. During his first meeting with Mark, the 
underlying presence of consumer culture and the mass media resonates like a soundtrack. 
The first lines have Gary talking about the future, a time when all sexual encounters will 
be virtual: 
Couple of years ' time and we'll not even meet. We'll be like holograph 
things. We could look like whatever we wanted. And then we wouldn't 
76 Fromm offers the United States Army as an example of the morphological development of language vis a 
vis authority. During World War II, a typical Army read: "Uncle Sam Wants You!" Despite the 
anthropomorphic presentation of nationhood, the seat of authority remains clear, and the slogan clearly 
represents the ethic of personal sacrifice typical of the society of denial. The use of this traditional 
avuncular manifestation not only emphasizes the Army's system of hierarchy and personalizes the notion 
of duty to one's country, it clearly evokes the patriarchal nature of the Army and draws on the latent male 
desire to earn the "father's" approval by means of sacrifice. In The Sane Society ( 1955), Fromm writes, 
"Even the American army has accepted much of the new form of authority. The army is propagandized as 
if it were an attractive business enterprise [ and] the soldier should feel like a member of a team" ( 1 53). A 
trajectory toward ever-more-indiscernible forms and expressions of authority, and in line with society's 
ever greater investment in the cult of the individual and the mandate to enjoy, are apparent in the Army's 
most recent recruitment slogan, that invites American citizens to join an "Army of One." 
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want to meet 'cos we might not look like our holographs. You know what 
I mean? I think a lot about that kind of stuff me. (22)77 
This future promises pleasure without the dangers or disappointments associated with 
messy, emotional human sexuality. In this world, the notion of "relationship" in terms 
separate from the market will have become extinct. What Gary foresees is the perfect 
fusion of egocentric wish fulfillment and product variety translated into consumer choice. 
Also implicit in the above passage is a disdain for the body in its natural state. In 
Ravenhill's Some Explicit Polaroids, one encounters a similar disdain. In that play, 
Victor, the boy toy Tim seems to have ordered online--"I downloaded you because you 
wear little shorts and you gyrate to trash" (283)--is a miracle of modem reconstructive 
medicine and fitness regimes that leads Matt Wolf to remark, "Revolutionary ideals to 
transform the body politic have been replaced by the flat-out worship of (what else?) the 
body" (52). This comment clearly echoes the neo-Lacanian appraisals of a society of 
consumption that has become ever more focused on private enjoyment at the expense of 
older production-society notions of community. In Some Explicit Polaroids, Ravenhill 
documents the growing contemporary fetishization of the body. This fetishization trades 
in physical archetypes that, much like the Disney images discussed earlier, are geared 
toward optimal marketability. This physical "ideal" is quite literally marketed by means 
of every contemporary media form. These bodies are cyborgs, hybrids of nature and 
human intervention; they are increasingly plastic and artificial, and they are increasingly 
advertised, selected, and purchased. In this play, one sees that concern for the public 
77 These lines inevitably lead to the language of sales. Gary says, "See, I called you back. Don't do that for 
everyone" (22). Mark, Gary implies, is in some unspecified way different/better than all his the "others"-
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sphere has imploded under the pressure to address one's private enjoyment. Although 
Wolf feels the need to include the caveat "so to speak" when he says that Victor was 
"downloaded . . .  off the Net" (52), indicating that he is writing metaphorically and with a 
sense of irony, the statement is more accurate and literal than he may be comfortable 
admitting. Likewise, in Shopping and Fucking, we see such attitudes regarding the body 
carried to their logical conclusion. Rather than being merely shaped by consumerism and 
the media, the desire is for the obsolete body to be replaced. Arthur Kroker, writing on 
Deleuze and Guattari in The Possessed Individual, envisions "materialism in the new 
age" as "all about panic doublings: the flight from the body with organs to the digital 
dreams of becoming speed, becoming slowness; and the fantastic valorization of the 
virtual self by the fear of falling back into corporeality, into the body with (dying) 
organs" (Kroker).78 In this way, one can see how the electronic media offer 
contemporary versions of some of the same consolations previously supplied by a 
commonly held religion. 
In Shopping and Fucking, identities are viewed as being as artificial and plastic as 
the body. In the same scene, Gary asks Mark, "How old do you want me to be?" When 
a blatant attempt to trigger the competitive impulses he feels it safe to assume when it comes to enjoyment. 
78 A similar impulse is manifest in other plays, as in Martin Crimp's play Attempts on Her Life when the 
parents of an unnamed girl converse about their daughter: 
--"I feel like a screen." 
--She's lying there, isn't she, with the tube in her poor thin arm, looking terribly pale, 
whiter in fact than / the pillow. 
--"Like a TV screen," she says, "where everything from the front looks real and alive, but 
round the back there's just dust and a few wires." 
--"Dust and a few wires." 
--She'd like to act like a machine, wouldn't she. 
--Act? She'd like to be a machine. Sometimes she spends days on end, whole days on end 
pretending to be a television / or a car. 
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Mark says, "I'd like you to be yourself," Gary responds, "That's a new one" (23). At this 
point, Gary offers Mark some cocaine, and Mark, who is trying to kick the habit, 
becomes defensive. Gary's questions about Mark's sexual predilections make him even 
more uncomfortable. Therefore, when Gary asks, "So, you're looking for regular?" as if 
he were speaking of coffee or gasoline, Mark responds by launching into the language of 
pop psychology (itself a commodity). He ultimately reveals too much and inadvertently 
identifies himself to Gary as vulnerable-as an easy "mark"-a pun Ravenhill may have 
intended: 
The important thing for me right now, for my needs, is that this doesn't 
actually mean anything, you know? 
Which is why I wanted something that was a transaction. 
Because I thought if I pay then it won't mean anything. Do you think 
that's right-in your experience? 
I'm sorry, I'm making you listen. 
I've been away to get better, well to acknowledge my needs anyway, and 
now I'm starting again and I suppose I wanted to experiment with you in 
terms of an interaction that was sexual but not personal, or at least not 
needy, OK? (24-5) 
In light of Mark's vulnerability, Gary's next speech is ominous, expressing his 
competitive and opportunistic nature. He says, "Downstairs. The arcade. Somebody's 
-A television, an automatic pistol or a treadle sewing-machine. (24-5) 
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just had a win. You gotta know which ones to play otherwise all you get is tokens. I've a 
lucky streak me. Good sound, int it? Chinkchinkchinkchinkchink" (25). The scene ends 
with the audience witnessing Gary "cashing in." He has managed to get Mark to pay the 
full amount for a service he has not satisfactorily rendered by appealing to Mark's 
( outdated?) compassionate tendencies and his sense of fairness. 
The language of emotional connection has become a bargaining tool in the 
characters' negotiations of power. In a later scene, Gary begins to tell Mark a personal 
memory of childhood abuse. Mark is immediately uncomfortable and tries to cut him 
off--"No. Don't, please" (32}-but Gary continues to speak. After a few more personal 
details, Mark can take it no longer and erupts: "FUCKING SHUT UP OK? KEEP 
YOUR FUCKING MOUTH SHUT" (32). While the end of the play seems to confirm 
that the abuse was real, and although Gary appears genuinely to desire a relationship, he 
seems unable to imagine a relationship that is neither commodified nor sadomasochistic. 
He is, however, able to imagine ways of using this personal information for his own ends. 
For instance, to Mark's profane outburst, Gary acidly replies, "Sound like him" (32), 
effectively establishing a link between Mark and Gary's abusive step-father that plays on 
Mark's sympathy, and probably on his sense of guilt over the failed father/lover 
relationship he had with Robbie. The coup de main comes when Gary bursts into tears, 
and Mark dissolves. According to the stage directions, Mark "makes a decision. He 
takes Gary in his arms" (33). 
Whether or not any of his emotions are authentic, it becomes clear that Gary 
views human affect as a legitimate weapon in the war-the competition-for enjoyment 
and has no qualms regarding its use; although, the notion of an megitimate weapon, or of 
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inegitimate means, seems out of place in this play unless, perhaps, as a generational 
indicator designed to show, in Mark, some vestige of an older, more naive, and more 
humanistic value system. After a few scenes that show Mark's and Gary's relationship in 
an unexpectedly conventional fashion, the climactic moment in their relationship arrives: 
Gary: I knew it. You've fallen for me. 
Mark: Fuck. I really thought I'd broken this, you know? 
Gary: Do you love me? Is that what it is? Love? 
Mark: I don't know. How would you define that word? There's a physical 
thing, yes. A sort of wanting that isn't love is it? No, That's well, desire. 
But then, yes, there's an attachment I suppose. There's also that. Which 
means I want to be with you, Now, here, when you're with me I feel like a 
person and if you 're not with me I feel less like a person. 
Gary: So is that love then? 
Say what you mean. 
Mark: Yes. 
I love you. 
Gary: See. (55-6) 
Mark's confession leads him to talk about "mov[ing] forward," "developing a 
relationship that is mutual," and "respect [and] a recognition of the others' needs" (56). 
In a way, Mark's response is exactly what Gary has long wished for-not, that is, the 
offer of a relationship built on ridiculous notions of altruism, reciprocity, and respect, but 
simply Mark's confession of love, an utterance which for Gary signals imminent victory. 
Mark assumes a common understanding of relationships built on notions of fondness and 
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canng. Gary is, however, unable to take such statements seriously. For him, such 
phrases have never had an existence beyond the banal, pop-psychological usages that 
designate the mere appearance of emotion. They are displaced signifiers-nothing more 
than the language of business exchange, acquisition, and competition-in a form 
appropriate .to exchanges involving companionship and sex, as opposed to other sorts of 
goods and services. Without really understanding the phenomena, Gary does, however, 
recognize that some people seem affected by such language, in the same way a car-buyer 
may be played upon by a glib car salesman. Gary also recognizes that Mark is just such a 
type; therefore, Mark's admission of emotional connection (i.e., "investment," in Gary's 
understanding) signals to Gary his weakness and dependence. 
Gary smells blood in the water, and he does not hesitate to strike: 
Gary: I didn't feel anything. 
Mark: No? 
Gary: When you kissed me. Nothing. 
Mark: I see. 
Gary: Which means . . .  gives me the power, doesn't it? So I'll tell you. 
You're not what I'm after. I don't want it like that. 
Mark: But over a period of time . . .  
Gary: No. 
Mark: You see, if you've never actually been loved­
Gary: I'm not after love. I want to be owned. (56) 
Gary is right: he does have the power, and this power is made explicit when Mark begs 
Gary to stay. Yet, Gary shows that when one conceives of power in a strictly competitive 
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sense, then whatever forms of power may be derived from a loving relationship are 
destined to remain purely imaginary, simply because they cannot be imagined as a real 
possibility. Gary also shows that the impulse to use sentiment as a weapon precludes its 
existence as anything else. By using his relationship with Mark in this way, Gary is 
denying the possibility that this relationship can be anything other than reified, and he 
erases any chance that his relationship with Mark can be different than the ones he has 
experienced up to this point-in other words, abusive as well as commodified. 
It is true that Gary's view of relationships is nihilistic, but it is important to note, 
as does sociologist Kenneth Prandy, "that perception of the world as amenable to change 
depends upon the experience of effecting change in one's everyday life, and that the lack 
of such experience engenders a view of the world that simply accepts things as they are 
and assumes that they could not be otherwise" (Burris 14). Sociologists Kohn and 
Schooler report similar findings-that a lack of a sense of self-efficacy is frequently 
linked to a high level of conformity and a reluctance to change (passim). The same idea 
is bolstered by Albert Bandura and Gian-Vittorio Caprara, who together isolated 
perception of self-efficacy as a subject for study, and by Hans Toch, who devotes a good 
deal of space in his watershed book Violent Men to outlining how a sense of participation 
and agency is key to the hope of successful behavior modification and, with his research, 
a decline in recidivism. 79 
Erich Fromm's beliefs regarding life within an authoritarian system provide an 
interesting platform for juxtaposing Brian and Gary. Despite the appearance of radical 
79 See: "Longitudinal Impact of Perceived Self-Regulatory Efficacy on Violent Conduct" and "Impact of 
Adolescents' Perceived Self-Regulatory Efficacy on Familial Communication and Antisocial Conduct." 
178 
difference in the above accounts of Brian and Gary, Fromm would probably argue that 
they are more similar than different. He would also likely assert that the differences 
signify nothing more than individual responses to a shared duress: 
What is the common root of both the masochistic and the sadistic 
strivings? . . .  To quote a telling description of Dostoevski, in The 
Brothers Karamasov, he has "no more pressing need than the one to find 
somebody to whom he can surrender, as quickly as possible, that gift of 
freedom which he, the unfortunate creature, was born with." The 
frightened individual seeks for somebody or something to tie his self to; he 
cannot bear to be his own individual self any longer, and he tries 
frantically to get rid of it and to feel security again by the elimination of 
this burden: the self. (Fromm, The Fear of Freedom 130) 
Boeree helpfully consolidates Fromm's ideas, saying, "Authoritarians respond to a 
painful existence by . . .  eliminating themselves: If there is no me, how can anything hurt 
me?" (Boeree 3). Still, "others respond . . .  by striking out against the world: If I destroy 
the world, how can it hurt me? It is this escape from freedom that accounts for much of 
the indiscriminate nastiness of life-brutality, vandalism, humiliation, crime, terrorism" 
(3). Fromm adds, "If for any reason other persons cannot become the object of an 
individual's destructiveness, his own self easily become the object. When this happens in 
marked degree, physical illness is often the result and even suicide may be attempted" 
(Fromm, The Fear of Freedom 155). In addition to the "many illnesses" diagnosed by 
mental healthcare professionals, suggests Boeree, "drug addiction, alcoholism, even the 
joys of passive entertainment" may be thought of as forms of self-destructiveness (Boeree 
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3). In this way, Fromm "turns Freud's death instinct upside down: Self-destructiveness is 
frustrated destructiveness, not the other way around. (3) 
Here, Fromm describes two fundamental forms that the universal impulse to 
escape freedom may take, and both forms are to be found in both characters. Brian and 
Gary are both responding to the same authoritarian system and to the same pressures to 
enjoy. However, where there is a sense of agency-as with Brian-the response is 
directed outward; where there is little or no sense of agency-as with Gary-the response 
turns inward. In business interactions, Brian counts himself a master. For this reason, 
whenever he is able to put interpersonal relationships within a business context, he will, 
and one can easily see the reifying effect it has on those around him. Brian's home life is 
not provided for the audience; however, the implication is that none actually exists. In 
addition, Brian's conception of his son as a status symbol or a recipient of his patronage 
shows that even his familial relationships appear to have been altered to match the one 
language he knows and the only one in which he may conceive and express ideas, that of 
the business world. On occasions when Brian is confronted by a matter he finds it 
difficult or impossible to articulate in this language, he attempts to make the issue less 
threatening by keeping it at a safe distance or a manageable level. 
This buffering of experience makes reactions one might define as self-destructive 
less apparent in Brian, but they are there, nonetheless. For example, Brian's  familial 
lexicon is most sincerely expressed in relation to The Lion King. Only within the 
sanitized, non-challenging, and wish-fulfilling world of Disney does he allow any 
semblance of sentimentality to emerge. Commodification is certainly part of these 
conceptions, as well. However, in those moments of the film when one is confronted in a 
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simplified and cartoon form with mortality (i.e. , the death ofMufasa) and perpetuity (i.e. , 
in elaborations of the idea of the "cycle of life," as when Simba-who "looks like the 
dad. Just like him" (Ravenhill 9)---carries on in his father's stead), one sees the greatest 
levels of affect in Brian. This retreat to a passive form of entertainment is a self­
destructive and self-negating retreat to mass cultural conformism. Fromm says that one 
particular "mechanism is the solution that the majority of normal individuals find in 
modem society. To put it briefly, the individual ceases to be himself; he adopts entirely 
the kind of personality offered to him by cultural patterns; and he therefore becomes 
exactly as all others are and as they expect him to be" (Fromm, The Fear of Freedom 
160).80 So, ''when we need to hide, we hide in our mass culture," explains Boeree. "It is 
the horizontal counterpart to authoritarianism" (3). Gary, on the other hand, hides in the 
mass culture or follows masochistic and self-destructive paths. 8 1 Only under rare 
circumstances does he acquire enough of a sense of agency to direct his destructiveness 
outward. His relationship with Mark provides such circumstance. When Mark confirms 
Gary's power over him, it offers Gary the opportunity to attack (an)other instead of 
attacking himself. Therefore, although his relationship with Mark does not resonate for 
him the way the hoped-for sadistic father figure does, it does provide other forms of 
consolation. Meanwhile, Mark, Lulu, and Robbie feel little sense of agency and, like 
80 Dr. Charles Maland notes the similarity between Fromm's agruments in The Fear of Freedom ( 1960) 
and those of David Riesman, Reuel Denney, and Nathan Glazer regarding the "other-driven" personality 
type in The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character. New Haven: Yale UP, 1950. 
81 Gary's masochistic desire recalls Larry's description of "dermatitis artefacta" in Closer. In "The Voice 
on the Skin: Self-Mutilation and Merleau-Ponty's Theory of Language," Janice McLane explains that 
expressions of trauma may be manifested as self-violence when conventional forms of communication are 
forbidden or prove inadequate. Such acts of masochistic violence, themselves, constitute a form of speech. 
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Gary, are generally at the whim of a powerfully deterministic system and of individuals 
like Brian. 
At the end of the play, when Robbie sodomizes Gary with a fork at his request, 
one can best see some of these typical, inwardly focused responses. It is true that Gary 
has his request ( and ostensibly his desire) fulfilled. It is also true that Robbie is given the 
opportunity to act out his aggression toward his rival for Mark. Still, I find it 
unconvincing to attempt to read the ending, as does William C. Boles, as a positive one. 
First, as in the examples discussed above, this instance exhibits both the inwardly and 
outwardly destructive responses one can expect within a highly authoritarian system like 
that of pervasive consumer capitalism. Second, it exemplifies the amazing degree of 
compartmentalization that often accompanies extreme reification. Todd McGowan 
explains: 
Compartmentalizing of the various aspects of one's life into wholly 
distinct and insular realms . . .  is the foremost ideological gesture of late 
capitalism. The great benefits of dividing one's life into distinct realms is 
that it allows late capitalist subjects to engage in the most ruthless 
behavior while continuing to see themselves as moral individuals. 
Ruthlessness, here, is strictly business and has nothing to do with one's 
real personality. ("From Enjoyment" 59) 
This compartmentalization is most apparent in Brian's withdrawing and coldly 
calculating "mob" business mentality, but it is also apparent in Lulu's actions in the 
Seven-Eleven, in Gary's rejection of Mark, in Mark's initial abandonment of Lulu and 
Robbie, and in Robbie's willingness to "fork" Gary. 
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For the above reasons, I cannot agree with Boles, who says that in the final 
moments "the violence is generated out of a sense oflove and obligation," that 
"following Gary's murder, the world . . .  rights itself once again, just as the young cub's 
killing of his uncle [in The Lion King] restores order to that world," and that "through 
Gary's murder, love, albeit brief and unregenerative, is finally achieved" ( 1 33). To 
render Gary's death with some aura of a Christ-like sacrifice, or to characterize his 
murder as a mercy killing, is unconvincing. At the end, the play devolves into a story­
telling session during which Mark depicts a post-apocalyptic world, complete with a 
scene "in a market [or] some sort of bazaar" on a satellite circling Uranus (89).82 
Apparently, the authoritarian system of global capitalism has survived the annihilation of 
the planet and extended into space.83 Mark's tale also includes a mutant. This mutant, 
however, is not ugly: he is "tanned and blonde," boasts spectacular "pees," and is 
impossibly well-hung: "his dick . . .  I mean, his dick is three-foot long" (89). The 
extreme fetishization of the body has also, apparently, survived or, rather, flourished. 
Ultimately, it becomes clear that Mark can't image a world removed from consumer 
culture. Parts of this passage remind one of the work of Samuel Beckett: 
82 I agree with Professor B. J. Leggett, who says that Marber's  use of"Uranus" is surely meant to be a pun. 
83 In a relatively light-hearted and fitting example of capitalism's invisible operation as/within "the 
fundamental manifestation of contemporary ideology," McGowan cites the documentary film Trekkies 
( 1999): 
When pressed for details [ about the series], [ fans of the Star Trek universe] mention its 
fairness, its equality, its diversity, its tolerance, and its ethic of nonviolence. However, 
not a single fan depicted in the film, out of hundreds that are interviewed, mentions the 
fact that the Star Trek economy is a wholly socialist one, that this universe is so far from 
our prevailing capitalist one that its subjects don't even have money . . . .  Though Star 
Trek doesn't hide its rejection of capitalism, Trekkies don't see it because global 
capitalism has become a fundamental horizon of our thought. ( 193). 
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See the mute . . .  Well, he's mine and I own him. I own him but I hate 
him. If I don't sell him today I'm gonna kill him. 
So . . .  a deal is struck, a transaction, I take my mutant home and I get him 
home and I say: 
I'm freeing you. I'm setting you free. You can go now. And he starts to 
cry. I think it's gratitude. I mean, he should be grateful but it's . . .  
He says-well, he telepathises into my mind-he doesn't speak our 
language-he tells me: 
Please. I'll die. I don't know how to . . . I can't feed myself. I've been a 
slave all of my life. I've never had a thought of my own. I'll be dead in a 
week. 
And I say: That's a risk I'm prepared to take. (89-90) 
The ending is hardly reassuring when it suggests a master-slave relationship similar to 
that of Pozzo and Lucky in Waiting for Godot and a situation of dependence not unlike 
that of Hamm and Clov in Endgame. Whatever bit of hope is expressed by the freeing of 
the mutant is mediated by a future that is dicey, at best. And whatever solace one might 
extract from the final sharing of the single-serving "ready meals" is negated by cynically 
ending the play with a vignette that is a simulacrum-a Bowdlerized version--of the 
beginning. It is as if we have come back to the original situation. There has been no 
progress. The drugs and the vomit have simply been swept away to facilitate a sanitized 
Disneyesque reproduction of the original scene. Even the final images, the final words, 
the final depiction of the characters and their relationship-that is, in the play's final 
message to the audience-everything still ultimately and pointedly revolves around a 
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commodity. And this commodity, the ready meal, recalls the play's transformation of 
symbols from those that suggest natural human consumption (i.e., eating) to those that 
suggest a kind of "unnatural" ( and unhealthful) human consumption offered by a culture 
that has shifted the notion of food from one emphasizing use value and sustenance to one 
emphasizing exchange value and/by promoting it as a form of entertainment ( e.g., the 
appearance of the ready meals of scenes one and two, Robbie's job in fast food, the candy 
bar Lulu steals at the Seven-Eleven, and of course, the forks). Insofar as the ready meal 
unites natural biological function with artificial cultural function, it also conjures the title 
of the play and its own telling juxtaposition. 
In part, Boles is right: there is an attempt by these characters to make a story 
come true, to introduce their own "little story." However, behind, within, and all around 
this story are glimpses of the master narrative their story is meant to hide from their eyes. 
While the play is not entirely without hope, it is easy to see why a label like the New 
Nihilists might seem appropriate with Ravenhill. The questions with which Leslie Wade 
concludes her essay on Shopping and Fucking are provocative. Wade asks, "How is 
community possible for the posthuman order? How can we conceive of and realize a 
new-world solidarity-that is, a solidarity of strangers?" ( 1 1 5). In hopes of answering 
these questions, Wade refers us to Jodi Dean's book Solidarity of Strangers: Feminism 
after Identity Politics as a place to begin, but perhaps marine roboticist Naomi Leonard, 
recipient of a 2004 McArthur "genius grant," provides the most apt portrait of this new 
order, the new solidarity. Discussing the work that earned her the McArthur grant, she 
describes a collected group of individuals that are completely selfish, a description that is 
not out of place when speaking of the characters in Ravenhill 's play. She, however, is 
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referring to the schooling fish that her underwater machines are designed to mimic and 
study ("A Chat"). While Shopping and Fucking is not an expression of utter 
hopelessness, the situation at the play's conclusion reflects an epithet by Emil Durkheim 
in Le Suicide-for all that remains is "a disorganized dust of individuals" ( 448). 
Furthermore, the connotations of regression or devolution that come with applying 
Leonard's description of simple sea creatures to the artificial family of Mark, Lulu, and 
Robbie and the society of which they are a part may not be entirely misplaced. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Tongue Tied: Public Language and the Potential for Violence in Contemporary 
Drama 
Some of the most persistent, and persistently wrong, beliefs regarding aggression 
and violence-those infiltrating the culture at the level of both sociological theory and 
folk wisdom--offer biological explanations regarding the frequency, severity, and nature 
of aggression and violence. Researchers agree, for instance, that gender plays a 
significant role in aggressive and violent behavior. However, recent scholarship suggests 
that older, conventional models which characterize aggression as the product of human 
biology are, at best, incomplete and oversimplify these very complex behaviors. 
Moreover, accounts that understand aggressive and violent behavior as primarily 
instinctual and essentially male may, at worst, indoctrinate subjects into the very ethos 
and logic of violence. Yet, despite much recent debunking, such notions endure. The 
thinking of the general population still lags behind the available knowledge and, in some 
cases, popular thinking even exhibits an unwillingness to accept any measure of 
responsibility for the existing systems of violence. 
Consider two very different but illuminating examples: In July 2001 ,  Brad J. 
Bushman, Roy F. Baumeister, and Colleen M. Phillips published a study in the esteemed 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology indicating that an acceptance of popularly­
held catharsis models of aggression can actually contribute to the likelihood that an 
individual will aggress. When people believe that aggression is nothing more 
complicated than a natural release of the tension associated with frustration, they 
generally have fewer qualms about aggressing themselves and may even consider their 
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aggression as "healthy" or inevitable. As noted in the first chapter, this conception of 
catharsis is a fixture of the popular media, a facet of contemporary culture satirized in 
Michael Wynne's play The Knocky: 
Norma: Bastards. 
Mary: Eh, that' s it. Come on, be assertive, I saw it on Oprah. What 
you've got to do is scream your anger out. 
Norma: Yer Wha'? 
Mary: Y'know, "Swearing can be suitable." (107) 
Second, in 1980, Malamuth, Haber, and Feshbach documented that the so-called rape 
myth-the erroneous belief that all women share a fundamental desire to be overpowered 
by men-was still widely accepted as fact. It is significant that such beliefs have 
remained intact despite the ostensible condemnation of rape throughout western society, 
even to the extent that they have had an influence on both social and legal codes with 
respect to gender violence. Perhaps more striking, however, is the fact that "men and 
women alike were found to believe that women tend to enjoy sexual assaults that entail 
the infliction of pain" even though, individually, "few female subjects believed they 
could derive pleasure from being victimized" (Zillmann, Connections 236, emphasis 
added). Both of these examples demonstrate the influence that sociology, in the form of 
language, exerts on cultural "truth" and individual belief and behavior. The stories 
people tell each other shape the opinions they hold, but they also determine those areas 
where individuals feel there is no longer any need to investigate or analyze further 
because it has already been done for them and such information is now a matter of 
common knowledge. Therefore, as with the women cited above, people are often more 
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willing to rely on the accepted wisdom of their culture than their own experiences, 
intuition, and logic, so much so that they may find it easier to view themselves as 
abnormal than to question the existing cultural narratives. 
The second chapter, devoted to a discussion of institutional forms of linguistic 
violence, introduced the role of language in academic culture. Academia may, in fact, be 
more correctly understood as a "subculture," for it exists within, and sometimes in 
opposition to, the more mainstream culture of which it is a part. Most times, however, 
subcultures are not so easily recognized and partitioned off from the mainstream, and the 
language codes that identify and distinguish them present more subtle differences. 
Gender, class, geography, race, and combinations of these can define the boundaries of 
certain subcultures and, although they may obviously deviate from the mainstream 
cultures within which they operate, oftentimes they are not recognized as subcultures by 
those inside or those outside their margins. Recent psychological, sociological, and 
anthropological research has tended to emphasize the role played by a range of social 
influences in the development of human behavior, and much of this research has centered 
on gender identity, violence, and the overlap between the two areas. 
"Psychologically oriented sociologist" Marvin E. Wolf gang and "sociologically 
oriented psychologist" Franco Ferracuti offer some of the most comprehensive and 
detailed analyses of subcultures and their contributions to violence in The Subculture of 
Violence: Towards an Integrated Theory in Criminology (xix). They argue that there are, 
indeed, "subcultures of violence." By this they mean segments of a larger mainstream 
culture, wherein one may observe "a potent theme of violence current in the cluster of 
values that make up the life-style, the socialization process, the interpersonal 
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relationships of individuals living in [the] similar conditions" of that group (Wolfgang 
and F erracuti 140). 
As discussed in the previous chapters, language plays a significant role in 
establishing one's social existence and identity, shaping an individual's knowledge, 
attitudes, and beliefs, as well as coloring the spectrum of social experiences that confront 
and, in turn, shape individuals. For this reason, the language acquired in a violent 
subculture plays a key role in the creation and maintenance of that individual's 
aggressive and violent behavior. The far-reaching influence of language necessarily 
exerts an immense influence on one's relative acceptance of violence and the likelihood 
that one will resort to violence as a response to frustration and conflict. However, 
recognizing the influence of another individual's linguistic and cultural heritage and 
understanding how these factors fashion that individual's relationship with violence are 
subject to the inherent difficulty of viewing the world via someone else's culturally 
constructed lenses. It is far too easy to dismiss such factors prior to any examination and 
to attribute far more agency to others than they have, while quickly noting the 
circumstances that condition or obstruct one's own exertions of will. In Bryony Lavery's 
play Frozen, Agnetha' s erudition regarding the behavioral mechanisms that lead others to 
commit violence does not prevent her from easily slipping into just such a double­
standard, where her own behavior and interests are concerned. That is, until Nancy 
forces her into self-reflection: 
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Agnetha: I worked with him every day for ten years. Two days before he 
died . . .  I slept with him. It just happened. His wife is a very good friend. 
Why am I telling you this? 
Nancy: Why are you? 
Agnetha: Do I tell her? 
Nancy: No. You just suffer. "The difference between a crime of evil and a 
crime of illness is the difference between a sin and a symptom . . .  " Your 
words. I read your thesis . . .  You knew what you were doing. Live with it. 
(Frozen 100) 
So, while the attempt to consider things from another's vantage point can be 
difficult and complicated, it is worthwhile, and we are fortunate that our attempts have 
been facilitated by a handful of social scientists who have concentrated their efforts 
toward a better understanding of the sources and nature of violence, as well as those who 
have devoted considerable time and energy in the study of language's effects on personal 
and social identity. Such methodologies make it possible to decipher some of the 
otherwise unaccountable violence in what Aleks Sierz calls the "in-yer-face theatre" of 
the nineties and the new millennium. Together, they show that many of the aggressive 
and violent tendencies exhibited onstage may find their roots in the languages characters 
have learned in their respective subcultures, the perspectives they have developed in 
accord with such languages, and the responses they have rehearsed as members of these 
linguistically proscribed subcultures. 
Individual examples will be drawn from a range of contemporary plays, wherein 
much of the violence is born within and partly due to the confines of restrictive and 
inadequate linguistic codes. These codes help determine characters' states of mind, their 
worldviews, and their relative (in)ability to interact with others and adapt to 
surroundings. Therefore, these next chapters will address the socio-linguistic factors that 
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contribute to the so-called "subcultures of violence." Specifically, Chapter IV will show 
how Basil Bernstein's accounts of "public" and "formal" language use may help to 
facilitate the diagnosis of a propensity toward violence and to explain why certain 
linguistic features are more connected to subcultures where violent behavior 
predominates. A great many contemporary plays might be usefully explicated with the 
help of Bernstein's ideas. I will focus a few: Anthony Neilson's Petetrator, David 
Harrower's Knives in Hens, David Eldridge's Serving It Up, and Tracy Letts' Killer Joe. 
Basil Bernstein's greatest contribution to the study of language is in his 
recognition of the impact language has in determining how individuals may interact with 
the world around them. His accounts of elaborated and restricted codes go a long way 
toward explaining phenomena as divergent as the dynamics of a group's social bonding 
or an individual's likelihood of achieving academic success. Elaborated codes, he 
explains, are much less tied to specific circumstances or immediate contexts or to sets of 
shared assumptions than those that are "restricted" in any of these ways. The extent to 
which people use elaborated versus restricted codes is largely determined by the 
(sub)cultures in which they acquire and then practice their language; and the prevalence 
of one code versus another is useful in forecasting the degree to which individuals will be 
able to participate in the range of (sub )cultures they will encounter during their lives. It 
should be said from the outset that another of Bernstein's major contributions is that he 
never posits absolutes. As Cathy Urwin suggests, Bernstein's theories are anti­
universalist and sensitive to class differences (27 1 -2). For these reasons, Bernstein's 
ideas are particularly apt for the present discussion; after all, to study subculture is to 
study class difference. 
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A kind of class difference helps one locate the violence in Neilson's Penetrator, 
for the three characters represent different cultural and socioeconomic realities. 
Neilson's play is comprised of three friends who have known each other for varying 
lengths of time and at different levels of intimacy. The three may be usefully imagined 
as occupying positions on a spectrum that charts one's degree of investment in a language 
closely identified with violence. Of the three, Tadge and Alan represent the poles­
Tadge is heavily invested in a subculture and a language of violence, while Alan is 
relatively free from violent subcultural and linguistic influences. Max occupies a 
position between the two, for he has been moving from Tadge's pole toward Alan's. 
Although the play is certainly about betrayal, the violence in the play results not from 
Alan's betrayal of Max; in fact, the revelation of Alan's betrayal comes too late to be the 
cause of the conflicts witnessed on stage. Nor can the aggression be explained as simply 
the result of jealousy between friends-perhaps the most apparent invitation to anger and 
retaliation in the play. Rather, the conflicts rest in the uncomfortable negotiation on the 
part of the characters vis a vis each one' s  commitment to the linguistic codes and 
ideologies of specific subcultures of violence. 
Neilson makes it clear that Tadge suffers from some mental or psychological 
pathology. He appears delusional and disconnected from himself and his current 
surroundings. However, Neilson also indicates that Tadge was not always so. In a 
number of ways, the play implicates the process by which Tadge has come to his present 
state. It is true that the audience is privy only to brief glimpses of a few pivotal moments 
in Tadge's life, yet one can still identify three distinct "stages" in his development. The 
trickle of information gives the audience just enough to reconstruct bits of the past and 
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gain some sense of the history behind the present situation. In this way, the play suggests 
that there has been a transition from the tabula rasa of the young Ronnie Junior, to the 
aggressive and hyper-masculine adolescent Tadge, to the "young man" who shows up on 
Max and Alan's doorstep and declares: "I don't have a name!" (Neilson 61, 77, 98).84 
Tadge' s eventual inability to define himself as an individual mirrors his inability to 
articulate individualized thoughts during the course of the play. Tadge demonstrates a 
linguistic lack-the absence of what Bernstein terms a "formal language." This missing 
language may be understood as "the language of . . .  personal, individual qualifications," 
a language whose "form implies sets of advanced logical operations" and "a need to 
verbalize . . .  relations in a personal, individual way" (Bernstein, "Some Sociological" 
28). This is not to say that Tadge is not an individual, or that he does not experience the 
world in an individual way. It simply means that Tadge has not learned a linguistic code 
that facilitates the expression of, and therefore a verbally self-conscious awareness of, the 
individual qualifications that make up his individual experience. What he is lacking is a 
meta-language that allows for a critical engagement with experience, as opposed to mere 
descriptions of objects and encapsulations of events. Bernstein best explains what is at 
stake for individuals who do not have access to, and therefore the advantages of, a formal 
language: 
The very means of communication do not permit, and even discourage, 
individually differentiated cognitive and affective responses. This is not to 
say that speakers . . .  interact in a completely uniform manner . . .  but it 
84 Tadge, we are later told, is short for Tadger (i.e., "penis" or "erection"), which is the nickname this 
character earned due to the inappropriately sexual response he had to an episode of peer-inflicted 
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provides a language-use which discourages the speaker from verbalizing 
his discrete relationships with the environment. (Bernstein, "A Public 
Language" 47) 
It is, perhaps, this fuller consciousness of the social structures within which the characters 
operate that constitutes the greatest difference between Tadge and his peers Alan and 
Max, the two who do have access to a "formal language." 
Playwright David Harrower provides some of the most lucid examples of 
speakers deprived of the linguistic means of comprehending and articulating their 
relationships with the world around them. In Knives in Hens, Harrower presents a young, 
rural, married couple. Although the young husband's language is rudimentary, his 
knowledge and abilities surpass those of his young wife. The opening scene introduces 
us to their barren rural existence, made even more so by their inability to express and 
order it. In particular, the young woman's highly literalistic understanding of language 
colors her understanding of her environment and proves an intellectual barrier between 
her and her husband. By means of his characters' first verbal exchange, Harrower 
provides a dramatic, or extreme, example of the limitations inherent in languages: that is, 
those-as are "public" languages-that are relatively meager in their capacity to convey 
the subjective, the abstract, the metaphoric: 
Young Woman: I'm not a field. How'm I a field? What's a field? Flat. 
Wet. Black with rain. I'm not field. 
William: Never said that. 
Young Woman: Says I'm a field sitting here. 
aggression while still a schoolboy. 
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William: Said you're like a field. 
Young Woman: 'S the same. 
William: Nothing close, woman. 
Young Woman: If I'm like a field must be a field. 
William: (laughs) Don't have to be a thing to be like it. 
Young Woman: How? 
William: Just don't. (Knives in Hens 1) 
William's initial dominion over his wife is presented as the result of his greater access, 
however small, to the benefits of a "formal" language. The linguistic source of William's 
power is stated bluntly, in lines following closely behind those cited above: 
William: I know more'n you. 
Young Woman: Know that. 
William: You're like anything I want. (2) 
In the aggregate, Knives in Hens may be read as an account of language 
development in the person of Harrower's young female character. This prospect is 
strengthened by the play' s linear structure, which serves to foreground the young 
woman's gradual acquisition and greater implementation of language. In the second 
scene, William's young wife is pictured alone and speaking aloud in a futile attempt to 
find language adequate to express her existence. At this early stage of the play, she 
demonstrates an agonizing lack of vocabulary, but she is even more painfully hobbled by 
her inability to express, and understand, abstraction. The next time we find the young 
woman alone and speaking out loud, her expressions-while still merely descriptive-for 
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the most part come in complete sentences. However, although she has clearly achieved 
greater fluidity with regards to the things she can express, in this eighth scene, her spare 
language still clearly hampers her ability to articulate the existential. Finally, in scene 
twelve, while the young woman employs the same nouns and adjectives gleaned from her 
tiny lexicon, her capacity to speak, her confidence, and her ability to comprehend the 
world has been liberated somewhat by the inauguration of the future tense to her 
repertoire. 85 
Neilson similarly foregrounds language and change over time by means of a 
structural linearity. Specifically, he conveys the process involved in making the Tadge of 
the present moment by introducing a travel motif. Tadge's overalljourney to the present 
point is highlighted by means of two vignettes depicting Tadge 's literal progress on the 
road to Alan and Max's flat. In these vignettes, Tadge' s physical journey is consistently 
associated with a particular type of language. In each, the speaker is an unidentified and 
disembodied voice, one described in the stage directions as "deep and subhuman" 
(Neilson 6 1 ). In the opening scene of the play, this voice recites a monologue comprised 
of the sort of sexually explicit narrative one might associate with cheap, mass-produced 
pornographic novels or the "letters" that frequently appear in "sex mags." At first, the 
audience is simply left to speculate. The idea that the narrative may, in fact, have been 
taken from a pornographic magazine is reinforced when, in the following scene, Max is 
shown masturbating while holding just such a magazine with his free hand. In addition to 
85 In a key passage, the village miller convinces the young woman to write her name and to take ownership 
of her language. This moment comes after the miller has acquainted the young woman with the literalness 
characteristic of her (and most of the villagers') conception of language---"'S that not what you're village 
believes? . . .  When a thing's got a name 's got a use?"-and it immediately coincides with the apex of the 
woman's linguistic development. 
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the sexual content of the opening narrative is an unmistakable thread of violence in the 
narrative. Much like the voice, however, the violence is devoid of context, from any 
clues that might indicate its source or its nature. Even the final image, which may either 
refer to the act of shooting a gun or which may simply be a violent metaphor for sex, is 
. left ambiguous. By scene's end, the audience is abandoned to a sense of inexplicable and 
unresolved tension. The scene's only figure, the vague, headlight-lit hitchhiker who will 
only later be identified as Tadge, is compared to "a patient dog," whose "eyes are 
glazed," and whose movements are "slow and dreamlike" (6 1). Neither this figure nor 
the low, inhuman voice supplies any stability, any indication as to whether the sexual and 
violent narrative describes events real or imagined, or any clue as to if/how the young 
man standing alone on stage might be involved with these events. The scene only 
announces that one should be aware of certain unexplained connections between this 
figure, sexuality, violence, and a banal and automatic experience oflanguage-and all of 
this within a singularly dark and sinister frame. 
The next time we encounter Tadge, in scene three, he is standing facing the fa�ade 
of a building used to house lurid spectacles. Still known only as the hitchhiker of scene 
one, he stares up at two neon signs, one reading: "VILE BED SHOW" (73). The other 
sign reads: "GRILS GRILS GRILS" (73), the misspelling signifying a transparent 
connection between a particular level of language skill and a particular setting and 
lifestyle. Once again, the dull, unnatural voice of scene one permeates the theater, but 
this time, the languages of sexuality and violence have more clearly merged. There is no 
longer any doubt that the two are mutually referencing each other and coming together to 
form a hybrid language expressing a violent sexuality. Once again, this paradoxically 
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tired yet aggressive language, uttered by an unseen, unknown, and ''un-human" entity, is 
tied to Tadge's physical progress by depicting another point along the highway leading to 
Alan and Max's flat. In this respect, Tadge's corporeal trajectory incorporates this hybrid 
language----the two transitions ( one taking Tadge from one place to another, the other 
turning his language from one thing to another) progress together, nearly paralleling each 
other, and draw characters and conditions ever closer to the site of eventual conflict. 
Significantly, in each of the vignettes, and in Tadge's ultimate arrival at Max and Alan's 
flat-an arrival marked by the physical absence of both Max and Tadge but the presence 
of Max's voice as it echoes from offstage----Tadge' s corporeal appearance is preceded by 
language, and explicitly a language conveyed by the disembodied voice of another 
speaker. Not much changes when Tadge finally opens his mouth to speak, for the 
language to which he gives voice is still in many ways disembodied and seemingly 
borrowed, not really his own. 
From his first appearance on stage, Tadge utters a stream of non-sequiturs and pat 
phrases; in fact, his first line is both. For, immediately upon Tadge's arrival, Max asks 
him, "What the fuck are you doing here?" (Neilson 77), to which Tadge absently mutters 
the rote response, "All right man" (77), as if Max had asked him the equally pat question: 
"How've you been?" In his next few lines alone, Tadge utters four non-sequiturs and 
responds to another five questions with a dazed silence. The mechanical nature of his 
responses is further emphasized when Tadge looks to Max to say how much sugar he 
should take in his coffee. He seems unable to make this difficult decision on his own and 
falls back on the stability and simplicity offered by a former habit that, unfortunately, he 
has forgotten. Another example of mechanical language comes later in the same scene, 
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when Alan admits his prejudice with regards to the army and what he feels it has come to 
represent. In response to Alan's confession, Tadge blurts out, "Would you like it if 
Saddam Hussein was running the country?" (83).86 The bumper sticker logic of this 
phrase only seems to corroborate Alan's negative impression of the military; moreover, it 
shows that, when pressed, Tadge will resort to the jingoistic rhetoric he has picked up at 
home or while in the service. This particular exchange ends with Tadge bragging about 
the army's amazing potential to acquire intelligence and execute even the most difficult 
of military operations. Here, as in other plays, we see documentation of unsettling 
phenomena: Violence at the interpersonal level often translates into violence on a broader 
cultural plane ( e.g. , at the level of clans, communities, nations); violent nationalism is 
often especially virulent among populations less favored within the nation in question. 
A particularly emblematic example appears in David Eldridge's play Serving It 
Up, as one socially debilitated youth complains about his literal and figurative place in 
life to his equally disenfranchised (and much more violent) friend: 
Nick: This country is shit. 
Sonny: No. No it's not. Greatest country in the world, England. We won 
the war, didn't we? And the fucking Argies. And them fucking Arab 
cunts. 
He starts to sing "Rule Britannia " drunkenly. (Serving It Up 38) 
86 The play was written in the wake of the first Gulf War in Iraq. 
200 
In his defense of Britain, the criteria of England's greatness themselves slant towards the 
racist and the violent. Elsewhere in this play and others, the nation's success in cricket 
and football warrants the same. 87 
Likewise, in Pentrator, and still referring to Saddam Hussein, Tadge says, "We 
know everything about him. We've got stuff you wouldn't believe. We could kill him 
anytime we like without going anywhere near him" (83). Max then asks the obvious 
question: "So why don't we?" Tadge's reply is a monotone: "Top secret" (84). Max 
assumes that, by this incomplete sentence, Tadge means that he knows things that are too 
sensitive, or that he is forbidden, to share. However, to Max's follow-up question, "You 
can't tell us?" Tadge mutters, "I don't know" (84). Apparently, when Tadge uses the 
pronoun "we," it does not include him. This use of the "royal 'we"' is strangely 
incongruous because it is divested of every trace of the monarchial privilege and power 
that the usage suggests, serving to underscore Tadge' s own cultural disempowerment. 
Tadge has come to accept that, like the soldier of Tennyson's "Charge of the Light 
Brigade," his "is not to reason why; [his] is but to do and die," and his language reflects 
this. Taken together, Tadge's lines also convey the possibility that Tadge doesn't even 
87 Enda Walsh's play Disco Pigs portrays a similar nationalism among the disenfranchised, quite 
unquestioned and based on spurious or absent reasoning. In the following passage, one can see a hatred 
based on experience and things tangible, a respect based on slogans, sports, and pomp, and a dialect that 
borders on malapropism and serves to emphasize these discrepancies: 
Runt: Is Pork dat big? 
Pig: Not big, no , but manky. Not big, Runt, bud a big black barrel a black dat only do 
pause purr da pissy grey rain. 
Pig: Ya noel wen Sonia finally become champion da wonder horse an gallop her way to 
suckycess bak in old Godden-burg, yeah? An Sonia stan on da winny po-dium wid da 
whirl medal all a dangle from de pretty liddle neck as da nationalist rant-hymn blast da 
fuck oudd da sky an da green white an porridge all a flutter in da breeze. An all da Irish 
201 
know whether or not he knows. At this point, Tadge is immediately off on a tangent and, 
in the process, he makes a statement that directly contradicts what he had said only 
moments before. 88 It is at this point that Tadge begins his long and graphic tale about 
"The Penetrators," a mysterious cadre or fraternal order whose members he claims have 
tortured and violated him. 
Tadge' s experience of language suggests one of the linguistic features most 
closely linked with violence-a heavily mechanical understanding and application of 
language. Tadge is, of course, depicted as deeply troubled and delusional; however, this 
does not reduce the value his language-use holds in providing insight into his cognition 
and his character. In fact, his language, his neuroses, and his aggressive and violent 
nature are intertwined in intricate ways--each representing a symptom and a source of 
his limited cognitive abilities, his un-individuated subjectivity, his limited ability to 
communicate, and his limited recourse to healthier responses to frustration and/or 
provocation. Similarly, in the guise of a lecture given by Agnetha, the New York School 
of Medicine' s Chair of Psychiatry, Bryony Lavery's play Frozen presents a series of 
scrupulous and apt summaries of current psychophysiological theories regarding the 
mental states of those in that most exclusive and violent group of individuals-those 
known as "serial killers." 
around da track an in da whirl, an anybody who even fuck an Irish dey all have a liddle 
tear a boy in der eye when dey say, "Dis is a great day for Our-land!" 
88 Tadge claims that the army is going to give him twenty thousand pounds. Just minutes before, the sum 
was eighty thousand. When Max calls this discrepancy to his attention, Tadge "stares at him, 
uncomprehending" (84). 
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Agnetha first acknowledges that these violent persons have frequently 
experienced damage to the frontal lobes, portions of the brain designed, among other 
things, to "modulat[ e] impulses," to "provide judgement," and to "organize behavior and 
decision-making" (Frozen 35). "They," she concludes, "are responsible for making us 
human" (39). She explains that such damage manifests itself as an "insufficiency of 
suppression" and as the inability to "adapt to a new situation" (39). So, whereas "when 
it's clear there is no threat," healthy individuals are "able to accommodate that" change in 
information quickly and easily, with cognitively impaired individuals, this is not the case. 
"There's a kind of rigidity there," Agnetha explains, "like the person is ice-bound in a 
kinda Arctic mid-winter" (39). Brain malfunctioning can also render an individual 
incapable of empathy and compassion so that, when confronted by another's fear or 
distress, they become "fearful and distressed themselves, or [lash] out with threats, anger, 
and physical assaults" (55). More specifically, in cases of severe abuse and neglect, one 
can expect to find damage to the "left hemisphere of the brain which plays a large role in 
logic and language" (59). This is true to the extent that among "children . . .  with a 
history of some kind of abuse[,] not only was the rate of abnormal EEGs twice as high as 
[that for children of] a non-abused group, but in every case, the abnormality [in brain 
functioning] was on the left" (59). The gist of Agnetha's lecture is that the primary 
casualties of emotional trauma are the logic and language centers of the brain. 
Still, the cognitive difficulties displayed by Tadge tend to betoken the hampering 
effects of his subjection to restricted codes and a restrictive public language as much as 
they reflect neurological damage associated with abuse and neglect. Without information 
regarding the relative health and functioning of Tadge's brain, it is impossible to 
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definitively state whether the linguistic immaturity and inflexibility we witness is meant 
to characterize the symptom or the source of faulty cognition. Yet, either way, we know 
that Tadge' s environment has had an immense influence on his mental state, and we 
know that his cognitive and linguistic capabilities mirror each other significantly. 
Furthermore, in either case, Tadge's limited and mechanical use of language is of 
a kind that Martin Esslin would describe as largely vacant, or "devalued," indicating a 
corresponding vacancy in the speaker' s self. Jeanette Malkin explains: 
Devalued language implies a lack of efficacy and an alienation from 
meaning, the source of which is the experienced insufficiency of words to 
encompass existential bewilderment. The dramatic product of this verbal 
deterioration takes the form of inarticulate noises, empty cliches, verbal 
inversions, distortions, non-sequiturs. (Malkin, Verbal Violence 39) 
Although Malkin looks elsewhere than toward existential bewilderment for the sources of 
devalued language and alienation from meaning, she implicates the same forms of 
expression. She characterizes certain forms-a heavy reliance on the use of cliches, 
cliche-idioms, jargon, proverbs and other quotations- as "the ritualization of language," 
while others--cases wherein "language speaks through man without recourse to the 
speaker' s  intent or control"-she labels "verbal mechanization"( 40). The latter take the 
form of semantic blanks, tautological utterances, or other similar forms of incomplete 
logic or illogic ( 40, 108). An example that qualifies as both "the ritualization of 
language" and an instance of "verbal mechanization" constitutes a running gag in Martin 
McDonagh's The Cripple of Inishmaan. Ridiculous in its overuse and its fallaciousness, 
several of the characters repeat the refrain: "Ireland mustn't be such a bad place so if 
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____ want(s) to come to Ireland," wherein the blank may be filled in with any 
person or group that has traveled to Ireland and happens to be the current topic of 
conversation (cf., 14, 21, 21, 37). The absurdity of the phrase becomes undeniable when 
it is, at one point, even applied to fish: "Ireland mustn't be such a bad place so if sharks 
want to come to Ireland" (78). Rather than citing existential bewilderment, Malkin sees 
ritualized and mechanized forms of language as characteristic of "language domination"; 
in other words, each is symptomatic of a speaker who has become overly subject to the 
language socially imposed upon her or him and who has lost or resigned a measure of 
creativity in thinking about and using language. 89 And often, as made clear in the 
example from McDonagh, such language also serves to strengthen local social bonds.90 
A good example of how rote language can function as the glue that cements the 
social bonds of a group comes in Harrower's Knives in Hens when the young husband 
and farmer instructs his young wife in the farming community's customary and 
communal hatred of those different from themselves. In this case, the object of hatred is 
the town's outcast miller, despised because he does not labor on the land as they do, 
because they suspect him of taking advantage of them by capitalizing on their 
89 The discrepancy between subjection to ritualized language and a recognition of its illogic may be seen in 
the following exchanges taken from Jonathan Lewis's play Our Boys: 
POM: Still, I suppose no news is good news. (Pause) 
Keith: (thinking; then) No it fucking isn't. What a stupid, ridiculous saying. No news is 
good news. I mean really. (49) 
--and--
Parry: I'm just trying to stay one step ahead of the bastards. Play them at their own game. 
Remember the drill? You fail to plan, you don't plan to fail. 
Keith: No-one planned to fail Parry. (52) 
90 This is even (or especially) true of the ubiquitous profanity in Neilson's Penetrator. 
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dependence upon his services, but also because they fear him for his greater education 
and knowledge. The young farmer and husband's lesson goes like this: 
William: All you need's hate for him. 'S what he expects. Every bone of 
your body. 'S village custom. 
Young Woman: I do hate him! 
William: Again. 
Young Woman: I HATE him! 
William: Stronger ! 
Young Woman: I HATE HIM! Show him you're afraid, 's how it starts. I 
hate every miller there is. Throw them in a pond and watch their bellies 
swell and stink. 
William: You got it now. (Knives in Hens 9) 
What we see is, literally, a tradition-a custom of the village comprised mostly of 
farmers-and the lesson is, literally, a ritual. At first, William's wife simply repeats the 
sentiments of her husband. Eventually, however, she assimilates the town's hatred, 
personalizing it by making it her own and, ironically, ad-libbing within the confines of a 
communal and proscribed suspicion and loathing until William can confidently aver, 
"You got it now"-meaning, "You are now one of us." In this way, the villagers define 
themselves in relation to the miller, by means of what they fear and despise, glorying in 
their social, linguistic, and cognitive limits. 
Some social scientists consider the ritualized use of language as either a subset or 
an empirical manifestation of the more general over-habitual behavior emblematic of 
some individuals. In a book devoted to the study of Violence, Aggression, and Coercive 
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Actions, James Tedeschi and Richard Felson explain: "Some coercive actions are habitual 
( or 'mindless') and are elicited by specific conditions associated with social interactions" 
(211 ). Such socially mandated behaviors include linguistic ones. Under these 
conditions, coercive, aggressive, and violent behaviors may be enacted without the 
actor's full awareness-sometimes an unawareness of having acted at all, but more often 
an unawareness of an action's coercive, aggressive, or violent nature and effects. To 
compound matters, in the words of Tedeschi and Felson, "Actors with prelearned scripts 
may be predisposed not to consider alternatives" and may respond to others with violence 
without thinking there might be another option open to them (211 ). Such individuals 
seem "capable of inhibiting their initial choice [only] if the expected costs seem 
[obviously] high" (211 ). 
One of the most recognizable examples of behavior derived from a "pre learned 
script" happens to be a linguistic one-hate speech. In Disturbing Discourses: Language 
Violence in Institutional Sites, Linda Jean Parks explains, "Hate speech is an instance of 
deliberate reiteration. That is, the speaker of hate speech is not the originator of that 
speech; she is simply resurrecting an already coded style of speech, tested in the past and 
been found to work in an offensive way against an 'other"' (7). Some social scientists 
extend this idea further, arguing that hate speech can be a conditioned and automatic 
iteration, instead of a fully conscious and deliberate choice. In fact, some very 
contemporary analyses of "hate speech"-in contexts as diverse as the long-standing 
tensions in Northern Ireland or the proliferation of websites maintained by racist 
organizations like the Ku Klux Klan-tend to emphasize the extent to which cliched and 
other tired and worn forms of language can become conditioned. These analyses discuss 
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how hate speech can be so fundamentally opposed to originality of expression that even 
"novel" expressions of hatred will tend to follow established formulas and models 
without much variation. In still other cases, both old and new forms of hate speech can 
be employed with an absence of consciousness that allows their users to contradict the 
logic of their own speech as they are speaking it (Billig). 
There is evidence, as well, that "prelearned scripts" are heavily indebted to the 
operations of biomechanics and to psychophysiological conditioning. In phenomena not 
far removed from "body memory," the body learns to enact habitual forms of behavior 
without the need of any overtly conscious involvement in the process (Tuite). The sort of 
vehemence practiced by the young woman towards the miller in Harrower's Knives in 
Hens, for example, can come to initiate the actual physiological conditions associated 
with the emotions of fear and hatred in response to, and therefore seemingly natural to, 
the villagers' linguistic scripts characterizing millers as worthy of such emotions. And 
insofar as Piaget, Vygotsky, Luria, et al. emphasize the significance of automatic 
applications of language in the formation of egocentric and aggressive tendencies, their 
individual theories serve to bolster the above conclusions. As Arnold Buss asserts, "The 
most potent maintainer of prejudice is habit strength" (259) as it is rehearsed in the 
language and practiced in the form of aggressive acts. 
With a language that is conceived of as a strict formula, any experience beyond 
the scope of the standard phraseology is so counter to the way one has learned to use 
language that such experiences become even more difficult to express due to the 
restricted and ritualized nature of the language-more so than in a formal language that 
allows greater flexibility in creating new forms and phrases. Tadge's language, marked 
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by conditioned responses, slogans, broken or shortened phrases, and dumb silences 
exemplifies what Bernstein calls a "public" language. Bernstein's ideas regarding 
"public" and "formal" languages help a great deal in explaining the links between 
particular language uses and an increased propensity for violence by those subject to 
these uses-both in terms of recognizing symptoms and in understanding why such 
linguistic patterns might be likely to engender aggressive behaviors. Dialogue 
representative of a mechanical use of language, of course, is not restricted to the eastern 
shore of the Atlantic. One can see similar usages in the work of American playwrights, 
as well. In such plays, the characters' speech is replete with pat phrases and cliches, and 
the rote evasions of making an individualized response are repeatedly executed in the 
language. However, before returning to the plays, one must first understand what is 
meant by the phrase '"public' language." 
Several of the linguistic features most closely tied to aggression and violence are 
characteristic of Bernstein's concept of a "public" language and can best be explained in 
these terms. By way of introduction, a "public" language in some ways corresponds to, 
and overlaps with, Bernstein's more widely known concept of the "restricted code"­
insofar as both public languages and restricted codes are structured for maximal (local) 
social bonding. However, whereas a restricted code is defined exclusively by the 
speaker's expectation of already shared information and experience-and, therefore, the 
tendency to omit communication that would be redundant to anyone familiar with the 
context, even when this is not the case-a public language implies additional criteria and 
is defined by a host of linguistic patterns that characterize the simplified relationship that 
some speakers have with their language. The phrase "restricted code," then, merely 
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denotes an exclusion of some contextual information. A public language, on the other 
hand, is further characterized by a lack of rigor in the application of formal reasoning and 
by blindness or negligence in the weighing of potential alternatives. Bernstein says, "A 
language which contains a high proportion of short commands, simple statements and 
questions where the symbolism is descriptive, tangible, concrete, visual and of a low 
order of generality [is] . . .  a public language" (Bernstein, "Some Sociological 
Determinants" 28). The public language may be contrasted to the formal language, a 
language that does not rely on pre-established, static, and communal conceptions of 
identity and, thereby, "permits sensitivity to [social] role and status" in ways that a public 
language does not (Bernstein, "Some Sociological Determinants" 28).9 1 • 92 
Beyond the above general terms, however, specific markers help identify a 
language as a public language. The first two features common to a public language are a 
pronounced use of categoric statements and a pronounced absence of expressions of 
uncertainty defined as "qualifying phrases expressing doubt (e.g., 'I think') or a desire for 
greater clarity (e.g., ' I  mean')" (Turner and Pickvance 98). They are here mentioned in 
conjunction because often used in tandem. Geoffrey Turner was the first to document the 
discrepancy between middle-class and working-class speakers in their respective use of 
expressions of uncertainty. In one investigation, for example, a group of children were 
shown pictures illustrating a series of events. However, the dialogue and contextual 
91 The languages of Carol and John discussed in the second chapter illustrate many of the features of a 
public and of a formal (but jargon laden) language, respectively. 
92 Note Bernstein's careful choice of terms. Both "public" and "formal" suggest a language designed for 
the world at large. The former, however, is no more than that, while the latter is also designed so that 
individuals may negotiate their place in the world. 
210 
information that would have spelled out for them the exact nature of these events was 
withheld. When controlled for other variables and compared, Turner was able to show 
that working class children ''use fewer linguistic expressions of uncertainty when 
compared with the middle-class children" (Turner 1 79). So, in conversations with the 
children, "when the middle-class children were asked 'What is the man saying?' or 
linguistically equivalent questions, a relatively higher percentage said ' I  don't know"' 
( 1 80). Typically, it was only "when this question was followed by the hypothetical 
question 'What do you think the man might be saying?' [that] they offered their 
interpretations" ( 1 80, emphasis added). In contrast, the working-class children provided 
their "answers" readily and confidently, even though these were utterly personal in 
nature. 
Bernstein accounts for these class differences by means of his ideas regarding the 
use of public versus formal languages. Although people who have large lexicons are 
more likely to have access to a formal language and elaborated codes, Bernstein insists 
that the difference between restricted and elaborated codes, public and formal languages, 
is not one of vocabulary. As Turner paraphrases, it is not that the working-class children 
"do not have access to such expressions, but that the eliciting speech context did not 
provoke them" ( 1 79). Instead, their usual speech patterns are not ones that would 
encourage them "to consider the possibilities of alternative meanings and so there is a 
reduction in the linguistic expressions of uncertainty" ( 1 79). Essentially, even at a very 
young age, the middle-class children had developed a much greater awareness of, and 
sensitivity to, the possibility of differing viewpoints, alternative interpretations, and a 
variety of responses from which they might choose. The middle-class children were 
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already more able to recognize supposition and interpretation as such. Therefore, these 
children had access to a form of metalanguage. They at least intuited the notion that 
linguistic codes, including their own, could be considered and spoken about objectively 
and that specificity, elaboration, and elasticity are important aspects of the language they 
use. The very linguistic codes to which the children were exposed on a regular basis­
the distinct "socialization procedures" they underwent-were "likely to encourage the 
children to be flexible in their thinking" and "to perceive reality in terms of more than 
one alternative, in terms of a range of possible interpretations" {Turner and Pickvance 
109- 1 1 0). These children were much less bothered when they met with ambiguity and 
complexity in their language, and they were less intimidated when they encountered 
ambiguity and complexity in other, non-linguistic contexts. 
It is not difficult to see that a linguistic code (i.e., a public language) that does not 
routinely require speakers to distinguish between facts and opinions or between a 
codified interpretation (e.g., a scientific theory) and an individual, idiosyncratic 
interpretation frees speakers from the intellectual rigor associated with doing so. While 
speakers of a formal language learn the importance of making qualifications that signal 
the status of each expression as more or less subject to certainty, speakers of a public 
language who are not required to practice making such qualifications are unlikely to hone 
any of the allied cognitive skills to the same degree. So, these linguistic differences 
foster very different kinds of thinking. A public language, by dismissing the need for 
many of the linguistic qualifications that identify concepts as "individual" rather than 
"universal" or "believed" as opposed to "known," discourages speakers from adhering to 
the logical qualifications the linguistic ones signify. Such speakers are encouraged by 
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their language to see the world as finite, definite, and absolute like the language they 
speak. This may account in some measure for the draconian literalism Carol applies to 
language-hers and John's-in Mamet's 0/eanna. Perhaps Carol lacks a certain 
"sensitivity to [social] role[s]"; perhaps she is restricted in her ability "to consider the 
possibilities of alternative meanings" with regards to John's language (spoken and 
unspoken); perhaps she finds it difficult "to perceive [the] reality" of her situation vis a 
vis John "in terms of a range of possible interpretations." 
Considering these limitations, it is not surprising that public language users are 
more likely to fall victim to the use of the categoric statement. In terms of cognition, "the 
frequency of, and dependency upon, the categoric statement in a public language 
reinforces the personal at the expense of the logical, limits the range of behaviour and 
hearing, and conditions the types of reaction and sensitivity towards authority" 
(Bernstein, "A Public Language" 46), all of which could hold some sway in producing an 
outcome like that depicted in Mamet's 0/eanna. For, in addition to allowing one to view 
the world in blacks and whites and according to received wisdom and localized 
experience, a public language "discourages further analysis of [an] event and [the] 
processes which provoked it an_d so discourages the search for reasons other than those 
which can be formulated in a public language. It inhibits . . .  'going beyond what is 
given'. Curiosity is therefore limited in such a way as to enhance the solidarity of the 
social relationship" ( 46). Surely, for a woman who feels herself outcast and isolated as 
does Carol, her desire for solidarity with the members of her unnamed "Group" can be 
recognized as a motivating force. 
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Bernstein says, however, "Equally as important as the cognitive implications are 
the social implications" ( 45). Because the content of a categoric statement is typically 
subjective rather than objective, the veracity of the statement is often determined by the 
certainty with which it is spoken, the volume with which it is spoken, or by whom it is 
spoken rather than by means external to the act of speaking. In such cases, the objective 
truth of a statement is often based solely on the strength of the speaker's (or the 
listener's) attachment to the belief being expressed or the social position held by that 
speaker. For this reason, "if this categoric statement is to be challenged, as the reason is 
the authority conferred upon the person . . .  the challenger immediately attacks the 
authority or legitimacy which is an attribute of the form of the relationship and this brings 
the social relationship into one of an affective type" ( 45). To question what is said is 
tantamount to questioning the person who said it, both in terms of that person's veracity 
and authority. An example of this is seen in Tadge 's interactions with Alan. Beginning 
with his declaration "I'm not so thick I don't know a Penetrator when I see one," Tadge 
commences his case. "I can prove it to you," he says. Then, as "proof' that Penetrators 
exist, Tadge ''produces a big, ugly hunting knife: a knife to end all knives" (Neilson 101 ). 
As far as anyone other than Tadge knows, the knife could have come from anyone or 
anywhere; and, therefore, the only evidence is Tadge's claim: "I took [the knife] off one 
of them" ( l O l ). Without an understanding of the limits of his language and the processes 
of independent reasoning, Tadge believes he has produced indisputable evidence. 
Furthermore, the anxiety Alan begins to feel being around such a menacing weapon 
(especially in Tadge's hands) is, for Tadge, sufficient proof that Alan is a Penetrator; 
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otherwise, Tadge concludes, Alan would have nothing to fear. Once this idea has entered 
his head, no argument can dissuade Tadge from what he knows. 
In fact, every suggestion that Tadge could be mistaken, or that Tadge's wielding 
of this enormous knife might be a bad idea, are not seen as considerations to weigh 
logically. Even when phrased as requests-"Could we put the knife away now?" (103}­
or simply posed as neutral appeals to reason-Alan: "Accidents happen around knives" 
(103); Max: "Put it away, Tadge, or we'll never hear the end of it" (103); Max: "You're 
freaking him out, man. It is his house too" (103}-these suggestions are clearly viewed 
by Tadge as attacks on his person and his authority. Here, Tadge's language use 
approximates that in Bernstein' s depiction of the public language user: 
Instead of an individual learning to create a language-use within which he 
can select to mediate his individual feeling, a public language-user tends 
to attach his feelings to social counters or tags which maximize the 
solidarity of the social relationship at the cost of the logical structure of 
the communications, and the specificity of the feeling. ("A Public 
Language" 46) 
Alan finally appeals to Max to intervene, "Tell him to put it away or he'll have to leave. 
Or I will." Tadge's response is to say, "I wouldn't hurt you with it. You're my friends. 
(Pause.) Aren't you?" (104). This is followed by a reassertion of his authority and of his 
suspicion of Alan and his motives. Tadge reproduces the knife, grinning and waving it 
around while "going into exaggerated poses with it, Bruce Lee-style . . .  like a thirteen­
year-old" (104-5). This childish role-playing behavior is in actuality a direct challenge to 
Alan, and this is made clear when Tadge takes Alan's teddy-bear hostage at knife-point 
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and orders Alan to "confess . . .  or the teddy bleeds like an Arab" ( 105-6). When Alan 
maintains his innocence to the end, Tadge, "with a slight nod of reluctance, tears the 
teddy to shreds" ( 1 06). The seriousness with which one is to view Tadge's assault on the 
teddy is made clear in the stage directions, where Neilson outlines "The Knife Sequence" 
as "a vicious and frightening action, all humour going from [Tadge's] face" ( 1 07) and in 
Neilson's notes to the text.93 Tadge completes his destruction of the teddy, really a 
symbolic attack on Alan, all "red in the face from effort, and drops t�e disemboweled 
teddy on the ground" ( 106). 
Tadge' s "nod of reluctance" indicates that he does not want to destroy the bear; 
rather, he feels he has no choice. Faced with Alan's perceived affronts to his authority 
and honesty, and because Alan is a Penetrator, Tadge sees his actions as unavoidable and 
just. In this single act, one can discern the operation of more than one of the "self­
disinhibiting processes"-the linguistic means of justifying punitive aggression­
outlined by Albert Bandura, Bill Underwood, and Michael Fromson. Of the seven self­
disinhibiting processes these researchers describe, Tadge's mutilation of Alan's teddy is 
written so as to exemplify at least three of them: by "ascribing culpability" for the act to 
Alan's perceived affronts, by "extolling the . . .  necessity of [the] punishment" of a 
Penetrator, and by "attributing [his own] punitive behavior to situational or role 
requirements" (261 )  as the only one in the room who recognizes the threat Alan poses. 
93 In a note to the play labeled "The Knife Sequence," Neilson writes: 
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It is virtually impossible to script this scene, so what you have here is only a guideline. 
The scene is designed to be played at the highest pitch of intensity and you should bear in 
mind that it will take a long time to reach that pitch. It's far and away the most draining 
sequence I've ever seen played on stage but-if it's done right-uniquely shattering. 
Good luck to you. ("Notes" 1 19) 
Tadge argues that Alan "should have confessed" (Neilson 106) for the sake of his teddy 
bear. Of course, Tadge does not recognize the no-win nature of the situation into which 
he has placed Alan: don't confess, and something bad will happen; confess, and 
something bad will happen. Tadge is blinded to the witch-ducking illogic of the situation 
because he feels certain of Alan's guilt, the need for justice, and his own responsibility in 
ensuring that justice is achieved. 
Another characteristic common to a public language may at first prove confusing 
in light of a similarity between the terms used by Bernstein and his colleagues and some 
terminology that has been introduced in prior chapters. This characteristic is a tendency 
away from "egocentric expressions," and this is in many ways interwoven with the 
above-mentioned tendency towards the categoric statement. The meaning Bernstein 
assigns to the phrase "egocentric expressions" is quite different from the meaning Piaget, 
Vygotsky, and Luria intend when they speak of "egocentric language." The latter, used 
in previous chapters, may be thought of as a measure of a speaker's non-recognition of 
others-of their existence and the existence of their needs and wants. Bernstein's use of 
the phrase "egocentric expressions," on the other hand, denotes a speaker's reference to 
self--for example, by means of the personal pronoun "I," as in "I think" or "I believe"­
as an indication of the speaker's awareness that the statements s/he is making are 
personal and subjective. Bernstein's terminology, then, refers to the linguistic markers of 
a speaker taking personal responsibility for her or his use of language in ways similar to 
the use of qualifiers discussed earlier. So, in a public language, one would expect to find 
an abundance of self-centered "egocentric language," but few examples of self-aware 
"egocentric expressions"-indeed, substantially fewer than in a formal language. 
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This is exactly what one encounters in David Harrower's Knives in Hens. This is 
the case because one way in which speakers may bypass egocentric expressions is to omit 
subject clauses altogether, as in the extremely immature language used by the barely 
articulate William and his wife as, together, they elide subject clauses thirteen times in 
the first eighteen sentences of Harrower's play. In fact, the absence of egocentric 
expressions, like the presence of categoric statements and other expressions of certainty, 
is another way of gauging language maturity. In the words of Bernstein and Turner, a 
public language encourages speakers to "focus on the event" only (Bernstein, "Social 
Class" 4 77); whereas, a formal language "encourages the speaker to focus upon the 
experience of others as different" and "to focus on the affective state" created in others 
by an event (Turner, "Social Class" 165, 1 68)--in other words, tolerance and empathy. 
So, while much of what Tadge says constitutes "egocentric .language," unlike Alan and 
Max, he does not utter a single "egocentric expression" during the course of the play. 
However, John Piel has the earlier conception of "egocentric language" in mind 
when he explores the effects of language maturity on adolescent aggression, providing a 
glimpse into the initial stages of the development of aggressive patterns of behavior in 
adults. When Piel examined the language for degrees of language maturity, he looked for 
markers such as the presence of paradigmatic versus syntagmatic responses; in other 
words, he examined the responses for indications of egocentric language or self-centered 
thought.94 He discovered that, "When attempting to explain physical aggression, 
94 Piel states that he was interested in testing the responses of the adolescents specifically for examples of 
maturity, as opposed to production, explaining, "Language maturity reflects levels of movement from 
egocentric speech to sociocentric speech, whereas language production reflects language quantity, often 
determined by counting the number of words used by an individual" ( 10 1 ). One key marker of language 
maturity was a greater presence of paradigmatic responses relative to syntagmatic ones. "An example of 
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language maturity had more explanatory power than sex or social class had. Specifically, 
an inverse relationship was found between language maturity and physical aggression" 
( 1 04). 
At this moment, it is important to recall Hans Toch's previously cited statements 
that inadequate linguistic skills are related to a greater propensity toward violence, but 
also to a greater likelihood of violent victimization at the hands of others. For example, a 
study team lead by Tomoko Shinoda-Tagawa to investigate violence in nursing homes 
found that "the more cognitively impaired the resident the more likely s/he would be 
victimized"; in fact, "residents living in an Alzheimer unit were almost 3 times as likely 
to be injured [by fellow residents] as those in another unit" (595). The victims, then, 
were those linguistically and/or socially inept enough to "behave in a manner that 
proceeds [sic] an aggressive response" (596), among which were ''wandering, being 
verbally abusive, and [being] socially inappropriate" (595). This last vague category was 
a catch-all for any behavior that was considered out of the ordinary or beyond the pale, 
including the sorts of verbal ramblings and outbursts indicative of Alzheimer sufferers. 
For many, language seems so elemental to humanness, that physical and mental 
deficiencies have long been associated with impatience, intolerance, and violence. 
Alzheimer patients, for instance, are frequently and easily viewed in dehumanized ways, 
due in part to their lapses from fluid coherent speech and in part for the "unnatural" 
sounds they often make in its stead. Having lost the ability to use language like others, 
they find themselves outside the classification "human" in the taxonomies of others. 
paradigmatic response might be: 'Black,' White," Piel clarifies, "whereas a syntagmatic response might be: 
'Black,' car. In the case of syntagmatic responses, the position of the word is important because it triggers 
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With such definitive ties between subnormal language skill and aggressive behavior, 
certain characters' language skills may identify them as potential victims and warn of 
approaching violence long before it surfaces in the form of a physical act. 
Martin Esslin says as much in his account of the way the non-responsiveness of 
the baby in Edward Bond's classic play Saved serves as an incitement to the men who 
throw stones at it in its pram. In a similar fashion, in American playwright Neil LaBute 's  
In the Company of Men, Chad singles out Christine' s deafness-her vulnerability and her 
inarticulacy-as justification for using her for his own sport: 
Chad: 'S  John Merrick, that's the only thing I can think of, the whole time 
. . .  I am sitting across from the fucking Elephant Man! 
You should see her going at it. Working to put the simplest sounds 
together . . .  I mean, an "a, e, i, o, u, sometimes y" is like the holy grail. : . 
. After about fifteen minutes, I can' t watch any more saliva form, the 
comer of her mouth, or I'm gonna lose my taco salad, I mean it. (In the 
Company of Men 20) 
From this description, one would never guess that Chad considers Christine attractive and 
nice and fun to be with, or that he would derive pleasure from spending time with her, 
kissing her, and having intercourse with her. One can guess, however, that Chad is the 
kind of guy capable of violence. Likewise, in a play like Richard Cameron's Can 't Stand 
Up for Falling Down, much of the plot is unknowable. Still, one can sense the oncoming 
a personal or egocentric response, but for paradigmatic responses the response word shares a category 
relationship in meaning relative to the stimulus word" ( 102). 
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violence against the simple, inarticulate Al Janney at the hands of the men who cause his 
death at the quarry. 
Overall, adequate and mature language abilities are much less likely to be 
associated with violent forms of behavior. In fact, matters of language maturity provide 
strong indications regarding the degree to which language users are likely to develop the 
sort of linguistic and cognitive flexibility associated with a formal language. This is true 
because mature languages, even at the grammatical level, afford greater opportunities for 
variance, modification, and emphasis, thus inviting rather than discouraging individual 
forms of expression and helping develop sensitivity to others and other viewpoints. The 
level of flexibility may be described in terms of whether the language promotes primarily 
"ritualistic" or primarily "rationalist" methods of thought and behavior. Linguist Edward 
Sapir acknowledges that the speakers of different languages-that is, languages 
completely foreign to each other, as well as languages with more subtle differences­
may accurately be described as living in different "worlds of reality." Harry Hoijer 
explains, as Bernstein paraphrases, that "the languages [people] speak affect to a 
considerable degree both their sensory perceptions and their habitual modes of thought" 
("A Socio-Linguistic Approach to Social Leaming" 121) and, thereby, "a view of life, a 
metaphysics of their culture, compounded of unquestioned and mainly unstated premises 
which define the nature of the universe and man's position within it" (Hoijer, quoted in 
Bernstein, 122). Bernstein adds that socialization within a certain language-logic will act 
"selectively on the possibilities of man by creating through time a sense of the 
inevitability of a given social arrangement, and through limiting the areas of permitted 
change" (Bernstein, "Social Class" 174). And although Bernstein describes the 
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socialization process as one wherein "the language-use facilitates development in a 
particular direction rather than inhibiting all other possible directions" ("A Public 
Language" 43), the former can function as the latter. 
In the context of restricted codes and public versus formal language use, the 
public language teaches its adherents to "emphasize verbally the communal rather than 
the individual, the concrete rather than the abstract, substance rather than exploration of 
motives and intentions, and positional rather than personalized forms of social control" 
(Vol. 1 ,  143). In short, public language users are much more likely to follow static social 
codes of language and behavior that favor what is already believed and believed to be 
known, that rely heavily on tradition and convention, that look for explanations that 
remain simple and direct no matter how complicated or complex the issue, and that 
privilege the letter of the law and categorical imperatives. Therefore, where one is 
"sensitive" to the elaborated code system of a formal language, what is new in language 
or experience is more likely to be embraced as "symbolic and social development"; 
whereas, where one is "not sensitive" to the elaborated code system of a formal language, 
one is more likely to fear that which is new, experiencing it as "symbolic and social 
change" and seeking to avoid it (Bernstein, "A Socio-linguistic Approach to 
Socialization" 144). While habit strength is always a factor in the range of linguistic 
and behavioral choices open to an individual, it exerts an especially strong influence on 
those subject to a public language. These factors help explain, for instance, the suspicion 
and anxiety experienced by the villagers towards the miller in Knives in Hens. And it is 
the young woman's escape from these fetters that the play tracks. Finally, nearing the 
play's end, she is able to engage mentally both possibility and likelihood, to entertain the 
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hypothetical, and to make judgments and predictions about things to come. Her 
movement towards greater cognitive potential attests to her move towards more open and 
versatile language. The newly-acquired dissatisfaction for her current lot in life is 
probably the direct result of her newly-acquired understanding of the future as something 
yet to be written, as posing multiple opportunities, and as vulnerable to the influence of 
one's ideas and actions in the present. So although she now sees much that is distasteful 
in her present condition, she now also sees some avenues for change. The first of which 
is the elimination of William, an exceptional case of language development producing 
violence, but only because her husband remains the epitome of an insensate, plodding, 
and brutish existence. 
One of the greatest weaknesses and dangers of a public language is that its users 
learn to bypass questioning and reasoning and simply to apply "ritualistic" methods of 
dealing with experience (cf. Bernstein and Henderson) and that the learning of 
"ritualistic" versus "rationalist" methods has practical implications regarding an 
individual's relative ability to reason in the language. Ultimately, those denied access to 
a formal language are hampered in their ability to comprehend many of the logical 
relationships represented in the linguistic structure. In contemporary drama, examples 
abound. In addition to those already presented, some of the most striking 
accommodations of violence are facilitated by ritualistic responses that gloss over the 
gaps in logic. Patrick McCabe's play Frank Pig Says Hello illustrates how an axiomatic 
or cliched phrase can substitute for a conscious examination of events and motives and 
accountability. Frank, represented in both his present voice and in the person of his 
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younger self, recalls his adolescence and the boy he constantly harassed and beat up 
while he was just a Piglet: 
Frank: The thing is-I liked Philip. I really liked him. I had a name for 
him. Mr Professor I called him. 
Piglet: Mr Professor. 
Frank: I really did like him. It was a pity the way things turned out in the 
end. But there's nothing you can do about that, is there? (Frank Pig Says 
Hello 246) 
Here we see Frank (a.k.a. Piglet) cast his actions as inscrutable and beyond his control. 
Such resignations to fate may be the most common ways of avoiding responsibility and 
guilt. The vernacular is awash with sayings that, in the guise of humility, patience, or 
faith, relieve one of any burden to act purposefully, to reflect on one's actions, and to 
enact substantive change in one's character. 
That is not to suggest, however, that speakers of formal languages are 
automatically exempt from such abdications. In the initial chapter, I introduced the idea 
of "deindividuation," a mechanism-frequently associated with team, club, or family 
loyalty, religious or political affiliation, or nationhood-whereby persons think of 
themselves as part of a greater whole, often employing their group identification as a way 
to share responsibility with, or shift it to, the others in the group. If one does something 
for another or a group of others, then the actor (no matter how vile the action) manages to 
claim a degree of selflessness, of principle, and of interest in a greater good. It is the 
mental operation that makes acts of terrorism-and a whole host of selfish, unprincipled, 
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and banally evil actions-violent possibilities. And while all nations, religions, and 
political groups have ascertainable numbers, boundaries, and limits, fate is universal, 
infinite, and without constraints. Even those who do not believe in fate may, on 
occasion, find it convenient ( or involuntary) to attribute some outcome to this mysterious 
force. 
The rituals of public language that abolish attention and reflection take other 
forms, as well. The Smith family in Letts's Killer Joe is an ideal case study of the 
"ritualistic" methods associated with a public language, showing both how they manifest 
themselves in the language and how they affect the making of abstract and logical 
connections. It is precisely the ordering and organizing of environment, the purposeful 
and explicit differentiation of time and space, and the encouragement of abstract 
conceptualization that a public language lacks. Therefore, the fundamental loss is that 
the public language does not foster, but teaches its users to evade, deliberateness in 
thought and reflection about one's language and action. These absences are made clear 
in the unreasoned and illogical statements made by the Smiths in Killer Joe. 
The play opens with Chris begging his father, Ansel, for cash to appease the loan 
shark to whom he owes money. When this fails, Chris shares his plan to have his mother, 
Adele, Ansel's first wife, killed to collect fifty thousand dollars in insurance money. 
Ansel asks Chris who would stand to receive payment from the policy, and Chris tells 
him that the sole beneficiary is his sister, Ansel's daughter, Dottie. Ansel is taken aback 
by this news: 
Ansel: She didn't leave nothin' to me? 
Chris: Of course not, you dipshit. Why would she do that? 
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Ansel: I 'm her ex-husband. 
Chris: She hates you, Dad. You know that. 
Ansel: Yeah, but still- (Letts 1 5) 
Likewise, Chris is shocked at the end of the play, after the hire of "Killer" Joe Cooper 
and the murder of Adele, when he learns that Dottie is not a beneficiary, at all. Instead, 
all the money will go to Adele's new boyfriend, Rex: 
Chris: That can't  be. I don't-what do you, what do you-what do you 
mean? Because I was told! Because-because I was told! Because Rex 
told me! He told me! Rex told me! 
Sharla: He was lyin' .  
Chris: Why would he do that? 
Sharla: Why do you think? 
Chris: No, no, he couldn't  have known! He couldn't 've know that I 'd do 
this! 
Ansel: Who told you about Killer Joe? 
Chris: (It hits him.) Oh . . .  oh, God . . .  (52) 
Slowly, Chris comes to realize what the rest of the family already knows-that Rex 
arranged things so that Chris would take all of the risk of hiring Joe to murder Adele, and 
Rex would gain all of the reward tied to her death. In both cases, the basic logic 
regarding how Adele is likely to choose a beneficiary escapes the Smiths as soon as they 
begin to imagine receiving the insurance money. However, these are just the first of a 
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series of failures to connect means and ends, causes and effects. And in every case, the 
inability of the Smiths to make these logical connections in the language also serves as a 
linguistic source of absolution, excusing even the most violent thoughts and actions. 
When the audience first meets Chris, he has been kicked out of Adele 's house and 
has come to Ansel's trailer for a place to stay and to ask his father for money. He says, "I 
wouldn't be in this mess if it weren't for Mom, y'know-" ( 1 3). He then proceeds to 
accuse Adele of stealing the cocaine he was going to sell to pay back the man he owes: 
"So the blow I was plannin' on sellin' to pay these guys back is gone, and now they're 
gonna kill me. My own mother, for Chrissake" ( 14). Of course, Chris does not recognize 
the mess he is in as having anything to do with his borrowing money from a man who 
might kill him for non-payment or with the original financial straits that led him borrow 
in the first place. Likewise, his decision to leave the cocaine in the home of a woman he 
does not trust and feels is always out to get him is somehow Adele's fault, not his own. 
Shortly thereafter, the audience discovers Chris's long-standing penchant for fly-by-night 
investments and long-shot schemes, the constant failure of which never deters him from 
attempting the next one. On one occasion, Chris gets the crazy idea to make money by 
raising rabbits. He doesn't know a thing about rabbits or how to care for them, he enters 
into this business with the expectation that his two deadbeat partners are going to share in 
the workload, he invests more money than he can afford to lose, and he eventually leaves 
the rabbits unsupervised for two weeks, during which time, the venture is ruined. "Aw, 
Jesus, another one of your stupid . . . .  Every goddamn time. What about that farm-?" 
Ansel reminds Chris. This time it will be different, Chris assures him. "I'm talkin' about 
somethin' a lot easier than that" ( 14), he says, as if the simplicity of a plan is a guarantee 
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of its success, not an indication of haste in its planning, laziness and negligence in its 
execution. 
Early in .the play, when Ansel asks Chris about his most recent falling-out with 
Adele, "Well, what'd you do to her? She wouldn'ta kicked you out for no reason-" 
( 1 3), Chris avoids reflection and simply attributes this decision to Adele's nature, not his 
own actions: 
Chris: She's a fuckin' bitch, Dad­
Ansel: You hit her, didn't you? 
Chris: Goddamn it, NO! I didn't hit her, I told you- (13) 
Although it later becomes clear that Chris did not "hit" Adele, he confesses to picking her 
up and throwing her into the refrigerator. "That's pretty much the same as hittin' her, 
wouldn't you say?" asks Ansel. "No it's not," Chris responds, unable to recognize the 
two as occupying the same category. Besides, he then rationalizes, "I barely threw her. 
There's not a mark on her" ( 13). Chris's claim is based on an "outrageous 
comparison"-Chris's favorite linguistic means of justifying his actions to himself and 
others. That he could have used even greater force allows Chris to assess his actions 
according to a skewed standard and, therefore, to view them as relatively gentle and 
humane. The violence inherent in his decision to use force does not need to enter into his 
evaluation at all because he has mentally constructed a hierarchy of violence. Chris 
knows that "a real man doesn't hit a woman," and this well-worn phrase gives him the 
semantic basis for placing almost any other form of violence lower on this scale. So, by 
this measure, as long as he didn't "hit" Adele, she got off easy. Chris has only 
circumstantial evidence of Adele's supposed guilt, yet by means of a little linguistic 
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sleight-of-hand-that is, the automatic implementation of a stock phrase--further 
analysis is superfluous. Chris clings to a literal understanding of the phrase--a stance 
itself based on a tautology: it "means what it means"-so that its spirit is lost in its letter. 
The fact that Chris would not have "thrown" Adele without intending to frighten or harm 
her-the spirit of the act-is subsumed by the fact that "he did not hit her" and that 
"there's not a mark on her." Therefore, on the literal level, the act is rendered benign. It 
is like another stock phrase: "no harm, no foul." If the alleged foul does not produce 
blood, then it couldn't have been very severe, and all should agree that it never happened. 
So, while Chris's intentions might matter when judging his actions towards Adele, the 
idea gets swept away by the wisdom of a catchy phrase. 
Chris also manages to place responsibility for his present problems at the feet of 
Killer Joe Cooper. It was Joe Cooper, the police detective, who chose not to arrest 
Digger Soames, the man Chris owes money, for a murder Joe knows he committed. 
Chris's own illegal and unethical behavior does not dissuade him from asking acidly and 
accusingly, "Aren' t you supposed to arrest people who commit murder?" Joe's answer, 
"Where would you suggest I start, Junior?" brings with it a not-so-subtle reminder that, as 
they speak, he and Chris are involved in a murder plot, a fact Chris has conveniently 
dismissed. Besides, Chris surely rationalizes, "causing" a murder is nowhere near the 
same as "committing" one. Then, the way Chris gets his family involved in this murder 
plot introduces two additional linguistic mechanisms associated with violence. The two 
mechanisms even form the title of the previously cited article by Bandura, Underwood, 
and Fromson describing the "Disinhibition of Aggression through [the] Diffusion of 
Responsibility and [the] Dehumanization of Victims." First, Chris uses language to 
229 
diffuse any sense of responsibility for Adele's murder; next, he uses language to "justify" 
the killing and even to cast it as a form of altruism: 
Chris: Now think of it this way: which do you think would be better for 
Dottie, havin' ten thousand dollars so maybe she could go to that Amazon 
school, or havin' a beat-up, old, ugly, naggy alcoholic mother for another 
twenty years or so? 
Ansel: I see what you're sayin'-
Chris: Exactly. So as long as Dottie never knows what we're talkin' about 
. . .  we're really <loin' her a favor. ( 16- 17) 
Chris, it appears, avoids feeling shame in part by keeping the information away from 
those, like Dottie, who might censure it. So, with the morality of Adele's murder only 
debated among those who support it and who can remain intellectually and emotionally 
detached from the act, there is no threat of shame. 
Late in the play, Chris does show signs of a sense of guilt; however, such feelings 
are simply too underdeveloped and too general to do him much good and prevent him 
from making the deal with Joe. The problem is that Chris does not connect these feelings 
of guilt to the specific actions that generated them. This is a problem common to users of 
a public language and represents another condition associated with a deficiency in 
dealing with affect, as well as a compromised understanding of the relationships between 
means and ends. Bernstein explains that the public language "discourages the experience 
of guilt and shame in relation to particular situations. This is not to say that all feelings 
of guilt are minimized, but they are minimal in relation to certain social acts. This is not 
to say that the individual will not be aware that the act is wrong nor that punishment is 
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just, but that feelings of guilt are divorced from the notion of wrongness" (Bernstein, "A 
Public Language" 49). Guilt is felt but not placed-adequately, accurately, or at all. 
Shame and guilt responses are further hindered by Chris's implementation of 
some of the linguistically driven practices of disengagement detailed by Bandura and his 
colleagues. Albert Bandura says, "People do not ordinarily engage in reprehensible 
behavior until they have justified to themselves the morality of their actions. What is 
culpable can be made honorable through cognitive restructuring" ("Social Leaming 
Theory" 24). In this case, Chris uses euphemism and outrageous comparison to establish 
the justice of his plan. "The more outrageous the comparison practices," explains 
Bandura, "the more likely are one's reprehensible acts to appear trifling or even 
benevolent" (25). It never occurs to the characters that they might escape the miserable 
Adele by keeping a physical distance between them rather than resorting to murder 
because they are too concentrated on their affective responses to her and to her money to 
entertain the full panoply of options open to them. In addition, considering only the most 
extreme of options enables the characters to paint the satisfying of their greed as a mere 
inevitable side-effect of the necessity of dealing with the larger problem that is Adele's· 
presence and influence in their lives. So, Chris increases their emotional blindness by 
providing a detailed verbal portrait of the years of constant aggravation, insult, 
inconvenience, and embarrassment that are sure to accompany Adele's continued 
existence. According to Bernstein's characterizations, a public language is one "where 
the emphasis is on the emotive rather than the logical implications" (Bernstein, "Some 
Sociological Determinants" 28), and to respond in the straitened manner exhibited by the 
Smiths is perfectly in keeping with the structure of a public language. 
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One might note that the above account of the future with Adele leaves out any 
mention of the crucial moment. This might be because Chris has never honed the sort of 
abstracting language that is readily available to users of a formal language. If he had, he 
might have narrated a highly abstracted version of Adele's actual death, insinuating a 
quick, tidy, and nearly painless-and nebulous-sort of "end." As public languages 
trade in the present, the tangible, and the visual, there would exist the danger of evoking 
powerful emotions regarding this aspect of Chris's scheme. Chris however, addresses the 
event by means of silence. Chris simply lets the un-narrated, and therefore unimagined, 
moment of Adele's  death remain unspoken and absent. In this way, he avoids conjuring 
any strong feelings, without having to rely on the abstracting language that, to him, is 
unrefined or completely foreign. However, Chris doesn't  limit himself only to a 
depiction of a future that includes Adele. The future without Adele is handled, not by 
means of abstract formal language, but rather through highly specific and tangible 
reference to the money. Chris is then able to abstract Adele' s death by commodifying 
her, even though confined within the limits of a public language. 
Chris' s plan is made especially attractive when characterized· as simultaneously 
offering to solve yet another source of the Smiths' suffering: their obvious poverty and 
debt. These conditions are, perhaps, clearest in the detailed description Tracy Letts gives 
of the setting, Ansel's "trailer home on the outskirts of Dallas, Texas" (Letts 8): 
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The playing area should be quite small and cramped. A low ceiling is 
helpful. 
The furnishings and decorations . . .  are seedy and cheap; wall 
covered with ugly wood paneling; tattered, smoke-stained plastic shades 
covering the windows; kitchen filled with dirty, mismatched cups and 
utensils, many of them fast-food giveaways; a hide-a-bed, stained, tom, 
burned with cigarettes; . . .  grimy refrigerator . . .  ; Taco Bell refrigerator 
magnets, Dallas Cowboy cheerleader calendar, ZZ Top poster, and other 
detritus of the poor. (8) 
Any means of escaping this environment, whether by drugs, alcohol, or insurance money, 
would surely be cast in a positive light and lose much of its taint. 
Albert Bandura states, "moral justifications and palliative characterizations are 
especially effective disinhibitors" and help one disengage from "self-evaluative 
consequences." Not only do they "eliminate self-generated deterrents, but engage self­
reward in the service of injurious behavior." In other words, "What was morally 
unacceptable becomes a source of self-pride" (25). When the cash settlement is put, for 
instance, into the concrete terms of Dottie being able "to go to that Amazon school," 
Chris has laid the groundwork that will later allow him to say to Dottie, in all sincerity, 
"Maybe you don't think I did right by you, but by God, I did the best I could. Nobody 
can accuse me of not havin' people's best interests at mind" (50). Of course, by 
"people," he really means himself, not Dottie, not Ansel and Sharla, and certainly not 
Adele. In many ways, Chris is no better than Adele, and many of the characteristics 
Chris attributes to Adele could just as easily be applied to him. Still, he is able to avoid 
reflection and self-censure by recasting Adele's murder as a way of providing for the 
family. Best of all, the plan does not require active participation or effort by anyone 
other than Joe. Even though there isn't any likelihood of labor on Chris's part, his 
enlistment of Ansel and Sharla is not as superfluous as this fact would suggest. By 
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simply telling them about the plan and involving them in the prospective rewards, Chris 
manages to diffuse the degree of responsibility he might have otherwise felt. 
In their research, Bandura, Underwood, and Fromson determined that people do, 
in fact, act "more punitively under diffused than individualized responsibility" conditions 
(258-9). The gap in the relative harshness of reprisals selected by groups and the relative 
mildness of those selected by individuals widens still further when the objects of punitive 
conduct are dehumanized. In an experiment, Bandura and his colleagues allowed 
participants "accidentally" to overhear the subjects to whom they believed they were to 
administer shocks spoken of in neutral or dehumanized terms. The shocks administered 
by participants could range in intensity based on a scale of one to ten. Overall, those who 
believed they shared responsibility for determining the severity of the shocks to be 
administered chose to dispense more intense electrical shocks than those who believed 
themselves solely responsible for determining their severity. Moreover, under the 
combined conditions of diffused responsibility and dehumanized subjects, the gap in the 
severity of the shocks selected between the two classes of participants rose from a 
difference of less than one half a point to more than two full points on average. Chris's 
ability to diffuse responsibility for Adele's murder among the rest of the Smith family, as 
well as the power his characterizations of Adele have in reducing her to a subhuman level 
in their eyes, permits a degree of callousness greater than that allowed by either of these 
factors alone. When taken together, the result is to create a great deal of room for these 
characters to avoid human responses towards Adele and to deny the existence of any 
affective bonds. 
234 
Ironically, the hired killer, Joe Cooper, is more aware of language use than are the 
Smiths.95 The play's conclusion includes an unrelenting critique of the ritualistic 
language and behavior of the Smiths by Joe. In the final scene, Joe begins to mock the 
Smith family's rote and unreflective use of language: 
Sharla: That Chris is so stupid. I coulda told you he'd fuck things up. 
Joe: Why didn't you? 
Sharla: Why didn't I? 
Ansel: Just an expression, really. 
Joe: What is? 
Ansel: Well . . .  what she said. That she coulda told you he'd fuck it up. 
Joe: I've never heard that expression. 
Ansel: Manner of speakin', is what I mean- (57) 
Here, Sharla's claim of superior insight is immediately refuted-she recognizes only in 
retrospect facts that should have appeared obvious, been considered rationally, and acted 
on from the beginning. Then, when Ansel tries to deflect some of Joe's attention away 
from Sharla, he highlights the entire family's readiness to consider any utterance as 
axiom. Only after Joe has pointed out the illogic of the original statement and the 
subsequent acceptance of it as wisdom ( conventional or otherwise) is Ansel forced to use 
his language consciously and to recognize Sharla's statement as thoroughly pointless 
speech. 
By this time, Joe has pieced together the plot concocted by Sharla and Rex, but 
rather than immediately resorting to violence, he goes through a comprehensive and 
95 Joe is also violent, but the sources of his violence are different and will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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condescending account of the evidence of Sharla and Rex's scam, ostensibly for Ansel's 
benefit. In an exhibition of formal language use, he verbally displays the logic the 
Smiths cannot approximate in their habitual use of a public language. Then, while 
demonstrating that he has figured everything out to the last detail, Joe calls for Sharla to 
incriminate herself.-to show her guilt, as well as her linguistic and logical deficiencies­
by participating in his verbal performance. In character, Sharla's response to Joe's 
concentrated and articulate verbal attack on her intelligence and her pride is a series of 
automatic, unoriginal, and profane insults. Calmly and composedly, Joe takes Sharla by 
the throat and warns her that eventually one can expect violence to accompany such 
language: 
Joe: There's no need for name-calling. I haven't called you any names. 
You be polite to me. I'm a guest. (62) 
Joe: What did I say about insulting me? (62) 
Joe: You insult me again, and I'll cut your face off and wear it over my 
own! Do you understand? ! (64) 
Sharla pleads with Ansel to intervene on her behalf, but Joe makes it clear this 
would be unwise. In addition, Ansel now knows that Sharla has been cheating on him 
with Rex and that she has been planning to betray him for the sake of the insurance 
money. He tells Sharla, "Hey, you made your bed-" (64). Joe picks up the refrain, 
saying, "That's right. Now lie in it" (64). By the time of Chris's arrival, Joe's derision 
has reached its peak. "I heard about the money," he informs Chris, then, in a phrase with 
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which the Smiths are likely to be familiar, he adds: "I'm all broke up things didn't work 
out" (65). Chris unwittingly replies, "Yeah, me too," inviting Joe to continue his 
sardonicism-"But that' s the way the world turns, right?" "That' s the way the cookie 
crumbles?" "Caveat emptor, you know what I mean?" (67}-reciting a string of cliches 
that foreground the lack of awareness and deliberateness characteristic of the Smiths' use 
of language. With these pat phrases, Joe also indicates and mocks how their logic 
mirrors their language, emphasizing the Smith family habit of depicting every negative 
thing that befalls them as some inscrutable tum of fortune and not the result of the 
choices they make. Joe drives home the contempt he feels for the Smiths' hollow 
reliance on ritualistic forms of language by forcing them into ridiculous enactments of 
other types of social ritual. He disparages the empty social conventions the Smiths 
substitute for the substance of family, religion, marriage, and love. First, he orders Sharla 
to adopt a traditional maternal role, serving the Smith family supper as they all sit around 
the dinner table nuclear-family style. He makes them join hands as they say grace, and 
he announces that the "K-Fry-C" fast-food stand-in for the traditional home-cooked 
family meal "smells heavenly" (67). A little ways into their supper, Joe facetiously taps 
the side of his cup with a "spork" and, in parodic formality, announces his "engagement" 
to Dottie. He declares, "The fact is: we've fallen in love" (68). 
That all of Joe' s sentiment is phony and contemptuous becomes clear as the play 
hurtles towards it climactic ending. First, Joe asserts Dottie's rights as Chris vies for 
ownership of Dottie: 
Chris: You can't have my sister, Joe. 
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She's my sister. I'm taking her with me. We're leaving here. 
Joe: Maybe we should let Dottie decide-
Chris: Dottie doesn't have a say in the matter. (69) 
Eventually, however, the two men take turns barking commands at her in an effort to 
determine her rightful master: 
Chris: Dottie, go get your stuff. 
Joe: Stay seated. 
Chris: Dottie? 
Joe: Dottie. Take your seat, Dottie. 
Chris: Go get your stuff. 
Joe: Take your seat. 
Chris: Dottie? 
Joe: Dottie. 
Chris: Go on, Dottie­
Joe: Stop--
Chris: Dottie, go get your stuff, now­
Joe: Dottie. 
Chris: That a girl-
Joe: DOTTIE! ! !  She's my retainer. (69) 
The play finally ends in violence, combining homicide, infanticide, and fratricide, all of 
the characters coming together in a vile inverse image of the family to kill Chris. The 
play' s closing image is one of the pregnant Dottie "with her finger tensed on the trigger" 
of Chris's .45, "ANSEL holding his stomach" in pain, "SHARLA crying behind him," 
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"JOE smiling" maniacally, and "CHRIS dead in the refrigerator" (72). Letts withholds 
the denouement, and the audience is left to consider how the immediate crisis will end, 
which of the characters will have a future, and what kind of future they-especially 
Dottie's unborn baby-can hope to have under the weight of the family's dysfunction 
and in light of their inadequate language skills. In a final depressing note, Killer Joe 
Cooper represents the child's best hope of acquiring the skills s/he will need in order to 
survive and to approach any semblance of an actualized human being. Joe is violent, yet 
he is the one character who could pass on the language skills that would allow a child to 
escape the sort of life in which the Smiths find themselves trapped and the violence their 
language helps to usher in and maintain. 
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CHAPTER V 
Hypermasculine Performance: Language and the Violent Male Subculture in 
Contemporary Drama 
This chapter isolates those aspects of public language that are closely interwoven 
with aspects of a conservative and conventional masculinity. The chapter will explore 
features of hypermasculine culture and features of language that have become largely 
indivisible. As the term "hypermasculine" implies, there is an aspect of performance 
involved-within certain subcultures, masculinity must be constantly asserted and 
demonstrated. Therefore, those within such groups frequently adopt behavior designed 
specifically to announce their masculinity by extraordinary means. The hypermasculinity 
is often, in essence, an over-the-top performance; hypermasculinity becomes 
hyperperformativity, and language is among the main vehicles of these performances. 
To pick up where the previous chapter left off: of all the features associated with a 
public language, the one that has perhaps the greatest implications regarding the 
development of aggressive and violent patterns of behavior, is its tendency to be a "tough 
language." Furthermore, a discussion of subcultural allegiance to violence-prone 
language and behavior can best be undertaken by exploring the public language's 
"toughness." Such is also the most gainful method of introducing a discussion of 
gendered language and its relationship to violent behavior. First, here is what Basil 
Bernstein means by the phrase "tough language": 
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A public language . . .  tends to be what can be called a "tough" language 
and will elicit behaviour in accordance with this, both verbally . . .  and 
physically . . . .  Tender feelings which are personal and highly individual 
will not only be difficult to express in this linguistic form, but it is likely 
that the objects which arouse tender feelings will be given tough terms­
particularly those referring to girl-friends, love, death and 
disappointments. (Bernstein, "A Public Language" 48) 
Because a public language restricts one's ability to express the highly individual, it makes 
sense that with expressions of feelings-always experienced in a highly individual 
manner-the speaker of a public language is likely to feel an added hindrance. Not only 
are there the restrictions regarding the expression of individual experience discussed in 
the last chapter, but by virtue of the potentially tender subject matter for which the 
individual has no vocabulary or experience expressing the articulation of such things is 
singularly trying. Furthermore, as one shall see, cultural codes are often present that 
essentially punish individuals for their attempts to learn, rehearse, and improve their 
abilities on this front. So, as Bernstein notes, two distinct forms of constraint inhere in a 
public language. The more straightforward constraint is that such expressions have 
"never been encouraged or facilitated by the language-use" so that "the individual's 
previous learning is inappropriate and inadequate" ( 48). The other constraint is that "a 
psychological correlate of the producing of an individual qualification is isolation from 
the group" ( 48). As the terminology suggests, group solidarity constitutes one of the 
primary communicative functions of a public language. So, for individuals who have for 
years been socialized into the logic of group solidarity, any departure from this logic will 
be especially uncomfortable, embarrassing, confusing, and threatening. 
Due to the frequent and overwhelmingly negative responses associated with the 
articulation of tender feelings, the individual's experiences will "in tum modifly] the 
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individual's ready entertainment of such feelings" (50). The "toughness" of the language 
therefore translates into a "toughness" of sentiment and behavior, even "a denial or 
hostility towards the object which aroused the tender feelings" ( 48}-a form of 
transference that holds the object of the feelings responsible not only for the cultural 
negativity associated with those feelings, but also for the awkwardness felt on account of 
the individual's own lack of communicative ability. Clearly, the negative feelings 
produce and compound negative feelings, making the entertainment and expression of 
tenderness less and less likely. In a relevant discussion, Dolf Zillmann observes, 
"Individuals do not partition excitation compounded from reactions to different inducing 
conditions. Autonomic and/or somatic feedback permits neither the isolation of all 
factors . . .  nor the apportionment of excitation to the various contributing factors. As a 
result, individuals tend to ascribe their excitatory reaction in toto to one specific . . .  
inducing condition" ( Connections 197). Oftentimes, then, the producer of the tender 
feelings becomes the site of all the language-user's compounded dread and hostility. 
As Alex Sierz notes in In-Yer-Face Theatre: British Drama Today, "The nineties 
was the decade of the boys" ( 153). Oftentimes, the proliferation of new young, male 
dramatic voices during the period has been called "laddism" or "the New Laddism." 
These plays are certainly about "maleness" and frequently about violence, but they are 
also about the language of maleness and the role this plays in the violence. This is the 
case because many of the masculine subcultures depicted in the drama of the 1990's and 
the new millennium are in thrall to both a public language, with its "tough" qualities, and 
to masculine codes rehearsed and developed in a specific language of masculinity. So, in 
a play like Enda Walsh's Disco Pigs, one can witness how a public language devoid of 
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the means to adequately express feelings of love-as opposed to the expression of 
laddish fraternal bonds, even with members of the opposite sex-can deprive a 
relationship of the sort of intimacy and communication necessary to render it anything 
more, or different, than camaraderie. Throughout most of Walsh' s play, Pig and Runt 
speak of and to each other as platonic friends would. The only times that a hint of Pig's 
romantic interests are revealed to Runt are in the staged fits of jealousy that are the 
pretense for attacking the college boys they both disdain, giving Pig an opportunity to 
exercise his extreme inclination for violence and the opportunity for Runt to 
simultaneously fleece them while they are otherwise "engaged": 
Runt: Is jealous all ovur, in it! Smash! Ya fillty bollix! Smash smash 
smash smash smash smash smash smash! ! (Disco Pigs 172) 
Otherwise, only the audience is privy to Pig' s long and fairly poetic speech casting Runt 
and himself as lovers. For this information, Pig steps out of the play momentarily, adopts 
a theatrical stance, and, in a highly artificial gesture, performs a soliloquy in order to give 
voice to his feelings and desires. Only to the audience, and in a stylistic and solo 
expression designed to indicate that this is Pig' s interior fantasy rather than anything 
actually verbalized, can anything like tenderness be approached. 
In a _similar vein, whole sections of Kevin Coyle' s play Corner Boys recreate for 
the audience the uncertainty and fear experienced by two boys who have grown 
interested in the play's two female characters. The play demonstrates the relative ease 
with which the girls can converse on matters of the heart-luckily for the two boys-but 
it also shows how comfortable and confident the boys are talking about and participating 
in violence. This world, apparently, is well known to them, so that even as fourteen-year-
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olds, Dave and Barry are masters at negotiating the intricacies of their culture's 
masculine codes. As such, Act I, scene 2 is devoted to the boys' inability to ask a girl 
out; Act I, scene 3 is a lesson in their relative ineptitude when it comes to initiating even 
a casual conversation of a personal bent; and Act II, scenes 3 and 4, show the boys 
constantly relapsing into programmed patterns of male behavior. The play's reference to 
the stereotype of the male as N eanderthal--one or the other of the girls is literally 
dragged or physically carried off-stage by one or the other of the boys at least three 
times-is more than a metaphorical device or glib commentary on the boys, for the boys 
identify most closely to this sort of behavior, and their participation in it is accurately cast 
as either adolescent petulance or boyish playfulness. 
The toughness of a public language is also manifested in the way it is couched in 
terms of social-that is, power-relationships. In his investigations into the "language of 
control," G. J. Turner examines the various linguistic mechanisms by which people 
attempt to exert control over others and over situations. In addition to threats, these 
mechanisms include commands, positional and personal appeals, manipulations of guilt 
and shame, and forms of verbal disapprobation. Turner observes that, while those with 
access to a formal language were likely to gravitate towards personal appeals, incitements 
of guilt, and verbal disapprobation, users of a public language more often used 
imperatives, positional appeals, incitements of shame, and threats. The main distinction 
in these sets of mechanisms is that the former modes emphasize an individualized 
conception of self and an individualized use of language, whereas the latter place the 
emphasis on social bonds, socially mandated conceptions of self, and a relationship to 
language primarily devoted to maintaining social order and social continuity. Public 
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language users more often conjure appeals based on ideas of authority, hierarchy, social 
function, and duty. The elicitation of shame, for instance, is based on how one's actions 
are likely to be viewed by one's community, whereas an elicitation of guilt involves 
reconciliation between one's own behavioral standards and one's actions. In addition to 
the above, Turner was able to identify trends within the above categories. For example, 
beyond the public language user's greater overall use of threats, the threats such a 
speaker make are more frequently inexplicit and ambiguous, conditional, and highly 
forceful than those employed on occasion by users of a formal language. 
Threats regularly punctuate the dialogue of Killer Joe. Of the five characters, 
four make threats during the course of this very short play. The title character, however, 
represents the exception to the rule that is the Smith family-that is, the other four 
characters in the play. The manner of Killer Joe Cooper, the police detective and hired 
killer on the side, is frequently warm and genteel, and his approach to violence is usually 
like that of Brian's in Shopping and Fucking. Joe maintains his distance, often farming 
out the "hits" to others, essentially a crew of murderous subcontractors. When he does 
tackle a job himself, he takes pains to have as little personal contact as possible with 
those hiring him, and he tries to keep his knowledge of the targets to the mere patterns of 
their existence-their usual comings and goings-just the information needed to plan the 
most effective and safest strategy. By doing so, he avoids the possibility of affective 
identification with any of the victims. To Joe, as was the case with Brian, violence is a 
business, and Joe conducts his with cool efficiency. The Smiths, however, are loud, foul­
mouthed, uncouth, and dysfunctional. When Joe makes a threat, it is usually specific and 
calmly and quietly spoken. He rarely finds it necessary to raise his voice, and he explains 
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both the conditions and the repercussions of the threat clearly and free of all uncertain 
terms. The threats made by the Smiths are very different, and a close look at these threats 
will show that the Smiths are subject to the limitations of a public language. 
In the opening scene of act two, bloodied, bruised, and prostrate on the floor, 
Chris tells Joe that he wants him to stay away from his sister. "You want me off the job," 
Joe says to Chris, "[just] say the word" (Letts 44). Then, as Joe turns to leave, Chris 
warns him, "You better not hurt my sister" (46). Chris's threat, as is typical of a public 
language, is both ambiguous and conditional. The utterance itself is the condition, and 
the consequence of meeting the condition is an implied: "or else!" However, what 
constitutes harm and what form the retribution might take are both predictably absent and 
remain unclear. Appropriately, Joe' s reaction is a laugh. When Chris asks defiantly, 
"What's so funny?" Joe says, "Oh, I don't know. That just . . .  struck me" (46). Joe' s 
response highlights the absurdity of Chris's ultimatum. Beaten so savagely that he is 
now unable to stand, Chris's vague warning to Joe is really nothing more than Chris 
resorting to a script he has internalized. His words are just the sort of aggressive and 
ominous statement that he has come to associate with being a man. The facts-that he is, 
at the moment, unable to act on his threat, that he is probably incapable of being a danger 
to a man like Joe in any event, and that he would be hard-pressed to summon the courage 
under the most favorable of condition-are all beside the point. 
Chris' s threat is a purely automatic response-a bit of role-playing-and Chris 
does not conceive the need for, or even the possibility of, contemplating what he says 
prior to saying it. He simply says it. However, although Chris utters his words 
mechanically, largely divorced from deliberation and reflection, his language, in the 
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words of Jeanette Malkin, "does not fail to communicate; in fact, it communicates all too 
well its aggressive, leveling tendencies" (Verbal Violence 39). Chris's language may be 
understood as an attempt to accomplish two seemingly opposed ends, for it is first "a 
form of attack whose general function is to repel contact," but it is also "group-language, 
impersonal and vicious as it is, [ and] also serves as a common bond among [the] 
members" of a subcultural language community ( 128). It is a threat, but given the 
context, one can see that what comes out as an imperative aimed at Joe, is in reality a 
rather pathetic claim of-Chris's impotent insistence on-his manhood. Having been 
beaten and embarrassed and bumped out of the role he sees himself in-as the Smith 
family's alpha male--Chris feels the need to assert and reclaim some of his lost 
machismo and dignity. However, the other two men in the play see themselves in that 
same role, and the familiar "pissing contest" ensues. 
As these characters vie for supremacy within the family, one can see public 
language use, capitalist language's capacity to commodify, and the languages of 
masculinity converging to fuel the competition between the Smith family's men (i.e., 
Ansel, Chris, and the family's newest member, Joe). As demonstrated in the third 
chapter, the language of capitalism is eminently available and eminently suited for the 
dehumanization of people. Aside from each of them hoping to "cash in" on A�ele's 
death, the men in the play exhibit an underlying capitalistic ethic that is connected to 
some fairly conventional notions of gender role. These conventional ideas of masculinity 
and femininity are ultimately revealed by means of a public language and a capitalist 
vocabulary, both ill-suited for what are essentially discussions about personal 
relationships. While the public language places the emphasis on the local social bonds 
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that are underpinned by their subculture's social constructions of gender, the language of 
the marketplace attempts to identify the men's speech as dispassionate and pragmatic, on 
the one hand, and as part of an exclusively male realm, on the other. With all of this in 
play, one can see each man, for instance, at some point attempting to cast himself as a 
shrewd and practical businessman and as the family's head-of-household and primary 
bread-winner. However, these roles are only satisfied in the men's talk, not in their 
actions. 
The familiar phrases drawn from the world of business show themselves, in the 
mouths of these men, to be so threadbare as to be meaningless. One sees, for example, 
Chris lecturing Ansel on the wisdom of hiring Joe-"This really isn't something we can 
afford to cut comers on . . . .  Killer Joe's a professional, and he'll do this right" ( 1 5}­
when, in fact, Chris only knows as much as Rex has told him. And, elsewhere, one sees 
Ansel arguing from some strange approximation of contract law that he and Sharla 
should each receive individually, rather than share, a cut of the insurance money because: 
"I am the father here, y'know. We're talkin' about my ex-wife. I'm the one who found 
her. Not you, and not Dottie" ( 1 6). Even Joe employs the language as if his "contract" 
with the Smiths were a written legal document rather than a verbal arrangement for 
murder bound, not by laws and jurisprudence, but by coercion and violence (24-26). All 
three of the men assume a business attitude when it comes to Adele, managing to 
dehumanize her by reducing her to a commodity and further distance themselves from the 
gruesome reality of their actions. By casting the entire enterprise as exactly that, an 
enterprise, the men not only separate themselves from the human facets of the event, but 
also construct identities in keeping with the conventional notions of manhood privileged 
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by their subculture. Casting themselves simply as level-headed and steadfast decision­
makers who are willing to make whatever sacrifices are necessary for the good of the 
household, they bastardize the meanings of a word like "sacrifice"-rejecting the notion 
of self-sacrifice one might expect and assigning to it a meaning that more closely 
resembles that of a "sacred" killing. 96 
Likewise, all of the men verbally distort notions of chivalry and guardianship at 
the exact moments they claim, and attempt to demonstrate, their ability to care and 
provide for the women in the family. Tellingly, all three men, at some point, position 
themselves as Dottie's guardian; however, in each case, the position carries with it the 
taint of self-interest. At first, Chris is happy to leave custody of Dottie to their father, 
Ansel. However, when he realizes Ansel is willing to sacrifice Adele and Dottie for the 
sake of the family-that is, for the money-he sees it as his duty to supplant Ansel as the 
family's caretaker. When the deal with Joe becomes contingent upon Dottie serving as 
Joe's collateral, or "retainer," Ansel curses loudly, "GODDAMN IT!" (26). However, 
the audience soon realizes that this outburst is in reaction to the television's poor 
reception, not to Joe's treatment of Dottie. Regarding the de facto prostitution of his 
virginal daughter-in this subculture, a virtual spinster at twenty-Ansel says, "Y'know, 
it might just do her some good" (26). Ansel here paints Dottie's continued virginity as 
something unnatural and probably the result of an implied mental defect. He goes still 
96 In a passage reminiscent of Mamet's American Buffalo and Glengarry Glen Ross, Ansel brags about his 
fleecing of a customer at his garage. In this exchange, Ansel equates his professed knowledge and business 
acumen and his cut-throat opportunism with a superior masculinity: 
Chris: You charged him how much? 
Ansel: Fifty bucks. 
Chris: For a lousy spark plug! 
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further, to the point of suggesting that, if she were to have sex, it would likely have a 
socializing effect on her and render her more "normal." Ansel's argument, in essence, is 
that what Dottie needs is a good fuck. Then, with the sound of a television lottery 
drawing playing in the background, this scene transitions into the next. The sound of the 
forces of both capitalism and chance in action here are not accidental; the fantasy of 
money easily gained is both deliberate and appropriate. 
Apparently disgusted by Ansel's failure in the role, Chris begins to fashion 
himself as Dottie's custodian. He becomes indignant at Ansel's insistence that Dottie 
dress up for her first "date" with Joe, yet he appears to be more concerned about a 
perceived insult to him than about an injury to Dottie. Chris and Ansel get into a heated 
exchange over Dottie's dress, and "CHRIS is suddenly in ANSEL's face," yelling, "LET 
HER CHANGE!" (33) and usurping Ansel's proprietary role. However, Chris's rationale 
for allowing Dottie to change shows that he is no more concerned about Dottie than is 
Ansel, for he grumbles, "It's bad enough we gotta give the son-of-a-bitch a present. We 
don't have to gift-wrap it" (33). In Chris's version, like Ansel's, the sacrifice of Dottie is 
not the main concern, and, as is typical of a public language, it is voiced as unavoidable. 
Chris and Ansel's public language, and the fact that the sacrifice of Dottie barely affects 
them, together eliminate the need for further consideration or debate. So, the men, by 
virtue of a linguistic construction-not circumstance-and a language that discourages 
investigation into the origins of situations, simply have no choice but to capitulate to 
Joe's demands. And the phrasing suggests that Chris and Ansel-not Dottie-will just 
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Ansel: Hell, he didn't know the difference. Dumbass Yankee. About sucked my dick for 
having the right-sized wrench. (22-3) 
have to live with things as they are. Chris's version also clarifies what little genuine 
devotion he has for his sister, and it shows an absolute ignorance regarding the 
etymology of a word like "guardian," reducing the role he must play to a position of 
masculine privilege and power removed from any reciprocal demands upon him. So, in 
Chris's own words, Dottie is a "present," an "it" to be "give[n]" to any old "son-of-a­
bitch" when it forwards his own interests and not a human being deserving of 
consideration and protection. 
Finally, Joe's behavior isn't very different. On his first "date" with Dottie, a 
scene reminiscent of Lulu's job interview for Brian in Shopping and Fucking or Larry's 
purchase of Alice's services at the strip club in Closer, Joe orders Dottie to strip off her 
jeans and sweatshirt and put on her dress in front of him. During their conversation, he 
explains to Dottie that he has never been married "because women are deceitful, and 
lying, and manipulative, and vicious, and vituperative, and black-hearted, and evil, and 
old" (37). These are the first indications that Joe is looking for someone to control and 
dominate, not a partner. Joe's opinion of women and his manner towards Dottie suggest 
it is no accident that Joe has chosen to be with an inexperienced, naive, twenty-year-old 
virgin with a slight mental defect, and some apparent psychological problems, and social 
ineptness. Clearly, Joe is looking not for an equal, but for someone it will be easy for 
him to deceive and lie to, to manipulate, and to whom he may safely be vicious, 
vituperative, black-hearted, and evil-not to mention an attractive and much younger 
woman. 
As will soon be evident, Joe's opinions of women are all too common in highly 
( or hyper-) masculine subcultures. But before turning to that topic, I would first like to 
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address a matter closely related with the ongoing discussion of the public language's 
"tough" nature. As mentioned earlier, public languages are highly sensitive to the social 
mandates of the subcultures of their speakers. In addition to an emphasis on social, as 
opposed to individual, conceptions of self and on social bonds and hierarchies, public 
languages place an increased emphasis on socially constructed views of the world at 
large. Public language users, less curious and less likely to search for causes of effects, 
are generally less apt to question the veracity of their subculture's claims about the way 
things are, why they are that way, and what should (or can) be done about these 
conditions. Public language users tend to be more conservative with regards to the 
fixtures of their social milieu than are formal language users with regards to theirs. One 
frequent consequence is that public language users often accept their subculture's 
attitudes regarding violence at face value, rarely comparing the subculture's axioms 
against their own experiences or attempting to evaluate the logic of subcultural claims, 
especially the root causes of violence and what may be done about it. In fact, if given the 
choice between giving their subculture's assessments of the world priority ov�r the 
evidence of their own experience and logic or questioning beyond what is given, they 
may feel that they are in some way jeopardizing their subcultural identities and stick to 
the former-better safe (socially) than sorry. 
As Hans Toch relates, much violence is perpetrated by individuals who 
incorrectly view themselves as threatened, their heightened sense of danger accounting 
for their greater readiness to respond with violence. In general, it is not unusual for 
individuals, regardless of language structure, to view the world as more dangerous than it 
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really is. 97 Criminologist Alison Young argues that contemporary culture, broadly 
defined and in general, is marked by its increasing sense of "shared victimization" and "a 
shared awareness of risk and danger" (232). Elayne Rapping points to evidence of these 
shared cultural fears: 
By 1997, prison construction and management had become the single 
greatest growth industry in the [U.S.]. The imposition of more harsh and 
punitive measures-three strike laws for simple, often non-violent 
offenses; harsh mandatory sentences; the rise in legalization and 
enforcement of the death penalty; the trying of youths, often in single digit 
age groups, in adult courts; highway chain gangs; punishments involving 
public identification and shaming of offenders and exoffenders; and so 
on-defined an increasingly repressive, crime-fearing and punishment­
loving society [ and] a state whose policies are increasingly driven by 
essentialist notions of evil (Rapping 9-10, 15).98 
Likewise, Todd McGowan draws attention to the increased popularity of "car alarms, 
home security devices, and all the things that insulate us from encounters with the other." 
We can also recognize essentialist notions of evil and the fear they create in the use and 
the effect of phrases such as the "Evil Empire" and the "Axis of Evil." McGowan 
attributes a great deal of this contemporary fearfulness to increasingly fractured, isolated, 
97 Especially, as notes Dr. Chaires Maland, in post-9/1 1  western societies. 
98 Dr. Charles Maland suggests that signs of a public shift away from such punitive measures are beginning 
to become apparent. 
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impersonal, and privacy-craving cultures. As was made clear in the third chapter, some 
of the structures that were supposed to create greater unity among people have, in many 
ways, produced the opposite effect of splintering macro-cultures into smaller and more 
discrete micro-cultures-in essence, proliferating subcultures, as well as subcultural 
identity and allegiance. McGowan warns, "Even though we erect these defenses in 
response to the threats of a world increasingly dominated by privacy, what we fail to see 
is the way our response creates the world it is responding to. We look out from behind 
barricades and see a world in which there is no public bond, all the while failing to 
recognize that it is our barricades that destroy it" (The End 1 75). 
The consensus among sociologists seems to be that individuals, in fact, often do 
contribute to or create the hostile conditions they encounter by perceiving them as hostile 
in the first place. For public language users, this general tendency is compounded by the 
fact that they are far more likely to live in areas rife with poverty and crime than are 
formal language users. The problem, then, is that public language users are often, in 
reality, more likely to encounter violence-which seems to corroborate their worst 
imaginings-but also that the languages they use do not encourage them to look for or 
consider the cause and effect and other logical relationships between conditions, actors, 
and events. The impression given in/by the public language is that the violence around 
them is inscrutable, inevitable, and perpetual. Todd McGowan explains that in addition 
to the greater fragmentation of society into small subcultural enclaves, the devolution in 
interpretive skills characteristic of contemporary society also come into play. He 
explains the predominant contemporary relationship to violence in the following way: 
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As the victim . . .  of [a] crime, I experience it as a wholly random act, 
disconnected from the functioning of the social order as a whole. What I 
experience most forcefully is the fact that the crime could have happened 
to anyone-that it could have happened to someone else just as easily as it 
happened to me . . . .  Crimes appear, in other words, in almost every 
instance as particular acts without any link to the universal, without any 
connection to the social order in which they exist. . . .  Hence, it becomes 
impossible to interpret crime, to grasp particular crimes within their 
universal significance. (McGowan 99)99 
"The predominant response," as with the infamous events at Columbine High School in 
Colorado, is "to emphasize the event' s complete resistance to explanation. One often 
hear[s] something like, ' It' s a senseless tragedy' or 'The horror of the event goes beyond 
all attempts to explain it"' (McGowan 218). Some of the clearest recent examples may 
be found in the official statements of the Bush administration that frequently insist upon 
the inscrutability attached to episodes of violence, lumping all violence under the title 
"terrorism" and thus denying that there might be social, economic, and political causes of 
99 McGowan adds the following footnote: 
Hate crimes illustrate this failure perhaps even more remarkably. Whenever an area 
within the United States becomes the site of a hate crime, the residents of the area 
immediately insist that this one hate crime is an isolated phenomenon, wholly anomalous 
and not reflective of the attitude of the region as a whole. This attitude appeared, for 
instance, in full force in and around the town of Jasper, Texas, after the brutal murder 
there of James Byrd by white supremacists. (McGowan 2 1 6) 
To this, I would add that the likelihood of regional, and therefore social, origins of crime and violence seem 
to be well supported by the demographic data. For example, in The Subculture of Violence, Wolfgang and 
Ferracuti attest that "whites in Southern United States have homicide rates four to five times higher than 
whites in New England" (262, emphasis added); that, "with minor exceptions[,] . . .  the higher the class 
status, the higher the incidence of suicide, and the lower the class status, the higher the incidence of 
homicide ( 1 54); "that most crimes in general, except the white-collar variety, are attributed to [the lowest 
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such violence. Tellingly, President Bush's response to the school siege in Beslan, Russia 
was: "The atrocities that took place in the school were beyond comprehension" (Bush, 
"Remarks"). 1 00 
When one considers the combined influence of a heightened sense of imminent 
violence and a resignation regarding one's ability to avoid violence, it is no wonder that 
suspicion and paranoia are regular features among the speakers of a public language. 
Public language speakers are far more likely to express intolerance toward anything 
foreign to their subculture. For example, overt racism is common among subcultures 
highly suffused with the characteristics and influences of a public language. Instances 
where characters in contemporary drama express racist views are frequent; are primarily 
exhibited by characters representative of a lower socio-economic standing, of public 
language use, and of membership within decidedly masculine subcultures; and are, more 
often than not, unexamined, automatic, and often.unconscious responses. One play with 
striking examples of this brand of unreasoned but overt racism is David Eldridge's 
Serving It Up. At one point, Sonny is on his soapbox, but this time rather than being 
allowed simply to spout his opinions, he is for once called to account and asked to 
explain his position. It soon becomes clear that Sonny's position is not a position at all, 
but a displaced anger and hatred bereft of logic or coherence: 
Nick: Why do you hate the blacks so much? 
Sonny: Just do. Always have. Hate the Pakis more though. 
stratum of a social organization]; and that "the rate difference between the social classes is significantly 
greater for physically aggressive rather than for purely acquisitive crimes" (261 ). 
100 The next line continues in this vein and reads, "Many in America, and I know many in Russia, simply 
cannot conceive the hearts of a person [sic.] that would mow down innocent children." 
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Nick: No-why? 
Sonny: What do you mean, why? Hark at Ken Livingstone ! 
Nick: No, but why? 
Sonny: What? Piss off, Nick. Don't  give me that lefty shit . . . 
Nick: What shit? 
Sonny: The only reason they're good at cricket is because they've got 
more monkey in them than us-Makes them bowl faster. 
Nick: I 'm not a fucking lefty. 
Sonny: You sound like it. 
Nick: So what are you, Sonny? (Pause.) 
Sonny: Stoned. 
Nick: Don't fuck about. 
Sonny: I 'm not talking about this. 
Nick: Why? 
Sonny: Politics is crap. 
Nick: No, Sonny. What are you? Who the fuck are you, Sonny? (Serving It 
Up 46) 
Sonny himself doesn't understand the source of his racism, so there is no way to defend 
it. The only responses he can muster are evasions and iterations of standard racist claims, 
or rather pseudo-claims, for he doesn't have enough of a handle on the beliefs he 
expresses to point to any specific problem or danger. 
When Nick keeps pressing Sonny for an answer, Sonny finally lets loose a flood 
of bile that to him probably feels like an argument but possesses none of the necessary 
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qualities. He deflects the conversation away from a defense, which he cannot muster, to 
his solutions of his as yet unidentified problems: 
Sonny: Know what I'd do? I'd sling all the fucking darkies and Pakis out, 
the Kurds can go, and the fucking Greeks. There are enough of them 
around. 
Nick: So? 
Sonny: There must be a million of blacks here now, Nicky-boy. We 
should have England just like it used to be. This country's going down the 
swanny. We should be the best-for fuck's sake, we didn't even qualify 
for the World Cup! ( 46) 
Sonny neglects to consider what ill effect these groups have had on England, aside from 
somehow being responsible for England's poor showing in football. Earlier, Sonny cited 
the superior cricket skills of "the darkies," as well as the pre-eminence of Viv Richards, 
even though he was "black as the ace of spades" ( 46). Yet, in some unspoken way, the 
country's prowess at soccer has been affected as a result. Sonny's Arcadian desire for an 
England that no longer exists, one when the country always qualified for the World Cup, 
seems to have nothing to do with the arrival of the immigrants he hates. In fact, if one 
reads the play as a reflection of the England existing outside the world of the play, the 
World Cup immediately prior to the appearance of Eldridge's play is the one for which 
(the only time since 1978) England did not qualify. Ultimately, it was the "darkies" of 
Brazil who claimed the world title. 
Still, Sonny's venom is not spent. He ramps up once more for an attack: 
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Sonny: If they are going to stay here we should give them a couple of 
sheets of corrugated iron and a packet of nails and let them build their 
shanty towns down the road. 
Nick: But, Sonny . . .  
Sonny: They'll be all right. What happens if you lose a dog. It doesn't 
suddenly die, does it? It survives and gets a bit here and there. The 
foreigners will do the same. They live like animals anyway. (47) 
Here, Sonny's gripe appears to be the poverty of these "foreigners" that requires them to 
"live like animals." But if one suspects that Sonny's accusation is one of the standard 
ones, such as "shiftlessness" or "incivility," one would be proven wrong by Sonny's next 
few sentences. Here, Sonny gives an account of his own life typical of the accounts used 
as portraits by racists against those they despise: 
Sonny: People can look after themselves. White people do it as well. I'm 
all right, I've never worked proper-and I don't want to either. Charlie's 
been in and out of work all his life, we're sweet. Come on, Nick-I can 
go on to the estate get two ounces of resin on tick and by five o'clock I've 
eamt a ton and got a deal for myself. Dad gets a few quid on the side down 
at the dogs. Don't need a job. Got the dole. I can live. If I knock someone 
every now and again, then who gives a shit. You've got to look after 
number one, mate. ( 4 7) 
That indolence, or the sale of hash, or reliance on welfare subsidies and the charity of 
others, or the pervasiveness of a purely egocentric worldview-all characteristic of 
Sonny's existence by his own admission-might have more to do with the present state 
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of England than the presence of "darkies" and "foreigners" never occurs to him. It seems 
more likely that lives like Sonny's may be more responsible for the country "going down 
the swanny"; moreover, Sonny's lifestyle may provide the best explanation for the 
discontent, anger, and frustration that fuel his displaced hatred. The hatred begins to look 
a lot more the simple fear of change and of difference. After all, fear is the only 
consistent characteristic in Sonny's  speech. 
So, when the "toughness" of a public language, the corresponding absence of 
curiosity and the application of reason, and the frequently resulting suspicion and 
paranoia join forces, then episodes like the following, also from Eldridge's  play, become 
more than simply possible; they become foreseeable: 
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Wendy: Got a great arse, Nick. 
Sonny: You fancy him . . .  
Wendy: So? 
Sonny: You're after Nick. The cunt, he knows I . . .  
Wendy: What? 
Sonny: Bastard, all that shit about the bird at the chip shop and it was you. 
Wendy: So what are you trying to say, Sonny? 
Sonny: Cunt, I' 11 have him for this. 
Wendy: You lay a finger on Nick. (Pause.) 
Sonny: Good in the sack, was he? Got a big prick, has he? 
Wendy: Leave off, Sonny. 
Sonny: Come on, Wend, don't get all shy on me. You've never been the 
one to hold it all in before. I've heard your filth in the pub. 
Wendy: I really want to fuck Nick. I wank over him in the bath. I want to 
suck him off and I want him to fuck me till I cry. Are you satisfied now, 
Sonny! (63) 
At first, Sonny's indignation that his friend, Nick, has pursued Wendy behind his back 
seems justified, but then Wendy provides some key information about their history and 
about Sonny: 
Wendy: Don't try and look upset, Sonny, you don't give a shit about Nick. 
I know you too well. (Pause.) It 's been up there in your little brain for at 
least a year, hasn't it, Sonny? 
Sonny: Leave it alone, Wend-
Wendy: No, Sonny, I've never liked you. You think everyone's against 
you, betraying you, using you, Sonny, just like you think Nick is. But you 
use people-and when you've had enough of them you just smash them 
in. I know you, Sonny. (63-4) 
Wendy's comments show that when affect substitutes entirely for reason, hurt feelings 
are a sufficient basis for evaluating a situation, and one's own idiosyncratic thoughts and 
dishonest behavior are enough to establish another's guilt. Considering the combined 
inadequacies of a public language to aid in effective interpretation and to guide one's 
reactions, inappropriate and effusive responses are typical. However, public languages 
are more than merely highly affective. They are actively anti-intellectual, and this is 
often manifested as a distrust of those with language uses, often those of a formal 
language, that differ from those of the public language user. 
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Jonathan Lewis' play Our Boys takes place in hospital and depicts a group of sick 
and injured soldiers who share a ward. Much of the conflict is situational, arising when 
an officer (actually a Potential Officer in the Military [or in the Marines], hence the 
abbreviated POM in lieu of a name; Porn is also, it should be noted, a denigrating slang 
term for military officers in general, supposedly coming from their use of pomades) 
agrees to board with a group of enlisted men due to a lack of available space in the 
officer's ward. From the time of his arrival, the enlisted men demonstrate their 
suspicions of the officer, some of which stem from their past experiences with officers, 
while others are simply based on stereotypes. Many of the enlisted men's assumptions, 
in the form of accusations, are expectations that all officers are from the higher social 
strata, privileged, and university educated. The disdain these men have for the privilege 
enjoyed by their so-called betters becomes a fluid rejection of everything they see as 
representative of the higher classes and its privilege. This includes their education and 
their primarily formal language use, so the prejudice these men harbor for members of 
higher social strata translates into a rejection of the very qualities that separate a primarily 
formal language from their primarily public ones-the greater emphasis on the higher 
cognitive functions, including greater abilities with generalization, differentiation, 
synthesis, analysis, abstraction, metaphor, interpretation, and reflection, among others. 
That these men consider a formal education and the formal language it employs 
superfluous if not utterly useless pervades most of their exchanges: 
262 
Keith: What are you reading then, sir? 
POM: The Wasp Factory. 
Keith: The Wasp Factory? 
POM: Yes. 
Keith: About wasps is it? 
POM: No, not really. 
Keith: A factory? 
POM: No. 
Keith: Why is it called The Wasp Factory then if it's not about wasps or a 
factory? 
POM: Well, it is in a way I suppose. 
Keith: Ah! One of those kinds of books. (Our Boys 23) 1 0 1 
Keith's literalness is in stark contrast to the symbolism of the novel the POM is reading, 
and of the officer's conception of language. Moreover, Lewis' choice to have his 
character read Iain Bank's novel underscores the very different relationship the enlisted 
men have with language. Lucie Armitt says, "The amoral stance of The Wasp Factory is 
driven by the logic of anti-reason" (Armitt). She also alludes to features of the novel 
that, when considered in light of the context within which the novel appears in Lewis' 
play, tend to highlight the nature of the language the enlisted men use. Noting the 
novel's violence and the way the narrative acts-like the public language in Killer Joe­
to ameliorate its gravity, Armitt says, "The entire narrative of Bank's novel is couched as 
10 1  Similarly, in one scene of Serving It Up, Nick turns to Sonny, the exemplar of public language use and 
admits to an uncustomary curiosity and endorsement of written (i.e., formal) language: 
Nick: I've been thinking of some mad stuff lately. When I 'm bored, I just think about­
space, Sonny. 
Sonny: Space? 
Nick: I've been reading a book. 
Sonny: You nob. 
Nick: It's not posh. No long words. 
Sonny: Words bollocks. Didn't you have enough of books at school? (7) 
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typical boyish misadventure, but twisted and sickened by a pathological eye. Irrespective 
of whether Frank is murdering wasps or small children, he always does so in a manner 
evoking the fantasies of child's-play" (Armitt). It brings to mind the phrase that 
condones so much aggressive and violent behavior by males: "Boys will be boys." 
In another striking and relevant comment, Armitt explains how "women are set up 
as the despised "Other" of the book because," in the eyes of the protagonist, Frank, "they 
are 'weak and stupid and live in the shadow of men and are nothing compared to them" 
(Armitt). Perhaps unwittingly, she is indicating a link in the novel between the qualities 
of a public language and one of the primary qualities of an ultra-masculine subculture. 
Since such subcultures are almost invariably indebted to public language, the connection 
is not an idle one. Indeed, when one factors in the two elements most indicative of a 
hyper-masculine subculture-a disdain for women and all things feminine, as well as a 
decidedly physical and perf ormative conception of masculinity-the effects of a public 
language become exaggerated. 
In the third chapter, we saw how human beings can be turned into commodities 
by means of language, and some of the examples were quite gender-specific. For those 
belonging to a hyper-masculine subculture, women may be conceived of as nothing more 
than trophies, gaining their significance only insofar as they are desired by men and can 
be put on display, as in Kevin Coyle's Corner Boys: 
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Johnny: Why'd yous fight? 
Barry: Dave tried de' get off with Donna McFadden. 
Johnny: Are you mad or something? God, she's like Chopper's status 
symbol, she's his Reebox Pump, she is. (252) 
However, commodification is only one of the ways that women are objectified and 
denigrated by the language of the hyper-masculine subculture. Women are considered 
less intelligent and capable than men, as here in Our Boys: 
Keith: She got the dates the wrong way round. 
Parry: Typical fucking female. (30) 
In addition, women are generally devalued and viewed as less deserving of basic human 
respect and lacking in dignity. Here, Parry discusses the relative advantages of a blow-up 
doll when compared to a real live woman: 
Parry: Better than any girlfriend except it can't squeeze your blackheads 
for you. (27) 
But, by far, the most frequent form of objectification and denigration is the way that 
women are reduced to the role of sexual servant. The sort of language used to speak of 
women in these subcultures routinely casts them as meaningless beyond the copulative 
function they represent. Again, Jonathan Lewis' character, Parry, best exemplifies this 
sort of language use and the attitudes that underpin and are reinforced by it. Here he 
prompts Mick, just recovering from a circumcision for medical reasons, to describe an 
upcoming leave for R and R: 
Parry: Here, tell them about your holiday. 
Mick: Yeah. Can't wait. Should be wall to· wall skirt. At least that's what 
they all say. 
Parry: 18 to 3 0 isn't it? 
Mick: Yeah. Majorca. Should be brilliant. 
Parry: Yeah, but what's the point-you can't shag yet, can you? 
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Mick: There's more to life than shagging, Parry. (58) 
As one can see, even Mick, who shows a more enlightened view of the opposite sex, has 
become well versed in the language of objectification in his exclusively male 
environment. But it is Parry who has put on the language in the form of a fabric that 
seamlessly joins attitude and expression, no longer able to distinguish subcultural rhetoric 
from reasoned choices and behavior: 
Parry: We had a forty-eight hourer in Bangkok, and we went to this 
parlour called "W onkee Dicks." . . .  They lined the girls up and you chose 
the one you wanted, then after the massage she asks if you want any 
extras-"fucky or blowey"-and they've got this special trick, right: when 
you start coming she sticks her middle finger right up your arse and 
twiddles something so that you can't stop coming. I thought I'd died and 
gone to heaven. ( 16) 
Keith responds, "They're only kids, you know that" (16). A statement, not a question, 
mind you. Yet, the language that portrays women as existing solely for the pleasure of 
men allows Parry to shrug and say, "I like them young. Less chance of disease then" ( 16). 
It is no accident, either, that the language with which Parry denigrates women should also 
be inflected with racism. 
But the hyper-masculine subculture's most dramatic variations on the theme of 
female denigration are, perhaps, those instances where, as in the competition between 
Larry and Dan in Marber's Closer, women are objectified so that men may climb a rung 
in the subculture's hierarchy of maleness. In such cases, the woman isn't even a physical 
entity, she's merely a sign meant to signify another's masculinity by opposition, through 
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control, or in her obliteration as female. It is only fitting that Parry should provide our 
first example: 
Parry: I first did it when I was thirteen. 
Keith: And when did we get on to this topic of conversation? 
Parry: Porked the baby-sitter, Janet, during Match of the Day ! I scored 
more than West Ham that night ! ( 16) 
Clearly, what Parry presents as significant is the early age at which he lost his virginity, 
that his first time was with a girl old enough to be his baby-sitter, and that he "scored" 
more than once-all meant as testaments of his great prowess, even from the beginning 
when he was a complete novice. The implied argument is that Parry must be a "natural," 
for nothing else could account for what took place that night. Although the girl is named, 
one suspects that the detail is there merely to lend credence to the claim-to give it an air 
of verisimilitude. Ultimately, the name Janet means as little as, or perhaps less than, 
what was on television at the time. 
Of all the many depictions of a hyper-masculine power struggle that utilizes the 
feminine as cannon fodder, the one I find the most disturbing is Rebecca Prichard's Fair 
Game, set in the world of adolescent male rivalry. Although the play is a no-nonsense 
account of adolescent violence and rape, the original production included an all­
adolescent cast, a move that steeped the play's premiere in controversy. Such a 
courageous decision may have made for a particularly powerful rendition, one I'm sure 
that audience members won't soon forget, and one that may have rendered a passive and 
complacent reception nearly impossible. The actors on stage must have presented a set of 
visual cues that were hard to ignore or misread-the female character is outnumbered 
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four-to-one; she is younger and smaller, more open and eager; she is portrayed as out of 
her element in the neighborhood, at school, at home, and certainly among the other 
characters in the play. In the first few moments of the play, Prichard introduces the 
playground as the site of a contest over membership and hierarchy in the male enclave 
that is the sports team. The boys jockey for position, and at this point the gamesmanship 
appears harmless, typical boyhood behavior. However, the appearance of Alex's  step­
sister, Debbie, proves to be the catalyst that heats things up, and Prichard takes advantage 
of the opportunity to show just how thin is the line between the earlier gamesmanship and 
the eventual violent outcome. 
The main contestation over power is between Alex and Andy, but the casualty of 
their struggle is Debbie. Andy appears to be the more athletic, charismatic, and 
aggressive of the two boys. As they vie with each other, the other two male characters, 
Simon and Gigs, throw their support and loyalty from one to the other in conjunction 
with the rising and falling of their relative positions in the group' s  hierarchy-the 
hierarchy and the struggle for position are apparent necessities, even for a group of just 
four boys. Andy soon discovers that he can get a rise out of Alex by means of his sister. 
Alex probably views this small group of friends as his space, in the sense that it is 
removed from his obligatory roles in the family and at school. This is probably the place 
Alex considers himself most "free" to "be himself." Yet, ironically, he may be more 
inclined to act contrary to his instincts, his inclinations, and his ethics here than in any 
other setting. So, when Andy invites Debbie to join in with the group, Alex sees this as a 
violation of his territory and his freedom to live beyond the reach and restrictions of his 
family. It is, first of all, an attack on his independence and it pushes the conflict with 
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Andy to the fore. However, in Alex's initial reactions and Simon's one-track humor, 
Andy will soon discern that Debbie can provide him with additional ammunition: 
Alex: Why'd you ask her to the lake for? 
Andy: Who? 
Alex: Debbie. 
Simon: To keep an eye out. What' s wrong with that? 
Alex: You fancy her or summink? 
Simon: Are you mad? Your little sister? She's only thirteen. 
Gigs: She's a kid. (Fair Game 22-3) 
Alex's taunt about the boys fancying Debbie is, at first, taken as such. However, it isn't 
long before Alex's view that the notion of the others liking his sister is a threat to the 
group's integrity is registered in his preoccupation. Again, he remarks on this theme: 
Alex: Why you sticking up for her? You fancy her? 
Simon: Yeah: Just my type. 
Gigs: She's got nice tits. Only joking, mate. They laugh. (23) 
Once Alex has divulged the site of a raw nerve, and after Simon and Gigs 
demonstrate the effect the touching of this exposed nerve has on Alex, Andy is prepared 
to use this information to his advantage. And it is ideally suited to Andy's interest in 
reaching and maintaining the top position in the little group's hierarchy, for joking about 
Debbie in this sexualized manner is something in which Andy, Simon, and Gigs may 
participate, but Alex cannot. This fact places Alex at the periphery of the group, 
marginalizing him and making him the sole target of every onslaught as long as they keep 
to this topic. The teasing in this vein continues and increases: 
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Andy: Maybe we should check it out. See if her "dangling glurbs of joy" 
are for real. They laugh, except Alex. 
Alex: You do fancy her, don't ya? 
Andy: Yeah. She's a babe. Pure horn. What you gonna do about it? Andy 
throws the ball at Alex, hard. Alex throws it back at him, hard. Alex turns 
his back to the group, sitting down. Andy throws the ball at his back. 
Alex: Ow! They laugh. (26-7) 
The blocking of the above scene and the laughter painfully underscore Alex's newly 
precarious position within the group. 
Things escalate when, in addition to including Debbie in their plans, and in 
addition to sexualizing her, Andy easily prompts her into an aggressive stance versus her 
step-brother and his attempts to boss her around. 1 02 With this move, the odds are now 
four-to-one against Alex. From here on out, with every exchange Alex is further 
excluded, the sanctity of his group is further breached and invaded, Debbie is further 
objectified, and Andy's agenda is further accomplished with less and less effort on his 
part: 
Debbie: My top's fucking soaked. You've ruined it. 
Simon: You can take it off if you want to. (to Alex) Only joking, mate. 
Alex: Yeah? 
102 Note Simon's humorous misuse of language as Debbie defends her right to wear whatever she wants to 
school: 
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Debbie: Sent me home for wearing a short skirt one time. 
Simon: That's a bit sexist innit. 
Debbie: I wear what I like. 
Gigs: And we like what you're wearing. (30) 
Andy: Your top' s soaked. You cold? 
Simon: She could take it off. 
Gigs: Feel free to take it off, yeah? (39) 
Andy can step back and adopt a neutral position, or pretend to care about Debbie, leaving 
the others to be labeled the instigators. Besieged in his group of peers, losing ground to 
Andy, bested by Debbie (his sister and a mere thirteen-year-old girl), and denied the 
opportunity to participate in the current tone of sexuality, Alex' s is indignant, and feels 
ostracized and emasculated. 
Wolfgang and Ferracuti explain that in such overtly masculine subcultures, boys 
appear much more likely to be motivated by their concerns with social self-preservation. 
Therefore, social "alienation of some kind . . .  seems to be a form of punitive action most 
feasible to this subculture" (Wolfgang and Ferracuti 160). In Fair Game, the alienation 
inflicted upon Alex comes in a strictly linguistic form. No attempts are made to 
physically exclude him; in fact, the exclusion is entirely in a subtle manipulation of 
words--ones loaded with subtext. In these overtly masculine subcultures, the thought of 
a social death is more frightening than is the prospect of bodily harm; in fact, bodily 
harm, ironically, provides one the opportunity to proclaim one's masculinity. And since 
in a subculture of violence "the counter-norm is nonviolence" (160), the use of violence 
is viewed as a legitimate and often favorable method of solving problems and of proving 
one's masculinity. For example, adolescents in subcultures of violence are taught that 
"violence [is] a viable, even preferable, response" (115) every time their parents valorize 
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their aggression verbally. In one interview, the father of a boy in a violent subculture told 
Bandura and Walters that, if his son were to fight, he would "let it go until one won. See 
who was the best man." ( 1 15). His statement is indicative of the ethos portrayed in 
Prichard's play, an ethos wherein men are to be judged according to their ability and their 
willingness to use a violence whose logic is ingrained and whose "truth" is validated with 
every such utterance. 
In a subculture that despises non-violence as womanly passivity and views 
violence as a simple expression of masculinity, its members are likely to divorce 
instances of masculine violence from questions of ethics altogether. As the popular 
saying goes: "Boys will be boys." Suddenly, with just a phrase, the ethical 
considerations that surround an act of violence have been neutralized by casting the act as 
instinct rather than inclination, as the natural male response as opposed to one of a range 
of available choices. In addition, the behavior is written off as largely benign when 
formulated in the language as a case of adolescent exuberance, focusing on the boy's 
intention to enjoy himself, and not an instance of violence, with the focus on the boy's 
egocentric disdain for others. Finally, in a hyper-masculine subculture, a verbal . 
connection is made between the violent behavior and maleness itself. More than innate, 
this behavior is what boys/men do and, therefore, defines them as boys/men. As such, 
violence has a kind of incorruptibility. It is simply part of the natural, straight-forward, 
and honest speech of maleness. While words can be lies, actions-so the logic goes­
cannot be untrue. Only when paired with language can an action be said to be false. For 
these reasons, participation in violence does not produce the individual feelings of guilt 
one might expect; instead, non-violence-that is, the forgoing of a definitively male 
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behavior-is imbued with a sense of shame. Abstaining from violence is made to feel 
like a dereliction of one's social duties, like declaring oneself a "man" (by means of one's 
false vernacular) without having presented evidence to others of one's right to the title 
(by means of the masculine, and typically violent, "language" of action). These mark the 
extreme cases; however, even in mainstream culture, some violent behavior is made 
tolerable by virtue of language designed to put its critics on the defensive or by language 
that, quite meaninglessly, depicts itself as suspect when compared with the pure honesty 
of action. That male behavior can be driven by fallacy, enacted falsely, or have its own 
inherent falseness is incomprehensible, and thereby the notions of "truth" attached to 
such behavior become confused with those of "appropriateness" and "necessity" and, 
thus, sew the seeds of presumed "moral rectitude," "obligation," and "inevitability." 
Besides, only a pedant would insist on rehashing an issue that is labeled "no big deal," for 
"boys will be boys." As H. A. Giroux notes, "Under the rubric of fun, entertainment, and 
escape, massive public spheres are being produced through representations and social 
practices that appear too 'innocent' to be worthy of political analysis [ and human science 
research]" ( 45). While this is generally the case, these forms of linguistic refashioning 
play a substantially more significant role in subcultures that privilege violence. 
So, with a mandate to commit violence, no hope of exerting his will over the 
entire group or the situation, and driven by a craven desire to reassert his masculinity, his 
power, and membership in the group any way he can, Alex focuses his hostility on a 
single target. He attacks the person he sees as the cause of his marginalization and, also, 
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the one who launches the final dart-the one that goes just a bit too deep. 1 03 Yet, other 
factors recommend this target-a target that is likewise marginal and one that allows him 
a perverse opportunity to emphasize his maleness and, at the same time, insist on his 
participation in the group, even if that means the objectification and sexualization of his 
own sister. 
Motivated by the fear of social annihilation and anger, Alex is pushed over onto 
Debbie and then commits an act he surely would never commit elsewhere or under any 
other circumstances. He rapes Debbie. Ultimately, Simon and Gigs show that their 
objectifying jokes were more than just jokes-their words contained more truth than they 
were willing to admit-and they scramble to take their own turns with Alex's sister. 
Alex, Simon, and Gigs all engage in acts they know to be wrong and, in this respect, 
false. The greatest perfidy, however, is that enacted by Andy when he mercilessly and 
obliquely completes his mission and utterly defeats the abject Alex with words aimed at 
Debbie: 
103 The exchange that leads directly to the violence is prompted when "Alex pulls knife from his pocket. He 
flicks the switch but the blade will not release. Something is the matter with the knife. They all laugh" (5 1) :  
Simon: What's the matter, Alex? Can't ya get i t  out? 
Debbie: He never can unless he's wanking in his room. 
Simon: Oooh, hear that, Alex! I wouldn't take that if l was you. 
Debbie: You're like your Dad, you are. You're a fucking pervert. 
Alex: I'm not like him. I'm not like him. I'm not. 
Debbie: You're fucking pathetic. (5 1 )  
This i s  not the only reference in the play suggesting abuse in the family. I f  such abuse were present, the 
outcome on language and its role in regulating behavior would be predictable. Ruth Hayward summarizes 
studies conducted by B. D. Perry, which record the detrimental "impact on the structure and function of the 
brain when a child is exposed to violence early in life, at critical or sensitive stages for brain development" 
(50). Children raised in abusive environments acquire a "stress response" that makes them "hyper-vigilant, 
more prone to 'fight or flight' responses, even when unwarranted, and thus more prone to impulsive 
violence" (50). For them, "the higher functions of the neo-cortex, including reflection and judgment before 
action," are less likely to be activated to regulate behavior (50- 1 ). That such a background is suggested in 
the play helps account for the striking absence, in Alex, ofreflection, judgment, and self-control, as well as 
in his impulsive, hyper-vigilant nature. With respect to Alex, it may also be of interest to note: "Character 
attacks may be more catalytic to a violent reaction than other verbally aggressive acts" (Infante, et al. 368). 
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Andy: Jesus. Cover yourself up. (Debbie begins to cry softly with mu.ffled 
sobs.) Now you're crying. Look at yourself. Was you born without 
shame? 
Go home. You're filthy. Go and wash yourself. (53) 
Andy's actions-not his words-are dishonest here. Finally, even though the stage 
directions indicate that Alex feels remorse and the final images are of Alex gently 
covering Debbie and gently cradling his sister's head in his arms, the language shows the 
power that hyper-masculine ethics exert over Alex. However remorseful Alex may be, 
he doesn't hesitate to fall into step with the group's now-undisputed leader and echoing 
Andy's sentiments-"You slag. I'm so ashamed of you. I'm so ashamed" (54)-turning 
Debbie into the scapegoat and realigning himself with the boys. 
Prichard's play is certainly shocking, but not because it is removed from reality; it 
is shocking because it is so plausible. There is no easy connection between language and 
violence ( e.g., the dehumanization of women always leads to gender violence or gender 
violence is always preceded by dehumanizing language); however, while not easy, the 
connections are very real. When the languages of disrespect or disgust, competition and 
hierarchy, aggression and violence become inculcated into one's everyday understanding 
of the world and represent a large portion of the avenues of expression open to one, then 
the form of one's language begins to inform the content of one's thought. The potential 
overlap between expression and cognition, and between thought and subsequent action, 
are essential to the make-up ofNeilson's play Penetrator. For exa�ple, the audience 
comes to recognize that, for Tadge, adolescence was a time dominated by sexuality and 
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violence. All of his prized memories are of sexual escapades (including those that are 
autoerotic or homoerotic), or of beating up other kids for Max-"I kicked his cunt in for 
you!" "I kicked him to fuck!"  ( 109). In each, the languages of sex and violence always 
intermingle. Then, after high school, while Max left his adolescent environment to go to 
college, Tadge continued to loiter in this environment for a time before eventually joining 
the army. Here, too, sex and violence were the norm. Max and Tadge's lives most 
diverge at this point, and their physical departure best explains how Max came to learn 
new language patterns; in other words, it best explains their psychological departure. 
Max begins to learn a language more formal in its structure and more civil in its content, 
while Tadge becomes ever more entrenched in the subcultural languages of violence. 
In his notes to the play, Neilson writes, "When Max and Alan (but not Tadge) are 
being vulgar, they adopt funny voices as a distancing technique" ("Notes" 1 1 8). The note 
testifies to Neilson's awareness of the linguistic mechanisms individuals use to erect 
barriers between themselves and that which they find disconcerting or uncomfortable. It 
also attests to Neilson's deliberateness in crafting the dialogue. Surprisingly, just as the 
funny voices Max and Alan use when they speak in vulgarities, the toughness of Tadge' s 
language similarly functions as a distancing technique. It is a way for him to diffuse the 
emotional charge that comes with intimate personal relationships, which, if one recalls, 
are the very areas public language users have the greatest difficulty articulating to 
themselves and others. For this reason, these are also the areas that are the hardest for 
them to assimilate. Bernstein explains: 
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As the nature of the language-use limits the verbal communication of 
feelings the latter tend to be as undifferentiated as the language. 
Consequently, the emotional and cognitive differentiation . . .  is 
comparatively less developed, and the cues responded to in the 
environment will be primarily of a different order . . . .  Of critical 
importance is the type of language-use upon which value is placed, for 
once a value is so placed, then that language-use will reinforce the 
emotional disposition which resulted in the initial preference. (Bernstein, 
"Some Sociological Determinants" 33) 
In other words, progression towards intimacy-a process that requires communicative 
and emotional openness-will be impeded in the most intimate of human connections. 
The "tough language" creates a greater level of security in intimate relationships, but only 
because it is euphemistic and disparaging. Because the speaker of a public language does 
not have a means of articulating these areas of experience, or acknowledging their 
significance, then s/he begins to internalize that these areas do not warrant articulation. 
The public language user learns to conceive something-less-than-intimate as intimacy, 
and this surrogate form remains comfortable-"safe"-because it dilutes the emotional 
content that makes the public language user anxious. However, as noted earlier, when 
one is asked to abandon the language' s  toughness and articulate feelings of affection and 
intimacy in a tender and individual manner not provided for by the public language, all of 
the anxiety of the moment-including the distress caused by one's  linguistic 
inadequacies-is likely to be attributed to the source of the stressful feelings. 
The pairing of "tough" public language with the hyper-male subculture's 
tendency to discount or deny all things considered feminine is recognized as blatantly 
connected to violence. In their landmark work Adolescent Aggression, Albert Bandura 
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and Richard Walters convey the strength with which language affects conceptions of, and 
social behavior in reference to, intimate relationships. The researchers compared the 
language used by aggressive boys as opposed to non-aggressive boys and discovered 
significant differences. For instance, the sort of "incompetence in speaking of sex" seen 
in a play like Corner Boys "was documented in both sets of boys; however, this 
incompetence assumed different forms" ( 145). While they did not use Bernstein's 
terminology, Bandura and Walters nevertheless discovered that the aggressive boys 
tended to use a "tough language." They were the "most open and frank about their sexual 
experiences [but] tended also to be the most crude" ( 145). 
Also contrary to what one might expect, "there was no difference . . .  in the 
number of psychosexual references" in the language of the two groups of boys"; 
however, "the aggressive boys . . .  gave a significantly greater number of responses that 
involved references to physical expressions of sexuality" ( 1 80). The researchers, here, 
had managed to isolate a consistent theme among the aggressive boys. One especially 
illustrative example comes in one aggressive boy's response to a story introduced by the 
researchers: 
Investigator: "And how are the people in your story thinking and feeling?" 
Boy: "I hope he's feeling with his hand; I don't know how she's feeling." 
( 1 82). 
Initially, the boy's conception of the word "feeling" is clearly physical in nature. If the 
boy in the story is "feeling" anything, it must be with his hand. For him, the idea of 
feeling something affectively is not a possibility, or at least not the primary possibility. 
Then, the boy's language alters subtly and unconsciously as he shifts between two 
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definitions of "feeling" based on whether he is referring to the male or the female 
character in the story. As inconceivable as it is that the "feeling" attributed to the male 
character in the story might be other than tactile, the boy is equally unwilling or unable to 
consider that the "feeling" on the part of the female character in the story might be 
assertive and physical. For her, the boy apparently reasons, "feeling" must be emotional. 
And since this kind of feeling marks a strictly female territory, he, of course, would not 
"know how she's feeling." 
Entire areas of existence are demarcated as belonging to one sex and are, 
therefore, off limits in the language of the other. As above, the limits placed on 
experience translate into limitations within the language; however, the above example 
also suggests that limitations within the language translate into limitations in perception 
and cognition, even when it defies logic. A good example is that "the most impressive 
difference between the aggressive and the control boys" Bandura and Walters report may 
be seen "in their attitudes towards girls who [engage] in premarital intercourse. The 
aggressive boys typically held to a double standard: you have sex relationships if you 
can, but you don't marry girls who have already had sex experience" ( 1 75). 
What is shocking is the way the aggressive boys view intimate relationships, as 
well as the priorities they create and the behaviors they perform as a result. For, while 
the non-aggressive boys "were much more likely to say that premarital relations were 
understandable and acceptable only if the boy and the girl liked one another very much," 
the aggressive boys indicated that they "would not forego a chance of sex relations unless 
they liked the girl" ( 1 75, emphasis added). The aggressive boys take pains to keep sex 
and affection separate. The aggressive boys, it seems, hold an entirely opposite 
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understanding of sexuality and its relation to intimacy, essentially denying that sex is in 
any way an intimate act. One can detect, in such attitudes, a tendency on the part of the 
aggressive boys to objectify not only their sexual partners, but also the sex act itself. 
While the non-aggressive boys conceive of sex as part of an intimate relationship, even as 
a form of intimacy, the aggressive boys tend to view sex as a form of entertainment or 
conquest. This fact is evident in the language. Bandura and Walters relate that "several 
of the aggressive boys were extremely frank, almost boastful, about their sexual 
conquests and sometimes went into considerable detail," adding that "the importance of 
sexual conquest as a proof of masculinity was often verbalized by the aggressive boys" 
(173). These attitudes are made eminently clear in Prichard's play. 
Bandura and Walters relate that whereas the non-aggressive adolescents spoke of 
sex as one of a number of "affiliative activities" ( 172)--activities designed to, or with the 
effect of, creating intimacy between individuals-the aggressive adolescents spoke of, 
thought of, and used sex as a way of expressing and proving their masculinity. "Their 
sexual acts usually were unaccompanied by any affectional response; in fact . . .  they 
sometimes expressed hostility toward, and deprecation of, their sex partners" ( 172). 
Cognition that limits one's ability to weigh a variety of responses calmly and rationally is 
exacerbated in a violent subculture by means of linguistic codes that create strong links 
between sexuality and aggression rather than between sexuality and affection. As I said 
in the first chapter, for boys in violent, hyper-masculine subcultures, sex is something 
done to not with another. 
Research shows that it is a very small step from an impersonal conception of 
sexuality to an aggressive conception of sexuality and, ultimately, to sexually aggressive 
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behavior and sexual violence. In a study conducted by H. Eysenck, "a large number of 
responses concerning sexual attitudes and sexual behaviors [were] . . .  subjected . . .  to 
factor analysis in order to determine interrelations" (Zillmann, Connections, 62). Among 
men "the only marked correlation with ['aggressive sex' and] another factor proved to be 
with 'impersonal sex'" (62). In this study, "an equally strong relation between aggressive 
and impersonal sex emerged for females" (62). This simply serves to strengthen the 
above correlation and suggests that there are sociological rather than biological roots. In 
a recent survey of world-wide research in this area, Dolf Zillmann says, "Regardless of 
the degree of literacy and cultural advancement, it appears that promiscuous sexuality 
tends to promote impersonal sexual relationships and that such relationships, in tum, 
promote violent sexual inclinations" (63). 104 He even goes so far as to indicate a lack of 
affect as the single sure connection between sexuality and violence. 
Much like the disembodied voice and the "deep, ominous bass rumble" that 
accompany Tadge on his journey through Neilson's Penetrator, Tadge's violently 
objectifying conception of women and of sexuality permeates every scene where he is on 
stage. From the tale of a comrade who "chored some liver from the kitchens . . .  and 
fucked it into his thermos and shagged [it]" (82), to his off-the-cuff remark that he had 
"shagged two girls at once . . . .  Two of them, about thirteen years old each" (89), to his 
detailed and graphic account of the freakish pornography that was shown at the army 
base in West Germany, an account that devolves into a chant of "Cock I cunt I cunts I 
cocks" ( 1 1 5- 1 16), Neilson continually brings violence and sexuality together in the 
104 "Degree of literacy" here simply means the rate at which citizens of different cultures are able to read 
and write and is not a measure of general language maturity, skill, elaboration, or formality. 
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language used by and associated with Tadge. So much so, that the language not only 
represents Tadge, but serves as a kind of synecdoche of this character. 
Tadge's language of sexual deviance and violence is intimately tied to his time in 
the army, a subculture where, Alan says, "He's been learning how to hate niggers and 
queers and Irish people and Arabs!" (8 1 ). Alan's version, unflattering and stereotypical 
as it is, does not seem to be far from the truth. Tadge's stories about his time in the 
military and his stories about the Penetrators suggest an environment and a language 
awash with violence, as well as an affinity for violent forms of sexuality. If not 
absolutely benign, some of these linguistic connections are broadly cultural. Jean Franco 
says, "Domination has traditionally been semanticized in sexual terms and power has 
traditionally been associated with masculinity. Social, political, and economic power are 
represented through a lexicon that is drawn from sexual relations. Hence the social and 
the sexual have become intimately connected" (506). This assessment is probably 
especially true of the military, as it is a site heavily indebted to notions of hierarchy and 
power. Here, then, one might expect a language conspicuous for its conflations of 
sexuality and violence. Furthermore, as a readiness to participate in violence is necessary 
for the successful functioning of any armed force, militaries regularly introduce 
mechanisms designed to help soldiers disengage from the affective and moral 
considerations that might make them balk when they are called upon to do so ( cf. 
Grossman). 1 05 
105 A portion of an anonymous review of psychologist and Anny Ranger Captain Dave Grossman's book 
On Killing reads: 
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The truly terrible news is that contemporary civilian society, particularly the media, 
replicates the Army's conditioning techniques and-according to Grossman's 
controversial thesis-is responsible for our rising rates of murder and violence, 
Information regarding Tadge' s military training is never revealed, but there are 
enough references to suggest aspects of humiliation and brutality. Tadge's accounts of 
abuse at the hands of the Penetrators actually mirror techniques of victimization that are 
known to have been enacted upon the young men in a variety of military and paramilitary 
subcultures across borders and across time. Daniel Santiago describes some of these 
methods. "They are brutalized," he says. "Often they are raped. Shamed and 
particularly among the young. In the explosive last section of the book, he argues that 
high-body-count movies, television violence (both news and entertainment), and 
interactive point-and-shoot video games are dangerously similar to the training programs 
that dehumanize the enemy, desensitize soldiers to the psychological ramifications of 
killing, and make pulling the trigger an automatic response. 
Some commonplace mechanisms used to help disengage soldiers from affective and ethical 
concerns are identified in Jonathan Lewis's play Our Boys. The following passages demonstrate the 
management of affective and ethical responses by means of a sterile language, as in the first case; by means 
of grammatical obfuscation, as in the second case-the phrase "conduct unbecoming" being "elliptical" or 
a "transferred epithet," the one characterizing the lack of a necessary term, the other a qualification of the 
wrong term (OED Online); and the omission or "plausible deniability" of information, as in the final case: 
POM: All these abbreviations. Can't get used to them. PO, MO, QEMH. It's like 
learning another language isn't it? 
Mick: You have to have abbreviations. (He recites the following as ifhe has learnt it) It 
reduces personal inefficiencies in a large and diverse organization, but it shouldn't be 
thought of as dehumanizing. 
Parry: Well, well, well, Mr. Fucking Psychology. You been saving that one up? 
Mick: No, we done a course on it just before I left Junior Leaders. "The Army, a Total 
Institution." It was brilliant. We done all this brain-washing techniques and hypnotics. (9) 
-and-
Keith: If they don't get us for anything else, they'll get us on a section 69. 
POM: What's a section 69? 
Joe: Conduct unbecoming. 
POM: Unbecoming what? 
Joe: Conduct unbecoming a member of Her Majesty's Armed Forces. 
POM: Yes, but conduct unbecoming what? 
Keith: Exactly. (5 1 )  
-and-
Joe: Keith died on Friday afternoon. (He pauses) You just missed the funeral actually. 
POM: What happened? He was all right when I left. 
Joe: Complications. 
POM: What do you mean complications? 
Joe: That's all they're prepared to say. (63) 
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humiliated, the young recruits can only reclaim their dignity through repetition. They 
convince themselves that what happened to them was insignificant by doing the same to 
others" ( 1 7). Linda Kintz echoes this assessment, saying, "Structurally, these young boys 
have first been treated like women, then trained to treat other people like the women they 
we�e" (85). Linguistic versions of these physical structures, what Albert Bandura refers 
to as mechanisms for the "Disinhibition of Aggression through Diffusion of 
Responsibility and Dehumanization of Victims," are included in all of these iterations of 
domination, humiliation, and abuse. An especially potent example is when Tadge, in the 
midst of reliving an instance of abuse, breaks into an army cadence, singing: "Wounded 
Arab girl / Lying by the road / I'm so horny I could shoot my load / Fuck her up the arse / 
Shoot her in the face / But save her cunt for the boys at the base" (Neilson 109). The 
brutal and sexualized account of a young girl's mutilation, with the concluding image of 
a group of soldiers obtaining pleasure from her disembodied vagina, is a case of 
dehumanization in the extreme. The message is that the only valuable part of the Arab 
girl-her "cunt"-has been salvaged from what was an otherwise useless and 
meaningless object. The young girl's worth is represented by her absence. Even the 
salvaged portion is an orifice, a hole. This symbol of the girl's absence further reduces 
her, rendering her less even than an object, and more as a mere function. Finally, Alan's 
indictment of the army is recalled in the fact that the girl depicted in the cadence is Arab. 
Tadge, in fact, has "been learning how to hate . . .  Arabs." 
Femininity, though, is feared and attacked when it appears outside the female 
body, as well. Hyper-male subcultures typically use a male-female dichotomy in every 
situation where respect, social status, and power are contested. The rule is simple: the 
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more masculine the male and his behavior, the more deserving he is of respect, social 
status, and power. The inverse of the rule is also in force: the more feminine the male 
and his behavior, the more deserving he is of disrespect, social ostracism, and 
powerlessness. These rules, and the simplistic binary upon which they are based, tend to 
invite two extremes of behavior. One must find a way to associate one's rivals for 
positions in the hierarchy with an exaggerated femininity. When it comes to the self, one 
must project the most masculine appearance possible, which tends to encourage a hyper­
performance of maleness-a version of maleness that is highly overt ( and, therefore, 
highly physical) and inflated. Behaviors are built into the language as scripts, and as long 
as one follows them-no matter how ridiculous or illogical the role-one will be 
rewarded. Such performances are essential ingredients of the hyper-masculine 
subculture, and while one has the freedom to select from the scripts to meet the 
immediate circumstances, whether or not to follow a script is not something to which 
many members of these subcultures are likely to give much, if any, conscious thought. 
For the above reasons, in the words of Deborah Phillips: "Social context understood as 
cultural constructions and enactments of masculinity is an important area of focus for 
ending gendered practices of violence" (50). 
Elijah Anderson, author of the influential article "The Code of the Streets," 
presents a number of findings distilled from contemporary social science to provide a 
detailed account of one particular brand of violent male subculture. The "code" he 
describes comprises a language, a system of ethics, and a set of priorities. He also warns 
that membership in subcultures that subscribe to this or a similar code are becoming ever 
more prevalent. Within such subcultures, reports Anderson, members are often "able to 
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command respect through their presentation of self.-by allowing their possessions and 
their body language to speak for them" (88). To say that these subcultures are heavily 
semiotic is an understatement. Phillips elaborates on the semiotic and perf ormative 
intensity typical of the adolescent male subcultures she studies and that preoccupy so 
much drama of the 1990 's and the new millennium: 
When cultural discourses in all forms of representation are understood as 
power/knowledge that takes hold of the body through performativity, 
bringing into being the social it names, [one] can begin to understand that 
what is at stake can be existence itself, for example, existence as a "man" 
in a dominant fiction of "natural" White male supremacy and in a reality 
of a society structured by "his" imaginary and unachieveable presence. 
[Doing so] allows us to decenter the individual, free-will subject and to 
foreground shared cultural discourses, regimes of truth, and our 
participation and complicated complicity in reproducing discourses not of 
our own choosing or benefit. (63-4) 
Violent subcultures are generally predicated on narrow definitions of manhood, ones that 
adhere to the patriarchal conventions of men as warriors, protectors, providers, and heads 
of the household and the community. The performance of identity is an inescapable part 
of any ( sub )culture; however, where masculinity is defined in overt and often physical 
terms, the performance of masculinity is more evident and deeply evocative-and it is 
more necessary. 
In the subculture of violence, those who possess physical characteristics or 
outward manifestations of the social attributes considered most "masculine"-e.g., 
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charisma or attractiveness, according to the subculture's standard of masculine beauty­
have the advantage in terms of privilege and persuasion. Those possessing these gifts 
"may not have to campaign for regard but may, rather, gain it by the force of their 
manner" (Anderson 88). However, "those who are unable to command respect in this 
way must actively campaign for it"(88). One of the most fascinating but detrimental 
patterns associated with aggressive male subcultures is one that Deborah Phillips 
explores in detail in her study of adolescent male aggression. As the result of the 
extensive series of interviews conducted with the adolescent boys, both in groups and 
individually, Phillips was able to compare the responses and behaviors of these boys as 
they adapted them to suit their current environment. The boys, in fact, demonstrated the 
need to make the study group into its own subculture. Two of her discoveries are 
especially relevant to the present discussion. First, among the boys "occupying positions 
on the margins of hegemonic masculinity," she learned of efforts to win positions "closer 
to the norm" (59). The sort ofhyper-performativity required of these hyper-masculine 
subcultures may be recognized in the consistent denigration of everything feminine 
discussed above, but also in the sort of homophobic language used by Max and Tadge in 
Neilson's Penetrator. 
Alan's lifestyle is very much a foil or a counter to the hyper-masculinity often 
exhibited by Max and Tadge. Alan is linked to a whole array of attributes more 
frequently associated with the feminine than the masculine, and through much of the 
play, both Max and Tadge make comments insinuating that he is gay, a proposition 
refuted by the fact that Alan has been seeing Max's ex-girlfriend-and for longer than 
that relationship has been over. Max and Tadge consider much of Alan's behavior as of 
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questionable manliness. Alan is a vegetarian. Alan's relationship with his mother is 
decidedly close. Max suspects Alan's preference for (in a mock French accent) Alain 
Delon movies and calls him a "fucking bumboy" (Neilson 67). At one point, Alan 
proposes he and Max play the card game, Switch-a proposition Max rejects out-of-hand 
because, "Switch is for faggots" (69). Alan's experience with, and interest in, girls and 
heterosexual activity is repeatedly called into question. For example, whether or not 
Alan has had girlfriends, and the reasons he might not have, are recurring themes and 
matters for debate for Max and Tadge. Finally, during the course of the play the audience 
sees Alan folding the laundry and straightening up the apartment, hear him expressing 
sympathy for women and feminism, learn that he sleeps with stuffed animals, and watch 
as he gets into a "huff' after one of Max's most pointed remarks regarding his (lack of) 
interest in women. 106 This preponderance of references to what is stereotypically 
"feminine" clearly forces one to contrast Alan and Tadge. Notably, no such "feminine" 
objects, interests, or activities are associated with either Max or Tadge, and the play's 
homophobic comments are reserved for Alan alone. And, notably, Tadge has more of 
proprietary role in the apartment than Alan-who lives there-and Alan is forced to 
leave at play's end. Alan is obviously at the bottom of this hierarchy. 
This sort of dynamic is hardly exclusive to Neilson's play. Suspicion regarding 
the feminine is a part of mainstream western culture, which has traditionally "excluded 
females and values associated with the feminine" (Jones 1 1 9). Likewise, mainstream 
masculinity has its share of homophobia as seen, for example, in the fact that "fathers 
106 Perhaps one is meant to see Tadge's violent assault on Alan's teddy bear not only as the symbolic 
assassination of Alan, but as the assassination of a symbol of the "feminine" in, or associated with, Alan. 
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[are] nearly five times as disapproving of cross-sex play by boys than girls" (Bosley 5 1  ). 
However, the degree to which these characters express suspicion towards that which is 
"feminine in nature" or ''unnaturally effeminate" in men is due to a subcultural ethics of 
hyper-masculinity. Regarding her extensive interviews with adolescent boys, Phillips 
says, "I . . .  heard about being repeatedly positioned on the margins of hegemonic 
masculinity and the effects of this positioning" ( 59). She found that every time a group 
of boys assembled, they fashioned a new masculine "subculture," and each of the 
subcultures fashioned by the boys required that certain roles always be filled, regardless 
of whether any of the boys in subculture would, elsewhere, be considered appropriate for 
those roles. A boy might occupy a position representative of the masculine norm in one 
setting; however, in a different setting, the same boy might be obliged to occupy a 
marginal role, one that would have appeared unthinkable in the first setting and clearly in 
violation of the boy's essential "nature." 
Yet, no matter how the boys were arranged into groups, it remained necessary to 
designate some of the boys as targets for ridicule, aggression, and violence. In each 
grouping, "at least one boy . . .  was positioned as . . .  'smart,' 'quiet,' and ' [a] nerd,' . . .  
and another boy was positioned as 'stupid,' 'weak,' 'annoying,' and 'a pansy"' (62). 
Each position implied a form of treatment. For example, "the smart nerd seemed to be 
mostly left alone" by the other boys in the group; whereas, "the boy positioned as weak, 
annoying, stupid, and a pansy was repeatedly humiliated through practices of verbal 
ridicule and physical assault" ( 62). In a hierarchy that largely depends on the dynamics 
of the group rather than the attributes of those in it, "positioning depends, in part, on how 
others . . .  are positioned" ( 62). This attests to a socially fluid, rather than a fixed and 
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inherent, masculinity. For this reason, in a performatively male subculture, hyper­
performativity of the norm is one method of demonstrating one's masculinity, but an 
equally effective alternative is to certify one's own nearness to "the hegemonic norm of 
masculinity by marginalizing others" (52). The performatively male subculture abhors a 
vacuum and requires a "pansy," albeit a wholly relative and purely social designation, in 
whose person the feminine may be denied and derogated. 
Wolfgang and Ferracuti have identified a rejection of the feminine and 
homophobia as definitive markers of male subcultures of violence. Moreover, they hold 
these attitudes directly responsible for much of the antisocial behavior exhibited by 
members of masculine subcultures of violence. They explain: 
Rejecting female dominance at home and at school and their association of 
morality may be a means of . . .  asserting their masculinity, and such 
assertion must be performed with a strong antithesis of femininity namely 
by being physically aggressive. (305) 
If non-violence is identified with the "feminine" traits of weakness, passivity, and 
cowardice, then non-violence announces a willingness to play the victim-that is, to play 
the woman. Hyper-masculine subcultures are highly sensitive to the slippery slope of 
allowing or embracing the feminine. So, for some men, it is a lightning-quick mental 
process that takes them from non-violence and passivity, to weakness and cowardice, to 
subjection and victimization, and finally to the terrifying Ur-image of playing the 
"bottom" or "submissive" in an act of male-on-male sodomy. This helps account for the 
ubiquity of homophobia in the "laddish" plays of the 1990's, and it helps explain why, in 
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these plays, the word "cunt" is unmatched as the favorite pejorative and intimations of 
homosexuality are the favorite form of character attack. 107 
Consider the weight given to such concerns in the contemporary drama. 
Prichard' s  Fair Game provides one of the most perceptive examples of this mindset in an 
exchange about the ostensibly innocent subject of dancing. When the boys discover that 
Alex' s sister, Debbie, loves to dance at raves and even choreographs her own routines, 
they ask her for a taste: 
Andy: Why don't  you show us how you dance at them parties? 
Debbie: What? 
Andy: You know. At that rave. You's saying how everyone dances and 
that. Show us some of ya moves. Go on. (34) 
But when Debbie looks for a partner-"Whose gonna dance with me though?" (34)-her 
efforts are all for naught: 
107 These are just a few of the seemingly unlimited examples of anti-feminine and homophobic stances: 
Chopper: Hello, boys. Having one of your jolly little queer embraces. I always wondered 
about your sexualities, always thought yous were swinging to the wrong side. ( Corner 
Boys 266) 
Agnetha: Your mom pops you in the sink I step dads arrive / you get chased / you get 
fucked / up your little bottom, don't you? / up your sad, dirty little ass . . .  / We 're onto 
you, I you sad, predictable, banal / fuck . . .  (Frozen 75) 
Parry: He probably fancied you. I've heard he likes a bit of Ginge. 
Mick: Fucking hell! I ' ll have him! 
Parry: I didn't think he was your type! (Our Boys 12) 
Gigs: Say you're a cunt before I gob in your face. 
Simon: Ah! "You're a cunt." Get off me, you queer. 
Gigs: Say it. Gigs lets a string of gob hang down then sucks it back into his mouth. 
Simon: I'm a cunt, I'm a cunt. 
Andy: Leave him. Gigs gets off Simon. 
Simon: Beast. I'm gonna report you for sexual harassment. (Fair Game 9) 
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Simon: Gigs'll dance with ya. He's a disco queen. You should see him. 
Puts on his Mum's underwear. Loses himself completely. 
Gigs: Shut up. (34) 
And when Debbie turns her attention to Andy, his response is just as stubbornly negative: 
Debbie: Come on, I'll teach ya, 's easy. 
Andy: Si'll dance with ya. 'E's a nutter. He'll do anything. 
Simon: I ain't dancing. (35) 
The upshot of these exchanges is that dancing is something girls do, not boys. 
While it would be okay to watch a woman dance-that is, to have her perform for you, 
with implications like those involving Lulu and Brian in Shopping and Fucking-it is not 
okay to participate. It is a no-win situation for males: dance awkwardly, and you look 
foolish; dance gracefully, and you look gay. Simon makes the connection clear when he 
images Gigs as a disco "queen," cross-dressed and caught up in the music. The portrayal 
utilizes common stereotypes of homosexuality, and the notion of abandoning oneself 
emotionally to the music is, of course, a blatant violation a masculine ethos. Even when 
Andy translates Debbie's request into the language of masculinity by casting it as risk­
taking behavior, requiring confidence and courage, Simon signals that this is too much 
for even his "nutter," "willing-to-do-anything" reputation. 
After Debbie performs for the boys, another reality common to many subcultures 
of violence is presented in the following scene: 
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Debbie: Normally when I dance I'm more . . .  
Andy: What? 
Debbie: I felt . . .  normally when I dance it's  like I lose myself. 
Gigs: What do you mean? 
Debbie: I dunno, it' s  like . . .  I get high. That's my high. Just get to a 
higher level, you know? 
Debbie: Sometimes when I'm dancing I get right into it. When I stop I 
dunno where I am. I just like it. I lose myself . . . .  Do you know what I 
mean? 
Gigs: Uhm. "No." 
Andy: What d'ya mean, Debbie? (40) 
In addition to the inarticulacy of the characters in this passage, we see a key difference in 
the culture in which Debbie used to live and the one into which she has now moved. 
Debbie comes from a culture where, however limited, individuals had non-violent forms 
of entertainment, achievement, and expression open to them. Ever since she moved into 
Alex's home, she has noticed the cultural differences. In her new environment, "People 
just switch on ya all the time. One minute they're alright. The next time you see ' em and 
they' re like, 'What you staring at?' Can't look at no one" (41). And Debbie, who loves 
to dance, is deprived of much of this source of joy: 
Debbie: All the raves here are crap. 
Gigs: Yeah? You go raving do ya? 
Debbie: Not here. Round my sides we had some dark raves. Everyone's 
dancing and smoking up and that. No one dances here. They just get 
pissed out their head and fight. (3 3) 
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Elijah Anderson explains, "Generally people outside the ghetto have other ways of 
gaining status and regard, and thus do not feel so dependent on such physical displays" 
(Anderson 89) in the form of "flash" possessions, hyper-masculine speech and body 
language, and overt physical violence. 
Within the environments portrayed in these plays, however, individuals are denied 
many of the opportunities available elsewhere, in particular, those which do not involve 
drugs, alcohol, the mass media, or violence. In such an environment, characters develop 
very different impressions of the future and what it holds: 
Sonny: Forty, I'm kicking the bucket. 
Nick: You're not going to die then. 
Sonny: Yes I am. I've planned it since I was ten. In a pub. A fight. I do 
this bloke over with a pool cue, fuck him right up. Just as I walk away, his 
mate says something, I turn, a gun. The cunt shoots me . . .  in the stomach. 
The prick. Second bullet right between the eyes, no mistake that time, just 
like the Krays. (Serving It Up 9) 1 °8 
Uneducated, in poverty and/or on the dole, living in a culture that encourages unhealthy 
behaviors, it is no wonder that an atmosphere of apathy pervades the world of Sonny and 
his peers and that forms of escapism are so attractive to them. Unfortunately, the 
subculture is the only life these characters have known, and they have been taught to 
valorize the very behavior that makes it so precarious, while despising the mainstream for 
its foreignness and its failure to live up to the standards of their subculture. 
108 Ronnie and Reginald Kray were gangsters in London's East End during the 1950's and 60's. Although 
there is quite a bit of debate regarding the nature and scope of their criminal activities, they were 
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Disenfranchisement from, and disapproval of, the mainstream may be seen in 
what is one of the most significant and revealing associations those in hyper-masculine 
subcultures make-a link between effeminacy and intellectualism. In general, formal 
education, learning, and the desire to learn, are all belittled as the concerns of effeminate 
men. Complexity and nuance are viewed either as hair-splitting or the perverse 
inventions of a too-active mind. After all, the things that really matter-things like truth, 
reality, loyalty, what it means to be a man-are straightforward, uncomplicated, and 
incontrovertible. 109 Likewise, deviations from the colloquial (i.e., slangy and local) 
language-and from the predominant public form of language-are viewed unkindly, as 
opposed to the solidarity of the local group and to the physicality natural to masculinity. 
In Walsh's Disco Pigs, one sees a hatred of those belonging to higher social strata 
converted into entertainment or a game that is cognitively justified by making 
associations between the pursuit of education, formal language skill, and effeminacy. 
Additional justification come by means of the valorization of stereotypically male 
behavior and the acceptance of hierarchies that privilege those who best epitomize the 
subculture's notions of maleness: 
Pig: Fookchaa ! ! Stoodent, in a? 
Runt: Lookalike. 
immortalized in the 1990 motion picture The Krays (writing credits go to British playwright Philip Ridley) 
and have, at least since the movie, achieved a cult following among street toughs in Britain. 
109 When, during the 2004 Presidential campaign, Democratic nominee John Kerry suggested that U.S. 
policy in Iraq was a "complicated" matter, incumbent George W. Bush effectively changed the subject and 
reduced all of Kerry's concerns regarding American foreign policy to one sentence, retorting, "There's  
nothing complicated about supporting our troops in  combat" (Bush, "Address"). 
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Pig: All dat chit-chat, chit-chat, chit-chat . . .  SHAT! ! Pork's brightest oud 
der an whod a guessed, Runt? I men, look dat yoke! 
Runt: Pig poin ta a lanky skin-an-bone dress in da height a ration! 
Pig: Jesus da hairy an Joseph! 
Runt: He nee runt style help ! His tapioca skin globby eyes an bum hole 
moud all sittin lax need a mooppy hair style long since gone! 
Pig: Das pugly, hey Runt ! 
Runt: Dem stoodent type got no soul ! Style in't in it ! 
Pig: Das righ, girl! 
Runt: De men dey act like ol dolls, da ol dolls do up like men! 
Runt: Like dancing dags a Oxfam, dey no shame! Shame! ( 1 70) 
Of particular distaste to Pig is the emphasis on language characteristic of the students. 
Yet, once again, Pig's own malapropistic dialect conveys much of the meaning. What 
may at first appear a too-subtle reading is, however, supported by the amazing frequency 
with which Walsh incorporates these odd renderings throughout his play. For "I mean," 
Pig substitutes "I men," thus linking himself with the appropriate masculinity. On the 
other hand, the skinny effeminate students are "dress," not dressed, and they act "like ol 
dolls." These little "mistakes" emphasize what is being said at the literal level, and the 
feminized depictions of the students are further linked to the lifestyle and pursuits of the 
students. They are, after all, "dress in da height a ration !" Here, references to an article 
of female clothing and to the intellect are tied into a single phrase. Then, in the next six 
lines, "style"-something we are told the students lack-is mentioned three times and 
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appears to represent what Pig and Runt possess, instead. Finally, mention of "Oxfam" in 
conjunction with the surrounding talk about education and students is likely to make 
Oxford or "Oxbridge" come to mind. 
All of this is prelude to assault. Pig and Runt have a system worked out. Each of 
them finds a dance partner-"So Runt move in on misty mothball! Da tapioca king is 
who we' ll take!" (171). Then as soon as Runt elicits a kiss from her dance partner­
"Den he kiss Runt! An dat my cue!"-Pig comes running over to "pay da par a da 
boyfriend, soap opera fans!" In the ensuing chaos, Runt of course claims the student' s 
advances were unsolicited and unwanted, giving Pig the "right" to beat him mercilessly. 
Here, too, the malapropistic dialect makes the mindset of Pig and Runt crystal clear. 
Pig's dance partner, "She say sometin"; however, Pig "don no dat squeak too well" (171), 
again very conscious of the differences in their respective languages. When Runt plays 
the role of the innocent and beset girlfriend, she paints a false, but truly revealing, 
account of what happened. She says, "He kiss me, Pig! He gay me tongue an all, ya 
dirty-doggy! !" (172). Once again disdain for a perceived effeminacy is cast in 
homophobic terms. Under the circumstances, even the "dirty-doggy" becomes 
potentially loaded. 
On the other hand, Walsh, Prichard, and Eldridge all provide solid examples of 
those in a hyper-masculine subculture valorizing violent male behavior. Pig reminisces 
about boyhood fights, bragging: 
Pig: Roy Keane, I know dat fella . . .  oh yeah . . .  madge him cry an cry . . .  
an him ol-ler an all! 
297 
Runt: Nancy was he? 
Pig: Was ta me, girl! ( 167) 
In Fair Game, Simon warns Debbie about Andy, saying, "Don' t listen to ' im, Debbie. 
'E' s evil," and Gigs seconds the sentiment, cautioning, "You' ll end up on a poster. His 
brother killed Leah Betts" ( 17). But all of this is for effect-to build Andy up in 
Debbie's  eyes, not to scare her away. Here violence, dangerousness, and "evil" are 
simply ways of asserting one' s masculine desirability. Andy knows this and, 
"(pretending to be pissed off)," tells Simon and Gigs to "shut up" ( 1 7). In Serving It Up, 
Sonny's  friend Nick listens to Sonny' s mother, Val, tell the following story about 
Sonny's father, Charlie: 
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Val: We went to the curry house a couple of years ago when Viv first 
started going out with [John] and Charlie didn' t  take a liking to him. It 
was awful-I didn't know were [sic] to put my eyes. Charlie kept making 
jokes about the Pakistanis. And he wouldn' t  drink any wine. Said he 
might as well write ponce across his head. It weren' t  too bad till the end. 
John said he'd  treat us but Charlie wouldn' t  let him. He kept going on 
about not being bought by a little prick from Highbury. I wouldn' t  mind 
but he didn' t  have any money! And he ripped up John's cheque book! 
(Nick grins.) Don't laugh, Nick. That was a week's wages I had to pay. 
And he had a fight on the bus home. Some Sikh boys broke his arm in two 
places. 
Nick: Good old Charlie. (24-5) 
Wolfgang and F erracuti explain, "Being a bad boy . . .  can become a positive goal if 
goodness is too closely identified with femininity" (305). In this particular episode, 
Eldridge shows that this behavior is not just a matter of boys being boys, because it 
becomes a life-long proposition and is frequently carried into adulthood. As long as men 
are in a position to view themselves, or to be viewed by others, as potential threats, then 
one 's manhood is always at stake, and there is always the possibility that it will have to 
be defended. Although the threat to Charlie's manhood was not physical in this instance, 
the response had to be, because Charlie felt he had no other way of combating this threat. 
The second chapter introduced the idea that oftentimes an institution's supreme 
concern is its own continued existence. It may be helpful, at this point, to think of 
institutions as subcultures-which they frequently are-and to consider that a focus on 
self-preservation is perhaps typical of subcultures in general, including violent, hyper­
masculine ones. Although violence is a choice, for those in aggressively anti-social 
environments, it is not a choice with the same implications and consequences. One must 
understand that those living in subcultures of violence do not make their decisions simply 
to ignore or spite mainstream ethics. Their aggressive and violent behavior complies 
with the ethics of their subculture. When a subculture condones and, in some cases, 
favors violence, then to commit what mainstream ethics would deem an anti-social act­
that is, an act of violence-is not so in that context. In fact, insofar as the act follows the 
beliefs of the subculture with which they identify, the act may actually serve the cause of 
subcultural solidarity, which is perhaps the subculture's foremost function. If one takes a 
moment to consider the many ways public-language-using subcultures give priority to 
notions of group solidarity, one can begin to glimpse the extent to which such subcultures 
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become indebted to definitive subcultural behavior, even if it is violence. In this respect, 
violent behavior may be entirely social from the viewpoint of a subculture's members. 
That all individuals must, of course, identify with and aspire to mainstream culture is just 
the sort of assumption that hampers understanding of subcultural dynamics. 
When subcultural behavior is viewed as a series of poor choices, compromises, 
deliberate rebellions, or failed imitations of the mainstream, one has adopted an attitude 
detrimental to any attempt to deal with the violence endemic to it. The violence in these 
subcultures is widely and deeply systemic, and "the development of favorable attitudes 
toward, and the use of, violence in a subculture usually involve learned behavior and a 
process of differential learning, association, or identification," or all three (Wolfgang and 
Ferracuti 160). The code of ethics is structured around an alternative, but complete and 
deeply felt, set of priorities. In addition, the aggression and violence associated with 
these priorities is formidably sustained by means of "two major classes of reinforcers: the 
pain and injury inflicted upon the victim and its extrinsic rewards" ( 160). "Both are 
present in a subculture of violence," they stress, "and their mechanism of action is 
facilitated by the social support that the aggressor receives in his group" (160). In fact, as 
Elijah Anderson has witnessed, "any respect [those living in violent subcultures] might 
be able to gamer in the wider system pales in comparison with the respect available in the 
local system; thus they often lose interest in even attempting to negotiate the mainstream 
system" (Anderson 94). One must realize the extent to which certain forms of violence 
come to be constructed, not only as socially acceptable, but as necessary, justified, or 
even honorable by means of the subculture's linguistic codes. In her doctoral 
dissertation, Marvenia Bosley explains that many adole�cents and adults come to 
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perceive their violent acts as a form of protection, as the preemptive measures that shield 
them from the impending violence of others. Likewise, G. Gerbner and L. Gross note the 
same phenomenon, saying, "It [is] not at all uncommon for . . .  youngsters to believe that 
to perpetuate [sic] violence upon others somehow prevent[ s] others from perpetuating 
violence on them" (192-3), when, in fact, it generally has the opposite effect. 
These ethics and linguistic mechanisms are integral to Lewis's play, but also to 
Disco Pigs and Serving It Up. In these plays, one faces violence that seems socially 
dictated. Oftentimes, violent behaviors have become unthinking and habitual responses 
taught and reinforced by the subculture, and they oftentimes reflect frustration, 
humiliation, and hostility created by the subculture, but then deflected away from it by 
means of language. Earlier, we saw examples in the form of a nationalism and a regional 
allegiance that are singularly fierce on the part of those most demoralized by the 
conditions and policies of those nations and regions. Still other examples involved the 
displacement of anger in the form of racial and gender hatred. In all of these cases, blind 
social obedience is transformed and recast as "loyalty." This can be a particularly 
effective means of linguistic manipulation because subcultures often define loyalty as 
something unconditional, and in violent subcultures loyalty is often defined as something 
one can have for people and places, but not for ideas or principles. 
At one point in Lewis's Our Boys, Joe confronts Parry's subcultural (i.e. , military) 
conception of loyalty, and such questioning makes the exchange rather heated: 
Joe: After that patrol why didn' t you just go and change your wet socks? 
You could have done it quietly, no questions asked. But no, you obeyed a 
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command even though you knew the Rupert was a liability and you end up 
with them cutting blocks of ice away from your feet. 
Parry: I don't know. You just do, don't you. 
Joe: Course you know. You're choosing not to. 
Parry: All right, well it's  the training isn't it? It' s  the rules. 
Joe: Exactly. The rules of the game. 
Parry: You ain' t no better than us. 
Joe: Maybe not, but at least I'm beginning to realize I've got one of these 
(he points to his head) and it does work by itself. (32) 
And Parry is right: Joe is no better. He, too, has simply accepted every command and 
fulfilled every expectation, whether or not it made sense, or served some purpose, or was 
the right thing to do. Just like Parry, Joe has never before asked why certain things were 
done a certain way, nor why such things could not be done differently. When Joe finally 
questions whether Her Majesty' s soldiers are receiving the sort of care they deserve, 
considering the big and frequently tragic sacrifices they have made in the name of queen 
and country, Keith reminds him that the army was concerned enough about him that 
"they sent your finger to be analyzed in America" where they are more likely to diagnose 
his mysterious and "very rare blood infection" (32). Finally applying his own reason, Joe 
simply replies, "They could have sent me too" (32), thus eliminating the need to amputate 
his finger in the first place. 
In a graphically violent encounter, the audience is forced to sit helplessly while 
Sonny, in Serving It Up, murders a young man at a bus stop because he refuses to give 
Sonny one of the chips he's eating. What starts out as joking soon turns to aggression as 
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a drunken Sonny insults Ben for being stingy (a "tight cunt") and Ben reacts to Sonny's 
third repetition of this epithet by pulling a knife as a warning. Both men feel obligated to 
assert their masculinity with a show of bravado; however, in a subculture .where violence 
is not the ethical taboo it is in mainstream culture, the usual distinctions between the 
"mere" performance of aggression and its implementation do not exist. Elijah Anderson 
designates what is at stake in such a subculture. He says, "A display of nerve ... can 
easily provoke a life-threatening response, and the back-ground [sic.] knowledge of that 
possibility has often been incorporated into the concept of nerve" (Anderson 92). So 
even those staging aggression as part of the hyper-masculine performance their 
subculture requires must be prepared to move from suggestion to action without 
hesitation. 
This metamorphosis is best accomplished by those who have already accepted the 
possibility of violence-that is, accepted violence even before the potential of violence 
presents itself. In this respect, all threats have to be taken seriously, and those who are 
ready to commit violence because violence, for them, is habitual are always in the 
process of defending their social status by defending their lives. The leisure to weigh 
options is often a luxury not afforded those in violent subcultures, especially those whose 
subcultures are, in addition, heavily invested in coded systems of masculine performance. 
Therefore, the subculture's requisite masculine rhetoric and behavior is what creates 
much of the violence characteristic of their subculture (i.e., violence as a social 
phenomenon), but it is also these heavily internalized social codes of language and 
behavior that sometimes prevent the individual's falling victim to violence (i.e., violence 
as a personal phenomenon). So the belief that one's individual acts of violence are a 
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matter of self-preservation is constantly corroborated, making individuals all the more 
devoted to, and dependent on, the existing social codes. 
Sonny has just such a relationship with violence, and he fights to keep it there, as 
one may see in the following passage: 
Nick: Last Friday. The bloke at the bus stop. 
Sonny: That prick with the chips? (laughs.) 
Nick: Yeah. 
Sonny: What about him? 
Nick: You didn't  have to cut him, Sonny. 
Sonny: Yes I did. I always cut them. 
Nick: No. 
Sonny: What the fuck's the matter with you? 
Nick: It just pisses me off, that 's all. 
Sonny: Don't get moody on me, Nick. He was an asshole. He pulled a 
knife on me. He deserved it. ( 48-9) 
In a circular bit of logic, the habit, once in place, becomes the justification for the 
act that has become habitual. As with Sonny in the passage above, a system of 
precedence substitutes for rational thought and analysis. The formality applied to the 
habit and the language that surrounds it justify the violence. Anderson explains this 
mindset: 
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The operating assumption is that a man, especially a real man, knows what 
other men know-the code of the streets. And if one is not a real man, 
one is somehow diminished as a person . . . .  There is thus believed to be a 
certain justice to the code, since it is considered that everyone has the 
opportunity to know it. Implicit in this is that everybody is held 
responsible for being familiar with the code. If the victim of a mugging, 
for example, does not know the code and so responds "wrong," the 
perpetrator may feel justified even in killing him and may feel no remorse. 
He may think, "To bad, but it's his fault. He should have known better." 
89). 
This amounts to a complicated and convoluted act of the "disinhibition of aggression 
through diffusion of responsibility and dehumanization of victims." One makes reference 
to the broken social codes and subsequent social disdain the victim has warranted; 
therefore, one indicates the contempt one has a right to show the victim. In short, one 
blames the victim. 
Submitting to this mindset allows Sonny to cast in a positive light the most 
negative of violent actions. To remove this mindset would spell a self-reckoning that 
Sonny is unable to endure: 
Nick: He was screaming like a baby, Sonny, like a baby. All that blood 
pissing out of his mouth. You enjoyed it. 
Sonny: No. 
Nick: Yes you did, you loved it, you always do. You always do. That . . .  
That was . . .  
Sonny: Fuck you, Nick. 
Nick: That was shit, Sonny, that was shit ! And we always do it. We 
always do it, Sonny! I do it, you do it-it's bad, Sonny, it's bad. 
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Sonny: Yeah, we do it. We do it, Nick. So fucking what? You should 
think about where you stand. Who your mates are. ( 49) 
When faced with the prospect of coming to terms with the violence he's committed and 
his motives for doing so, Sonny takes Nick's lead and affirms Nick's vicarious 
complicity in the act. Sonny also wields the language of personal loyalty and social 
confederacy, essentially introducing the familiar false dichotomy of "if ya ain't wid us, 
yer agin' us." 
Sonny's friend Ryan, back in town to announce his upcoming wedding, provides 
the most honest depiction of the environment from which he fled. Going to the dog races 
for the first time since he left years earlier, Ryan describes the spectacle he witnessed: 
Saw a weird thing. They was getting ready for the first heat and I was 
buzzing-well, I ain't been the dogs since I left. The hare, right, it shot up 
the track, but as it turned the comer it slowed and slowed, Sonny. 
Something must've been wrong with the power. But the dogs-they 
caught up-and they caught it. They ripped it apart, Sonny. (52-3) 
The dogs in Ryan's account are depicted as at the mercy of forces beyond their 
understanding and control. After all, one cannot blame the dogs for doing what they have 
been bred and trained to do. Perhaps some of the fault lies with the hare, the power 
outage, the opportunity presented to the dogs, but the immediate situation is a catalyst 
only because of the dogs' specific conditioning. While, for the dogs, the drive is an 
instinctual response towards "prey" possessed by all dogs but that has been exaggerated 
and reinforced through training, for the characters in Eldridge's play, whatever human 
impulses might be assigned to them, their uniquely violent responses are produced by 
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means of cultural codification and linguistic legislation. In each of these cases-whether 
a mindless operation of biomechanics or the praxis of social mandates-the resultant 
behavior represents a surrender of individual will. As Karl Marx would attest, the 
processes of biomechanics and social mandates are not very different. In The 
Philosophical Foundations of Marxism, Louis Dupre explains, "For Marx, praxis is more 
than a principle of consciousness: it is a prereflective unity of nature and consciousness 
which can be explicated in thought but not initiated" (216). The gap between impulse 
and action, between word and deed, is too narrow to insinuate conscious thought, and 
reflection is not something encouraged or facilitated within hyper-masculine subcultures. 
Sadly, until the individuals in these violent subcultures acquire new habitudes of 
language or learn new rituals, violence is likely to remain the norm. 
307 
CHAPTER VI 
The Elephant in the Room: Formal Violence and Unacknowledged Shame in the 
Plays of Martin McDonagh, Neil LaBute, and David Eldridge 
Female violence has traditionally been characterized differently than male 
violence, and rightfully so, considering the clear gender differences in their most 
common manifestations. Yet, while female violence does not resemble its male 
counterpart, it does not resemble many of its predominant cultural portrayals, either. In 
concert with long-prevailing stereotypes, the aggression of women has typically been 
portrayed as highly emotional, reactionary, or wholly irrational and as "expressive" rather 
than "instrumental'' in nature. Because male aggression has persistently been viewed as 
representing the "standard" in terms of aggressive behavior, and because female 
aggression has so often manifested in forms alien to male aggression-including many 
forms that are less overt-female aggression has generally been treated as a pale version 
of, or failed attempt at, masculine aggression. Viewed in this light, female violence has 
routinely been cast as comic, pathetic, or not really violence at all. In cases where the 
aggression of the "weaker" sex in any way approaches those manifestations typical of 
male violence, female aggression is depicted as tainted-as exhibiting a foreign 
admixture of masculinity. Therefore, aggression by women has traditionally been seen 
as, at best, laughable, at worst, unnatural. 
Similar essentialist notions of aggression persist. An interesting example of this 
mindset occurred during the mid 1 980' s. In response to concerns regarding rampant 
domestic violence and the lack of empathy often shown to its female victims, the 
Brazilian government instituted police stations designed to deal specifically with cases of 
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domestic violence. Each Delegacia de Defesa da Mulher, or DOM, was staffed 
exclusively with female officers, reflecting "the essentialist belief that underlay its 
creation-the assumption that female police officers would be inherently better equipped 
to deal with female complainants" (Ostermann 352). However Sarah Elizabeth Nelson's 
sixteen-month investigation of the prototype DOM in Sao Paulo found that "the DOM 
replicates several of the problems found in regular police stations"; for example, "the 
female officers-who often do not choose to be placed in police stations specializing in 
violence against women, and who receive no specialized training to deal with it-show 
insensitivity to violence against women and are oblivious to the complexities of violence 
at home" (354), sometimes to an even greater extent. 1 10 In such cases, the female officers 
more readily identify themselves as members of a police force that has chosen to 
marginalize them than as members of a traditionally marginalized gender group who are 
increasingly the victims of violence in the home. 
Ana Christina Ostermann places some of these difficulties in a specifically 
linguistic frame. Cataloging the differences in pronoun usage by officers during 
interviews with the female victims of violence, she discovered that, within traditional 
police stations (CIV's), the more familiar voce, widely used in conversation, even among 
strangers, is used roughly ninety-four percent of the time; whereas, officers in the DDM 
setting switch, forty percent of the time, to the more formal a senhora. Ostermann argues 
that this intentionally formal substitution, along with the "rapid elicitation of information, 
which happens at the DDM but not at CIV, might, owing to its inquisitional character, 
collaborate in creating more distant and even dehumanizing interactions" (359). Overall, 
1 10 For similar findings, see Hautzinger (1997) and Human Rights Watch ( 1995). 
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departmental attitudes and culture rather than the gender of the officers involved 
contributed more to the relative amount of empathy that was extended by officers to the 
individual victims of violence. These sorts of dynamics seem to represent the standard 
and not exceptions to the rule. 
In a purely literary context, similarly essentialist notions persist, as well. Martin 
McDonagh was launched into immediate acclaim as a playwright with his "Galway ( or 
Connemara) Trilogy," which includes his play The Beauty Queen of Leenane. 1 1 1  In 
Beauty Queen, McDonagh deftly uses all of the tricks of his trade to shock his audiences 
with the violence he unearths. However, William C. Boles makes a perceptive 
observation about the play when he contends, "Much of the shock at the scenes of 
violence is derived not as much from the horrific torture on stage (although it is quite 
realistic) as from the spectator's realization that McDonagh has cleverly deceived them 
both into thinking the play was a comedy and also into sympathizing with a parent-abuser 
and murderer while hating the victim" ( 1 30). In fact, McDonagh utilizes just the sort of 
essentialist notions regarding the nature of female violence identified above to 
manipulate his audience. He then, however, caters to these self-same notions to win back 
his audience and reestablish "normalcy" by the play's end. 
The dialogue of Beauty Queen is redolent with references to violence, but 
throughout much of the early part of the play, these references are couched in language 
designed to elicit laughter rather than horror. The opening scene introduces a topic and a 
tone surely familiar to anyone sitting in the theater, which helps create a sense of 
1 1 1  The Beauty Queen of Leenane was first performed at The Town Hall Theatre, Galway on February 1 ,  
1 996; the entire trilogy was first performed together at The Royal Court Theatre, London on July 1 7 ,  1 997. 
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identification-primarily with McDonagh's character Maureen. Put-upon, exasperated, 
unappreciated, Maureen is an Everywoman who suffers the sorts of daily indignations 
and irritations common to audience members. In addition, by introducing Maureen's 
mother Mag as the source of these feelings, McDonagh taps into a universal theme-that 
is, the uniquely prescient ability by which family members can "push one's buttons" and 
"strain one's nerves" while simultaneously eliciting a strong sense of obligation for 
caring and patience. At this point, the play's minor conflicts-bred of foul weather and 
foul moods, thankless chores and lumpy instant soup-are easily understood and 
assimilated. McDonagh has, in essence, extended an invitation to the audience to make 
itself at home, for the familiarly petty complaints and retributions ( e.g., Maureen pouring 
Mag's tea and porridge down the sink to spite her) are only barely inflected with anything 
more sinister: 
Mag: The fella up and murdered the poor oul woman in Dublin and he 
didn't even know her. The news that story was on, did you hear of it? 
That's a fella it would be better to avoid outright. 
Marueen: Sure, that sounds exactly the type of fella I would like to meet, 
and then bring him home to meet you, if he likes murdering oul women. 
( 1 0) 
Violence registered on the nightly news and taking place miles away no more touches 
Mag and Maureen than the nightly news touches members of the audience, and it takes 
on a distant, abstract quality. It exists more as rumor than reality and is therefore 
subsumed into the dialogue as nothing more than playful-if somewhat pointed-banter. 
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The next few intrusions of violence (e.g., stories of the priests that "go punching 
you in the head" for no reason; the tale of the man who supposedly cut the ears off his 
brother's dog for spite; the memory of the neighborhood boys "pegging" a tennis ball at 
Mag and Maureen's chickens) are, likewise, nothing more than bits of narrative, and they 
are presented to the audience as such. Each bit of information is represented, in its 
telling, as a likely half-truth, exaggeration, or local legend, and each is questioned­
either doubted or disputed-as it is being conveyed. Furthermore, stereotypes regarding 
the Irish "gift of gab" and propensity towards "blarney" help to keep the ever-increasing 
violence at bay. These long-familiar notions of lrishness combined with McDonagh's 
own contributions regarding Irish-ness-his own caricatured versions of accent and 
idiom, the sentences awash with "feck" and "fecking," the Yoda-like syntax-allow him 
to fashion a tone of comic unreality, a sort of Eire-burlesque. It is within such a 
framework that the first "real" violence occurs in the second act. 
Prior to such violence, the start of the second act is central to McDonagh's 
ambush of the audience, for it is at this point that Pato is forced to declare his allegiance 
to either Maureen or Mag. Perhaps because Pato represents the only chance for a wholly 
sympathetic character in the play, audience members are drawn to anchor themselves 
where they rightly intuit the moral center of the play. They readily tie their hopes to the 
fate of this character. Moreover, they are lulled by the promise of a Prince-Charming­
type rescue and, so, are led to expect the conventions attached to this ultra-familiar trope. 
Boles says: 
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McDonagh deftly sways the audience to one character's side . . . .  Like 
Pato, the audience automatically sides with Maureen, for no physical 
action in the play to this point supports Mag's allegations of her 
daughter's brutality; whereas Mag's cruelty, symbolized by her burning of 
Pato' s proposal, . . .  seem[ s] to support Maureen's contention. So even 
though Mag tells the truth, she becomes the villain, whereas Maureen lies 
and becomes the sympathetic victim. ( 129-30) 
However, equally important and tied up in the culture's most familiar and cherished 
tropes are the way that the female language and behavior being staged coincide with still­
prevalent stereotypes about the nature of female malice. Having witnessed the dexterity 
with which she moves around the cottage when she's alone, audience members know that 
Mag only pretends to be an invalid. They are likewise shown how, I contend, she 
employs the "repeated, simplistic questions" ( 1 30) underscored by Boles to feign 
helplessness, naivete, and innocence. In addition, Mag frequently uses these annoying 
repetitions intentionally to provoke other characters (such as Pato's brother, Ray) into 
abandoning their intentions and relinquishing their duties out of sheer frustration. The 
point is that Mag's sneaky, conniving, dissembling uses of language jibe with popular 
characterizations of women as sneaky, conniving, and dissembling. So, no matter how 
despicable one finds her actions, they do not (from a cultural standpoint) come across as 
alien or far-fetched. They are, ultimately, a refrain we've heard before. 
However, unlike Mag's malicious actions, Maureen's are cast in such a way as to 
guarantee their reception as singularly grotesque and monstrous. The device McDonagh 
uses to forward the plot-Mag's inability to safeguard the secret of her machinations-is 
itself characteristic of (gossipy) female language and ( covert, back-stabbing) female 
aggression. Therefore, when Mag inadvertently reveals knowledge that she could not 
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have known without having read Pato' s written proposal of marriage-blatantly · 
withheld, destroyed, and denied-the linguistic nature of Mag's violence (the purposeful 
ecriture and erasure of language) is stereotypical of female aggression. But, more 
significantly, there is no disruption to McDonagh' s previous narrativization of the action. 
Mag' s violence allows the audience to continue viewing the play' s violence in literary 
rather than literal terms. All of this taken together encourages audience members to place 
confidence in their expectations that Maureen's reaction will, likewise, fit the well­
established patterns of cultural myth. Everything, up to this point, has led to the 
expectation that Maureen will act "like a woman" and succumb to a violent emotional 
outburst--one of a very few conditions under which the words "woman" and "violent" 
may be united and not raise any eyebrows. Maureen, however, defies convention: 
Maureen . . .  walks to the kitchen, . . .  puts a chip-pan on the stove, turns it 
on high and pours a half-bottle of cooking oil into it, takes down the 
rubber gloves that are hanging on the back wall and puts them on . . .  
[then} sits at the table, waiting for the oil to boil . . . .  [When] the oil has 
started boiling[,} Maureen rises, turns the radio up, stares at Mag as she 
passes her, takes the pan off the boil and turns the gas off, and returns to 
Mag with it . . . .  Maureen [then} slowly and deliberately takes her 
mother 's shriveled hand, holds it down . . .  and starts slowly pouring some 
of the hot oil over it, as Mag screams in pain and terror. ( 65) 
Certainly, this episode of violence is graphic, but more than that it is calculated and 
silent. The real horror comes, not from the act, but from the way in which it is enacted. 
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Its aesthetic, its form, is one considered unnatural for women-that is, characteristic of 
''unnatural" women. 
For Anne Campbell, author of Men, Women, and Aggression, any hope of better 
understanding female violence requires a novel methodology. Campbell's asking of a 
new set of questions produced just such a new methodology and enables a new 
perspective. In her book, Campbell foregrounds the assumptions that had long informed 
the work in the area and against which she had previously struggled to make headway: 
With my doctorate behind me, I spent the next decade talking to the most 
aggressive young women I could find, mostly in remand centers awaiting 
court appearances or in juvenile or adult prisons. Mindful of the need for 
a control group, I also talked to nonviolent girls from similar backgrounds . 
. . . But in using control groups as an implicit base against which to search 
out the factors that give rise to aggression in young women, I was guilty of 
accepting the prevailing wisdom that normal women are not aggressive. 
Now it is certainly true that most women are not criminally violent, but 
very few women do not feel or act on anger, sometimes physically. (viii) 
By adopting a change in focus and tactics, Campbell has sought to avoid the sorts of 
veiled biases in play every time female violence is approached as something requiring a 
special explanation: 
I began to suspect that I had been working from a false premise. I had 
been asking why these women fight and ignoring the more interesting 
question: How do most women avoid fighting? Like men, women are 
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subject to anger, stress, and frustration. Yet women rarely come to blows. 
(2) 
The key, then, was simply to consider the possibility that female violence, like its male 
counterpart, is less likely to be an indication of abnormality in an individual than of gaps 
in a culture's regulative systems. Campbell did away with the old premise that male 
expressions of aggression are normative and that female violence is to be viewed as an 
example of how women are, essentially, failed men. This opens avenues of investigation 
not only previously closed but previously invisible. Male and female instances of 
aggression were formerly denied a similar origin and, therefore, a similar essence. 
However, investigators tried rigorously to unearth examples of male and female violence 
with a similar appearance, since the female behavior was thought to be nothing but a pale 
copy of male behavior. Elaborate explanations were devised to account for their rarity. 
Campbell recognized this as backwards logic. After all, it makes more sense that all 
human beings (regardless of sex) should be subject to a similar set of stimuli and a 
similar range of emotions-the anger, stress, and frustration-but that their responses to 
that stimuli and their expressions of those emotions should be variously conditioned by 
the availability and the acceptance (based on factors like gender) of those responses and 
expressions within their respective cultures. 1 12 
In her attempt to answer the question she posed to herself (above), Campbell 
conceived. the following hypotheses: 
1 12 Todd McGowan sees a similar phenomenon in the way people react more generally to violence. Using 
recent Columbine-type events as his examples, he cites two prevailing responses to violence: to consider it 
a "given" within certain groups, an apologia sufficient to exempt a search for sources; or to consider it the 
action of a single disturbed (i.e., abnormal) individual, rendering a search for answers beyond the 
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At the core of [Men, Women, and Aggression] is the idea that the way 
people represent the process of aggression to themselves is vital to 
understanding their actions and their interpretations of others . . . .  
[Specifically,] both sexes see an intimate connection between aggression 
and control, but for women aggression is the failure of self-control, while 
for men it is the imposing of control over others. (xi, 1) 
These differing attitudes by men and women regarding aggression are apparent in their 
predominant patterns of behavior. Yet, although the violence of both genders is replete 
with patterns, Campbell notes the facet that perhaps most distinguishes these two sets of 
patterns and the attitudes that underlie them. That facet is the greater formality generally 
attached to male acts of violence. 1 1 3 
Familiar forms of masculine violence, when compared with their female 
counterparts, more often manifest with a high degree of formally-that is, as 
( sub )cultural ritual. Masculine violence is more likely to follow ( sub )culturally 
prescribed rules regarding appropriate gendered behavior, is more often divorced from 
the immediate influence of emotion, is more often systematic and symbolic­
communicating ( sub )cultural mores in addition to idiosyncratic (personal and situational) 
reactions-and is more likely to assert identity claims important to the individual and in-
individual futile and, therefore, a waste of time and resources (Cf. The End 2 1 8). Both tend to discourage 
investigation and obscure or deny the possibility of discovering explanations of a broad or social nature. 
1 13 John Fairleigh writes that Patrick McCabe's Frank Pig Says Hello "can . . .  be interpreted as an 
investigation of violence. His target is not the brutalisation of history, but the sullen ungenerosity of a rural 
community towards an innocently simple young man, provoking him into a wild acting-out of his hurt; it is 
meanness that sears the soul and creates the monster" (xiii). This "acting-out" manifests in a series of 
familiar masculine rituals. 
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line with his (sub)culture. The high degree of formality associated with male acts of 
violence corresponds precisely with the high degree of acceptance ritualized acts of 
violence are afforded by men, a trend that testifies on behalf of Campbell's theories. 
Men, it seems, tend to be much more approving of such things as fistfights, boxing, the 
use of military force, and the death penalty, just to identify a few illustrative examples. 
As Campbell explains, all of these represent "ritualized or institutionalized forms of 
violence" (8 1 ). The ritualistic and institutional nature of violence by men is a theme that 
echoes from prior chapters and may be seen embodied in characters like John in Mamet's 
0/eanna, Dan and Larry in Marber's Closer, Max in Neilson's Penetrator, Brian (and 
Gary) in Ravenhill's Shopping and Fucking, Frank in McCabe's Frank Pig Says Hello, 
Dave and Barry in Coyle's Corner Boys, the Smiths and "Killer Joe" Cooper in the 
eponymous play by Tracy Letts, but only if one defines ritual as a shared aesthetic and 
not a collection of cultural artifacts. In every case, the male characters (both individually 
and within groups) are depicted as highly accepting of prescribed and formal exercises of 
violence. Otherwise, the behavior of these characters remains inexplicable-a collection 
of contemporary Iagos in their "motiveless malignity." Traditionally, and in contrast to 
men, women tend to view such forms of violence as unnecessary or absurd and, 
therefore, unacceptable. In fact, formal acts of violence account for the widest gaps-and 
the greatest areas of predictability-in the relative approval shown by each sex towards 
specific uses of violence. 
In Beauty Queen, McDonagh casts Maureen's violence as more than merely 
calculating (i.e., instrumental)-a feature equally apparent in Mag's more conventionally 
feminine use of psychological violence against her daughter. Even in the absence of 
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culturally prescribed components, Maureen's violence is a full-blown ritual, a 
symbolically communicative performance. 1 14 The episode has distinctive parts, each 
with its individual functions, and the entire endeavor comprises a performative whole. 
Maureen's violence incorporates threat and the symbolism of pain: it is an elaborate 
interweaving of torture as interrogation and torture as punishment, and its performance 
locates its props in the very symbols of Mag's and Maureen's ongoing domestic 
conflicts-Mag's rocking chair, Maureen's saucepan, the static-emitting radio. The 
process of violence-its performance-is as important as its results; in fact, the means 
and ends are inseparable, their boundaries everywhere blurred. 
For an audience accustomed to the hysterics ( conventionally and culturally) 
associated with female violence, Maureen's actions-which if not solitary and selective 
might be called a "pogrom"-are an aberration and an affront, for they come with latent 
assertions regarding Maureen's relationship to violence, one that is stereotypically male. 
Among the most disturbing features is the silence, a feature that draws attention to the 
absence of stereotypical female qualities-sympathy, nurturing, and compassion-in 
Maureen's cold enactment of violence. Likewise, the notion of"teaching someone a 
lesson" resonates more frequently and forcefully in male cultural conditioning and its 
privileging of competitiveness and physicality than it does among women. So, if the 
familiar stereotypes bring with them an expectation of veiled feminine violence but 
apparent female emotion, Maureen's behavior echoes more loudly the strains of blatant 
1 14 It may be helpful to consider the case of Clytemnestra, as she appears in Aeschylus' Agamemnon. 
Throughout the play, she is characterized and reviled as "manly." The royal-carpet welcome Clytemnestra 
provides for her husband and his net-bound slaughter both possess ritual qualities. These, combined with 
Clytemnestra's political ambitions, relegate her to a category outside the feminine, while her anatomy 
prevents any claims to the masculine. 
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masculine violence (both in terms of its visibility and its directness) and veiled or 
suppressed male emotions. Like Letts' "Killer" Joe Cooper and Brian in Ravenhill' s 
Shopping and Fucking, Maureen obviously means business, and she approaches the 
situation as such. And in adopting the role of interrogator or inquisitor, she adopts a 
masculine persona. Maureen "speaks quietly" and maintains her controlled manner 
throughout the interrogation cum torture; however, more significantly, Maureen's hot oil 
serves much the same purpose as Brian's electric drill in Ravenhill' s Shopping and 
Fucking-both represent a "lesson" as much as anything else. 1 1 5 
As I said before, however, McDonagh has a plan to diffuse the shock and disgust 
he has so gleefully achieved by this point in the play. Indeed, McDonagh has already 
quietly sown the seeds of conciliation. References to violence may float, detached, early 
in the play, only to become concretized in such a dramatic fashion at a later stage. At the 
same time, however, McDonagh hangs-unobtrusively, but in plain sight like 
wallpaper-a few ostensibly insignificant and inchoate bits of information that will 
eventually allow him to ameliorate Maureen's seemingly subversive violence. A key 
occasion comes the morning after Pato has spent the night. Mag has failed to convince 
Pato that her "shriveled" hand is the work of Maureen, her own acts of senility having 
destroyed her credibility, so she threatens Maureen with a mention of Difford Hall. 
Faced with the prospect of having Mag ferret out the official papers she has squirreled 
1 15 A similar example may be found in another ofMcDonagh's plays, The Cripple of lnishmaan. When 
Cripple Billy manages to "cod" Babbybobby by playing upon his emotions, Billy places Bobby in the 
position Billy typically occupies-that of "victim." Having been tricked by "a broken-brained fool," 
victimized by "the village orphan," "the village cripple," and exposed as showing an unmanly softness and 
sympathy , Bobby perceives an unacceptable deviation from the village's natural order and hierarchy. For 
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away-the ones by which Maureen was released from Difford Hall into Mag's custody­
Maureen reluctantly but immediately admits to having spent time in the "nut house." 
At this moment, McDonagh takes the initiative and broaches the very matter 
audience members are surely mulling over silently, thus managing to introduce the topic 
on (and in) his own terms. Feeling compelled by Maureen's embarrassment on the 
subject, by his own emotions and attraction for her, and by the awkward circumstances of 
the "morning after," complicated by having an unwelcome audience in Mag, Pato tries 
his best to recoup a delicate situation and restore decorum. In so doing, Pato goes much 
farther than he intends, inadvertently providing Maureen the beginnings of a 
comprehensive defense: 
What harm a breakdown, sure? Lots of people do have breakdowns. 
A lot of well-educated people have breakdowns too. In fact, if you're 
well-educated it's even more likely . . . .  I do have trouble with me nerves 
every now and then, too, I don't mind admitting. There's no shame at all 
in that. Only means you do think about things, and take them to heart. 
No shame in thinking about things and worrying about things . . .  and 'nut­
house' is a silly word to be using, and you know that well enough, now, 
Maureen. ( 43) 
this, the singularly kind and gentle Bobby feels compelled to punish Billy-dispassionately, but severely 
(92-3). 
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The uncomfortable subject matter, extremely personal and sensitive in nature, ensures the 
ready availability of euphemism and cliche for use by the ill at ease. As in the case of 
other forms of prescribed and automatic language, some already discussed, much of the 
language that surrounds the topic of mental health has become divested of its 
communicative value and meaning. It is designed, instead, to comfort the speaker and 
placate the afflicted. So, when Maureen tries to assess Pato' s tolerance with regards to 
the subject, he is ready with a series of platitudes: 
Pato: That's all past and behind you now anyways, Maureen. 
Pause. Maureen looks at him a while. 
Maureen: Am I still a nut case you're saying, or you're wondering? 
Pato: Not at all, now . . .  
Maureen: Oh no . . .  ? 
Pato: Not at all. That's a long time in the past is all I'm saying. And 
nothing to be ashamed of. Put it behind you, you should. (44) 
With Pato having set the tone and lain the ground work for her, Maureen's next few 
lines-"Put it behind me, aye, with that one hovering eyeing me every minute" ( 44); 
"She's enough to drive anyone loopy, if they weren't loopy to begin with" (45); "It's 
surprised I am how sane I've turned out !" (45)--come across as mere conversation. 
Maureen can comment on this serious issue, but do so in the form of banter. Her use of 
conventional phrases conjures their conventional usage, which is that of a shared 
language with no real expectation of meaning beyond a shared mood. The phrases about 
being "loopy" or "sane" may be sent and received, as usual-that is, as having nothing 
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whatsoever to do with actual sanity and insanity-and so effectively return the language 
to the safety of a casual and domesticated communal usage. 
This "preemptive strike" provides McDonagh the best of both worlds. On the one 
hand, the implications about Maureen's mental health can be relegated to the background 
early on while he builds audience sympathy towards her. On the other hand, these 
remnants are there to be carted out when McDonagh needs to provide audiences with a 
way to assimilate the graphic violence they have witnessed so that they might leave the 
theatre without any lingering misgivings. The suggestion that Maureen is merely 
"crazy"-a suggestion seemingly corroborated by her unnaturally masculine behavior, 
her far-off staring, and the forcibly ironic Grimm's fairy tale ending of the play-is 
sufficient to explain away her violence. If she is "merely" insane, there is no need to 
traverse further. There is no need to recall and reconsider the social conditions in Leeds 
that ostensibly lead to Maureen's "breakdown," the consistent commentary about an 
Ireland in many ways emaciated and dying, and the portrayal of a community and a 
culture bereft of opportunity and humanity. 
Without the easy means of escape offered by McDonagh, a socially conscious 
reading of the play might be plausible. One could even effectively argue that 
McDonagh's ironic ending is a statement about the inevitability of Maureen's fate and 
the appalling circularity of existence in Connemara due to the material and social 
conditions she and the other characters face. 1 16 However, the fact that the moments of 
comedy and the deft displays of story-telling ability take priority over such material 
1 16 In his introduction to the anthology Far From the Land: Contemporary Irish Plays, John Fairleigh 
comments that the works collected therein "confront one of the most urgent and unresolved issues in 
323 
makes it difficult to take the embedded social commentary very seriously or, in some 
cases, to notice it. There is, however, little evidence in McDonagh's early career (in and 
out of the theater) to suggest that social commentary was part of his agenda. Yet 
whatever his intentions, McDonagh's The Beauty Queen of Leenane and the rest of his 
terribly funny trilogy provide ample opportunity to examine the function of language and 
its relationship to violence within the aesthetics of the play. And viewed in light of the 
work of Anne Campbell and others, the implications of the play's language and violence 
can be extended far beyond the Connemara, County Galway that McDonagh creates. 
Furthermore, in the present context, McDonagh' s work provides a point of departure for 
a fuller examination of ritualized violence and the language at its core. 
Not surprisingly, the language of ritualized violence has its own characteristic 
features. The language of ritualized violence, for example, frequently attributes 
metaphysical or spiritual properties to the ritualized exercise of violence. So, in addition 
to general claims about the violence's role in accomplishing material and social goals, 
there are often claims about the violence's role as a source of purification and redemption 
for the individual victim of the violence. In alleging that certain forms of ritualized 
violence do not simply alter human behavior but affect human essence, the language of 
ritualized violence becomes inflected with the tincture of religion. Indeed, one does not 
need to go far to find examples where cultural notions of justice incorporate the 
phraseology of ritual atonement. One set of examples-regarding the curative properties 
of state violence-routinely justifies the maintenance and ongoing expansion of the 
contemporary Irish life--the incipient violence that counterpoints the cultivated national stereotype of 
bonhomie and blarney" (xiii). These works are themselves counterpoints to McDonagh's Beauty Queen. 
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nation's current penal system. In such cases, one can recognize that a reverence for 
repentance has been transformed into a reverence for penance, and that a piety for 
fundamental inward change has been displaced as a piety for the outward symbols of 
particular rites. In some cases, inward change is expected to be the natural outcome, 
seemingly a mere by-product, of some ritual performance, thus reversing their status. 
As outlined in earlier chapters, unthinking applications of language are fraught 
with danger, and here is no exception. Whenever language erases key distinctions-such 
as between the physical and the spiritual, the superficial and the essential-its users are 
invited to substitute conventional phrases for a conscious application of reason and to 
apply glib forms of wisdom to justify actions and assuage pangs of conscience. In other 
words, the respect frequently afforded to a familiar saying--even though the one using it 
is typically unaware of its origins, its history, or the path it traveled to one's ears-places 
the "wisdom" of such aphorisms beyond human questioning and seemingly beyond 
human control. Further, these maxims are rendered applicable to any and all situations 
one may encounter. Because the original context of the phrase has long since vanished 
from memory ( or because it is unknown to those using the phrase), it is as if there were 
no such context to consider. Nothing can be more ironic than the way the kernel of 
"wisdom" at the heart of a familiar phrase can achieve the status of universal truth by 
virtue of the fact that its original meaning has been lost. Language suffused with this air 
of the sacred serves to free its users from the responsibility of teasing out its meaning, 
considering its appropriateness, or assessing its truth. Even phrases that one would not 
consider axiomatic, because glibly familiar, sometimes produce similar attitudes of 
deference. 
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When freed from the above constraints, language can easily be put toward violent 
ends. Moreover, the same language can, after the fact, provide the basis for the 
rationalization and subsequent justification of violence, and often with reference to the 
psychic improvement or spiritual salvation of the Other. Shifting focus away from the 
denizens of the Emerald Isle to the sons and daughters of the self-proclaimed Land of 
Industry-the heirs to John Smith's land of milk and honey-Neil LaBute's aptly named 
trilogy, Bash, offers an especially provocative account of formal violence and its 
destructive potential. Moreover, because issues of masculinity and femininity are central 
to the acts of violence his play presents, these acts may be juxtaposed to illuminate the 
"rules of engagement" common to male acts of violence and traditionally missing from 
those of women. In the second installment of the trilogy, A Gaggle of Saints, there are 
descriptions of three separate episodes of violence. The second episode of violence is the 
heart of the play, and although not a direct attack on a woman, it is an attack on a 
perceived femininity. Then, when a woman falls victim in the play' s final episode of 
violence, this latter event serves as an effective foil for the examination of the earlier and 
central occasion of violence, foregrounding the ritual at its core. 
LaBute's play is structured as a pair of simultaneous monologues wherein John 
and his fiance, Sue, share with the audience their memories of a journey they once made 
to New York City for a gathering of their friends from a youth group in high school. 
Much of the early part of these monologues identifies John and Sue as upper-middle­
class white kids in their junior year at Boston College-Sue sacrificing the chance to 
study elsewhere because John's grades would then prevent their staying together. The 
two are represented as abiding by fairly conservative ideas about gender and gendered 
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behavior, and these notions clearly determine the way each one remembers the past. 
While Sue's recollections concentrate on dress materials and excitement over "shopping 
in ' the village, '" John's are rife with talk of sports and the makes and models of cars. 
John and Sue's account of the first time they met, on the running track at their 
high school, shows their indebtedness to conservative conceptions of gender and gives a 
foretaste of the ritual violence at the heart of the play. The play's technique of employing 
dual monologues can, at times, be confusing. In some places, John and Sue seem to be 
finishing each other's sentences they way couples often do, yet, in other places, they are 
portrayed as if unable to hear each other and to be talking at cross-purposes. The 
technique, however, proves useful in drawing particular attention to those instances when 
their versions of the past differ and the ways they differ. Both characters take similar 
pains to show that they have been playing by the rules of their gender. Sue, in 
conservative female fashion, is primarily concerned with the rules attached to male­
female relationships. She therefore feels the need to establish that she and her original 
boyfriend had, indeed, broken up prior to that moment on the school track when she and 
John first got together. Sue wants audience members to recognize, in spite of how things 
might appear, that there was a legitimate transfer of affection (i.e. , with respect to the 
rules of dating etiquette) from one boy to another. So, as she recounts events, she keeps 
insisting on the original relationship's prior demise for an apparently appropriate two­
week time period before getting involved with John. 
John's memories likewise reflect his primary interest in the incident, but for him 
(as with Larry and Dan in Closer) what matters most is his male-male relationship with 
his rival. John, for his part, takes pains to demonstrate the legitimacy of the violence he 
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used in his competition for Sue's affections. John's language attests to the tendency of 
male violence to be invested with ( and in) principles of form-that is, elaborate sets of 
rules and aesthetics. Just as the quantity and significance of the rules regarding male­
female relationships are largely absent in male codes of behavior, when it comes to the 
formal demands associated with male violence, there are few equivalents and hardly 
anything even to refer to as a female code regarding violent behavior. For men, violence 
can be a source of status and esteem. They are more likely to accept the notion that 
violence is sometimes necessary, and they are intuitively aware of the guidelines 
according to which violence may be justifiably applied. With male violence, rules and 
aesthetics play such an important role that oftentimes, as Anne Campbell observes, "It is 
not the moral rightness of the cause that justifies aggression (however much we would 
like to th.ink it is) so much as its form" (36). A close look at John's language makes the 
significance of form readily apparent, for John's linguistic constructions of events are 
designed to convey certain matters of formal importance: that the circumstances of the 
moment justified John's use of violence; and that John's exercise of violence was 
appropriate and stayed (roughly) within its proper bounds. 
John's portrait of his rival is not a simple act of memory. The language John uses 
is-consciously or unconsciously-designed to eliminate the possibility that he might be 
deemed a bully. Sue bolsters John's case by suggesting that her "ex" possesses some 
traits that-because they portray him in an unflattering light-can be used as justification 
for the beating he ends up receiving. She talks about how her former boyfriend "left the 
church"-a shared source of identity for John and Sue-and about an occasion of 
drunken, belligerent behavior at a party. Even though this is a decidedly partial account 
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of the boy's character, and even though there is no chance that these traits had anything 
to do with the event currently under discussion, they are shared with the audience. The 
mere presentation of these otherwise pointless bits of information implies a relevance to 
the story at hand, and in the listener's mind, they necessarily occupy a place of 
importance equal to that of any other anecdotal information. A case for blaming the 
victim is already underway, insofar as the critique of the one subject to violence is shifted 
from what the victim has done to who the victim is. 
More relevant to the story are John's confession that he had long wanted to go out 
with Sue-but knew she had a boyfriend-and his hope that his rival might "[join] the 
army and [get] sent to laos or something . . .  held back in school, even" (47). John, it 
appears, is already motivated to skirmish. Furthermore, John expresses a desire for an 
opportunity to outshine his opponent, leading him to fantasize about "a major football 
moment, touchdown to take the state championship, something majestic like that" ( 4 7). 1 17 
This fantasy speaks both to John's conception of appropriate gender roles and to his 
understanding of interpersonal relationships as a series of competitions. John's fantasy is 
really a fantasy about self, not about Sue or his relationship with her-it is a fantasy of 
self-glorification by means of another's defeat, the archetypal construction of male 
identity by comparison with the Other and in conspicuously physical terms. Given this 
competitive, comparative mentality, it is not surprising that John, too, introduces some 
seemingly insipid details about his opponent that subtly function as negative spin and, 
therefore, positive spin of John relative to his rival. He casually makes mention of his 
1 17 Dr. Stanton B. Garner, Jr. here recalled to my memory Willy Loman's son Biff and his similarly familiar 
dreams in Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman. 
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rival' s car-which is relevant to the story-but incorporates information whose purpose 
can only be to cast the event and his rival in a particular light: "nice new scirroco, all 
black, that he got as a graduation gift from his dad" (47). The subtle implication is that 
the other boy has nice things (Sue, for example?) that he did not earn and does not 
deserve. Furthermore, there is an implied absence of labor (i.e. , what real men do) and 
its corollary that the boy-driving the car that Daddy gave him-is spoiled (i.e., like a 
girl). John later reprises this motif of a questionable masculinity by focusing on the boy's 
unnaturally "long nails" ( 49), one of only two physical traits John bothers to mention 
about him. 
John also hopes to demonstrate that his fight with the boy was a situation he was 
forced into, and that the situation warranted the use of violence. He finds justification in 
the form of a perceived direct physical challenge. The boy creates a tangible barrier to 
John's progress by parking his car right on the track where John is jogging. Then, the 
boy actually lays hands on him. If the rival's being the first of the two to get "physical" 
weren' t  enough to exculpate John, John's interpretation of his rival' s actions as an 
attempt to feminize (i.e. ,  victimize) him is more than sufficient justification for violence. 
Campbell explains: 
For men, to be at the mercy of another person, whether physically or 
symbolically, is to be denied respect; and without respect there can be no 
self-esteem. Thus men aggress to prove to others ( and so to themselves) 
that they merit respect. (55) 
The masculine codes to which John adheres operate simply, in blacks and whites, without 
subtlety or nuance. Accordingly, adherents to these codes are encouraged to consider all 
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situations in terms of binaries. As John sees things, the only two responses recognized 
and permitted are to assume a position of passivity whereby he accepts the boy's 
provocative invasions of his personal space and masculine integrity-"one of his nails is 
digging into my nipple, holding my chest like he is . . .  hurts" ( 49)--or to assert his· 
autonomous masculinity by taking decisive (i.e., violent) action: 
i'm standing there thinking, "this doesn't need to be happening . . .  " and i 
tum on him. never spoke to him the whole time, just turned on him and 
flipped him over onto the ground and started pounding on his head. ( 49) 
Other potential responses, such as those represented by a use of language, are never 
seriously considered. Recourse to language is portrayed as anti-masculine and falls under 
the umbrella of passivity. John's scorn of language is clear: he considers his silence 
significant enough to mention it twice in his brief account of events. Tellingly, the 
threatening "hey!" (49) directed at John by his rival is the only word exchanged between 
the boys during the entire episode. Still, rituals determine what the exclamatory delivery 
of this ( or any) word means, and those versed in the rules of masculine aggression agree 
"action talks." This does not leave much room for alternative and innovative responses, 
nor does it provide much opportunity for the individualized interpretation of what others 
say and do. According to the ritualized conception of violence above, John can claim 
that he had no real choice in the matter-he did what he had to do. According to the 
formal demands of ritualized masculine violence, the ritual of violence, once started, has 
to be followed through. Moreover, with reference to the formal rules of masculine 
violence, John can safely say the other boy "started it," making him responsible for 
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John' s inevitable response. In other words, he asked for it. In masculine parlance: 
"Don't  play the game if you can't take the pain." 
For women, resorting to violence means being forced into an emotional state (e.g. , 
. of anger, fear, frustration, humiliation, etc.) so overwhelming that they enact violence. 
For men, resorting to violence often means something like a dispassionate mental 
operation that pairs present situations to a series of socially appropriate responses. 
Violence may be the "last resort" without suggesting a state of strong and immediate 
emotion. Consider these examples provided by Anne Campbell: 
When asked if they would approve of a teenage boy punching another 
boy, men and women agreed that it would be acceptable if the aggressor 
had been ridiculed or struck by the other boy. Women . . .  think such 
provocation led to an understandable loss of self-control, while men would 
tend to think of this as a typical adolescent fight for status. But the sexes 
disagree when the story is changed so that the other boy had challenged 
the aggressor to a fight; issuing a challenge transposes the situation from 
one of anger to one of ritualized confrontation, and women do not 
approve. (83) 
The latter more accurately explains John's actions. It is unusual-almost unheard of-­
for angry violence to occur in the absence of abusive language. John's silent and 
measured response places the conflict solidly in the arena of ritualized violence. 1 18 
However, this is not to say that men, including John, do not get angry in such situations, 
1 18 Dr. Stanton B. Gamer, Jr. offers the movie Fight Club as an interesting cinematic companion to the 
plays with respect to its similarly heavily ritualized violence. 
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nor that "their aggressive acts are devoid of emotion" (55). It means that anger is not a 
necessary component of male violence, nor must it be the catalyst. So, while Campbell 
concedes, "When their reputation is under attack, men get angry" (55), she continues: 
Their aggression is not a calculated decision to win back their personal 
integrity; it is an almost automatic and well-practiced response to 
challenge, and it is accompanied by righteous fury. The anger they feel is 
at the impertinence of another person's attempt to devalue or humiliate 
them. Unlike women's anger, it is about redressing social standing. (55-
6, emphasis added) 
There are two key points here. First, for men, violence and feelings of anger may be 
disassociated. They may be present simultaneously, but the one does not necessarily 
drive the other. For example, in laboratory studies "men, far more than women, proved 
capable of acting aggressively even when they had no personal grudge against their 
victims" (72). Perhaps the clearest indication of the ritualized nature of the violence 
enacted between John and his rival comes afterwards, when John recalls, "I shot baskets 
with him about a year ago, over at the elementary school, and he didn't seem so mad" (A 
Gaggle 50). After all, it wasn't personal. Second, male violence, like many forms of 
masculine language, is oftentimes not so much selected as engaged. The immersion in, 
and internalization of, rituals transfers them from a conscious to an unconscious form of 
behavior. The more familiar the ritual, the more one is indoctrinated and the less one is 
required to think before acting. The thinking typically comes later, in the form of 
justification. 
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Perhaps the case John feels most compelled to argue, then, is that he executes all 
of his violence in a manner that is above board. Such a possibility helps explain John's 
inclusion of two specific bits of information-the sort of obligatory information that 
traditionally ( and in my own experience) is never withheld from male narratives of 
violence. John, therefore, notably identifies his opponent as "a year or so older" ( 4 7). 
Then, even more to the point, John mentions the only physical trait-other than the long 
finger nails cited earlier-we ever hear about his rival. He is, John estimates, "about my 
size" ( 49). These two pieces of information are key to the rituals of masculine violence, 
for most male codes of behavior-even within so-called subcultures of violence-tend to 
acknowledge the significance of "the odds" in determining which acts of violence are 
shameful and which acts earn one respect. To fight against an equal opponent, or to fight 
when the odds are stacked against one, is to prove one's mettle and signifies one's right 
to the respect of one's peers. However, one who employs violence when the odds of 
success are heavily in his own favor is a bully and, with few exceptions, such behavior is 
likely to damage a man's reputation and status. Therefore, in situations where aggression 
can only be construed as bullying, men feel the same imperative to refrain from violence 
consistently felt by women. Indeed, while Campbell identifies some striking similarities 
in the interviews she conducts for Men, Women, and Aggression, she also discovers a 
fundamental difference in the way men and women understand aggression: 
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The only situations where men, like women, must restrain their desire to 
lash out are when the contest is so uneven that aggression could only be 
seen as bullying. And it is here that men's words seem to echo those of 
women. But while women's self-control results from their view of 
aggression as an unacceptable behavior, men's self-control is called upon 
when the other person is an unacceptable target. Women's restraint is 
based upon generalized values, while men's is based upon specific rules of 
conduct. (6 1 )  
For many men, especially those whose uses of violence are automatic and 
habitual, the only reliable counters to violence are the remnants of an otherwise long­
forgotten code of chivalry. The reliability of such counters derives from the fact that they 
are as automatic and habitual as are the frequent catalysts of violence. Richard B. Felson 
places great importance on notions of chivalry in traditional male behavior, and he notes 
some significant trends associated with such notions. First, the more traditional and 
conservative the masculine codes a man follows, the less likely it is that he will commit 
violence against women. Yet, these are the same men who are more likely to commit 
violence against other men, especially those they are able to view as feminized. Forensic 
psychologist Karen Franklin, professor and psychotherapist Elisabeth Y oung-Bruehl, 
psychology professor Gregory M. Herek, and sociology professor Michael Kimmel all 
agree that a conservative masculinity is the prime element in many attacks on gay men­
the perceived threat to their traditional masculine beliefs being the key motivating factor. 
This is a dynamic explored in the central act of violence in LaBute's A Gaggle of Saints, 
and an examination of the language surrounding this episode is necessary for a full 
appreciation of that dynamic and its relationship to ritualized male violence. 
The act of violence at the heart of LaBute's play is conveyed by means of John's 
memories of an act of "gay bashing" perpetrated with his buddies, and unbeknownst to 
Sue, while in New York. As evening approaches, the men and women split up to do 
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"boy" and "girl" stuff respectively, agreeing to meet back up as a group later that night. 
The violent episode takes place when the group of young men, cutting across Central 
Park, stumble upon two men kissing their goodnights before parting. In John's telling of 
events, he and his friends are deeply offended: 
you go on living, live and let live, whatever, but this, i figure is flaunting 
it. i mean, as much our park as theirs, and we're in town one night, that's 
all, one . . .  and we got 'a witness this? (60) 
Although John's thinking is evident, it is not clear. His muddled logic manifests in a 
series of contradictions. John makes it a point to emphasize that the kissing men have 
somehow ruined the only night he and his friends will be in town. However, his 
repetition of the fact-"one night, that's all, one"-because it immediately follows the 
line "as much our park as theirs," serves instead to underscore just how tenuous is their 
connection and claim to the park, the site of the eventual attack. Similarly, his credo to 
"go on living, live and let live" is mere lip service and is likewise soon refuted by his 
brutal actions. 
Although John wishes to cast the "gay bashing" as the logical extension of a 
violent visceral response to the men's unnatural behavior, he and his friends do not act in 
haste, nor do they proceed in a state of heightened and unrestrained emotion. Quite the 
contrary, John and the other perpetrators take time to premeditate the attack. They coolly 
agree to lie in wait for the "perfect" opportunity and hold back until John signals with a 
whistle for them to come running: 
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i don't even bat an eyelash as he moves in, his lips playing across my 
cheek, let his tongue run along my teeth and a hand, free hand, tracing 
down my fly . . . i just smile at him, smile and even lick his chin for a 
second, i see his shoulders relax. then i whistle. (62) 
The reasons for the above strategy are implied but, upon careful examination, they prove 
to be quite phony or, rather, imaginary. First, there is no need for John to lure the victim 
to a secluded location; he, in fact, follows the solitary man as he steps, of his own accord, 
from a dark and largely deserted park into the empty public restroom where the attack 
takes place. Second, while John is obviously proud of the self-control he shows prior to 
the beating-he later brags about feigning interest to put his victim at ease-the odds are 
so heavily in favor of the three twenty-something former high school football players that 
such actions can hardly be peddled as a strategic necessity. 
John also tries to paint the pleasure he derives from the experience as coming 
from his sense of having faithfully fulfilled his self-appointed role as moral inquisitor 
(and the poise with which he adopts this role), yet his own account of events points to 
other likely sources of pleasure. Perhaps even more disturbing than the violence in 
John's narrative is his vexed presentation of his motive(s). First, he and the others show 
themselves to be more than merely willing to enact violence. Moreover, John's own 
detailed descriptions call into question the gut-level disgust he claims as motivation for 
his actions. Not only does John participate-passively, but also actively-in the exact 
behavior he intends to punish, but he also carefully arranges the situation so as to have 
some gratuitous time alone with the victim-time used to sample the taboo he claims to 
abhor. 1 19 
1 19 See "Putting Freud to the Test" for a discussion of homophobia as an anxiety-based phenomenon. 
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Finally, after the assault, John takes the man's ring. Because there is no apparent 
justification or practical purpose for John's theft, this insult to the man's injury crosses 
over a line. Whatever claims John may wish to make with regards to the beating simply 
fall apart with regards to this other crime. By incorporating theft into the violence, the 
message John and his peers want to send about the man's "deviant" behavior is 
compromised by the introduction of another potential motive for the beating. 
Furthermore, used as a dramatic device in a play contemporaneous with a culture awash 
with "cop," "CSI," and "profiler" shows, the cultural comparison most available to 
audience members may be to a category or criminal--often a sociopath and/or a serial 
killer-who collects souvenirs from victims in hopes of later re-conjuring the sensations 
he felt while committing the crimes. The mere suggestion of this colors John's actions. 
Then, later, he gives the ring to Sue, his fiancee. Given the circumstances surrounding its 
acquisition and the nature of his relationship with Sue, the symbolism attached to the gift 
of a ring and the act of giving it invite a range of interpretations-ranging from medieval 
codes of comitatus and gift-giving to more modern rituals with overtones of sexuality and 
ownership--rendering the gesture similarly vexed. 
As mentioned before, toward the end of the play, LaBute includes an important 
foil to this act of violence. As passengers on a subway train, John and his fiancee find 
themselves in the vicinity of behavior that Sue expects John to consider reprehensible. A 
couple on the train exchange angry words in an openly hostile argument, which the man 
concludes by striking the woman savagely in the head. All of the other passengers sit 
silently averting their eyes, and Sue becomes concerned that her fiance may get involved 
in what could become a dangerous situation: 
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i could feel John tense up, getting all tense, but the couple was, i don't 
know, kind of dirty-looking and they seemed like, you know, those kind of 
people-i don't know what i mean by that, exactly, but they were-so i 
asked john, whispered to him, to "let it go."(BEAT) and you know what? 
he didn't so much as bat an eyelash, just kept holding my hand, holding it 
and playing with the ring on my finger, that made me so happy. (68) 
Here, too, John is characterized as not batting an eyelash, explicitly tying this episode of 
violence to the earlier violent assault. However, unlike the earlier passage, in this one, 
LaBute emphasizes John's autonomic response to the scene before him. The sight of a 
woman being struck by a man clearly makes him angry and tense. The only counterpart 
to this tension in the earlier event is on the part of John's victim, when his "shoulders 
relax" signaling to John his release of tension and, therefore, his maximum vulnerability 
and the right time to strike. However, in the present situation, although unable to 
disguise his initial reaction from Sue the way he was able to from his victim, John is not 
compelled to act. Fittingly, while John this time follows his credfr--"go on living, live 
and let live, whatever" ( 60}-he is at that same moment fingering the symbol of his own 
recent act of extreme and unwarranted violence. For the audience, these indicators point 
to the fact that John clearly does not have to commit violence, even when prompted to 
high levels of emotion and disdain. The latter episode forwards an interpretation of the 
earlier act of violence as caused by something other than ( or in addition to) strong 
emotion. In toto, the juxtaposition calls into question John's chivalry, his attempts to 
make moral arguments, and his understanding of even his own personally-professed 
system of ethics. 
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That "something else" is John's perception of the need to participate in a 
masculine ritual. Confronted with what he sees as questionable masculinity and 
surrounded by his peers, John feels the need to announce his distance from this perceived 
femininity. If not for the overt and public act of kissing, John and his friends may never 
have suspected the sexual orientation of the man in the park. Ironically, this fact 
probably makes the threat seem all the more sinister to John. Because the specter of 
femininity (or a flawed masculinity) can lurk so effectively under a masculine cover, then 
masculinity can never be simply taken for granted. As in the subcultures of violence 
taken up in the previous chapter, one's masculinity must be proven, and regularly 
demonstrated, through one's deeds. Sue does off er a potential reason for John's 
neutrality to the violence he witnesses on the subway car-that the man and woman 
involved are "those kind of people." However, this answer is unsatisfactory, if only for 
the reason that it is Sue's reaction and we have no way of knowing whether John feels the 
same way. In addition, it was precisely the fact that the two men could be designated in a 
way as "those kind of people"-their de facto dehumanization-that, in John's mind, 
grants him the right to engage in that earlier act of violence. What the social sciences 
suggest-in overwhelming fashion-are other likely reasons for John's participation in 
the first, and his abstention from the second, act of violence. 
Although the opinion (assuming John held such an opinion) that the people on the 
train were somehow inferior would certainly make it easier to distance himself from the 
woman's plight, the man's similarly dehumanized status would have had the opposite 
effect, making him a more appropriate target for violence in John's eyes. Perhaps it is the 
case that John's disdain for the woman somehow weighed more heavily than his disdain 
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for the man, but without access to John's idiosyncratic "moral calculus," one would be 
better served to pursue explanations elsewhere. One particularly well-documented trend 
seems to offer a way of distinguishing between the two events, and it provides answers 
less dependent upon conjecture and more in keeping with recent evidence regarding 
violent male behavior-simply that male "violence against men increases with the 
presence of an audience" (73). In fact, the most violent responses are found in situations 
where individuals are "with a group of close friends," as opposed to ones where 
individuals are "with a group of strangers" (Heasley 283). Two factors in tum contribute 
to this trend: first is the greater willingness of men to commit violence when they feel 
"emboldened by their friends"; second is the greater need felt by men to prove their 
masculinity before their immediate peers (283). 
Richard B. Felson cites several studies, all of which suggest that the strongest 
incitement to violence for young men is a perceived attack on their competence, and 
significant among these perceived attacks is the imputation of homosexuality (Cf. Felson 
25). Add to this the fact that "gay-bashing" is "the most socially acceptable, and 
probably the most widespread, form of hate crime among teenagers and young adults" 
("Hate Crimes" 16). 120 Dr. Karen Franklin reports that those who commit these types of 
assaults cite four major reasons for their actions ( 16). The first is that they hold negative 
attitudes about homosexuality. Homophobic individuals are far more likely to "perceive 
12° Karen Franklin says, "Part of it is related to the fact that discrimination against gays is still legalized and 
encoded. That sends a message to young people that, if gays don't have equal rights in employment, 
housing, child custody, the military, or marriage, then there's something wrong with them, and nobody's 
going to mind if we have some fun at their expense" ("Assault" 2) .  She adds, "It's not so much that the 
individuals harbor hatred and resentment. It's more that there's a cultural backdrop in which it's really 
permissible, if not very cool, to assault or harass gays . . . .  One out of ten of the college students (in a study 
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their peers as manifesting negative attitudes"; to "have resided in areas where negative 
attitudes are the norm"; to "be religious, to attend church frequently, and to subscribe to a 
conservative religious ideology"; and "are more likely to express traditional, restrictive 
attitudes about sex roles" ("Interview: Franklin" 2). Each of these holds true of the 
young men in LaBute' s so-called Mormon trilogy. The second is a kind of thrill-seeking 
behavior, hints of which are evident in John's account of the event. The third is the 
presence of a set of peer dynamics that seems to warrant the violence, the sort to which 
much of the previous chapter is devoted. The fourth is a perception that the violence is 
enacted in self-defense. Although this one of the four seems the most unlikely on the 
surface, it may have the most to do with the choice to commit violence. 
Many people view acts of self-defense as always in response to a threat perceived 
as immediate and physical; however, some acts of self-defense are directed against 
threats just as frightening, if less tangible. "Perpetrators feel that they are entitled, if not 
expected," says Franklin, "to help punish people who are stepping out of bounds for their 
male role or their female role" (4). Franklin cites a perpetrator who, when asked why he 
had attacked his victim, said, "This man was wearing lipstick and high heels. What do 
you expect me to do?" Franklin says, "I kept trying to rephrase the question-but why? 
But why? And he just kept repeating a physical description of the victim, as if common 
sense would tell me that he had to do this" (4). Michael Kimmel agrees, saying that in 
order to avoid the appearance of condoning, let alone practicing, homosexual behaviors, 
"one goes through an elaborate repertoire of behaviors, ideas, displays . . . .  That someone 
conducted in the Bay Area) . . .  said that they had either threatened or actually physically assaulted 
somebody they thought was a gay man or a lesbian" (2). 
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might see us as gay fuels all the ways in which we talk, act, dress, move in the world" 
("Interview: Kimmel" 3). 12 1 
The most important thing to understand in relation to the present discussion is that 
"homophobia is an assertion of control over the category 'homosexual.' Homophobes try 
to seize the power of definition" (Young-Bruehl 1). Elizabeth Young-Bruehl explains: 
Prejudice . . .  involves faulty generalizations. Such generalizations take 
the form "All Jews . . .  are filthy . . .  "; or "Negroes are ignorant, lazy, and 
primitively sexual"; or "Women cannot reason-they're too emotional." 
Prejudices against homosexuals do not take such a form. People do . . .  
speak of homosexuals as a general category . . .  but no standard adjectives 
follow . . . .  Fear or anxiety provides the predicate-if there is one, and 
there may be only a blank full of vague anger or discomfort, or a 
tautological spinning of the definitional wheels ("gays are . . .  pansies") . . .  
. The category itself . . .  is the main accusation. (1) 
And often, as with John, a perpetrator's  attempts at controlling the category are displaced. 
Speaking of a man she calls "Eric" in a study, Franklin says, "Eric distinguished his 
victim's sexual inclinations, which were not problematic, from his refusal to be invisible. 
Thus, Eric was punishing the man not for homosexual acts but for so-called flaunting" 
(Franklin 2). For Eric, and John, it is easier to justify violence against a behavior than an 
individual; yet, John's own characterizations of violence (as well as his characterizations 
121 Ironically, the same individuals who "when placed in a situation that threatens to excite their own 
unwanted homosexual thoughts . . .  overreact with panic or anger," tend to "demonstrate significant sexual 
arousal to male homosexual erotic stimuli" (Adams I ). 
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of his high school foe earlier in the play) make it unlikely that a change in his victim's 
homosexual behavior was ever the intended goal. As a matter of fact, for both Eric and 
John, the acts end up having little to do with the victims at all. It is as Franklin suggests: 
Because it offers direct-rather than secondhand--evidence, group 
violence against homosexuals is an ideal way for men to demonstrate their 
masculinity to their peers . . . .  Thus, in group assaults the homosexual 
victim can be seen as fundamentally a dramatic prop, a vehicle for a 
ritualized conquest through which assailants demonstrate their 
commitment to heterosexual masculinity and male gender norms while 
simultaneously engaging in homosocial bonding with each other. (4) 
The men in the group essentially use violence against an obvious sign of homosexuality 
as a way of rendering, and keeping, invisible the homoerotic elements of their own 
homosocial bonding. The victim is not only dehumanized, he is reduced to the level of 
signifier. He is no longer a person at all, but merely a symbol that, once erased, sends a 
message about one's view of that symbol. Such violence is never a real struggle against 
homosexuals or homosexuality; it is a ritualized struggle against fear, the specter of 
homosexuality within their relationships and within themselves. 
Another powerful example of the formal nature of male violence appears in David 
Eldridge's Serving It Up. Although, the following scene demonstrates some fundamental 
aspects of such violence and presents a vivid picture for audience members, the scene 
also demands attention to the violence's formal nature if one hopes to account for the 
violence's presence. In this scene Sonny, the self-styled street tough, manages to tum a 
seemingly insignificant matter into a sanguine moment of horror. While cruising the 
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neighborhood with his friend, Nick, Sonny comes across a young man holding an order 
of chips: 
Sonny: Oi, mate, give us a chip. 
Ben: (laughing-to Nick) Oi is your mate taking the piss? 
Sonny: Am I black or what? Oi, give us a chip. 
Ben: Leave off, mate . . .  
Sonny: Give us a fucking chip . . .  
Ben: Piss off . . .  
Sonny: You tight cunt ... (Sonny tries to grab some.) 
Ben: (pulling a knife) Fuck off before I cut you. (He throws the chips and 
frees his other hand.) I mean it you prick! (39) 
The above episode introduces facets common to masculine ritual and its language. First, 
one must understand the potential legitimacy of Sonny's request and the potential 
legitimacy of Ben's refusal. Erving Goffman cites a residual element of some older 
notions of chivalry, saying, "Strangers in public places are bound together by certain 
minimal obligations of mutual aid, establishing the right, for example, to ask the time or 
directions, or even to request a cigarette or small coin" (Interactions 250). In this sense, 
Sonny certainly has the right to ask for a chip, and the request may even be interpreted as 
Sonny's invitation for Ben to perform an act of gallantry. The request lies somewhere 
between an expression of gentilesse-whereby Sonny willingly adopts a subordinate role 
(i.e., of supplicant) to allow Ben to demonstrate his magnanimity-and an expression of 
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hostility-whereby Sonny's request is in reality a demand, a command he expects Ben to 
obey. Sonny's drunken state and the unusualness of the request only complicate 
interpretation. Ben, chuckling in disbelief and speaking to the sober Nick rather than 
Sonny, in fact asks, "Is your mate taking the piss" to verify whether or not he has serious 
designs on his chips. Goffman recognizes the vexed status of such interactions and notes, 
"In granting such a plea, the individual may find that his entire package of cigarette [ or 
serving of chips] is calmly taken . . .  while his eye is held by the aggressor so that the 
affront is anchored in mutually recognized mutual awareness" (Interactions 250). Ben's 
suspicion of Sonny, but perhaps also an effort to avoid an escalation of tension, is 
communicated in the phrase: "Leave off, mate" (39), a phrase that likewise hovers 
somewhere between request, demand, and, maybe, threat. 
However, this poorly communicated gray area seems destined to produce an 
escalation of aggression and a violent conclusion. The fact that the unfolding conflict has 
nothing to do with chips and everything to do with respect and ritual is indicated when 
Ben, who has jealously guarded his food against Sonny, so willingly jettisons it in order 
to fight him. Furthermore, in encounters like this "there is a specialization of signs": 
"particular affronts can be defined as those an honorable individual ought not to tolerate" 
and, "once they are reached, the offended person must disallow excuses, feel things 
seriously, and take steps to re-establish the normative order ifhe is to preserve his honor" 
(Interactions 254). There exist, sociologists agree, actual "fighting words." Certain 
words and phrases have achieved this specialized function, and one must be very careful 
regarding their use, for the use of this specialized language is understood as a conscious 
and conspicuous "test [of] the recipient's honor, that is, his readiness regardless of price 
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to uphold the codes by which he lives," while "the actual offense is understood by all 
parties to be incidental, a mere convenience" (255). Words and phrases of this kind 
become inseparable ingredients of the ceremonial order, serve a primarily ritual function, 
and derive their meaning almost exclusively from the role they play in the course of ritual 
proceedings. 1 22 In this case, once Sonny calls Ben a "tight cunt," whatever ambiguity 
existed in the matter of the chips dissolves, and Ben is obliged to respond. 
Rituals of masculinity, like the one just depicted, often support an "anti-morality": 
Society supports this capacity by imputing strong character to those who 
show self-command and weak character to those who are easily diverted 
or overwhelmed. Hence we understand the paradox that when an immoral 
deed is accomplished by a well-executed plan that excludes impulsive 
temptation, the culprit may be half-admired; he can be thought a very bad 
character even while it is appreciated that he is not a weak one. (259-60) 
By placing emphasis on the rituals of masculinity, one becomes free to earn a measure of 
respect and admiration wholly separate from actions traditionally considered moral and 
from those typically viewed as accomplishments and contributions. If one need not act 
morally to earn approbation, one can abandon demanding moral codes in favor of self­
interested behaviors and avoid feelings of guilt in the process. As Elijah Anderson says, 
"Generally people outside the ghetto [i.e., those places characterized by their low 
socioeconomic standings and high rates of violence] have other ways of gaining status 
and regard, and thus do not feel so dependent on such physical displays" (89). In a way, 
122 See, for example, Heasley, Babbitt, and Burbach, "The Role of Social Context in Students' Anticipatory 
Reaction to a 'Fighting Word. "' Sociological Focus 27.3 (1995): 281-283. 
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morality is reduced to a simple question of probability: of those things I can legitimately 
expect to accomplish within my present environment, which are most likely to earn me 
status. and regard among my immediate peers? Opportunities for violence and other 
forms of risk-taking behavior, although not without cost and danger, are readily 
accessible for those who seek respect and admiration. "The important point," says Albert 
Cohen, "is that the delinquent response, 'wrong' though it may be and 'disreputable,' is 
well within the range of responses that do not threaten his identification of himself as a 
male" (Cohen 140). 
Yet, participation in formal violence, as is true of any formal behavior, implies 
"cooperativeness and regard for rules that are required on the part of all participants if the 
game is to be successful in generating and jeopardizing character, that is, bringing 
character into play" (Interaction 247). Accordingly, the most appalling aspect of Sonny's 
behavior is his violation of the rules. In rituals of masculine violence, the rules routinely 
dictate that both parties "make themselves available, voluntarily giving themselves up to 
the game"; however, "the hero, upon winning a challenge or a duel, can at that very 
moment turn his back on his opponent, knowing that superiority once established will not 
be immediately re-challenged, and that in any case constant care is not dignified" (247). 
This strange feature of masculine violence may provide additional proof of its primarily 
formal function. For, once the violence has served its ritual function, oddly enough, it 
typically ends. Sonny violates this code. After having ritually signified Ben's defeat, 
Sonny, nevertheless, continues his violence. Insofar as this aggression has become 
unnecessary, it has become unseemly, and Sonny's excessive exercise of violence is not 
justified by the rules of the game. 
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David Eldridge provides the following directions for the staging of Sonny's fight 
with Ben: 
Sonny and Ben square up to each other at a safe distance, then the stand­
off begins. Each moves waiting to pick his moment. Sonny lunges at Ben 
and catches him off balance. They struggle and fall to the ground. Sonny 
gets the upper hand. Ben drops the knife which Sonny takes hold of as he 
takes control. The lights begin to fade. (39) 
Eldridge's description leaves no question about the fight's outcome. The last image the 
audience glimpses as the lights go down is that of the disarmed and demoralized Ben as 
he submits to Sonny, who has taken "control." Since control is the object of ritualized 
male violence, once obtained, Sonny is obligated to let Ben go. Sonny has made his 
point, he has improved his reputation and status, and he has even wrested that blatantly 
phallic symbol of masculinity from Ben's hands and claimed it as his own. Yet, Sonny 
does not stop here; instead, he issues a threat to an already defeated and completely 
vulnerable (would-be former) opponent. He tells Ben, "I'm going to cut you up, you 
cunt" (39). As Ben, hidden by the darkness of the stage, pleads, "No . . .  No . . .  No . . .  
No . . .  ! " and then screams in terror and pain, the imagery and language of the scene 
similarly scream Sonny's uncertain self-identity and his precarious masculinity. 
Whether one reads Sonny's act of extreme violence as motivated by anger or 
pathology, it signals a significant loss of control. While he has managed to exert control 
over his rival, Ben, he is unable to regulate his own actions. By exceeding the boundaries 
allotted for ritual acts of violence, Sonny invalidates the very victory he had won. A lack 
of control of this nature and magnitude, Goffman explains, "is considered evidence of 
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weakness, inferiority, low status, moral guilt, defeat, and other unenviable attributes" 
(Interaction 10 1 -2). At a crucial point, Sonny's violence becomes counterproductive, 
personally and socially. For, "of all the qualities of character associated with the 
management of fatefulness," chief among these "is composure, that is self-control, self­
possession, or poise" (224). "This attribute," Goffman continues, "is doubly 
consequential, for it directly effects the functioning of a primary property [i.e., the 
successful completion of a task] and is a source of reputation in its own right" (224). 
Composure, then, can indicate competence on a physical level, but also strength and 
stoicism on an emotional level. 1 23 Consequently, for an individual who most prizes the 
repute of courage and toughness, composure can be read as the ultimate sign of both; 
whereas, a lack or loss of composure like Sonny's signifies when individuals have 
"ceased to be their own masters, becoming, along with their principles, subject to control 
by others" (224). 1 24 Violence, typically associated with masculinity, because excessive 
1 23 An excellent example of this masculine ethic is in Claude Brown's Manchild in the Promised Land: 
A whole lot of people in the neighborhood, cats that we'd come up with, gone to school 
with, were being cooked in Sing Sing. 
A few years after [ my release from] Warwick [Prison], I wanted to know just 
whether these cats were really hard. I think most of the guys my age looked upon them as 
heroes when they were cooked at Sing Sing. We wanted to know their last words. 
Somebody told me that when they cooked Lollipop-Lollipop was a cat who was kind of 
crazy, and we called him Lollipop because he liked candy-just before he left, he said, 
"Well, looks like Lolly's had his last lick." That was it. Everybody admired him for the 
way he went out. He didn't scream or anything like that. (2 1 1 ) 
124 The first indication that Sonny may feel at all constrained by the ethics of composure comes when Nick 
confronts him about the uncalled-for murder of the man with the chips: 
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Sonny: Don't get moody on me, Nick. He was an arsehole. He pulled the blade on me. 
He deserved it. 
Nick: It weren't about that . . .  That, that was about enjoying it, seeing the blood. 
Sonny: Don't give me this shit. 
Nick: He was screaming like a baby, Sonny, like a baby. All that blood pissing out of his 
mouth. You enjoyed it. 
Sonny: No. 
and showing the taint of emotion, becomes unmanly. Ironically, it is with respect to the 
rules of formal violence, then, that male conceptions of violence are most like those of 
women and, therefore, elicit a comparable interest in, and insistence upon, the regulation 
of violence. However, while men and women are likely to agree that Sonny's final 
actions are unwarranted and therefore unjustified, women would tend to view the initial 
rituals of violence in which Sonny and Ben engage as similarly unnecessary and 
abhorrent. 
If nothing else, Sonny's lack of composure, of poise, is a sure sign of a damaged 
self-conception. Likewise, the high level of concern about reputation and respect that 
generates the conflict in the first place is a mark of Sonny's insecurity and fear of social 
ostracization. Sonny clearly derives his conception of self externally. His idea of self­
worth seems largely defined in terms of peer opinion and social standing and consists 
mostly in appropriating the symbols of masculinity rife within his subculture. 
Considering the lessons of the previous two chapters, this is hardly surprising. 
Furthermore, Sonny's literal overkill hints at an exaggerated uncertainty regarding the 
very attributes to which this hyper-masculine performance is supposed to attest. In short, 
S_onny's violence is symptomatic of his shame. Thomas Scheff explains, "Self-esteem 
rests upon a very specific process, the management of shame and guilt" ( 167); he even 
goes so far as to "define self-esteem as freedom from chronic shame" ( 168). Whether or 
not shame avoidance models of violence can account for all forms of violence-the 
position held by Thomas J. Scheff and Suzanne M. Retzinger (Emotions xix)--or explain 
Nick: You did, you loved it, you always do. You always do. That . . .  That was . . .  
Sonny: Fuck you, Nick! (54) 
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all of the most consistent patterns documented by criminologists-John Braithwaite's 
claim ( Crime 1- 15 and passim }-they do convincingly elucidate much of the violence 
that occurs in the plays of the so-called Nasty Nineties. 
Scheff and Retzinger outline the ingredients fundamental to their shame 
avoidance model of violence: 
We develop an explanation of destructive conflict in terms of two 
interrelated concepts: alienation and shame. We argue that protracted 
violence occurs under two basic conditions. One, the parties to the 
conflict are alienated from each other and are in a state of shame; and two, 
their state of alienation and their shame go unacknowledged. (Emotions 
xviii) 
John Braithwaite, for his part, proposes a chronology and a clarification of the above: 
Shame leads to anger which leads to aggression. At the same time, there 
are forms of shame which prevent violence. Shame is both the major cause 
of violence and the emotion most implicated in preventing violence. The 
crucial question is how we distinguish forms of shame which cause 
aggression and forms which prevent it. Scheff and Retzinger argue that 
shame causes aggression when it is unacknowledged. ("Introduction" x) 
Braithwaite, Scheff, and Retzinger-following Erving Goffman's lead-consider the 
experience of shame a basic feature of human existence, and Scheff and Retzinger refer 
to it as the "master emotion" because its presence determines one's successful 
management of the other major emotions, such as fear, grief, and anger (Emotions xix). 
However, it is only unacknowledged shame-the type of shame one regularly encounters 
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in the drama of the 1990 's-that ultimately leads to violence. For Scheff and Retzinger, 
to acknowledge feelings of shame is the better part of shame management and enables 
one to discharge these feelings. Shame, then, like composure, is "doubly consequential": 
when people feel shame, they become "ashamed" of their shame and attempt to hide, or 
otherwise inhibit or deny these feelings. So, when Sonny's excessive use of violence 
contradicts his symbolic claims to masculinity, the inconsistencies within him, and 
between him and his professed self, are made apparent, both to himself and others. His 
inner failures are made public. In going too far, Sonny "has discredited his implicit claim 
to poise" ( 108); moreover, his excessive actions, undertaken for the purpose of 
concealing his shame "inadvertently confirm the falseness of [his] identity claims and 
[his] knowledge of their falseness" ( 1 02). He is, therefore, doubly exposed, doubly 
shamed. 
Ultimately, individuals who acknowledge their shame, and thereby discharge it, 
have positive self-concepts and tend to be "attuned" in their relationships with others. 
Juxtaposing the terms "alienation" and "attunement" highlights the socio-linguistic 
implications of shame. Attunement precludes many of the interpretive and 
communicative failures that doom specific interactions and entire interpersonal 
relationships. Scheff and Retzinger even characterize "attuned" individuals-those who 
are able to successfully manage and discharge feelings of shame-and their opposites in 
linguistic terms, as Braithwaite explains in the forward to their book Emotions and 
Violence: 
When actors have positive self-concepts and are what Scheff and 
Retzinger call "attuned' in their relationships with others, they have the 
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internal and external strength to acknowledge shame. They know how to 
laugh openly at doing something stupid; how to apologize for doing 
something wrong; how to defend doing something they believe is right 
without showing disrespect for the differing opinions of others. But 
insecure individuals with insecure social bonds are more likely to deny 
their shame, to be ashamed of being ashamed. (Braithwaite, "F oreward" 
xi) 
The latter type of individual runs the risk of what these researchers refer to as "triple 
shame-rage spirals" wherein "shame becomes triply recursive and self-perpetuating" (xi). 
One cannot discharge shame that one refuses to acknowledge, and unacknowledged 
shame confounds one's understanding of the other major emotions, rendering causes 
inscrutable and consolations inaccessible. It is for these reasons that Scheff and 
Retzinger posit shame as the "basic engine of repression-the cause of complete 
inhibition, on the one hand, and the runaway fuel of massive conflagrations of physical 
and emotional violence, on the other" (xix). 
All of the above attributes, of course, are necessarily tied to one's communicative 
abilities. As noted in earlier chapters, if one cannot accurately "read" one's interlocutors 
and/or clearly articulate one's own ideas and emotions, misunderstandings, conflicts, and 
violence become all the more likely, and all the more expected by those lacking these 
abilities, each in tum contributing to a continuing deterioration of relationships and 
communicative exchange. In this respect, the patterns associated with communicative 
failure and shame are the same, for the reciprocal influence characteristic of faulty 
communication and situations of conflict and violence is paralleled in the way that shame 
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perpetually felt creates a greater sensitivity to shame and an increased expectation of new 
shame in all aspects of one's existence. Expectations of shame can manifest so 
trenchantly that oftentimes "embarrassment/shame possibilities . . .  are not about the 
actual occurrence of emotions but anticipations and management based on these 
anticipations" ("Looking-Glass" 1 59). Also, as Gardner and Gronfein convey, "Shame 
can affect not just individual interactants but the occasions in which the interaction is 
situated as well" ( 1 77), leading shamed individuals to suspect and dread a fresh 
recurrence with each new and seemingly similar event. 
Shame avoidance theories represent a useful hermeneutic for many of the 
episodes of violence depicted in contemporary drama because many of the characters that 
populate these plays live in a state of an unremitting anticipation of shame. These models 
are especially illuminating when confronted with characters that are portrayed as heavily 
indebted to the sorts of public language usage and subcultural identification taken up in 
the last two chapters. Charles Cooley's oft-cited statement that we all "live in the minds 
of others without knowing it" is more than metaphoric. There is an element of literal 
truth in saying that part of every individual's existence is given over to attempts to shape 
others' perceptions-what we are to others-and that this is frequently an unconscious 
process. Even though the process is unmindful, people are constantly comparing the ideal 
image they wish to present with the image they feel they are presenting based on the 
actions and reactions of others. Shame enters the picture when the information one 
receives regarding what one is to others does not mesh with what one imagines of one's 
self. According to the philosopher William James, shame and all other matters of self­
concept may be expressed in terms of a ratio ("self-esteem = success/pretensions"). In 
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the words of Lewis, it is "the ratio between success and the pretensions underlying it" 
( 103). Shame, therefore, has both an "internal" and an "external" component and has 
everything "to do with unfulfilled expectations" ( 104 ). This helps explain how the 
anticipation of shame can be as powerful as its presence-because the anticipation of 
shame is the presence of shame. It is purely academic to draw a distinction between a 
self-concept that makes one feel ashamed and one that makes one expect to feel ashamed. 
For some individuals, then, a sense of shame is omnipresent and perpetual. It is no 
wonder that such individuals may go to extreme lengths to avoid experiencing shame; in 
the words of Lewis, they may choose to "tum the world upside down, rather than tum 
themselves inside out" (quoted in Scheff, Microsociology 93). 
Before applying a shame avoidance model to the literature, two key features of 
shame must be recognized. First, "Shame feeling is evoked by a wide variety of stimuli; 
[however,] once evoked, it is characterized by ambiguity as to the source and direction of 
the negative affect" (Lewis, H. 66). Second, although in all matters of self-concept "the 
self and the 'other' are both implicated" ( 66), "shame feeling is about the self, while guilt 
is about some-thing" (87); therefore, "the position of the self with reference to events is 
very different in the two states" (87). 1 25 The difference is that in shame "the 'other' is 
personified, while in guilt the 'other' is not apparent as the instigator and may or may not 
be apparent as the object to whom guilt refers" (87). In simpler terms, whatever the root 
cause of shame, it will always be associated in the mind of the ashamed with whomever 
125 Helen B. Lewis makes a distinction between shame and its cousin, guilt. She says, "The experience of 
shame is directly about the self, which is the focus of evaluation. In guilt . . .  the thing done or undone is 
the focus" (30). 
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the ashamed is in contact at the moment it is felt. As we shall see, this has grave 
consequences for those who live with those who live with shame-all the more so, when 
shame represents the ashamed person's accustomed state. According to the Goffman 
model, "if shame cannot be avoided . . .  actors actively deny it, attempting to save face" 
(Scheff, "Looking-Glass" 1 59). In such cases, the "humiliated fury or rage" that issues 
from a condition of unacknowledged shame "is thus likely to be diffuse and nonspecific, 
except that it is evoked by indications that the 'other' does not value the self' (87). 
In Serving It Up, Sonny is constantly on the defensive. However, he comes by it 
honestly. All of the characters living in Eldridge's depiction of London's East End are 
highly sensitive to social standing, particularly their own. Yet, in this environment of 
rampant poor self-image, Sonny's father, Charlie, is the exemplar of low self-esteem. 
Charlie cannot stomach the joys and achievements of others, especially when a 
comparison with him is implicit. For example, when his wife, Val, speaks excitedly 
about her sister's pregnancy, Charlie quickly derails the conversation to critique the 
sister's husband: 
Val: They're going to call it Alexandria 
Charlie: Alexandria-what sort of name is that? 
Val: It's nice, a bit sophisticated. It's time we had something sophisticated 
in this family. 
Charlie: Was it John's idea? 
Val: I think so. 
Charlie: Bloody Ponce. (Serving It Up 1 3) 
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At the point these lines are spoken, not much has been revealed about Val's sister, Viv, 
and her husband John. However, as the play progresses, the only information about John 
to which the audience becomes privy (aside from Charlie's obvious dislike of the man) is 
that he has a steady job and has had a small measure of success. This in and of itself, in 
Charlie's eyes, means that John "looks down his ruddy great nose at us" ( 1 3). Val 
defends John, reminding Charlie that John had offered Sonny a job so that he might come 
to enjoy similar success. Charlie replies, "Exactly" ( 14), as if John's offer of 
employment were sure evidence of his insidious nature and arrogance. 
Charlie likewise feels all of Val's actions and comments as interference, as 
critical, and as directed at him. For instance, in telling Val to give Sonny more freedom, 
Charlie cannot avoid articulating his shame: 
Charlie: Just let him get on . . .  
Val: What are you saying? 
Charlie: You know what I'm saying . . .  The pissing boy can't move 
without you asking where he's going. Everything anyone does you have to 
have your two penn'orth! It's like being watched-you can't move-you 
smother him, like you try to smother me. ( 1 5) 
As is typical of those with unacknowledged shame, a deflated and damaged ego is 
compensated by means of an exaggerated egocentrism. In addition to the dangers 
documented in previous chapters, Charlie's persistent sensitivity and expectation of 
shame often causes him to invite real occasions of shame. This is the case in the scene at 
hand, for Charlie's indignant accusations pique Val, and her responses refute Charlie's 
claims and reveal some of the sources of concealed shame that have poisoned Charlie's 
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self-image. Val discloses Charlie's long history of absences at home and his frequent 
presence elsewhere--drinking and gambling. She also recounts his poor track record as a 
father. When she finally confronts the man who has been criticizing her parenting skills 
with his own lack of interest and involvement the very moment he became a father-he 
was again "at the dogs"-he is touched to the quick and explodes: "Shut up! Just shut up, 
just shut up, just shut up! "  The scene ends with Charlie's pathetic attempt to reestablish 
some semblance of his fractured self-esteem by asserting his authority in his own home: 
"You just make the dinner and bake the fucking cake. That's how it is" ( 16). 
The extent of the damage to Charlie's self-esteem is further evidenced in the 
scene that follows Sonny's brutal knifing of Ben. As the sirens of the police cars 
responding to the scene of Ben's murder reverberate and bathe the stage in flashing blue 
light, Charlie stands alone, drunk and eating a kebab. The comical image has by now, 
however, passed from pathos to bathos. Charlie rails at the police like Lear cursing the 
storm, and the audience glimpses the roots of his shame in his unguarded moment, a truly 
painful example of in vino veritas: 
Hey-copper ! (Pause.) Cunt . . .  Fucking shit . . .  (Pause.) Law . . .  Not 
my fucking law, you bastards! (Pause.) You want my dole . . .  Have it . . .  
Fucking have it, you bastards . . .  
He unsteadily reaches with his free hand into a pocket and then tosses out 
his change and a crumpled-up note. 
Have it . . .  (Pause.) I'd rather have the shit off your shoes, copper . . .  You 
wait . . .  There will be the day when I hold the keys to your fucking cell, 
copper! And, copper-you won't get any grub either ! (Pause.) I remember 
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you . . .  I seen you at the dogs with the missis . . .  you ain't so proud then. 
(42-3) 
Charlie then falls over, drunkenly, injuring himself in the process, and the delusions of 
independence, power, and revenge evaporate, giving way to the same old impotence and 
rage. 
True to form, the son inherits the father's shame, and this is the only thing Charlie 
will pass on to Sonny. At one point, Charlie embarrasses Sonny at the pub in front of 
Nick, Wendy, and Teresa. Sonny is so ashamed that he denies that Charlie is his father, 
telling the young women that Charlie is his uncle. Later, Sonny disingenuously uses this 
event as an excuse to get together again with Wendy. He has arranged to meet her in the 
park, Sonny tells her, so that he might apologize for Charlie's behavior. "The pub-I'm 
sorry. The bloke who turned up," he says, ''well, I know he embarrassed you and Trese" 
(64). In doing this, Sonny avoids acknowledging his shame; he displaces it-it was he 
and not the young women who were bothered by Charlie's presence--and avoids 
acknowledging his own hand in the uncomfortable tum the night had taken. In clumsy 
fashion, Sonny then attempts to flirt with Wendy, hoping to woo her. Throughout, Sonny 
is touchy, and his manner is on the verge of rudeness. 
Sonny first tries a less vulnerable approach. Amidst speech inflected equally with 
defensiveness and aggressiveness, Sonny tells Wendy, "I reckon that-that you would 
feel better about things if you had someone" ( 65), casting his desire for Wendy as if it 
were Wendy who desired Sonny. Sonny and Wendy have known each other "since 
[they] were kids" (7), so Sonny's sudden and unprecedented show of interest and his odd 
attempts at romance come across as humorous, and Wendy laughs. Not sensing the sort 
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of response he had hoped for, Sonny goes for broke, faltering: "I can't say this very good. 
But-I think you 're-beautiful. . . .  I well fancy you, Wend" ( 66). 1 26 Finding his 
primarily public language attempts at expression inarticulate and wholly unconvincing, 
Sonny's "heart-felt" admission likewise elicits laughter, at which Sonny erupts: "Don't 
fucking laugh at me! I mean it ! (66). The rest of the conversation revolves around these 
same schizophrenic alterations between Sonny's sarcastic attacks on Wendy and his 
further attempts to win her over. At one point, Wendy mentions Nick, and Sonny 
bristles; however, Wendy recognizes the source of Sonny's anger as interior rather than 
exterior and rejects Sonny's attribution of his anger to his best friend: 
Sonny: All that shit about the bird at the chip shop and it was you. 
Wendy: So what are you trying to say, Sonny? 
Sonny: Cunt, I'll have him for this. 
Wendy: No, Sonny, I've never liked you. You think everyone's against 
you, betraying you, using you, Sonny, just like you think Nick is. But you 
use people-and when you've had enough of them you just smash them 
in. I know you, Sonny. (68) 
Eventually, Sonny's language attests to the shame that he cannot seem to acknowledge. 
Like an angry child, he retorts, "You're no better than me!"  (69). 
126 At their meeting in the park, the first words Wendy speaks to Sonny set the tone of the entire scene: 
"Don't call me Wend. My name's Wendy" (64). However, Sonny appears to remain oblivious-perhaps 
he is intentionally so-for he is determined to complete his romantic mission in spite of the many signals 
that he should not. It seems unlikely that, under such circumstances and in such an atmosphere, one could 
actually expect to succeed. In spite of this, Sonny proceeds headlong, giving the impression that he is less 
interested in a relationship with Wendy than in a scapegoat-that is, locating a site, outside himself, where 
he might place his helpless anger, or what Scheff calls "shame-anger." 
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The play culminates in violence, but much like other plays of the 1 990's, its 
ostensible cause is not its real source. Sullen and pouting, Sonny begins to confront Nick 
about the relationship he suspects Nick has been pursuing with Wendy behind his back. 
Just as betrayal appears to summon the violence in Neilson' s Penetrator, betrayal appears 
to conjure the violence that ends Eldridge's Serving It Up. However, if examined closely 
and understood in terms of shame avoidance theory and Scheff s "microsociology," one 
can recognize that betrayal is merely a smokescreen that Sonny uses, albeit rather 
effectively, to cover his shame and to obscure its stake in the play's violent climax. In a 
formulation reminiscent of those involving restricted versus elaborated codes, public 
versus formal uses of language, and social versus individualized orientations and 
conceptions of self, shame avoidance theorists speak of perceptual field dependence 
versus perceptual field independence. Helen Lewis refers to this formulation as "The 
Differentiation Construct." In layman's terms, people who are field-dependent have 
difficulty separating themselves cognitively from their environments. These people, that 
is, find it difficult to perceive themselves other than in terms of their places within the 
local environment. So, individuals who are perceptually field dependent-much like 
those who use restricted linguistic codes, those who are subject to public language, and 
those who are deeply indebted to the conventions of a particular subculture-tend to be 
socially over-determined and lacking in a measure of autonomy. 
There are, of course, consequences for being thus aligned, and one has great 
significance relative to the perception and expression of shame. Perceptually field 
dependent persons are more likely to look for the causes of their problems and the 
sources of their affective states outside themselves. Lewis explains: 
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This tendency to locate stimulation "out there" among field-specific 
persons may be understood as resulting from their greater difficulty iri 
keeping self and surround separate. This kind of cognitive style would 
also tend toward proneness to shame [ as opposed to guilt] ,  in which the 
self and "other" representations are more interconnected. ( 1 39) 
For such individuals, only those things that are undeniably personal and interior are 
separated entirely from the environment; therefore, while emotions are experienced 
tangibly as "interior" phenomena, their sources are not and so are automatically assumed 
to be "exterior" and sought for elsewhere. It seems hardly surprising, then, that such 
individuals might be more prone to shame than guilt or that they might have the tendency 
to direct blame and anger outward. For such people, indignation is far more likely than 
self-recrimination, and shame is far more likely to go unacknowledged. 
With the above in mind, an examination of the play's conclusion becomes more 
fruitful. At the end of Eldridge's play, Sonny assaults Nick with a knife, badly cutting 
him. The assault takes place after Sonny discovers that Nick has been sleeping with his 
mother, Val. However, if one simply accepts this as motivation for the attack, one may 
overlook key evidence to the contrary. First, as established earlier, Sonny has already 
been contemplating violence against Nick. He threatens to get even with Nick for 
pursuing Wendy. The truth of this accusation seems based more on Sonny's jealous 
suspicions than any real indications that they are seeing each other. The reason Sonny 
comes to this conclusion is basically because Wendy finds Nick attractive. There is no 
clear basis for Sonny's assumptions about Nick's betrayal of him. In addition, even if 
Nick were involved in some way with Wendy, the facts are: Sonny has never before 
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shown much interest in Wendy, the two are barely even friends, and Wendy's dislike of 
Sonny renders all of his romantic notions and intentions moot. Under such conditions, a 
relationship between Wendy and Nic�--ofwhich there is no evidence-could hardly be 
called a betrayal. Still, and especially with someone like Sonny, perception is everything. 
It is even more illuminating that Sonny discovers Nick's actual betrayal-his 
relationship with Val-while the two are together, face to face. In the immediate grip of 
anger, Sonny restrains himself. He yells at Nick, he roughs him up a bit, but he relents, 
merely ordering Nick from his presence. Up to this point, the violence has been 
relatively subdued, again especially for someone like Sonny. By the time Sonny inflicts 
the extreme violence upon Nick, he has had ample time to calm down. In fact, 
immediately after Nick leaves, "Sonny picks up [ a copy of] the Sun and sits down on the 
sofa" and "reads" (77). It seems reasonable, then, to suggest that while the above factors 
must surely be considered motivation, the actual source and catalyst for Sonny's violence 
must lie elsewhere. That Sonny's violence is the product of unacknowledged shame 
becomes a compelling possibility if one considers what occurs between the above events 
and Sonny's horrendous act. Foremost, Val arrives. 
Not knowing what has just transpired between Nick and her son, Val begins to 
chatter idly-Sonny has but five lines in the next three pages of printed text, while the 
rest belongs to Val-and the language she chooses could not be more pointed and 
unfortunate. Although covering a multitude of topics, the two recurring motifs are Val's 
approval of Nick and her disapproval of Sonny. Val speaks twenty-five lines before 
Sonny feels compelled to speak, and this is in response to Val's second mention of her 
chance meeting with Nick's mom at the market and the good news about Nick's new job. 
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This is followed by the comment: "You should try and take after him a bit more, Sonny" 
(78). As it turns out, Val too has a new job. She remarks, "Two of us who've got jobs 
today. Me and Nick. You see you can get a job if you really want one, Sonny" (79). In 
the next (long) passage, Val lectures Sonny about his poor work ethic, including several 
comments which depict him as either weak or lacking in toughness. She makes a direct 
comparison between Sonny and the Pakistanis he hates and in which they fare better. She 
says, "I don't know what's the matter with you, Sonny. I did my best for you, and look 
how you turned out" (79). She compares living with Sonny to "putting up with a bloody 
kid" (79) just prior to linking Sonny linguistically to his father, Charlie, calling him "your 
bloody father" (79). Even Charlie, of whom Sonny was earlier shown to be ashamed, 
comes off better in Val's wide-ranging critique. 
With all of this issuing from the mouth of the only person who has ever. defended 
Sonny, coming after the revelation of Nick's real betray�l, while still feeling the sting of 
Nick's perceived betrayal, and in possession of the knowledge that Wendy does not like 
him or find him attractive but "fancies" Nick-"Got a great arse Nick" (67)--Sonny's 
shame must be unbearable. Yet, it is unacknowledged. The pain caused by Sonny's 
splintered self-image is displaced and attributed to Nick's actions, and quite easily so 
because Nick is at the nexus of each of these painful conditions and unfavorable 
comparisons. Surely, Sonny must think, "Nick is the problem, and he must pay." The 
final evidence that it is Sonny's shame that propels him to violence is in the nature of the 
punishment Sonny metes out to Nick. Sonny's violence is part of a highly formal and 
calmly premeditated ritual. First Sonny seeks solace in escaping Val and going to the 
pub "to get arseholed" (80). It isn't until the next, and final, scene that we learn the 
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remaining details. One can recognize Sonny's tremendous shame and his jealousy 
towards Nick concentrated in a single hateful and symbolic act when Wendy recounts 
that Sonny "cut that poor bastard's face to pieces" (8 1 ). 
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CHAPTER VII 
The Rule of Thumb: Language and Women as the Victims and the Perpetrators of 
Violence in the Plays of Judy Upton and Rebecca Prichard 
Discussions of language and the violence perpetrated against women, and 
discussions of language and the violence perpetrated by women, necessarily involve a 
great deal of what has been presented in the chapters immediately preceding this one. 
For instance, domestic violence, the kind of violence against women that I will address 
here, has much to do with male notions of masculinity and femininity and is often a 
man's response to his unacknowledged feelings of shame. Shame is also, I will argue, 
key to the phenomenon whereby women more frequently assume traditional male forms 
of language and violence. The circuitous path I have traced since fir�t introducing 
aspects of female violence in the previous chapter's discussion of The Beauty Queen of 
Leenane has, in fact, sketched dynamics characteristic of many typical instances of male 
violence against women. Likewise, the prior chapter's discussions of shame avoidance 
theories will bear directly upon the explorations of some of the most prominent and 
aggressive behaviors newly adopted by women that will be undertaken later in this 
chapter. 
Almost all men claim to abhor violence against women, and in the words of 
Richard B. Felson, "Wife beaters are breakers, not bearers, of society's norms" (70). 
Based on this claim, one might expect male violence against women to be a relatively 
rare occurrence. However, R. W. Connell would amend this statement. He says, "Most 
men do not attack or harass women; but those who do are unlikely to think themselves 
deviant. On the contrary they usually feel they are entirely justified, that they are 
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exercising a right. They are authorized by an ideology of supremacy" (83). The way to 
integrate these two equally and demonstrably accurate accounts of domestic violence is to 
conclude that although men consider violence against women wrong in the abstract, those 
who commit acts of gender violence find linguistic means to deny, mediate, and justify 
their actions. Chris Smith of Tracy Letts' Killer Joe does exactly this when he 
downplays his violence against his mother, Adele. However, as Connell suggests, men 
who commit violence against women often-perhaps typically-justify their actions via 
recourse to gender stereotypes and ingrained notions regarding appropriate gendered 
behavior. Foremost among these is the specific and powerful Weltanschauung expressed 
in familiar sentiments such as "a man's home is his castle" and in common male 
appellations such as "head of the household." Frequently, familiar adages and 
conventional uses of language insinuate both a stereotypical masculinity and a heritage of 
masculine hierarchy, ownership and privilege, and having been raised to accept such 
seemingly innocuous nuggets of wisdom can condition one's ways of viewing and 
responding to one's surroundings. Therefore, as much as men expect to be challenged in 
the public (i.e., masculine) spheres, the home is supposed to be a man's refuge, the one 
place where his authority is unquestioned. Because it is viewed as a place bereft of actual 
peers, a perceived threat in the domestic sphere is, therefore, more likely to elicit surprise 
and indignation and can greatly exaggerate the shame that comes from unmanly feelings 
of weakness, uncertainty, or failure. Anne Campbell, perhaps, says it best: 
368 
Certainly men do not want to be seen behaving aggressively toward 
women, but that does not mean to say that they are unwilling to use it 
[sic. ] when no one is looking. Years of boyhood training are not easily 
cast off . . . .  When under threat-and with regard to women that threat is 
almost always to their superior status rather than a physical challenge­
many men assert themselves as loudly and ferociously as they can. They 
may not be at the top of the male hierarchy but they are certainly not going 
to be dominated by a mere "woman." (77) 127 
Perpetrators will often cast their acts of violence as necessary to enforce what they 
consider natural gender hierarchies. However, being well versed in the prohibitions 
against hitting girls, male "violence against women deceases [whereas] violence against 
men increases with the presence of an audience" (Felson 73). It is the flip side of the 
coin described in Chapter 5. In the absence of an audience or immediate and 
recognizable sanctions, such notions are not enough. As Thomas Scheff suggests: 
"Persons with low self-esteem are unable to manage shame in a way that leads to 
acknowledgment and discharge. For such persons, a situation which threatened shame 
would be overwhelmingly painful since it would be likely to involve them in an unending 
spiral of shame" (Microsociology 93). There is shame attached to being challenged in 
one's own home, which generates shame at seeming so inconsequential as to invite a 
challenge from one's wife ("a mere 'woman"'), which is then compounded by the 
realization that one actually feels threatened by this challenge, which is further increased 
by the sense that one's shame is perceptible to others, and so on. 
Understanding the dynamics of such a spiral helps explain such phenomena as the 
fact that, even though violent and non-violent boys alike acknowledge the measure of 
127 Here Stanton B. Gamer, Jr. suggests another useful parallel within a classic work of drama: Stanley 
Kowalski of Tennessee Williams' A Streetcar Named Desire. 
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respect owed to their mothers as parents and elders, violent boys typically have no 
qualms about the occasional act of violence against them. Along these lines, Albert 
Bandura and Richard H. Walters observe that when aggressive boys become frustrated or 
angry in their interactions with their fathers, their acts of aggression are generally 
displaced and directed at persons other than their fathers, oftentimes their mothers (98). 
However, before dismissing this maneuver as the simple selection of targets based on 
matters of convenience (i.e. , relative size and strength), it is important to note that this is 
not consistent with the behavior typical of these boys. In most settings, the greater size 
and strength of opponents recommends them as targets; they may, in fact, be sought out. 
Therefore, the choice to assault older women seems more in concert with notions of 
where the mothers of these boys are seen to fit into cultural and household hierarchies. 
For the sake of reputation, however, no boy or man wants to appear unable to "control his 
women," let alone be seen in a physical confrontation with one of them. For these 
reasons, the "rules" of etiquette require that, when it comes to women, hierarchical 
policing be kept private. 
The above patterns regarding male violence against women can, perhaps, be more 
adequately illustrated by means of a comparison. Consider this information from The 
American Psychological Association: 
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We know from social science research that the pervasive stigma that 
people apply to both mental and physical disability is expressed in many 
forms of discriminatory behaviors and practices, including increased risk 
for sexual and physical abuse. The Judge David L. Bazelon Center for 
Mental Health Law, a national organization representing low-income 
adults and children with mental disabilities, holds that such hate crimes are 
motivated by the perception that people with disabilities are not equal, 
deserving, contributing members of society, and, therefore, it is okay to 
attack them. ( 1 8) 
Male violence against women is, likewise, frequently facilitated and condoned by virtue 
of the perception that the victim has in some way "failed" to live up to our patriarchal 
society's masculine standards. Thus, women, children, homosexuals, the disabled, 
immigrants, and the poor may all find themselves lumped into a single broad category of 
people perceived to lack the masculine attributes that qualify one for respect. 128  
In fact, such individuals may doubly fail. They may, first, fail according to the 
physical standards associated with masculinity; in addition, they may also (or as a result) 
fail in terms of other, non-physical standards associated with masculinity, such as certain 
levels of social, legal, educational, and/or financial status. 1 29 According to such 
formulas, the perceived weaknesses of an individual-whether disease, disability, 
disfigurement, destitution, and disenfranchisement-mark them out as fair game for 
exploitation. Social Darwinism, Muscular Christianity, and Western Capitalism all 
represent cultural-historical examples that share aspects of an ideology whereby the very 
absence of legal protection, earning power, and social cache are seen as evidence of 
128 Recall Martin McDonagh's The Cripple of lnishmaan, wherein Cripple Billy uses his native intelligence 
to manipulate the "handsome, muscular" (4) but slow and guileless, Babbybobby. When Bobby discovers 
that the male social hierarchy has been thus breached, the physically helpless Cripple Billy becomes the 
object of Bobby's calm, quiet, dispassionate, but violent act of ritualized punishment (cf. 92-3). 
129 Women are often placed in a uniquely unenviable position, a non-win situation that guarantees their 
treble failure. They are held responsible for their failures to meet masculine standards but, at the same 
time, are punished whenever they stray from what is considered appropriate female behavior. Either way, 
they are sure to disappoint, thus solidifying their inevitable second-class status within certain cultural 
frameworks. 
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lesser worth and, thusly dehumanized, these "inferior" persons find themselves fair game 
for all nature of violence. 1 30 As made apparent in prior chapters, men and boys are taught 
to remain ever vigilant of relative social status, and they are frequently inculcated in 
systems of ritualized competition, aggression, or open violence. These lessons may, 
therefore, make them feel empowered to claim any advantage so long as they do so 
according to certain aesthetic requirements of masculinity. 
Beliefs in masculine superiority are central to many instances of violence, but are 
perhaps most apparent in instances of domestic violence, and some of the most carefully 
delineated representations of domestic violence can be found in the plays of Judy Upton. 
In the play Bruises, for example, Upton sympathetically and insightfully depicts three 
distinct cases of domestic violence for her audience. Indeed, Bruises demonstrates how 
even seemingly disparate types of domestic violence share certain similar and elemental 
features and how these fundamental conditions may result in the wide array of domestic 
violence in existence. For my part, I contend that some of the factors that most 
commonly underlie instances of domestic violence are unwittingly divulged-and, in 
some cases, unconsciously abetted-by means of language. Furthermore, I contend that 
certain subcultural milieus may be reasonably considered what Erving Goffman refers to 
as "total institutions" and that persons living within such environments are, for that 
reason, more prone to feelings of shame, less able to acknowledge them, and more likely 
to suffer the anger and perpetrate the violence generated by feelings of shame. 
13° For a comprehensive account of some key ways that a dehumanized underclass can be, and is, routinely 
exploited, see Barbara H. Chasin's Inequality and Violence in the United States: Casualties of Capitalism. 
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Bruises introduces four of the play's five characters in the first few moments, and 
two of them-the elder generation, Phoebe and Dave-are in a prone position, an attitude 
that each of the four will involuntarily assume at some point. The very first scene, which 
takes place between Jay and Phoebe, is only later revealed to have been the conclusion of 
an act of domestic violence. From the outset, then, the family violence is a symbolic 
inheritance that is, nevertheless, concealed from the outside world. Also introduced in 
the first few moments is the preoccupation that characters have with self-image. Kate has 
arrived in Worthing and is in search of a room. Jay lets her in at his father's B & B, 
immediately explaining the rules for boarders. When Kate announces that she is 
"famished" after her journey from lugging her bags around and asks whether Jay might 
get her a cup of tea and perhaps some toast, Jay extends no hospitality or professional 
courtesy; instead, in the officious manner of a menial laborer well-aware of his job 
description, he indicates how doing so would fall outside his regular duties. When she 
offers to pay him, he indignantly replies, "What do you take me for?" (3), implying that 
his services are not for sale. Kate keeps offering to pay more, but Jay keeps refusing. 
Finally, Jay makes a counter offer: "Kiss me" (4). With a word, Jay has altered the 
relationship entirely. Rather than be a servant at Kate's beck and call, Jay adopts the role 
of customer-Kate's services are the ones for sale; Kate, not Jay, will have to humble 
herself. 1 3 1 
The influence of notions of masculine privilege and the presence of 
unacknowledged shame become clear in Jay's speech early on. In spite of some serious 
131 In symbolic terms, the relationship between Kate and Jay is transferred from that of client-servant to that 
of prostitute-client, respectively. In addition, while Kate's offers are propositions, Jay's is an order phrased 
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flirting and flattery on his part, Jay consistently manages to assert his superior position in 
the relationship-that is, for now. When Jay's advances encourage Kate to reciprocate, 
for instance, he is compelled to establish primacy: 
Kate: (softly) And what do you like? 
Jay: What I'm seeing. 
She puts her hand on his shoulder, touches his hair. 
Kate: Honestly? 
Jay: Cross my heart. 
She moves to kiss him. He shrugs her off. 
I' ll tell you when I want to kiss you. 
He throws the cups in the sink, walks off (6-7) 
Jay makes it apparent that things between Kate and him will be done according to his 
prerogative. Later, Kate stops by the bar where Jay works while he is cleaning up, and 
Jay' s behavior is equally mysterious to Kate: 
in the imperative. 
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Kate picks up a cloth, begins drying up. 
Jay: You don' t have to do that. 
Kate: It's OK. 
Jay: I don' t want you to do it. 
Jay snatches the tea towel from Kate. 
Kate: Oh, fine. What do you want me to do? Talk? Keep quiet? Stay? Go 
away? 
Jay: Put your hand on my shoulder. 
Kate: Do you want me to stay like this, or do anything else? 
Jay: You can stroke my neck, mess my hair, I don't know. ( 12) 
Jay makes it known that he does not need Kate's--or anyone's-help. Once again, Jay 
tries to present himself as an island, and he feels the need to be demonstrably in control. 
Later, this desire will prove to be in complete opposition to Jay's behavior. Jay's later 
actions are likewise egocentric and impulsive, but they are no longer poised; instead, they 
are insecure, wild, and violent. Jay will be a man who has lost all of his manly 
composure; furthermore, he will be painfully aware of the fact. 
The night of the day that Jay meets Kate, he invites her back to his flat. The next 
night, he does the same. When Kate shows signs of reluctance, Jay's overly emotional 
response provides the first glimpse of the unstable self-image at the core of his unstable 
behavior: 
Jay: Christ, Kate, what is it with you? What do the guys you usually go 
with do? Do they have good jobs, a car, a nice place? Do they live 
somewhere exciting? Do they have lots of money? 
He pulls her against him. 
Bet they don't smell of stale beer and fags and chips. 
Kate: You smell very nice today. 
Jay: Not nice enough though obviously. 
Kate: Let me go. 
Jay: My pleasure. 
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Jay shoves Kate away from him, turns. (20- 1 )  
What is probably, to Kate, simply a matter of too much familiarity too soon is 
automatically taken by Jay as an unflattering assessment of him in her eyes. The few 
crumbs of attention and affection Kate has thus far shown Jay have been stewed 
overnight, steeped in Jay's poor self-esteem, and they are now bloated. Swollen by his 
insecurity, these tidbits have grown big in Jay's estimation, and he can no longer view 
them according to their original proportions. Similarly, when Kate tries to break free of 
Jay's embrace because it is an aggressive invasion of her personal space, he interprets it 
as a rejection of him as a man. Jay's suspicions automatically tum to his relative 
embodiment of the masculine qualities that attract women, and he cannot help but 
question his manhood. His shame renders him unable to interpret Kate's signals 
properly, and his communicative inefficiency guarantees that he will be hurt to the quick 
and become defensive. Heightened by an extreme sensitivity, Jay's interpretations of self 
and his perceptions of the interpretations of others are themselves driven to extremity and 
produce emotions that are out of bounds and out of check. All subtlety, all of the 
intermediate gray tones in his perception, are darkened to reflect his bleak, black self­
image. 
This is also the point at which his shame translates into violence. Kate says, 
"Hey, don't just walk away from me" (2 1 )  and tries to tum Jay around to face her. In so 
doing, she inadvertently grazes his face. Unbeknownst to Kate, Jay has just come back 
from the dentist and has had two teeth removed and the gums stitched. The pain of Kate 
touching Jay's face provides the catalyst for the unthinking response that is driven by his 
shame, and he "lashes out, hits her across the face, sends her staggering" (2 1 ). Three 
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particularly noteworthy aspects of Jay's violent response require attention. First is the 
response's exaggerated nature. The physical pain, however great, does not necessitate 
such a response. Rather than clutching the sore area, rather than jumping back, rather 
even than pushing Kate away, Jay strikes her. This is certainly a conditioned response 
and bespeaks aggression and not simple self-protection. The other two aspects are uses 
of language that come after the actual violence. These uses of language and Jay's 
corresponding behavior immediately following his assault on Kate provide crucial 
insight. The first uses of language allow Jay to evade responsibility for his act of 
violence. He casts his actions as surprising and atypical: "Shit. Are you . . .  ? God, did 
I? Kate!" (21 ); he casts them as accidental: "I didn't mean to, I just caught you" (21 ); he 
casts them as caused by forces outside himself: "You caught my jaw, I've had two teeth 
out and stitches" (21 )  and "That dentist's a bloody butcher" (21 ); and he casts them as no 
different or worse than what has happened to him: "Thank Christ it's at the back. . . .  Is 
my face swelling?" (21 -2). 
Equally significant is the way Jay references his own pain and employs the 
moment's heightened emotion to manipulate Kate. He uses the situation both to advance 
his original agenda and to lay the groundwork for Kate's eventual acceptance of his bad 
behavior: 
Jay: Kiss me, Kate. 
Kate: No--
Jay: Oh, Christ ! 
Kate: It'll hurt. 
Jay: Any excuse not to. 
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He sighs. She kisses him gently, he holds her head to prolong the kiss. 
Jay: Kiss me deep. 
She starts to, but stops. 
Kate: You're still bleeding. I can taste it. It must hurt. 
Jay: You're worth it. What's a bit of pain? 
They get up. He takes her hand. 
I'm only going to be able to manage soup for dinner, but I'll cook you 
something special . . .  you are coming back to mine? 
Kate smiles. 
They walk off and exit. ( 22) 
Aside from the obvious attempts to manipulate Kate by conjuring feelings of guilt, 
throughout the passage, Jay's depiction of pain is characteristic of one suffering 
unacknowledged shame, for in his formulation it is entirely externally stimulated. In 
addition, Jay's constructs a version of pain linguistically that places it somewhere 
between natural phenomenon and a necessary component of romance. The pain of which 
Jay speaks is inscrutable and inescapable--either it is just a part of life that one must 
accept and which shouldn't interfere with the few opportunities for happiness, or it 
is something fated and which serves to confirm whether or not one's love is "true." The 
latter position is reminiscent of a line from the lyrics of The Offspring's very popular and 
ironic portrayal of romantic relationships, aptly titled "Self-Esteem": "The more you 
suffer I The more it shows you really care / Right?" ("Self-Esteem"). According to Jay's 
linguistic manipulations, if Kate refuses to put up with Jay's abuse, it is a sign of failure 
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on her part-she doesn't really care about Jay-and the language helps ensure that Jay's 
abuse of Kate will not be held up to the same scrutiny. 
In Upton's version of Worthing, however, shame is rampant among its residents, 
and so is the violence it spawns. Shame is not a feature isolated to one or two 
individuals; instead, it permeates the environment. So, one quickly comes to expect Jay's 
responses to be out of proportion to the apparent stimuli, as when he storms out of the 
home of Kate's mother, Myrtle. Although he does not acknowledge his shame, Jay 
telegraphs it to the audience through his language: 
Kate: Jay works in the bed and breakfast hotel where I'm staying. 
Jay: ( edgy) Just to fill in while I'm deciding what I want to do . . . .  It 's just 
to help my dad out actually . . . .  I 'd like to start my own business. 
Maybe a sandwich franchise . . .  Kate could help me if she likes . . . .  
Myrtle: Perhaps when she's finished college--
Jay: Couple ofmy mates have got A levels and they've both been on the 
dole for three years now . . .  
Myrtle: But Kate's going to be a teacher. They always need teachers. 
Jay: You've got to let Kate make her own decisions. If she doesn't want to 
be a teacher, she doesn't have to. 
Myrtle: Of course she doesn't, I 'm just asking her to think things over. 
Kate: I have been-
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Jay: Of course she has. 
Myrtle: I just don't want to see her stuck in some dead-end job . .. 
Jay: In some dead-end town with a boyfriend with a dead-end job. 
He gets up. 
Thanks for the pie, Mrs Milner. I'm sorry you don't think I'm fit to grace 
your table. (30-2) 
The visit ends with some predictably dramatic language from Jay: "Let me go. I need to 
throw up. Your pie's left a nasty taste in my mouth" (32). Clearly, the discussion Myrtle 
thinks is about her daughter is always, for Jay, about him, as evidenced by the speed with 
which Jay moves from Myrtle's (albeit untactful) maternal concern that her daughter 
have opportunities in her future back to an evaluation of him as a potential suitor. Yet, 
while Jay may experience his shame as something shrill and severe, shame also afflicts 
the other characters, as may be seen in Kate's own reaction to the above tete-a-tete: 
"You're a snob, Mum. Dad's only a fitter. But you still married him. Oh, but I forget, you 
left him for Duncan. Duncan with his flash job in computers, his flash car, his whiny 
posh voice, his golf clubs .. . " (32). Kate, too, is sensitive about social status, including 
her standing within Britain's complex class system. Even though Myrtle claims, "I'd left 
your father because we'd grown apart" (32), the only explanation Kate can accept is one 
where her mother's decision reflects Kate's own preoccupations with her lack of money 
and status. 
Jay comes by his poor self-esteem honestly, as the play's promotional material 
appearing on the back cover of the printed text and elsewhere points out: "Beyond the 
windows of a South Coast boarding house lies a world of violence and pain, a world 
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where a father is passing an inheritance of drunken cruelty onto his son." One can see 
Jay' s shame as a reflection of his father's. Back at Jay' s flat after having left Myrtle' s  
home, Jay i s  still smarting. Jay' s shame, wrapped up as i t  i s  i n  the presentation of a 
wished-for masculinity, will of course be intensified by the presence of the one in whose 
eyes he tries to gauge himself. In fact, Kate's beauty, her sweetness, the reassuring sound 
of her voice-the very qualities that make her attractive to Jay-all serve as unconscious 
reminders of his perceived failure to realize the image he wants her to see. Jay' s own 
perception of failure is, therefore, projected onto Kate because he expects his perception 
of self to be matched by others' perceptions of him. He fully expects to find his own 
perception of failure reflected back in Kate's words and actions. So later, after the 
emotional visit with Myrtle and alone with Kate, Jay's shame is so raw that he seems 
almost perversely determined to misinterpret whatever Kate says. 
In an attempt to sooth, Kate tells Jay not to take her mother' s  opinions seriously, 
yet based on Jay's exercise of self-hatred, it is difficult to imagine that Kate could have 
said or done anything to change the course of events: 
Kate: She's always like that with everyone. Lots of questions. 
Jay: With your other boyfriends? 
Kate: Yeah. 
Jay: I thought you said you hadn' t  got any others. 
Kate: Previous boyfriends I should've said. 
Jay: Sure. Of course. Tell me about them. (34) 
The dialogue that follows is so reminiscent of the egocentrism exhibited by Dan and 
Larry in Patrick Marber's  Closer that it need not be included. However, unlike what 
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happens in that play, Kate refuses to participate and, instead, turns the tables on Jay, 
saying, "It's none of your . . .  well, you tell me about your previous girlfriends then" (34). 
Bent on an angry, self-loathing response to anything Kate might have said, Jay lashes out 
in an attack on Kate's emotions as vicious as any of the beatings he administers, and as 
evident of shameful self-hatred. Like his counterparts in Marber's play, Jay recognizes 
no distinction between "girlfriend" and "girl I've fucked." He, therefore, begins by 
blurting out the dirty little secret he has been keeping from Kate: "I fucked Phoebe" 
(34)-that is, his father's girlfriend. What follows is a full-fledged ceremony of shame, a 
fully formal ritual of violence: 
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Jay: And the others, starting in chronological order with my cousin Juno 
when I was eleven . . .  
Kate: No! No! 
Kate struggles, breaks free. Kate grabs up a cup, hurls it at Jay, who is 
sitting on the bed It misses narrowly. He looks startled, then angry. He 
gets up, she backs up. 
Jay: I'm going to fuckin' kill you. 
Kate: Keep away. Keep back. I'm going. 
Jay stalks Kate around the kitchen bench. She backs up, fearful. 
Kate: Jay, let me go. 
Around the bench again, and again, Jay with deadly intent. 
Please, Jay. 
Jay wavers, looks about to back off, lunges over the bench, grabs hold of 
Kate. She cries out. 
Jay: You're an evil bitch. Someone's got to teach you a lesson. (34-5) 
Jay's loose application of the word "girlfriend" makes it possible for him to proclaim two 
shamefully incestuous relationships in a self-conscious attempt to inflict pain on Kate, yet 
without consciously acknowledging his sense of either of them as shameful to himself. 
Just like his words in this scene, the "lesson" Jay delivers, as depicted above, is the 
picture of calm, quiet efficiency. 1 32 
For Jay's father, Dave, many of these patterns hold true. Persons, even genders, 
are exchanged, but certain fundamentals remain. For instance, Dave's shame likewise 
attests, as Erving Goffman suggests, to "unfulfilled expectations" or to, in the words of 
Helen Lewis, an unfavorable "ratio between success and the pretensions underlying it." 
Dave, just like Jay ( and to a lesser extent, Kate), makes a self-assessment. "Given their 
social identities and the setting," each will "sense what sort of conduct ought to be 
maintained" ( Goffman, Interactions 104 ), and each imagines himself patently and 
publicly unable to meet this standard. As is the case with Jay ( and Kate), Dave sees his 
relative lack of success in social terms-that is according to a self-perceived ( although 
typically unconscious) implicit comparison with his "peers"-but experiences this social 
failure as a private sense of shame. Furthermore, each individual experiences shame 
where s/he feels most vulnerable, which rarely reflects those areas where the individual 
most fails, but rather those areas where the individual's pretensions are greatest or where 
132 After an indefinite amount of time for the characters-but only seconds for the actors-Jay reenters 
claiming that he will "end it" by swallowing a bottle of pills. The threat is portrayed as a bathetic attempt 
at taking focus off the previous behavior that made Jay an object of fear and hatred and directing it toward 
behavior that makes him an object of concern and pity. Upton's stage directions show how far Jay is 
willing to go to generate sympathy and how ready he is to read sympathy in others. She writes: "Kate takes 
hold of Jay, meaning to snatch the pills, ends up hugging him. He hugs her tightly" (36). At bottom, the 
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the individual is least able to recognize her or his own accomplishments. One such area 
for Dave involves his music. It is not enough that others enjoy the music he produces, for 
he feels inadequate and unaccomplished beside Jay, who was once in a band that had a 
hit single and once played on the John Peel Show. Dave badgers Jay into passing a demo 
tape on to Harris, a person Jay knows in the music business, and he regularly badgers Jay 
about calling his "contact" to hear what he thinks of it. However, Dave does not 
acknowledge his shame; he projects his feelings of shame, attributing them instead to Jay: 
Dave: Why doesn't he mention my tape? He must've got it by now. 
Jay: Probably hasn't had time to listen to it yet. Probably gets a lot of tapes 
Dave: But he knows you. If it was your tape he'd have listened to it by 
now, wouldn't he? 
Jay: I don't know. I doubt it. 
Dave: Course he would. Well, you played on it. 
Jay: On one track. 
Dave: Did you tell him that? 
Jay: No, I-
Dave approaches him. 
Dave: Why not? You're ashamed ofme! (25) 
A fight ensures. Dave then targets Jay's shame as a way of avoiding his own and says, 
"You want me to fail, just because you have" (25). Jay denies it, saying, "I'm not 
moments when Jay has become the object of another's pity are probably the ones wherein his self­
perception and others' perceptions of him are the most consonant. 
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failing" (25), and the stage directions then read: "The fight starts to get nasty" (25). 
Phoebe helps put these things in perspective for the audience when Dave later complains 
that Jay is ''useless," seething, "All that stuff with his friend Harris being able to give me 
a break was all a big wind-up, a big piss-take at my expense" (32). Phoebe reminds 
Dave, "Jay never promised Harris could help you get bookings" (32); in fact, Harris and 
Jay are not "friends" in the traditional sense, only "friends" in the sense one uses when 
speaking of certain kinds of acquaintance. 
Like Jay, Dave finds it difficult to believe that his own self-assessments are not 
those of others. Realizing he's never met his girlfriend's sons, Dave accuses Phoebe of 
his shame, as well. 1 33 So, when Phoebe deals Dave a real blow and admits she has slept 
with Jay, the information seems to corroborate his poor self-image and encourages him 
view all of Phoebe's decisions and actions-such as Phoebe's suggestion they marry­
according to this skewed self-perception: 
Marry me so you could carry on seeing him, that it? I tried to ignore it, 
tried to intercept those little glances and smiles and keep them for myself. 
I tried to kid myself it was me that was keeping you here. I tried to ignore 
the fact that I'm old and fat and pissed and I can't play the bloody guitar. 
Tried to forget I have a son with the kind of looks I've never had. (33) 
These lines certainly exhibit self-pity, but they are also an accusation-that Phoebe does 
not properly appreciate Dave. In his final analysis, the problem is that Phoebe is "a 
133 Upton writes: 
Dave: When am I going to meet them? 
Phoebe: Soon. 
Dave: When's soon, Phoeb? You're ashamed ofme, I'm never going to meet your kids. 
(27). 
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whore" (33). So, although these sentences are spoken in the first person, they do not 
seem to represent an actual acknowledgment of shame by Dave. The entire passage is 
infused with Dave's general sense of persecution, his pervasive attitude that he'd be a lot 
happier and more successful if others were not constantly holding him back and down. 
Furthermore, Dave's method of "dealing with" the situation is no different than at any 
other time of trouble. His answer to the problem is the same outwardly directed and 
formally enacted violence: 
He . . . leans over Jay as he scrubs at a non-existent stain on the bench. 
Dave: Look at me when I'm talking to you, son. 
Jay looks up, wary. Dave tilts Jay 's chin up, gently, caressingly, so he is 
looking into his eyes. 
Dave: Look at me, that's right, look at me. 
Dave smashes his other fist into Jay 's face. Jay sinks down. Dave kicks 
him, walks off. (36-7) 
Jay and Dave are able to avoid acknowledging their shame in part because they 
are so successful at employing linguistic means to justify, and therefore avoid 
acknowledging, their violence. The most striking example comes from a conversation 
between Phoebe and Jay after both have come clean to their current partners about their 
shared illicit relationship. Jay begins, saying that he told Kate and that she has forgiven 
him: 
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Phoebe: Poor girl. Well, I don't forgive you! It's your fault everything's in 
tatters. Dave was so good to me, so gentle. It was real with him. I' 11 never 
forgive you. 
Jay: What? For what? It was real with me. It made you cry. What have I 
ever done to you-
Phoebe: Hit me! 
For a moment . . .  Jay thinks she is asking him to hit her. 
You hit me. The day Kate moved in, just a stupid row about the stupid 
cricket on the radio. You nearly killed me. 
Jay: Liar. You're pissed and you're making up stories . . . .  I might've 
slapped you once because you were calling me names. You couldn't 
decide whether you wanted a son or a lover, and England were being 
thrashed by the Aussies, so you took all your confusion out on me. (38) 
Using similarly dishonest linguistic constructions, rather than out-and-out lies, Jay 
manages to reshape memory in a series of small misrepresentations of past events, none 
of which in and of itself requires an uncomfortable acknowledgment of the falseness that 
they combine to produce. 
The meaninglessness of a phrase like "it was real" allows Jay to apply it 
indiscriminately, even though careful reflection regarding speaker and context would 
probably narrow the possibilities. In addition, Jay does the same thing with "it" that he 
did with "girlfriend," further loosening the already amorphous range of meanings for the 
phrase. That Jay has put this vague pronoun through the same transformations is made 
clear by the next line, for the "it" that made Phoebe cry was quite explicitly a sexual 
relationship, not passion, not romance, and certainly not love. Phoebe remembers things 
this way: 
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I didn' t say "yes," but he assumed . . .  I don't mean he raped me . . .  he 
was nice . . . and sweet . . . the first time . . . but after that . . . 
After the first time he was rough and he didn't think of me, he didn' t have 
any respect for me. If I made a sound, if I protested that he was gripping 
me too tight, hurting me . . .  he'd tell me to shut up. Once when I didn' t, 
he slapped my face. 
Then he wouldn' t sleep with me any more, he just started behaving like it 
hadn't happened. (33, 49) 
Most distressing is that when Jay asks Phoebe the frequently rhetorical question "What 
did I ever do to you?" he is actually surprised that she has an answer-so surprised that 
he cannot immediately process it intellectually, nor does he have an immediate visceral 
response. 
When Jay finally comprehends what Phoebe is saying, he responds with denial, 
and the linguistic tap-dancing begins in earnest. It is true that Phoebe is often drunk, but 
this is simply a fact and has no real bearing on the events in question. It is true that 
Phoebe has said things that have upset Jay; however, there is no evidence of name-calling 
in the play: it is more likely that Jay, sensitized by shame, misinterpreted something 
Phoebe said to him. It is true that Jay has occupied a nebulous position somewhere 
between son and lover, but he has never really been either, and the nature of their 
relationship-whatever it is-was never the result of indecision or conflicted desire on 
Phoebe's part. It is true that England was being thrashed by the Aussies in cricket, and 
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Phoebe even uses this to explain the tears Dave discerns in her eyes after the encounter 
with Jay, but this was not the cause of any of Phoebe or Jay's behavior, only a small 
factor contributing to the overall mood of the encounter. Finally, it is true that an upset 
Phoebe scratched Jay with her fingernails; however, the act was not malicious, nor even 
intentional. Although the audience is not witness to everything, they are provided 
enough information about the individual characters, their history together, and the 
occasion in question to determine that Phoebe's account is by far the more accurate one 
and that Jay's perception of events has been corrupted by a shocking collection of desires 
and insecurities. Between Jay's obliviousness, his gross misinterpretations, his neuroses, 
and his interests in fending off shame, he has grown absolutely certain of things that are 
simply and objectively false. 
The sort of perpetual shame sketched above must be even greater, in many ways, 
for the women in these overtly masculine subcultures. In many cultures, women are 
offered opportunities to attain regard that, if not equal to those of men, are considered 
equally appropriate for their gender. For women in a variety of subcultures, high levels 
of regard may be quite simply unattainable; still, there are typically ways for them to 
achieve approbation, and they usually involve adherence to subcultural codes regarding 
appropriate female conduct. Yet, consider the subculture wherein traditionally masculine 
behaviors offer its members opportunities to achieve regard, but wherein traditionally 
feminine behaviors are simply denigrated. Th� subculture may apply similar censures for 
breaches of gender norms, but it offers no approbation for their maintenance. Prichard 
and Upton write of just such circumstances, and several of their portrayals of female 
characters address attempts by these women to adjust to the diminishing returns for 
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women within their respective subcultures. These female characters, like their real-world 
counterparts, frequently adopt behaviors identified as male, including masculine forms of 
aggression. In these plays, audiences are therefore likely to encounter acts of violence 
perpetrated by, rather than simply against, women. In addition, these plays provide a 
platform for Prichard and Upton to interrogate a very real and current social 
phenomenon-the recent proliferation of all-female gangs. 
In a number of environments where women are given little or no incentive to 
adhere to traditional feminine roles, while the incentives for them to diverge from such 
roles outweigh the censures associated with doing so, women have begun to alter their 
behavior accordingly. The circumstances in which these conditions tend to place women 
can often lead to the manifestation of extremely ironic attitudes and unexpected conduct. 
Perhaps the most unlikely represents a shift from an acceptance to the adoption of certain 
male attitudes about women. Here, again, language provides the key, for the presence of 
these newly acquired attitudes is made evident in their language, and their language, in its 
turn, serves as the primary conduit for the ongoing dissemination and the seeming 
substantiation of these attitudes. Unflattering opinions of women are nothing new or 
rare, nor is it unusual to find women who have come to expect, or who have resigned 
themselves to, male misogyny. In a quietly disturbing passage of Serving It Up, Eldridge 
paints a poignant picture of such female resignation, and of a corresponding male 
obliviousness, when Wendy shares with Sonny a bit of what seems a fairly typical day at 
the hair salon where she works: 
390 
Wendy: Today I was washing this bloke's hair. He reached up and 
squeezed my tit. My right . . .  Not hard-just a squeeze. I didn't do 
anything. He abused me, but 1-1 wasn't . . .  
Sonny: Who is he? Tell me who he is-I'll kill him. 
Wendy: You abuse me. 
Sonny: I've never laid a finger on you. 
Wendy: The way you talk to me, the way you look at me . . .  I don't know 
why I came here, Sonny . . . .  When I picked up the phone I thought-Shit, 
go to the pub, get out-have a laugh. No. With you, Sonny? I must be 
thick. I must have been in a right sodding dream. (7 1 ) 1 34 
One may find passages of a similar n�ture in the plays of Prichard and Upton. However, 
these two playwrights also document variations of some of the newly adopted themes 
outlined above. 
Rebecca Prichard's Essex Girls was first performed at the Royal Court Theatre on 
November 1 8, 1994, barely two weeks before the Royal Court premiere of Judy Upton's 
Ashes and Sand on the first of December-both plays in which audiences were 
introduced to the members of female gangs. Although the violence in neither play was 
sufficient to shock audience members who had grown accustomed to other Royal Court 
productions involving more trenchant and vivid instances of violence onstage, the 
presentations of the female characters in both are unsettling. Moreover, the presentations 
1 34 One example of Sonny's abusive (and oblivious) speech comes immediately prior to the passage here: 
Sonny: Come on, Wend, give us a go. Pause. I've got some dough on me now. We 
could go up west, go to the pictures in Leicester Square, it' ll be great. 
Wendy: If I wanted to be bought I'd be knocking about down Commercial Road. 
Sonny: I would pay anything in the world to have you. 
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in both are marked by ironic and conflicted gender identifications and by types of 
language that resonate oddly in the mouths of women. The young women in Prichard' s 
Essex Girls are depicted in ways redolent of the young male characters encountered in 
prior chapters. Like their previously discussed male counterparts, they employ the same 
derogatory epithets and exhibit the same intolerance of things feminine. In one instance, 
rather than bristling at the unfair double-standard applied to male versus female sexuality, 
Prichard' s Diane takes an equivocal stance that shows her desire to align herself with a 
male point-of-view. 
In Hayley's retelling of an episode involving Diane's brother, Tony, Diane largely 
ignores the objectifying sexism of the male characters, and instead focuses attention on 
the need to punish the sole female character for her promiscuity: 
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Hayley: [Tony] went with a girl outside in a car. Weren' t  even his car. 
Someone saw them out the window 'cos the car was rocking. Five minutes 
later everyone's out there watching. 
Banging on the roof, they was. Like a football match, jeering ' im on. 
Everyone banging on the roof. They's going-"Tony, Tony, Tony." I 
swear they thought they was in there with ' im, half o'them. Pouring beer 
cans on the roof, they was. Jeering, shouting. Spurting the beer. They 
was off their heads. Suddenly the car stops rocking. Everyone was quiet. 
They start whispering "out, out, out," then shouting "out, out, out." We 
thought they was gonna tip the car, din't we, Diane? 
Diane: I told you, I wen' one. 
Hayley: Tony gets out of the car . . .  takes a bow. 
Girl gets out. They all started throwing things at her. I though, Gold 'elp 
you. She had to run down the street. I saw someone pick up a stone. 
Diane: I'd a stoned her. What an insult. Silly cow. ( 198) 
There are indications in the passage that Diane is at least partially concerned with 
defending a family member, and she does not glorify Tony's actions the way the 
congregation of boys do. However, the most striking feature of Diane's response is that 
it shows that she does not self-identify primarily as a woman. This tendency is repeated 
elsewhere and is characteristic of the other young women in the play, as well. In fact, the 
young women consistently display a high level of ignorance regarding, and disdain for, 
their "fellow" women, even to the point of superstition. 
Gathered together in the restroom at school, Kelly has to use the facilities but is 
faced with the prospect of one stall that is locked and possibly occupied and one stall 
where a tampon is floating in the toilet bowl. The scene is rather long, and Kelly is in a 
desperate need to go throughout. This, however, is still not motivation enough for her to 
use the available stall; instead, throughout the scene, she bangs on the door to the other 
stall, in hopes of hurrying its occupant-if there even is one: 
Hayley: Why don't you go in that one? 
Kelly: Makes my breakfast jumpy. 
Diane: Iss bad luck to piss on a tampon, anyway. 
Kelly: Is it? 
Diane: Yeah. Makes you go sterile in later life. 
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Hayley: I've 'eard summink like that. 
Kelly: It ain't true. 
Diane: Well, go in there, then . . .  
Kelly: N ah, I might catch summink off it. (200- 1 )  
The unpleasant sight alone cannot account for Kelly's steadfast refusal. Whether she 
believes the tall-tale told by her friends or not, Kelly clearly associates this feminine 
object with perversion and contagion. Prichard's women are likewise bound by a 
stereotypically male version of public language, a "tough" language that hampers their 
ability to articulate and entertain feelings. 
At one point in the play, Diane is prompted to share information of a delicately 
personal nature. Diane's "girly" confession, however, is met with the same lack of 
compassion characteristic of the male public language users already encountered, and, 
like them, Hayley takes advantage of the opportunity to wound and belittle Diane as a 
way of exerting her role as the alpha-( fe )male in the group's miniature hierarchy: 
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Diane: My mum had to try to do an artificial thing on my brother. 
Hayley: An abortion? 
Diane: Sort of. She had to do it herself. 
Kelly: Like . . .  
Diane: Like she got really drunk and she had to try and use a coat hanger 
and hot baths and all that. 
Kelly: Fuckin' 'ell. 
Diane: I know. 
Hayley: (as if to clear up a "messy "  conversation) Shame it didn't work. 
(209) 
The sorts of overt maneuvers one uses to gain a footing on the next higher hierarchical 
rung that have become a familiar feature within the all-male realms already examined are 
here being employed by adolescent women. They are driven by a similar desire to lay 
claim to greater measures of regard within the gang, as well as the wider subculture of 
which their gang is a part, and remarkably, the means to accomplish this stereotypically 
male goal is to master stereotypically male devices. 
Although the information Diane shares is dangerously close t� her core, one can 
also discern subtle assertions like those a boy might use to suggest a lineage of toughness. 
Diane's statement that her mother "had to do it herself' does not come across as a 
stereotypically feminine bid for sympathy but as a "masculine" sign of her pride in her 
mother' s mettle. This reading is strengthened by Kelly's implied question. She is purely 
interested in the mechanics of the procedure, and the fact that Diane is able to correctly 
interpret Kelly' s question prior to, or in lieu of, its articulation lends the sense that here 
the young women are thinking alike. Moreover, Kelly's "Fuckin' 'ell" and Diane's "I 
know" smack of an admiration Kelly seems to share with Diane and of the no-nonsense 
approach to complications that Diane would like to be seen to share with her mother. 
Finally, while Diane attempts to paint her mother's decision as the dispassionate 
discharge of a duty-note the public language fixture "had to" that conveniently 
separates actors, agency, and accountability, as well as the abstractifying "artificial 
thing"-Hayley pounces on the personal nature of the narrative to provoke Diane and 
push her towards an open confrontation. She almost succeeds. The stage directions state: 
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"Diane is offended' (209), but aside from making a nasty quip, Diane fails to step up to 
Hayley's challenge with a response that promised to be physical and in accordance with 
well known masculine aesthetics: "They lock eyes. Diane breaks it" (209). 
When the lingering tension between Hayley and Diane finally turns into physical 
action, one can see the opposition, or the transition, between traditional female forms of 
aggression and the open violence the young women have learned from their adolescent 
male counterparts. In this particular skirmish, Diane fires the first shot. In an act of 
"expressive" female aggression, she surreptitiously writes on one of the walls at school: 
"Hayley is a bitch." However, because Hayley is so inured in the "instrumental" forms 
of male aggression, she instantly assumes that the act was meant as a direct challenge to 
her authority and identity, which for her are defined according to the masculine priorities 
of physicality, toughness, competitiveness, and composure. Since Diane has never 
challenged Hayley directly, nor met any of the challenges Hayley has leveled against her, 
it does not occur to Hayley that Diane is in any way involved. Rather, Hayley 
immediately thinks of Stacey, her rival for the attention of would-be boyfriend, Phil. 
Again, in masculine fashion, Hayley intends to confront Stacey face to face and fully 
expects a fight. Not wanting her friend Hayley to face-off against Stacey, but not willing 
to admit to her indirect expression of anger and resentment, Diane tries to talk Hayley out 
of a confrontation with Stacey by reminding her that Stacey is "quite hard" (21 3). 
This, however, has an unintended effect. In line with the masculine codes she has 
adopted, Hayley sees in the description "quite hard" the quality that makes Stacey a 
worthy adversary. Then comes Diane's first real lesson in the masculine systems of 
instrumental aggression and hierarchy that are colonizing all areas of the school 
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environment and displacing the indigenous feminine systems wherever they manage to 
infiltrate. As an example of what Hayley can expect from Stacey should Hayley choose 
to confront her, Diane attempts a fake blow. Again, Hayley doesn't respond the way a 
girl should, or the way Diane expects: 
Diane goes to do a mock slap around Hayley 's face, but Hayley catches 
her hand. They look in each other 's eyes fiercely for a second-then, as if 
to relieve the tension . . .  
Hayley: Do what? 
Diane: (calmly) Let go. 
Hayley: Then I ' ll go like this . . .  
Hayley, still holding Diane 's hand, punches her on the arm. (213)  
The blow that Diane fakes is, characteristically, an open-hand slap. Hayley, subscribing 
to a masculine aesthetic, answers by making a fist and punching Diane. Symbolically, 
male and female collide in this passage. Hayley takes Diane's explanatory gesture and 
transforms it into typical male horseplay, with its ever-latent sense of posture and threat. 
In doing so, Hayley evokes masculine ritual. 
At this point, Diane seems to recognize that she will have to engage Hayley 
according to her adopted masculine ethic to be taken seriously, and she makes an overt 
physical gesture. Diane, however, is not accustomed to this new role, and it shows. In 
reference to Stacey, Diane says, "She'll probably come up behind you like this" (214), 
but then, like a girl, she pulls Hayley's hair. The physical struggle that ensues is, 
however, very "masculine" in that it is undertaken dispassionately, at least at first. Like 
John in LaBute's A Gaggle of Saints or Sonny in Eldridge's Serving It Up, Hayley and 
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Diane both manage to keep their emotions in check-suppressing the "expressive" facets 
of the violence-and proceeding with clear "instrumental" goals. Each wants to subdue 
the other by means of force, to procure a greater measure of regard, and to establish a 
reputation as one not to be challenged lightly. Diane now understands that only by 
subscribing to Hayley's acquired doctrine and by taking up Hayley's methods will she be 
able to make a significant and lasting impression on her-to earn her respect, to negotiate 
a position of primacy in the hierarchy of Hayley's informal gang, and ironically to secure 
her trust. Hayley, in masculine fashion, is suspicious of the indirect, subtle, clandestine 
forms of aggression frequently associated with women, so only in a direct challenge-an 
overt attack-does Diane demonstrate her trustworthiness. According to the formal 
requirements of traditionally male manifestations of aggression and violence, once the 
overt challenge has been answered and a victor declared, the matter is closed and one 
need not fear ( an immediate) reprisal. 
Elements of the aggression and violence in Upton's The Girlz represent some 
similarly "masculine" aesthetics and attitudes. Like most teenage girls, Tara and 
Roxanne are obsessed with the images they present. However, in a manner reminiscent 
of boys who perform hyper-masculine behaviors as a means of claiming for themselves 
the attributes valued in their local communities of peers, these teenage girls enact 
performances-traditionally masculine performances-in their attempts to have others 
view them the way they want to be viewed. Stacey is the lone exception, at least in the 
beginning, and the most mature girl in the play. However, Stacey's best mate is Tara, a 
girl who is steeped in the values of the local community and who, therefore, unwittingly 
represents the very influences that lead to Stacey's loss of social status and economic 
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opportunity. Tara is baffled by Stacey's disinterest in boys and tells her "It's not ... 
natural, Stacey" (9). Of course, Stacey has reason to be wary-her older sister is an 
unwed teen mother. Another sign that Stacey does not really belong to her local 
community is the fact that her attention is always turned toward the future, in the form of 
future goals ( e.g., college) and the expectation of future opportunities ( e.g., a career; a life 
elsewhere; the chance to meet guys who don't "look like a pile of pants" [9] to her). No 
one else in this environment, however, seems to expect much from the future, and none, 
therefore, spend very much time thinking about it or planning for it.1 35 Nor do Stacey's 
peers seem to recognize the value of a college education because, in their environment, it 
has none. For many of them, it simply represents another of the class markers that 
separate them from their "betters." For these reasons, Stacey's rivals and friends alike 
view her efforts as silly and futile, and they see her continued pursuit as putting on airs: 
MR KELSEY: Stacey, I've remembered the books you wanted. These 
cover most of the syllabus. 
(TARA looks amazed. ST ACEY looks at TARA, embarrassed.) 
TARA: What? Books? 
(ROXANNE laughs.) 
135 When Stacey first meets Shaun, she attempts to share with him something of importance to her and 
receives what is, unfortunately, a typical response: 
STACEY: I 've got plans to--
SHAUN: (Interrupting): Plans! Yeah, I like plans, yeah. I mean it's a good idea to make 
'em isn't it? So what you planning then? Like your future or . . .  or something? 
STACEY: Yeah. I want to go to college . . .  
SHAUN: Right. (a beat) Do you like cars? ( 10- 1 )  
Shaun is unable to articulate what, exactly, plans are (i.e., their purpose), how to make them, how to pursue 
them, or what some concrete examples might be. 
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ROXANNE: Becoming a swot, are you Stacey? (7) 1 36 
Like a true friend, Tara is concerned with helping Stacey fit in-that is, with her status in 
the present-which is why she urges Stacey to "skive," to be truant. Tara constantly 
takes Stacey under her wing and coaches her in the local values and teaches her how to 
negotiate the native social landscape. She is the one who teaches Stacey how to 
recognize "class," as in the scene where the two girls compare the bottles of perfume they 
each have stolen and plan to "shift" for money: 
ST ACEY: Allure. £36.50. 
TARA: (Impressed): Shit. Give it here. 
STACEY: Fuck off. 
TARA: I want to smell it. . 
(TARA takes the bottle.) 
TARA: S 'alright that. By Chanel innit? Loads better than number 5. 
STACEY: Fresh and sophisticated. That's what the advert says. 
{TARA sniffs the "Allure.") 
TARA: This one's quite classy, innit? Here. 
{STACEY sniffs it.) 
STACEY: . . .  If l knew what classy smelt like. 
TARA: Like me. Even my farts. (2, 5) 
136 "Swot" ( or "swat") is British slang roughly equivalent to such American slang words as: "nerd," "dork," 
"dweeb," or "wonk." 
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This final facetious response is truer than either girl knows or is ready to admit, for when 
it comes to "class" in the immediate milieu, Tara is the one of the two who has "it." And 
the way to achieve "it," and a great deal of the "it" itself, are matters of claiming the right 
to define--objects, actions, attitudes, and individuals. There are so few other things to 
possess (i.e., material goods but, more importantly, markers of individual merit); 
therefore, language-the authority over it--offers a rare opportunity for ownership. 
Consequently, in the microcosm to which Stacey, Tara, and Roxanne belong, authority 
with regards to defining and categorizing experience, including the administration of 
individual words like "swot," "allure," and "classy," is necessarily more closely tied to 
the culture's limited opportunities for material and social reward. 1 37 
Early on in the play, it becomes obvious that, within this microcosm, competition 
reigns and the girls apply a variety of methods-both traditionally male and traditionally 
female forms-in their attempts to attain status and self-regard. On one occasion, 
Roxanne, a year older than Stacey and Tara, takes advantage of her presumably superior 
size and strength to coerce Tara into giving up her seat in class, and does so in front of all 
of their classmates. Such exchanges are always loaded with social significance in strict 
inverse relationship to the availability of other opportunities to claim social status, so this 
particular exchange is heavily laden. As Erving Goffman explains, there are instances 
137 One must also remember that the level of ''peer pressure" tends to become exaggerated in those 
subcultures-those indebted, for instance, to a public language-that place a much greater emphasis on 
cultural wisdom as opposed to personal rationality and intense levels of localized social bonding and peer 
identification. In agreement with testimony presented earlier in the dissertation, Rachel Simmons, author 
of Odd Girl Out: The Hidden Culture of Aggression in Girls, writes: "The feeling of being crazy plagues 
[one] . . .  as she must choose between the sting of her own feelings and what she wants to believe about her 
friends" (78). She also cites Lyn Mikel Brown and Carol Gilligan's influential book Meeting at the 
Crossroads: Women 's Psychology and Girls ' Development, saying: "Believing a friend while ignoring the 
hum of one's own instinct is an important example of how a girl can 'give up or give over [her] version of 
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where two or more people are "concerned with establishing evidence of strong character, 
and conditions [are] such as to allow this only at the expense of the other participants. 
The very field that the one uses to express character may be the other's character 
expression" (Interaction 240). The use of threat and intimidation, the formal struggle 
over a prop (i.e., the seat) that has no value except as a means of forcing another to 
respond, and the adherence to a hierarchical system wherein one can achieve a higher 
position by lowering another's and by using physical means are all characteristic of 
masculine aggression and violence. 
The seriousness with which these little pitched battles are fought, the symbolic 
and instrumental significance of their functions, and the masculine ( as opposed to 
feminine) standard according to which objects and principles are assigned importance 
are, perhaps, most plain in a passage where Tara scolds Stacey for letting Roxanne swoop 
in and steal away the attention Stacey has been getting from Shaun: 
TARA: Shit! I don't believe you! 
(TARA drags STACEY into the toilets.) 
TARA: I don't believe this. You're a disgrace you are. And that slag, 
Roxy. How could you let her do that? Everyone fancies him. But he likes 
you. For fuck's sake, wake up, Stacey! You had your chance there. But 
you blew it big time. You let that slapper Roxanne walk all over you. 
STACEY: It's no big deal . . .  
reality to those who have the power to name or reconfigure [her] experience,' a major symptom of girls' 
loss of self-esteem observed by Brown and Gilligan" (78). 
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TARA: The fuck it isn't ! It'll be all round the school, on Monday. She'll 
be flaunting it in our faces. "Me and Shaun," "he says you're nothing," 
"he thinks you're a dog," "I just left you standing, Stace." 
STACEY: Look, if Shaun wants to off with poxy Roxy or some other sad 
tart, that's his problem . . .  
TARA: No, it's your problem, Stacey! It's your reputation on the line. 
Look, they haven't gone yet. Quick, grab your chance to smack her down! 
STACEY: I told you to forget it. I don't care. He's a complete prat. The 
car probably isn't even his. It's probably nicked. 
TARA: So? He's cool Stace, he's.fit. He's exactly the sort of guy you need 
to get yourself seen with. ( 12) 
This exchange exudes much the same flavor as some of those between Larry and Dan in 
Marber's Closer. Shaun is not a person, but a pawn in a match between Stacey and 
Roxanne. It is, likewise, redolent of John's mindset in LaBute's A Gaggle of Saints. The 
concern here is not with actualities but with the presentation, the performance, of self­
both one's own and that of others. The crippling blow Tara expects is Roxanne's 
"flaunting it in our faces"; sometimes a good offense (i.e., "grab your chance to smack 
her down!" by stealing Shaun right back from under Roxanne's nose) is also the best 
defense. Lastly, as with Sonny in Eldridge's Serving It Up, the "romantic partner" is not 
the actual prize being sought. Sonny's Wendy and Tara and Stacey's Shaun only seem to 
matter insofar as they are able to assist in the acquisition of the real prize, which is what a 
relationship with Wendy or Shaun might contribute towards one's status. Each is a prop, 
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a piece of property, a bit of bling, as it were. Fortunately, Stacey is blissfully unaware of 
these matters; that is, until Tara brings them to her attention. 
This is about the time that Tara's real motives become apparent. Tara is not so 
concerned about Stacey's reputation, per se. First, note her telling use of "our" rather 
than "your" in the passage above. Since Tara has been unable to make Stacey care 
enough about her own image to do what Tara would have her do, Tara then plays upon 
Stacey's sense of friendship and of loyalty: 
TARA: People are talking about you . . .  cos you've never had a guy . . .  
Everyone thinks you're a bit . . .  weird, Stacey. 
STACEY: Yeah, yeah. And I've told you I've got better things to listen 
that shit. 
TARA: It's not shit, Stacey. People are trashing your image, girl. And this 
isn't just your problem, it's mine as well . . .  people are taking the piss out 
of both of us . . .  just cos you can't get a bloke. 
STACEY: Look, Tara . . .  
TARA: You've got to deal with this thing okay? You've got to deal with it 
soon. 
STACEY: Yeah, okay- (13) 
Stacey is similar in character to the "retreatest" [sic.] gangs Erving Goffman describes in 
Interaction Ritual: 
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Although criticized and ridiculed repeatedly by other gangs for their 
cowardice and lack of manhood, the retreatests seldom responded to 
taunts, and always retreated from combat. They did not worry about their 
reputations as fighters-they had none-and did not think them important 
(Interaction 255). 
At the outset, Stacy is one of those rare individuals who can successfully separate herself 
from her culture's predominant value-system and its mores. At first, and unlike the vast 
majority of people, Stacey is somehow able to examine experience from outside the 
cultural ocean in which she is immersed. This fact seems even more striking in that she 
is a lone dissenter and lacks the support of even a small number of like-minded 
individuals. Yet, for these very reasons, I attribute her autonomy to a native naivete, a 
conclusion supported by the trajectory of Upton's play. After all, Stacey eventually 
learns what it means to be indebted to one's own culture, and she later experiences first­
hand the sorts of consequences about which Tara has, all along, warned her. In some 
cases, ignorance really is bliss. 
While Stacey proves willing to accommodate herself to Tara's demands, Tara's 
loyalty does not go so far. At the end of scene four, Stacey's impatience with Tara's 
efforts to get Stacey together with Shaun prompts her to walk away from the relentless 
Tara. Tara responds indignantly, "Stacey! Oy don't walk off when I'm talking to you 
girl! Stacey !" (22a). Tara's feelings of frustration with Stacey and the embarrassment she 
felt when Stacey turned to leave her standing alone are compounded in the next scene. 
Tara, who has managed to finagle private tutoring sessions out of her teacher, Mr. 
Kelsey, is trying her best to initiate a relationship between them. Sensing for the first 
time Tara's interest in him, Mr. Kelsey at first tries discreetly to separate from her and 
depart; however, Tara is characteristically relentless on this occasion, as well. Only when 
Mr. Kelsey mentions his wife does Tara start to get the message: 
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TARA: Your wife! (a beat) You never told me you were married. I've 
never heard anyone say anything about you having a wife. You don't wear 
a wedding ring, do you? 
MR KELSEY: It's not compulsory. 
TARA: And I thought . . .  by the way that you behave with us . . .  with me 
MR KELSEY: How do I behave with you, Tara? 
TARA: Like you're free. Available. The way you look at me in class . . .  
MR KELSEY: What about the way I look at you? 
TARA: You want me, Jon. 
(MR KELSEY laughs.) 
MR KELSEY: In your dreams maybe, Tara. 
(He picks up his case.) 
TARA: And in your dreams, Jon. Yeah alright, Mr Married Man, go 
running home to your cocoa and biscuits . . .  and dream about what you 're 
missing. (25) 
Mr. Kelsey explodes Tara's perception of herself, forcing her to think carefully about the 
behavior she saw as flirting, as desire. Perhaps there was some. In any event, Mr. Kelsey 
has made it clear that Tara has no power where he is concerned; in symbolic terms, her 
claim to "allure" is a bottle of perfume, and it is only hers through Stacey. 
The shame Tara feels by virtue of relying on Stacey for so much of her own 
identity is no longer supplemented by fantasies about Jon. Tara now suffers the full brunt 
of the pain caused by her suspect self-assessments. The thought of Stacey, with her 
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strength, her independence, her impact on Shaun (if only she cared), her drive to leave 
their world behind, intensifies the sense of crisis in Tara's sudden, revised self­
evaluations. In an act that testifies simultaneously to Tara' s indebtedness to Stacey, the 
source and nature of Tara's shame, and the conflict Tara feels between the desire to 
forward her own reputation vicariously-by association with Stacey-and the desire to 
lash out against Stacey and bring her down to her own level, Tara again pressures Stacey 
to be with Shaun. The school wall now reads: "Stacey is a lezbian," and Tara helpfully 
suggests that Roxanne might be the culprit. Of course, in reality, this is another ploy to 
convince Stacey that her reputation is in jeopardy and that she needs to do something 
about it. As usual, the solution is to sleep with Shaun. At this juncture, Tara is even 
more forthcoming and offers Stacey a more accurate picture of her "friend": 
STACEY: There' s plenty more guys around. Why's it have to be him? 
TARA: Because he's cool. You ask anyone at school who'd they most like 
to go with. This' ll stop all the gossip once and for all. After tonight it 
won' t matter what people write on the wall. 
STACEY: I just don't . . .  I mean he means nothing to me. 
TARA: Look, I' ll let you in on a little secret. . . .  Some of them haven't 
meant anything much to me. I know at the time I always go on about how 
great it is. But that's cos you have to. You have to talk it up. Otherwise 
people start talking, saying you're a shit shagger or you're frigid and stuff. 
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STACEY: You lied to me. You're my best friend and you lied about that? 
When you were like with Jordan and Ben and Lee . . .  you told me how 
great sex was . . .  
TARA: Sometimes it was. But sometimes it was shite. Like everything 
else, I suppose. The thing is, if the guy's really cool, he's got a reputation 
for being a loverman, you don't let on if it wasn't so good. Cos he'll have 
to trash your reputation . . .  tell everyone you were crap, to save his own 
credibility, see? (26, 27) 
Tara has revealed her duplicity. Although "duplicity" is a word perhaps more often 
associated with female forms of aggression, Tara goes on to show herself much closer to 
a male sensibility and to male rituals. The lie to which Tara admits is not made to 
strangers but to Stacey, the person who is supposed to be Tara's best friend. This is just 
one more in a string of examples of Tara's fundamental distrust of others and of her 
traditionally male style of dealing with what Basil Bernstein terms "tender" thoughts and 
feelings by ignoring or concealing them. The passage also shows, in Tara, an approach to 
sexual and personal relationships that is conventionally male, both in the lack of emotion 
and the use of sex to achieve status. Even the rush to have sex out of a fear of being 
considered "frigid" or being called a "lesbian" is closer to the male fear of being labeled a 
"virgin" than it is to any traditionally female approaches to sexual intercourse. In this 
passage, Tara also explicitly communicates that, in this environment, not only males and 
males, but also males and females, are in direct competition with each other. In this 
environment, "The very field that [ a woman] uses to express character may be [ a man 's] 
character expression" (Goffman, Interaction 240). 
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So, what are the characteristics of the environments most likely to produce the 
attitudes, the rituals, and the shame depicted above? And what are the conditions that 
implicate women in attitudes, rituals, and sources of shame traditionally reserved for 
men? The environments most likely to contribute these realities are precisely the sort 
presented in Judy Upton's version of Worthing, in Rebecca Prichard's version ofEssex­
in fact, in the settings of most of the plays included in this dissertation and, perhaps, the 
better part of the plays collected under the heading "In-yer-Face Theatre." The criteria 
that place these settings-these environments-squarely within this category are socio­
economic. Whether American "trailer trash" culture, the British cultures of so-called rent 
and comer boys, or the girl gangs depicted in the work of Upton and Prichard, many of 
these plays document life within subcultures at the lower end of the social and economic 
spectra. And while the characters that people these plays are not subject to some single 
monolithic environment, mindset, or set of truths, the shared socio-economics is not 
coincidental. These commonalities matter. Some of the trends characteristic of those 
living within such environments-the use of restricted linguistic codes and public forms 
of language, the presence of fierce localized bonds, the tendency for highly perf ormative 
articulations of (gender) identity, and the predominance of formal expressions of 
aggression and ritualized forms of violence-have already been touched on in relation to 
their environments. However, another feature characteristic of these subcultures has not 
yet here been sufficiently linked to environment-the presence of unacknowledged 
shame. 
Erving Goffman, often credited with pioneering contemporary investigations of 
shame, with formulating notions of shame management, and with introducing shame 
409 
avoidance theories of violence, specialized in the study of environments notorious for 
eliciting feelings of shame. These environments-which include prisons, asylums, 
certain kinds of hospitals and schools, and even the circumstances and conditions 
common to certain kinds of employment-he terms "total institutions." In many ways 
Goffman' s descriptions of total institutions seem very similar to Wolf gang and 
F erracuti' s accounts of subcultures, yet there are features of the total institution that are 
not necessarily present in a subculture. In his well-known treatise Asylums, Goffman 
explains the nature of the total institution. He says, "A total institution may be defined as 
a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off 
from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, 
formally administered round of life" (xiii). Based on this definition (and Goffman's main 
arena of study), it is clear that he has in mind just the sorts of institutional environments 
listed above. However, his definition of, and his conclusions about, total institutions may 
be reasonably applied to other, non-institutional settings. 
There are groups whose members are cut off from the wider society and whose 
lives are enclosed within formally administered structures of existence, yet who do not 
reside in an institution (in terms of physical barriers and edifices and official regimens) in 
the narrow sense. If the preceding chapters have demonstrated anything, they have 
shown that language and culture are oftentimes more effective than walls at separating 
(literally and figuratively) groups of people from the larger society of which they are 
considered a part. Goffman himself stresses of total institutions: "Their encompassing or 
total character is symbolized by the barrier to social intercourse with the outside and to 
departure that is often built right into the physical plant" (xiii), and this is clearly the case 
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for the members of many subcultures due to the linguistic and socio-economic realities 
that dictate how and where they live, how and what they think and speak. In addition to 
barriers regarding intercourse with the larger culture, Goffman cites the conflation of 
certain typically separate facets of life as another key element of the total institution. I 
contend that these two fundamental criteria of total institutions may be recognized as 
commonplace features in the lives, and of the environments, of the characters in many of 
the plays examined herein. I likewise intend to show that theories of shame can usefully 
expose some of the major sources of those characters' violence. 
That a non-institutional setting-a subculture, for instance-may in some cases 
constitute Goffman' s conception of a total institution can be most profitably 
demonstrated by an example taken from outside the theater--one that, unlike the 
examples one encounters in the plays, may be seen in its development into a total 
institution. In her non-fiction work Where I Was From, Joan Didion describes a set of 
conditions that, minus a specific organization, still qualifies in every way as a total 
institution. The total institution she describes is appropriate for use here in that it also 
represents, on the one hand, a performatively hyper-masculine subculture and, on the 
other hand, a subculture of violence. Furthermore, its constituent members are primarily 
public language users with strong localized bonds. Lastly, at the core of Didion's 
discussion of the environment are a series of acts of ritualized violence. 
In speaking of Lakewood, California, Didion takes her reader to the community's 
earliest roots. The town was built as a planned community of tract homes designed to 
house the workers who were expected to flock to the area to work in the aeronautics 
factories then under construction in southern California in response to several big military 
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contracts, many of them World War II servicemen anxious to take advantage of their G. I. 
benefits to buy homes. From its inception, the Lakewood community was engineered to 
be a self-enclosed, self-sustaining environment and, over time, the community steadily 
coalesced into a distinct subculture and to take on more of the characteristics of a total 
institution. It was an environment wherein everyone was greatly affected by the 
aeronautics industry; where the population was racially, religiously, culturally, and socio­
economically homogeneous; where the majority of the patriarchs had served together 
during the war and now shared the same employers and similar employment; where the 
matriarchs followed the same models of marriage and motherhood; where the children 
were educated in the same schools; where the entire community participated in many of 
the same activities (high school sports representing a particular obsession); and where the 
citizens in general saw no reason, and showed no desire, to extend their daily experience 
beyond the community's immediate borders. 
When the aeronautics industry slowed and then began to falter, the community 
suffered together as a whole. After two generations of this voluntary fraternal isolation, 
many of the community's residents had no significant experience or understanding of 
daily life outside Lakewood's perimeter. Based on the above-mentioned elements, 
Lakewood certainly represented a subculture. In addition, the residents' shared stake and 
participation in the community, its values, and its lifestyle, served as de facto barriers that 
made "social intercourse with the outside" and "departure," if not impossible, then at 
least improbable and infrequent. Lakewood, then, also comprised a total institution. As 
another way of explaining what makes a total institution, Goffman says, "A basic social 
arrangement in modem society is that the individual tends to sleep, play, and work in 
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different places, with different co-participants, under different authorities" (5); however, 
he continues, "The central feature of total institutions can be described as a breakdown of 
the barriers ordinarily separating these three spheres of life" (6). So, in their use of the 
phrase "total institution," Goffman and his colleagues propose that certain cultures, in the 
absence of concrete walls-those arising among mining communities, as one example-­
might, likewise, constitute total institutions. Lakewood, California is just such an entity. 
As I said before, Didion's account of Lakewood highlights the connection 
between instances of violence and the uses of language with which they are frequently 
associated. Lakewood, California garnered unwanted attention for a time in 1993 when a 
group of adolescent boys calling themselves the "Spur Posse" brought notoriety and 
infamy through their participation in a system of sexual exploitation that often included 
the use of coercion, intimidation, and physical force. Although the crimes were heinous 
and the girls young-some only ten years old-what most shocked the nation were the 
ritual aspects of the violence. As part of their violent criminal behavior, the boys 
conceived a form of competition and literally "kept score," devising a way to rate and 
compare their conquests. The girls involved were unfortunate to have lived in an 
environment where they were treated as having little value; however, they were all the 
more unfortunate to have lived there at a time when the community had become 
economically depressed. Such a combination of conditions is ripe for the proliferation of 
shame, and it should be noted that people within a total institution experience shame 
differently than others. 
Because the "defining structural characteristic" of the total institution fosters an 
"inability to conceive of the self in any terms save those offered by the institution" ( 178), 
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to experience the community's shame was, likewise, to experience an individual shame. 
Well aware of the shamefulness within their community, the citizens of Lakewood were 
"systematically deprived of the expressive means necessary to distance themselves from 
their polluted brothers and sisters" (176). Gardner and Gronfein clarify this unique 
experience of shame: 
Total institutions offer . . .  no way to disassociate [ oneself] from persons 
he or she may think of as disgraceful. . . .  In just those circumstances in 
which any given individual . . .  might most wish to distance herself or 
himself socially and symbolically from those with whom she or he is 
forced to associate, the expressive means available to her or him . . .  for 
self-identification in any unique way are rendered inaccessible . . .  . 
[Therefore,] one is not shamed . . .  because of an interactional deficit or 
deli ct but because one is placed in the company of ritually impure others 
and given no way to establish expressive distance from those others and 
the contaminating organization in which one is lodged. (178-9) 
Because the residents and Lakewood were so much part of each other, even though they 
had no hand in bringing about the shame, Lakewood's shame was experienced as each 
individual citizen's shame. This brand of shame can usher in a deep sense of one's 
helplessness and of the world's unfairness. 
Notably, the typical response in Lakewood was not to condemn the actions of a 
few offending members of the Lakewood community, but for individual members of the 
community to try to avoid shame by refusing to acknowledge its presence. In addition, 
the community's conservative notions of gender, strict sense of hierarchy, and 
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indebtedness to immature uses of language exacerbated the response. Didion reports the 
following: 
There was the refusal or inability to process the simplest statement without 
rephrasing it. There was the fuzzy relationship to language, the tendency 
to seize on a drifting fragment of something once heard and repeat it, not 
quite get it right, worry it like a bone. The news that some schools 
distributed condoms had been seized in mid-drift, for example, and 
pressed into service as an extenuating circumstance, the fact that 
Lakewood High School had never distributed condoms notwithstanding. 138 
The Lakewood example, however, takes one only half way. 
138 This is an example of the impulse to locate the stimuli for shame externally. In the case of a town rather 
than an individual human being, this meant looking for excuses within the wider community. Didion 
elaborates the popular argument about condoms: 
"The schools, they're handing out condoms and stuff like that, and like, if they're 
handing out condoms, why don't they tell us you can be arrested for it?" one Spur asked 
Gary Collins and Sarah Purcell on The Home Show. "They pass out condoms, teach sex 
education and pregnancy this, pregnancy that, but they don't teach us any rules," another 
told Jane Gross of The New York Times. "Schools hand out condoms, teach safe sex," the 
mother of a Spur complained on The Home Show. "It's the society, they have these 
clinics, they have abortions, they don't have to tell their parents, the schools give out 
condoms, jeez, what does that tell you?" the father of one Lakewood boy, a sixteen-year­
old who had just admitted to a juvenile-court petition charging him with lewd conduct 
with a ten-year-old girl, asked a television interviewer. ( 1 1 1) 
An equally popular use of language to locate the stimuli for shame elsewhere comes in the form of the 
public language user's archetypical reliance upon catch-phrases: 
"I think people are blowing this thing way out of proportion," David Ferrell of The Los 
Angeles Times was told by one Spur. "It's all been blown out of proportion as far as I'm 
concerned," he was told by another. "Of course there were several other sex scandals at 
the time, so this perfectly normal story got blown out of proportion," I was told by a Spur 
parent. "People, you know, kind of blow it all out of proportion," a Spur advised viewers 
of Jane Whitney. "They blow it out of proportion a lot," another said on the same show. 
A Spur girlfriend, "Jodi," called in to offer her opinion: "I think it's been blown way out 
of proportion, like way out of proportion." ( 1 1 1 -2, emphases added). 
Note, here, the unthinking application of a cliche; the general inarticulacy; the "abstractifying" nature of the 
language as it operates to negate the recognition of specific actors, actions, and choices; and, finally, the 
disturbing redefinition of these events by means of their context-in other words, this is not a case in which 
a sort of reprehensible behavior that often goes unnoticed is, for once, receiving scrutiny; rather, it is a case 
in which some "perfectly normal" behavior is being condemned due to an atmosphere of intolerance that 
has been created by the bad behavior of others. 
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A feature-that may very well have existed in Lakewood, considering the 
community's economic depression at the time-absent from Didion's account of 
Lakewood cannot be overlooked when dealing with the drama of Rebecca Prichard and 
Judy Upton. Whereas the circumstances surrounding the Spur Posse's prominence 
brought shame into the community for an intense, but brief, period, the sources of shame 
one finds in the communities depicted in Upton's and Prichard' s plays are ongoing and 
ever-present, a fact that makes these communities even more representative of Goffman's 
total institutions. The characters in these plays are more often than not living in poverty 
(in some cases, squalor) and on the dole. At this point, it is important to recall Elijah 
Anderson's previously cited statement that those living above the poverty line generally 
have access to opportunities to gain status and regard unavailable to those below it. 
Herein lies a pernicious feature of the total institution, and one that has especial 
significance for many of the characters crafted by Prichard and Upton. 
In Judy Upton's introduction to the first volume of her collected plays, she 
identifies some of the sources of such shame and at least one of the reasons it often 
remains unacknowledged. Of Ashes and Sand, she says, "This play is . . .  about the 
frustrations of being a working-class teenager, seeing the very limited prospects that are 
coming your way and dreaming of escape" (viii), and of the writing of Know Your Rights, 
she remarks that she was "looking at . . .  the powers that be and the way in which they 
encourage us to blame those immediately around us when things go wrong, in order to 
prevent us seeing the bigger picture" (viii). In tackling these issues, she and many of her 
fellow playwrights have taken up the mantle of some socially conscious predecessors­
John Osborne, Shelagh Delaney, and Edward Bond come immediately to mind. Like 
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their predecessors, these contemporary playwrights offer nuanced portrayals of social 
systems. These playwrights understand, for instance, that adverse social conditions 
frequently arise when unrelated and unorganized individuals simply tum their attention 
inward-that is, within the immediate borders of the nuclear family, the home they have 
mortgaged, the cubicle they occupy at work, the local homogeneous community of 
friends and peers to which they belong-not as part of some broad, self-conscious 
political agenda. These are the walls about which Todd McGowan speaks in The End of 
Dissatisfaction? Like McGowan, contemporary playwrights acknowledge that it is not 
always easy to consider the world outside these walls, especially when it seems foreign, 
hostile and apathetic by turns, and hopelessly beyond repair. This, however, is what 
many plays of the 1990's, including Upton's and Prichard's, invite one to do. 
The Britain of these plays, much like the original, remains a refuge for certain 
uncharitable Victorian attitudes about poverty. The notions of so-called social 
Darwinism and other remnants of the era present an unsympathetic and erroneous portrait 
of the poor as deserving, as "earning" in economic parlance, their plight. They are 
routinely thought and spoken of as being poor by virtue of their own lack of virtues. A 
lack of skills and education, the habits learned in an environment geared for social and 
economic failure, a dearth of opportunity, the many examples of institutional prejudice­
frequently these factors are ignored or denied in favor of an easy encapsulation of an 
entire class of people. Poor people are poor, goes the popular sentiment, because they are 
lazy, because they are stupid. Even when left unarticulated, poverty is clearly a highly 
stigmatized condition in the cultures of Europe and America, and stigmatization produces 
shame. 
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In Upton's Ashes and Sand, for example, the signs of shame are everywhere. 
Lauren has an eating disorder, Hayley practices self-mutilation, and Daniel hides his 
cross-dressing and also has inappropriate relationships with adolescent girls. The 
underlying sources are, however, consistently unacknowledged; none of the characters 
knows or even examines why they feel compelled to engage in such actions. The 
unacknowledged nature of their shame is apparent in the fact that each one of them is 
convinced that a change of scenery will work wonders, that it might refashion their lives. 
Consequently, Lauren and Hayley are planning to escape to Bali, and Daniel has put in 
for a transfer to Gibraltar. These characters-as well as Jo and Anna, the other two 
members of Hayley's gang-tend to blame superficial factors for their constant state of 
dissatisfaction. However, a set of conditions is responsible, not a location. Even where 
conditions like poverty and unemployment do not discriminate on the basis of sex, 
women like Lauren and Hayley may feel compelled to satisfy two sets of standards-one 
female, one male. Sometimes, the demands of these two sets of standards will conflict, 
and there will be no way to avoid failing according to one set of standards; moreover, 
there will be times when one cannot satisfy either set of demands, and one doubly fails. 
The pressure of two different such sets of demands is apparent, for instance, in 
Lauren's confused vision of the future: 
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Lauren: Fat or slim someone like me's never going to look like that. 
Daniel: You're much prettier than her. 
Lauren: Oh sure. But look at those clothes, you can't find anything like 
that in our high street. And she can go anywhere dressed like that, all the 
best clubs and parties. What hope for me of a life like that? Hayley 
reckons it's possible, that all it takes is money and she thinks we can make 
that kind of money. But I can't see it, we've been talking about going 
away somewhere exotic for three years. When's it going to happen? I've 
been offered a job at last. Washing up in a restaurant-crap. 
Daniel: You have to start somewhere, I suppose. 
Lauren: It's no good starting somewhere that's going nowhere. There's 
nothing for people like us, nothing. (23) 
In this passage one sees her switch back and forth, unsure of her proper role. Should she 
cultivate, exploit, and put her faith in her ability to satisfy a traditional feminine role as a 
way to improve her circumstances, or should she devote her time, energy, and hope 
toward working her way out of poverty? Lauren knows the former path is unlikely, if not 
for the reasons she has in mind. It takes much more than beauty, some fancy clothes, and 
proper speech to tum Eliza into a lady and, as the Shavian example makes clear, even 
ladies can be poor. The second path, a traditionally male one, is equally unlikely to bring 
success. Lauren is wise enough to realize that even if she were able to work her way up 
the ladder in the restaurant where she has been offered employment, the top rung of that 
ladder falls far short of where she would like to be. 
Lauren knows that she is destined to fail at either the female or the male role 
above; however, rather than give in to her desperation, Lauren thinks of a way she might 
fend of the shameful feelings of double failure. There is one female role she feels certain 
she could fulfill-she could have a baby. Of course, this ill-conceived attempt to avoid 
shame would be more likely to introduce opportunities for failure and shame that Lauren 
cannot, at this point, even imagine. 
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CONCLUSION 
Cycles of Shame, Cycles of Language, Cycles of Violence 
The United States is currently in the midst of a national debate over immigration 
reform, and the participants in this debate are adamantly polarized in their positions. 
These debates and the attempts at legislation they have spawned have brought to the 
national stage matters of language and violence that the playwrights examined herein 
stage at an interpersonal level. Like the interpersonal conflicts in these artists' plays, the 
national debates bespeak unacknowledged shame; they demonstrate a profound fear of 
the Other and a growing desire to cordon oneself and one' s property off from society at 
large; and they exhibit exchanges of rhetoric that are automatic, simplistic, misanthropic, 
and dehumanizing. 
To follow the course of the national debate is to witness the selection and 
implementation of the language according to which this topic will be publicly addressed, 
and this process involves many of the violent associations portrayed in contemporary 
drama. If considered carefully, one can see the extent to which the language surrounding 
the issue of immigration reform has been designed to truncate rather than extend 
discussion, with the effect of turning the possibility of open debate into a sally of 
aggressive and automatonic verbal gestures and rendering it false. One feels compelled 
to watch as our public leaders traffic in language sure to keep the scope of the issue 
shrouded in fog and in language whose sole purpose is to assign black hats to identify the 
villains. One can expect the word "aliens" whenever a speaker refers to the thousands of 
human beings currently living and working in the United States who are at the center of 
the debate and the proposed legislation. The word "illegal" carries great emotional 
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weight, but it also helps divert attention, veiling the fact that the United States has in 
essence and for decades granted people from Mexico and Central and South America de 
facto citizenship-looking the other way so as to benefit from their inexpensive labor. 
Employers in agriculture, landscaping, food service, warehousing, and distribution are 
suddenly "outlaws"-the heads of "rogue" companies who have "chosen" to break the 
law by hiring undocumented workers or who have "neglected" to verify the citizenship of 
those on their payrolls. These examples of language make it possible for individuals to 
ignore the fact that the very same government entities now threatening severe punishment 
had previously themselves "neglected" to provide employers the resources to check the 
social security numbers of their employees. Even members of the clergy are in danger of 
becoming "felons" if they-in a phrase borrowed from the vernacular of war-"aid and 
abet" people designated "illegal." All of the above uses oflanguage are geared toward 
blaming individuals in the present for system-wide failures in the past. By employing 
language that assigns blame to small groups of individuals-many of whom did 
everything in their power to adhere to the law-Americans hope to disguise the 
prevailing and pervasive American attitude that treated adherence to these same laws as 
equal parts inconvenience and naivete. Above all, there is the tendency to use language 
that refers to the laws of the United States as if they were the laws of nature. It never 
ceases to amaze me how readily-and effectively-individuals can offer the mere 
existence of a law as a priori evidence of its rightness or the inherent wrong-ness of its 
opposition. For many, the application of a label (i.e., "legal" or "illegal") is sufficient to 
alter moral and ethical essence. This questionable use of language and the fallacious 
logic to which it is married allow Americans to place the full weight of responsibility 
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elsewhere-upon a handful of individuals who have committed a handful of individually 
identified acts. Magically, the culpability of the few eliminates the complicity of the 
many, and the average American need not acknowledge the benefits s/he garnered under 
the old system, nor feel obliged to the people who were the source of those benefits under 
a new system. 
The language characteristic of the current debate on immigration policy 
underscores the importance of a yet another feature, one characteristic of languages in 
general. As the most fundamental of all social structures, language is at the core of every 
culture and every subculture. Furthermore, because language is the first cultural artifact 
any human being inherits, and because language is itself the means of all other cultural 
inheritances, in many ways one's language is one's culture. When viewed from this 
vantage, language is clearly representative of one's culture and represents a communal 
system that operates by virtue of its commonality, its communal nature. Even so, such 
features of language often remain invisible and operate invisibly. Individuals typically 
understand the language they use as a purely transparent means of recounting experience. 
Few individuals consider the influences their culturally specific language is likely to have 
on their initial encounters with experience; therefore, they do not question the objectivity 
they automatically assign to those encounters. Language, however, cannot represent the 
most essential aspect of culture-be, that is, a product of culture-yet remain culturally 
neutral. To acknowledge the logic of this is to acknowledge each person's 
phenomenological and linguistic relationship with experience. Language is that aspect of 
culture through which all other experience is comprehended, catalogued, and conveyed, 
and which functions as the primary cultural repository, making available-that is, 
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articulable to one degree or another--every cultural essence and nuance. As a result, 
culture and language are, in many ways, so tightly interwoven as to be indivisible and 
indistinguishable. 
For this reason, it is no easy thing to say what one learns when one learns one's 
culture's language. Certainly, all languages offer some measure of freedom for 
individual expression, but the level of freedom will, of course, vary in quantity and 
quality from one culture to another. Insofar as language is cultural artifact, it serves to 
unite cultural peers and, in so doing, serves to erode difference. So, if one-inadvertently 
and inexorably-learns the language of one's cultural peers, the necessary corollary is 
that s/he learns the same means of comprehension, categorization, and conversation as 
her or his cultural peers. Yet, the very qualities that unite and erode difference within the 
culture and among its peers are those features that expressly divide one, and exaggerate 
one's differences, from those outside one's native culture. This simultaneous uniting and 
dividing generally ensures a high level of commonality with one's cultural compatriots, 
including how one thinks, what behavior one considers appropriate within a given 
situation, what one values, whom one trusts, and which ideas one is conditioned to meet 
with suspicion, derision, or hostility. As evidenced throughout the preceding chapters, 
these features will differ from one group to another, and exposure to more than one 
group--to more than one language-offers greater choice and therefore, in many ways, 
greater individual freedom. 
Here, then, is yet another connection between the current national debate 
regarding immigration reform and some of the plays touched on in this document-both 
offer examples of unacknowledged shame and its detrimental effects. Neither the views 
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of immigrants and immigration now being expressed nor the presence of some form of 
unacknowledged national shame are unique to the United States. The United States is, 
however, notable in having a society that places explicit trust in the ability and 
willingness of its citizens to take part in the establishment of law as well as custom. We 
are, therefore, likewise unique in the implicit significance we have placed on the intellect, 
the knowledge, the rationality, the awareness, and the ethics of our citizens. Considering 
the overwhelming evidence of preceding chapters that language fundamentally affects 
cognition, formal reasoning ability, and the development of self-control, empathy, and 
compassion, one might think that those living in a democracy of our sort would be 
concerned about the language development of all those living within the nation' s  borders. 
Similar arguments could, additionally, be made regarding all members of our global 
community. 
Todd McGowan warns that societies will continue to fracture so long as the 
prevailing national ethics remain self-interested and competitive. The repercussions of 
such mindsets in terms of isolation, suspicion, and violence have been dramatically 
represented in the plays of many of the young writers of the 1990' s and the new 
millennium. These playwrights seem to share two convictions, and both are supported by 
the multitude of social scientists and theorists whose work has here been assembled. The 
first is that there are clear and often predictable ties between an individual' s  use of 
language and that individual' s  socioeconomic standing. As language development 
affects cognition, social aptitude, and frequently opportunity, it should not surprise 
anyone that language use, the skills associated with language use, and the class 
conditions most closely tied to language use tend to recur within cultures and subcultures. 
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The socioeconomic status one is born with does not determine one's future 
socioeconomic status; however, it often determines the presence or absence of factors 
that tend to lead to one's eventual social and financial success or failure. This leads to 
the second conviction: that once specific structures and uses of language become 
culturally coded, they become self-perpetuating. Since ways of thinking, indeed thinking 
itself, are so intimately tied up with one's use of language, then what one inherits is more 
than just a way of speaking. It is important, therefore, to remember that along with any 
particular language comes a propensity for a particular set of blind spots, a particular 
collection of prejudices, and a particular repertoire and particular patterns of response. It 
may often be possible to escape, but anyone who thinks it easy, largely within the control 
of the individual, or simply a matter of will are flying in the face of both logic and the 
evidence. 
So, behavior based in an defensive, class-sensitive understanding of language 
will, on the one hand, foster Carol' s initial inability to question John's authority but, on 
the other hand, allow her to sacrifice John for the sake of an agenda. Add to this the 
possibility that Carol is carrying around her own personal "baggage," and her behavior 
need not be read as either unfathomable or melodramatically Machiavellian. The 
misogynist, competitive, and consumerist language common to Larry and Dan 
illuminates both their mutual attraction to Anna and Alice, as well as what allows them to 
treat them the way they do. The theatrically masculine language that Chris Smith 
associates with manhood supplies the faulty logic at the core of his frequent 
irrationalities. Recognition of the relationships Tadge formed with language while 
growing up and while in the Army help to account for his lingering immaturity and lack 
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of autonomy. Sonny's devaluation of language and his difficulty articulating and, 
consequently, dealing with emotions offer an inroad into his intensely physical and often 
violent responses. Finally, Tara' s hyper-attention to the language used by her and her 
classmates and Stacey's nai'.ve refusal to acknowledge the powerful potential of this 
adolescent language combine to reveal the true nature of their friendship and to shine a 
light on the series of choices each girl makes. 
Circularity and self-perpetuation are doubly true of shame. With deference to 
psychologist Alfred Adler, John Braithwaite says, "Inferiority complexes are likely when 
socialization practices neglect pride as an emotion to be cultivated in the nurturing of 
responsible citizens" ("Forward" xiii). The likelihood of chronic shame, it would seem, 
should be even greater when socialization practices join forces with material depredations 
to confound the cultivation of pride. Moreover, Gardner and Gronfein assert, 
"Mortification assume[ s] special importance in those institutions to which people are 
typically admitted as a consequence of some alleged failure [ on their part]" (178). For 
these individuals, the experience of shame can play a central role: 
Shame is not something that is experienced in a series of episodes; it can 
be a constant, perduring feature of their social lives . . . .  The individual 
spends a good portion of her or his time . . .  aware . . .  that she or he finds 
congress with those outside of the stigmatizing category as problematic or 
uncomfortable . . . .  [With episodic shame] there may be careful 
preparation . . .  steeling oneself for an unpleasant reception . . .  even [for] 
harassment. . . .  As much as such contacts can be resented or loathed, 
these experiences can last only for the length of the face-to-face 
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interaction. The inhabitant of a total institution, however, will be mired in 
physical [(e.g., material)] confines in which shame can echo and reecho. 
( 1 76, 1 79) 
To begin to imagine what such a relationship with shame might entail, consider a solitary 
but fundamental potential difference in daily existence. Whereas, for example, the 
person subject to episodic shame can overcome or put aside "a harassing incident by 
gratefully relaxing when at home, the person in a total institution has no such option, for 
shame is woven into many facets of the total institution's everyday life" ( 1 79). The very 
notion of refuge, of "gratefully relaxing" in one's own home, assumes a home that is both 
comfortable and comforting; it assumes a home that offers one the ability to escape the 
conditions one finds distressing. However, for a person living in poverty or in a "bad" 
neighborhood, one's home may instead represent a constant reminder of one's shameful 
state. Such a home offers no comfort for, or refuge from, shame because it provides no 
respite from the conditions that are the source and the symbol of that shame. 
The title character of Judy Upton's Sliding with Suzanne represents a good case in 
point. The flat she shares with her foster son, Luka, offers them no source of escape from 
the conditions that characterize their socioeconomic status and no source of pride to 
offset the feelings of shame they elicit. When Suzanne's unsympathetic-and unaware­
mother, Theresa, tells her that she and Luka should be thankful for having "a roof over 
your heads" (38), it sparks indignant anger: 
Have you seen it? My roof? No you haven't. You haven't cos it's four 
floors up and there's two more of them floors between it and me. One with 
a demented cow who plays her Steps CDs all night and the other with a 
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mad bloke who leaves his windows open and screams blue murder night 
and day. (38-9) 
Theresa's opinion, because it is bereft of first-hand experience of Suzanne's flat, is that it 
cannot be that bad. The flat has met the material requirement of providing shelter from 
the elements, and no more can reasonably be expected. There is no indication that a 
home should do or represent more than just that. 1 39 
The fact that Theresa views Suzanne's complaints as nothing more than griping 
merely testifies to her inability to envision life in the flat. Because Theresa's home is 
comparatively comfortable and quiet, she is in a position to take these qualities for 
granted. However, for Suzanne, the lack of comfort and quiet are her flat's defining 
features, the aspects of it that occupy the foremost positions in her perception and 
memory. When Suzanne thinks about her "home," she does not imagine solace, she does 
not picture a place reflective of her identity, and she does not experience the satisfaction 
of ownership or even any feelings of connection to it; the flat, therefore, can elicit neither 
feelings of pride nor nostalgia. For Suzanne, the word "home" has none of the 
connotation or resonance it often holds for others. For her, ''home" is nothing more or 
less than a synonym for "residence." Gardner and Gronfein emphasize the deleterious 
impact of one's total immersion in the underlying conditions and experience of shame: 
Since institutional shame and mortification envelop the individual, she or 
he has, effectively, no way, or very humble and modest ways, to avoid it 
139 Later in the play, Luka makes the connection between his and Suzanne's home environment and 
Suzanne's susceptibility to illness: 
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If she lived somewhere nice, she'd eat properly. She wouldn't be so stressed out the 
whole time and I could get her to eat her breakfast. If it was quiet she wouldn't wake so 
or hold it at bay when in the institution, and very limited, fragile, and often 
permeable supplies with which to carve out a nidus of her or his own. It is 
not too much to say that the emotional ambiance of the total institution is, 
and is often realized to be, mortification. ( 1 80) 
When Theresa addresses Suzanne, her language further shames the ashamed individual­
that is, Suzanne. Theresa's language necessarily denies the ashamed Suzanne any 
justification for feeling shame, or at least denies the attribution of the shame to the 
sources the ashamed individual would like to hold responsible. Instead, responsibility for 
shame is placed right back on the ashamed person's already suspect character. With a 
word, the shame conjured by one's living conditions is glibly deprived of merit, and this 
casts further doubt on the inner resources that are the foundation of self-esteem. 
The injury that a matter-of-fact phrasing and an objective tone can inflict­
because they reduce human existence to a protozoan level, belittling or dismissing out of 
hand the presence, the significance, or the appropriateness of human emotion-are, 
likewise, made most apparent in the language. Defensiveness and indignation are the 
common signs of an interior conflict that pits the powerful but opposing emotions 
brought about by shame against each other. There is the sense that one is the shameful 
cause of one's own suffering, coupled with a sense of the inexorable justice of suffering 
what one has shamefully deserved. Finally, there is a sense that a shameful impotence 
and inertia are what prevent one from properly enduring or successfully overcoming 
one's suffering. The emotion of the ashamed person's response appears directly related 
early and she wouldn't be sick 'so much. We could go outside when we were getting on 
each others ' tits, instead of screaming the place down. (70) 
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to the lack of emotion characteristic of the language that precedes and extorts it, as when 
Theresa's flippant advice-"so, move"-roils Suzanne up into another rant: 
Yeah right. Go down the estate agents and say "Yeah I' 11 have that one­
the nice semi, with the conservatory and reception rooms." What the 
fuck's a reception room? I even went and got a job, Mum. You'd think I'd 
have learnt by now, wouldn't you? Course I lost my benefits, and no 
contract, no minimum wage, but what use are fucking A levels anyway? . .  
. I put up with the verbal [abuse], the groping cos I needed the money, 
needed to move from that shitty flat. Then Joanna [at foster care] says 
Luka's not going to school. "Maybe you should try to be there for him a 
little more," or "Maybe his needs don't fit in with your new career." 
"Career," yeah that was their word-my coffee-making career. So I cut 
down my hours, and then it wasn't worth the tube fare in. (39) 
The flippancy of Theresa's advice is only matched by the social worker's impudent use 
ofthe word "career." According to Theresa's language, Suzanne should be ashamed of 
being too lazy to take action, or ashamed at being too obtuse to recognize the obvious 
solution to what is not a real problem to begin with. According to the social worker's 
language, Suzanne should be ashamed that she has chosen the self-satisfaction of 
pursuing a career over the responsibilities she has to Luka as his foster mother. Both 
point to an insidious source of shame-the illusion of choice. Shame is inevitable when 
one is held accountable for one's choices while, at the same time, one's living conditions 
are "stripping him or her of those insignia symbolic of self and those supplies necessary 
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for maintaining and presenting an identity of one's own choice" (Gardner and Gronfein 
177). 
Goffman and other shame avoidance theorists have outlined notions of "chronic 
shame" and discussed "spirals of shame"; however, Goffman most explicitly connects 
these notions to the political realities that underlie the social conditions. In a review of 
Goffman's work, Gardner and Gronfein summarize the politics at the core of Goffman's 
understanding of the social psychology of shame. They write: 
Finally, and perhaps [most] important, institutional shame is political. . . .  
The creation of a state of constant shame on the part of [those] in total 
institutions is functional for the institution; since persons who by virtue of 
being in an institution of a particular type are shamed, not momentarily, 
but continuously, will be that much less able to test the bars, physical and 
symbolic, that keep them in the institution. Shame, embarrassment, and 
humiliation are seen, therefore, as means of exercising control, i_n addition 
to social emotions that may characterize individuals. (179-80) 
The methods of control multiply. As Goffman suggests, to suffer shame is to question 
one' s  ability, as well as one's right, to alter one's circumstances. In addition, members of 
a total institution tend to participate in the institution's  means of control over its 
members. Because it is common for individuals to view themselves in relation to their 
peers, when one feels unable to alter one's own status, one common impulse is to try to 
alter one's relative status by lowering that of one's peers. This has been addressed 
previously in relation to masculine hierarchies and in terms of the displacement of shame. 
Goffman indicates that in such cases "it will prove useful to be able to point out to . 
431 
[another] that the claims about himself upon which he rationalizes his demands are false, 
that he is not what he is claiming to be, and that in fact he is a failure as a person" 
(Asylums 1 54 ). 
One might reasonable imagine a total institution as made up of individuals 
constantly striving to induce more shame in their peers and, thereby, creating an 
environment wherein its members proliferate shame amongst themselves. Therefore, 
self-identification comes to mirror and reinforce external identification; those living 
outside, but also those living inside, the shameful set of conditions effectively deny to 
those who are subject to such shameful conditions the sense of having the right to critique 
or the ability to change them. The assessments of one's own peers may be used as 
grounds for outsiders to dismiss any positive claims one attempts to make about 
oneself.-anything that anyone living under similar conditions says can and will be used 
against each and every one of them. Spiraling shame often, for these reasons, translates 
into a spiraling increase of the conditions at the source of one's shame. Invoking 
Impression Management Theory, of which shame avoidance theories of violence are a 
subset, Marvenia Bosley says, "All individuals are strongly motivated to maintain a 
favorable opinion of themselves and some will go to extreme lengths to restore damaged 
self-images" ( 15 1). Frequently, individual attempts to restore self-image are violent. In 
the words of Erving Goffman: "If you rob people of all customary means of expressing 
anger and alienation and put them in a place where they have never had better reason for 
these feelings, then the natural recourse will be to seize upon what remains-· situational 
improprieties" (Interaction 147). 
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Wolfgang and Ferracuti identify the same vicious circles of socioeconomics, 
subculture, shame, and violence: 
The repertoire of response to unpleasant stimuli is delimited for them; it is 
not simply that more stimuli are displeasing [-although, this is a very real 
possibility] . And in this limited repertoire of alternatives, the ultimate 
weapon in efforts to control others, violence, not only is available but also 
has been incorporated into the personality structure through childhood 
discipline, reinforced in juvenile peer groups, confirmed in the strategies 
of the street. . . .  [Such an individual' s] subcultural group is prepared in 
similar fashion to his attack, to be governed by the same norms containing 
the same values. Within this value set, the external expectations of 
aggression more readily activate the intentional physiological responses of 
excitation, and the circle of violence circumscribes a situation containing 
the essential ingredients for assaultive crime. (267) 
In short, violence can occur when the "alternative" methods of dealing with ''unpleasant 
stimuli" are "delimited." Consider Suzanne's realizations that "no one wants my fucking 
A levels" (39) and that "If you've never had anything but shit jobs. [sic. ] you'll never get 
anything but shit jobs" (39). Suzanne feels helpless as she watches her choices of action 
begin to evaporate, and frustration swells. Even sixteen-year-old Luka recognizes 
Theresa's glib suggestions for remedy as foundationless and basically useless. He says, 
"It's not good just like moving somewhere else and thinking things'll be different. I mean 
you move from your shitty little flat to a shitty little flat down here . . .  so what? What' s 
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gonna change?" ( 51 ). Ultimately, when every hopeful plans tum out to be mired in a 
catch-22, it can sap one' s stamina: 
Luka: You could get another office job. You've experience. 
Suzanne: It's all changed though. I was just doing filing. Now it's all on 
computer. And I don't know one end of a computer from t'other. 
Luka: I could show you. We can get one. 
Suzanne: If we could afford it. (59) 
When one's dreams are hampered by one's environment, insult is added to injury: 
Luka: I won' t be poor like you. I'm gonna make a success of myself. Run 
a business. Sell mobile phones or something. I saw a bloke who'd done 
that on Working Breakfast. He was raking it in. 
Suzanne: How're you gonna become a businessman? Without money? 
Luka: I' ll go to college. 
Suzanne: It didn't get me anywhere. (59) 
And when so-called "role models" are nowhere to be found, desperation can set in: 
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Suzanne: Look at people in top jobs-are they like us? Do you actually 
know anyone in a top job? 
Luka: I've met my social worker' s boss. He's got a Mercedes. Tariq's 
brother plays for QPR. 
Suzanne: I'm not saying you shouldn' t be ambitious. When I came out of 
college I really tried . . . .  Got taken on at the Inland Revenue. A rewarding 
career, they said. But when I asked about promotion it was "Oh we don't 
need any more administrators right now." You couldn't even get to the 
second rung. To get to the top you needed to come in much higher up. 
Unless you can afford to go to university you' re fucked. I did apply for 
jobs where they ask for A levels but didn' t get past the interview. You're 
up against the posh kids-dressed up to the nines, taught to be confident 
and how to behave in interviews. You don' t stand a chance . . .  (60) 
Throughout Upton's Sliding with Suzanne, the words of Joan Littlewood, the director 
responsible for bringing A Taste of Honey to the stage, reverberate. It was Littlewood 
who famously called then-18-year-old playwright Shelagh Delaney the antithesis of 
London' s Angry Young Men because she knew what she was angry about. Upton, like 
the other playwrights acknowledged herein, follows a similar vein, for she, like Delaney, 
is interested in foregrounding the material conditions that do, in fact, affect one's 
existence. However, perhaps like John Osborne, these playwrights have not received the 
credit they deserve for writing what are, at their heart if not on their surface, plays that 
carry on the important tradition of socially conscious theater exemplified by their 
forebears. 
At the end of this study, I hope to have demonstrated the seriousness of these 
talented young artists and done justice to the sensitivity and accuracy of their work. They 
deserve to be taken as seriously as they themselves take their craft, their art. I also hope 
that I have drawn sufficient attention to the connections that exist between language and 
violence, and also between these plays and our obligations as audience members and 
citizens. Bertolt Brecht once_ famously urged us not to view art merely as a mirror to be 
held up to society, but as a hammer with which to shape it. In their fashioning of 
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complex and often complicated characters, intelligent and provocative dialogue, and 
settings and plots that reflect real human issues, many contemporary playwrights share 
Brecht's dramatic spirit. They frequently offer glimpses into aspects of society that 
rarely enjoy attention, let alone elaboration, and they continue to propose new ways of 
understanding these, as well as many of the more familiar, aspects of the cultures and 
subcultures that we and our fellow human beings inhabit. 
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